JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. D.N. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, assisted by Ms. B. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The predecessor in interest of the present petitioner, as plaintiff, instituted Title Suit No. 64/1985 in the court of learned Munsiff No. 1, Sivasagar for ejectment of the defendant-respondents from the plot of land measuring 2K situated in Nazira town and for realisation of arrear rent. The suit was under the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The defendant-respondents filed written statement and thereafter the following issues were framed: 1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether (a) plaintiff's suit is barred by Limitation, (b) and the defendants acquired right title and interest in the suit land by way of adverse possession? 3. Whether there is the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendants? 4. Whether the defendants are defaulter? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for? 6. To what reliefs the parties are entitled? 7. Whether the suit is barred by estopel? The defendant-respondents were irregular in taking steps in the said suit and as a result, the learned trial court decreed the suit ex parte by deciding all the issues in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner except issue No. 7 vide judgment and decree dated 29.7.1993. 3. The defendant-respondents thereafter preferred Title Appeal No. 9/1993 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar. The said appeal was dismissed with cost vide judgment and decree dated 28.9.1993. Thereafter, the defendant-respondents preferred Second Appeal No. 125/1993 which was disposed of vide judgment dated 22.2.1999. The Second Appellate Court while disposing of the said appeal came to the finding that the defendant-respondents as tenant constructed permanent structures on the land and as such they are entitled to compensation under section 5(1)(b) of the Act and finally remanded back the same by holding as follows: “5. For deciding this question of compensation only this appeal shall go back to the Appellate Court, i.e., Assistant District Judge, Sibsagar and the learned Asstt. District Judge if necessary may take evidence and decide the question of compensation payable to the tenant. The Appellate Court shall take only that aspect of the matter and other question shall not be reopened before the Appellate Court. District Judge if necessary may take evidence and decide the question of compensation payable to the tenant. The Appellate Court shall take only that aspect of the matter and other question shall not be reopened before the Appellate Court. Once this compensation is determined, time shall be fixed for the payment of the same and thereafter on payment of the same the decree may be executed against the tenant. The Appellate Court shall determine this aspect of the matter as early as possible as it is a suit of 1985. Both the parties shall appear before the Appellate Court on 31st March, 1999 to receive other instruction. 6. This disposes of the second appeal.” 4. The defendant-respondents thereafter filed a petition being No. 480/1999 dated 23.3.1999 before the learned First Appellate Court for passing necessary order allowing them to deposit rent upto the year 1999 under section 5(3) of the Act without prejudice to their right. Again on 31.3.1999, the defendant-respondents filed another application being Petition No. 533/1999 praying for an order to accept the rent from the year 1982 to 1999. 5. The aforesaid two petitions came up for consideration by the learned First Appellate Court. The said court below rejected the said two petitions on 19.5.1999 by holding that the Second Appellate Court directed it to decide only the question of compensation and not to reopen any other question. 6. The defendant-respondents thereafter preferred a revision application being CRP No. 191/1999 before this court challenging the order dated 19.5.1999 passed by the learned First Appellate Court. The said revision application was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 5.9.2003 by allowing the said revision application as follows: “4. In view of the above, the order passed by the trial court is set aside and it is directed that the application filed by the tenant-defendant shall be considered in accordance with law, i.e., under sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 and shall pass order thereon.” 7. The said petitions dated 23.3.1999 and 31.3.1999 were taken up by the learned First Appellate Court and vide order dated 13.3.2012 allowed the same by holding as follows: “9. In view of the foregoing discussions, I have carefully considered both the Petition Nos. 480/99 and 533/99 as directed by the hon'ble High Court. The said petitions dated 23.3.1999 and 31.3.1999 were taken up by the learned First Appellate Court and vide order dated 13.3.2012 allowed the same by holding as follows: “9. In view of the foregoing discussions, I have carefully considered both the Petition Nos. 480/99 and 533/99 as directed by the hon'ble High Court. There is a prayer in the Petition No. 480/99 dated 23.3.1999 to pass further orders as deem fit and proper. As already mentioned in the foregoing discussions, there is no reversal of order to pay the interest @ 12.50% p.a. In the prayer of the petition No. 480/99, the Appellant prays to pass necessary order allowing the appellant to deposit the rent today without prejudice to their rights which is to be agitated in the special leave petition before the hon'ble Supreme Court and record the decree as satisfied and/or pass such further order/orders as Your Honour may deem fit and proper. Following the directions of the Hon'ble High Court, I have considered both the petitions. Both the petitions are allowed with further order as prayed for in the Petition No. 480/99 directing the petitioners to pay the interest at the rate of 12.50% p.a. along with the arrear of Rs. 600. Both the petitions are allowed with costs. Draw a decree accordingly.” The said order dated 13.3.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar in Title Appeal No. 9/1993 has been put under challenge in the present revision application. 8. While issuing notice vide order dated 7.5.2012 by this court in this revision application, an observation was made by this court that the question as to whether the decree of eviction shall stand satisfied on deposit of arrear interest shall be subject to the outcome of this revision application. It is pertinent to mention here that as per order dated 20.3.2012 passed in Title Appeal No. 9/1993, the defendant-respondents had deposited the arrear rent and the interest as per the decree drawn up by the learned First Appellate Court vide two demand drafts for Rs. 750 and Rs. 800 in the First Appellate Court. 9. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the learned First Appellate Court by passing the impugned order had exceeded its jurisdiction if section 5(3) of the Act is considered. 750 and Rs. 800 in the First Appellate Court. 9. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the learned First Appellate Court by passing the impugned order had exceeded its jurisdiction if section 5(3) of the Act is considered. The act of directing the defendant-respondents to deposit the arrear rent under section 5(3) of the Act is totally uncalled for and as such, there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Further, it is submitted that the tenant as directed by section 5(3) of the Act has a right to move the application for deposit of arrear rent within 30 days from passing of the decree before the learned trial court and as such, the learned First Appellate Court being not the trial court, erred in law with material irregularity in allowing the petitions of the defendant-respondents for deposit of arrear rents and accepting the same. The learned First Appellate Court ought to have kept its jurisdiction confined in deciding the compensation as directed by the High Court in the second appeal. Submitting so, Mr. Bhattacharyya strenuously urged for setting aside the said impugned order of the learned First Appellate Court. 10. Mr. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, opposing the submission of Mr. Bhattacharyya, submits that the learned First Appellate Court had not exceeded its jurisdiction while passing the impugned order. The decree was prepared by the learned First Appellate Court and as such the decreetal court has the jurisdiction to direct the defendant-respondents to satisfy the same in the said court itself. Further arguing, Mr. Sahewalla submits that if at all there is any mistake on the part of the learned First Appellate Court that is nothing more than mere irregularity and this court as the revisional court shall not interfere until and unless grave injustice or hardship results from the said irregularity to the petitioner. Relying on the case law of Narayan Kalita v. Mt. Relying on the case law of Narayan Kalita v. Mt. Bhabitri Deby, AIR 1952 Gau 46 , a Division Bench of this court while deciding a revision application against an order of the learned Additional Sub-Judge, UAD, dated 11.3.1950 reversing the order of the learned trial court dismissing the plaintiff's suit and remanding the same to the trial court for a de novo trial, came to the finding that though the order was not covered by order XLI, rule 23 or rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same could be placed under section 151 of the CPC and in the exercise of its inherent powers the court should not have set aside the decisions of the courts below when plaintiff on account of her negligence or default failed to produce some evidence which may, possibly, have been relevant. Now the question is as to whether under such circumstances, the exercise of discretion by the Lower Appellate Court, as referred hereinabove, should be interfered with or not. The Division Bench accordingly came to the finding that the same was not inclined to interfere with the order of the Lower Appellate Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction which is entirely discretionary and the High Court is not bound to interfere on an extremely technical view in every case where an order has been made irregularly unless grave injustice or hardship could result from a failure to do so. Arguing in the same line, as referred hereinabove, Mr. Sahewalla further relies on the case law on H.S. Siddappa v. Lakshmamma, AIR 1965 Kar. 313 . Referring Har Prasad v. (Firm) Bhagwati Prasad Ram Sarup, in the said decision, the Allahabad High Court held that the High Court is not bound to interfere in exercise of its power under section 115 of the CPC if substantial justice has been done and the said substantial justice in this context must relate to the rights to which a party has a legal, as opposed to purely moral claim. Further, it was held in the said decision that where the order of a subordinate court though suffers from an illegality or irregularity has brought about a just result and where setting aside that order would bring about an unjust result, the High Court would not exercise its discretion under section 115 of the CPC and interfere with such order. Summing up Mr. Summing up Mr. Sahewalla, submits that there is no requirement for interference by this court with the impugned orders inasmuch as the action of the First Appellate Court is not at all illegal and at best could be termed as mere irregularity inasmuch as directing the defendant-respondents to deposit the arrear rent and the interest for the satisfaction of the decree had not caused any prejudice to the petitioners. 11. Considered the submissions of the learned counsels. The Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 is an Act to regulate in certain respect between the relationship of landlord and the tenant in respect of non-agricultural land in the urban areas of the State of Assam. Section 5(2) prescribes as follows: “5. (2) No tenant shall be ejected by his landlord from the land of the tenancy except in execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a competent civil court.” So, the decree by which the tenant shall be ejected must be a decree for ejectment passed by a competent civil court. To be a competent civil court it must have jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary. As the Act envisages a decree of a competent civil court and there being no stipulation of truncated applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) and the Act being silent to that effect, hence, it can be concluded that the applicability of CPC in its full rigour is envisaged by the said Act. 12. Section 15 of the CPC stipulates that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Section 16(a) of the CPC further stipulates that subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits for the recovery of immovable property with or without rent or profits shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated. Needless to say that section 5 of the Act stipulates a suit against the tenant possessing the tenanted premises, i.e., immovable property on rent which falls well within the stipulations of section 16(a) of the CPC. Thus, suit under the provision of the Act is to be filed in the court of the lowest grade within the local limits of which the immovable property is situated. 13. Thus, suit under the provision of the Act is to be filed in the court of the lowest grade within the local limits of which the immovable property is situated. 13. In the present case in hand, the suit was instituted in the court of learned Munsiff No. 2 at Sivasagar and it was numbered as TS No. 64/1985 and the petitioner as the plaintiff sought for reliefs of arrear rents at the rate of Rs. 30 per year from 1982, compensation cost at Rs. 10 per day till ejectment of the tenant defendant-respondents from the suit land. The same was decreed by the court of learned Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar. The defendant-respondents preferred Title Appeal No. 9/1993 in the court of learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar which was dismissed. The decree of Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar was upheld by the learned First Appellate Court and the defendant-respondents preferred second appeal which was disposed of by remanding the same as per the operative portion referred hereinabove. There was no interference of the judgment and decree passed by the original court of Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar. Section 38 of the CPC stipulates that a decree may be executed either by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution. 14. Section 5(3) of the Act is reproduced hereinbelow: “5. (3) No decree for ejectment passed on the ground of non-payment of rent shall be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree and if the tenant pays into the court whose duty it is to execute the decree the entire amount payable under the decree within the aforesaid period, the court shall record the decree as satisfied.” 15. From the language of the aforesaid sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act clearly states that no decree for ejectment passed on the ground of non-payment of rent be executed within a period of 30 days from the date of the decree passed. The said provision gives a protection to the tenant by stipulating that if the tenant pays into the court whose duty it is to execute the decree the entire amount payable under the decree within the aforesaid period, the said Executing Court shall record that the decree was satisfied. The language itself speaks that the provision is mandatory. 16. The said provision gives a protection to the tenant by stipulating that if the tenant pays into the court whose duty it is to execute the decree the entire amount payable under the decree within the aforesaid period, the said Executing Court shall record that the decree was satisfied. The language itself speaks that the provision is mandatory. 16. Keeping in view section 38 of the CPC, the court referred in section 5(3) of the Act is the court which passed the decree, i.e., the Court of Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar. In the present case in hand, as stated hereinabove, the original decree of ejectment passed by the Court of learned Munsiff No. 2 at Sivasagar was not interfered with by any of the Appellate Courts and as such, it must be executed by the Court of Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar which passed the decree. Even if the decree was passed by the First Appellate Court then also the same is to be executed by the court of first instance as stipulated under section 37(a) of the CPC which defines the expression court which passed a decree or words to that effect on relation to the execution of decrees. 17. Here in the present case in hand the decree passed by the trial court of the learned Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar had not been interfered by any of the Appellate Courts. There is no requirement of further drawal of fresh decree other than the one already drawn by the court of learned Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar. In order to avail the protection by the defendant-respondents under section 5(3) of the Act, they ought to have come up with the prayer for depositing the decretal amount with costs before the trial court itself, the same being the court whose duty it is to execute the decree. That they have not done. After remand of the matter by this court, as the Second Appellate Court, that too without interference of the decree passed by the trial, they preferred the applications referred hereinabove before the learned First Appellate Court. The said court rejected the same. Even in the revision petition while allowing the same, this court considered this order to be passed by the trial court and directed the trial court to consider the applications filed by the defendant-respondents in accordance with law, i.e., sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act. The said court rejected the same. Even in the revision petition while allowing the same, this court considered this order to be passed by the trial court and directed the trial court to consider the applications filed by the defendant-respondents in accordance with law, i.e., sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act. The learned First Appellate Court in compliance of this order passed in the revision petition directed the defendant-respondents to pay the interest at the rate of 12.50% p.a. along with the arrear of Rs. 600. 18. It has already been held that in the present facts and circumstances, the learned Court of Munsiff No. 2, Sivasagar is the court whose duty it is to execute the decree. The First Appellate Court, cannot under any circumstances could be termed to be the court whose duty it is to execute the decree and if that be so, the learned First Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to pass any such order directing the defendant-respondents to pay the amount referred above. 19. From the perusal of the order and the direction passed in the revision petition by this court it is clear and specific that the petitions were directed to be disposed of as per sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act. The impugned order passed by the learned First Appellate Court is without jurisdiction for non-compliance of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act. 20. In Balavant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706 : AIR 2004 SC 4377 while distinguishing irregular and wrong decrees or orders with those which are null and void held as follows: “The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said to be ‘null and ‘void’. In our opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such court would be without jurisdiction non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court or an authority having no jurisdiction is nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings.” From the ratio of the aforesaid decision it can be held that the learned First Appellate Court having no jurisdiction passed the impugned order and as such the same is void ab initio and non est in the eye of law and as such this court as the revisional court has the power to interfere. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 13.3.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge in TA No. 9/1993 is set aside. The submission of Mr. Sahewalla, the learned senior counsel referred hereinabove cannot be accepted when the impugned order is itself void. 21. This revision petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of. Interim order if any, stands vacated. 22. Send back the LCRs. No costs.