ORDER : D.N. PATEL, J. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 4213 of 2015 dated 30th August, 2016 whereby, the petition preferred by this appellant has been dismissed and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant (original petitioner) was serving with Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and retired on 28th February, 1999. This date of retirement has been submitted by the counsel for the appellant. 3. Thus, the whole service has been rendered by this appellant in the State of Bihar and the appellant has retired also from the State of Bihar on 28th February, 1999. This State has been bifurcated on 15th November, 2000. As there is no territorial jurisdiction with this Court, no writ can be preferred by this appellant (original petitioner) in the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi. Apart from the fact that there is delay in filing of the writ petition for getting retirement dues prior to 1999 and the writ petition is preferred in 2015. 4. There cannot be a jurisdiction vested in this Court on the basis of the residence of the petitioner. 5. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Narayan Mochi v. Eastern Coal Fields Ltd., Kolkata as reported in 2009 (3) JLJR 114 , especially in paragraph nos. 16 and 17 thereof read as under : “16. The expression “cause of action” means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. It means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. For every action there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. Negatively, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. For every action there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. The entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree, is the material facts. The material facts is also known as integral part of the cause of action. Unless the facts pleaded are such as have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case, they cannot give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to cause of action.” 17. Thus, the petitioner, who resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, has no bearing with the dispute, involved in the case and, therefore, his situs in Jharkhand is not a cause of action, because it has no bearing with the lis and, therefore, his residence within the State of Jharkhand cannot confer a jurisdiction to this Court, if it is otherwise not having. 6. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 710 , especially in paragraph no. 2, as under : “2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 , especially in paragraph no. 12, as under : “12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act, the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply regretted and deprecated the practice prevalent in the High Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., this Court observed : “We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.” In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh court alone will have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements and also on the basis of the locus fori, of the petitioner, this Court cannot get the jurisdiction because cause of action has arisen within the State of Bihar. No cause of action has arisen within the State of Jharkhand and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal is hereby, dismissed. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements and also on the basis of the locus fori, of the petitioner, this Court cannot get the jurisdiction because cause of action has arisen within the State of Bihar. No cause of action has arisen within the State of Jharkhand and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal is hereby, dismissed. In view of the final order passed in main appeal, I.A. No. 7114 of 2016 also stands disposed of.