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2017 DIGILAW 1497 (ORI)

Jadunath Jena v. Hiramani Bewa

2017-12-22

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Subordinate, Anandapur in Title Appeal No. 7 of 1982 reversing the judgment of the learned Munsif, Anandapur. 2. Respondent no.1 as plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration that the decree passed in T.M.S No.72 of 1974 and mortgage deed executed in favour of defendant no.8 are illegal and invalid. 3. The following family tree would show the relationship of the parties. Family Tree Bira Sa = Tulsi Sachi (daughter) D-5 Gopinath (son) Jhumuri (daughter) D-6 Mauda (daughter) D-7 Parikhit (son) Dharani (son) D-1 Hiramani (wife) Plf. Asamani(wife) (D.2) Kishore Son D-3 Bisaya (daughter) D-4 Case of the plaintiff was that Bira Sa was the common ancestor of the parties. After the death of Bira, the suit land was in possession of his three sons. His daughters are married. After death of her husband Gopinath, plaintiff used to stay with Parikhit and Dharani. They were separated in mess and possessed the suit land jointly. Tulasi, wife of Bira, died in the year 1963. To press their legal necessity, the plaintiff, Parakhit and Dharani mortgaged the suit land in the bank and borrowed a sum of Rs.2000/-. It was further pleaded that Parikhit and Dharani borrowed a sum of Rs.200/- from defendant no.8. On 20.12.1979, they transferred the suit land in favour of defendant no.8 by executing a deed of mortgage. Thereafter, defendant no.8 instituted a suit in the court of the learned Munsif, Anandapur in T.M.S. No.72 of 1974 for resumption of mortgage deed and obtained preliminary decree against Parikhit and Dharani without impleading the plaintiff as a party. The deed was not binding on her. With this factual scenario, the suit was instituted seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. 4. Defendants 1 to 7 have filed a written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff. 5. Defendant no.8 filed a written statement stating, inter alia, that plaintiff had no interest over the ancestral properties, since her husband died prior to coming into operation of the Hindu Succession Act. The mortgage in favour of defendant no.8 was made in the year 1960 by defendant no.1 and Parikhit. The subsequent mortgage done in favour of defendant no.9 was inoperative as against defendant no.8. Bira died about 45 years back and Gopi died about 40 years back. The mortgage in favour of defendant no.8 was made in the year 1960 by defendant no.1 and Parikhit. The subsequent mortgage done in favour of defendant no.9 was inoperative as against defendant no.8. Bira died about 45 years back and Gopi died about 40 years back. After death of Gopi, the properties of Bira were possessed by defendant no.1 and Parikhit. In the year 1960, defendant no.1 and Parikhit borrowed a sum of Rs.200/- from defendant no.8 on execution of a deed of mortgage by conditional sale. The same was within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Since the loan was not paid, he instituted T.M.S No.72 of 1974 against defendant no.1 and heirs of Parikhit. Preliminary decree was passed. In the suit, the plaintiff has not impleaded the court guardian as a party. Thus the suit is bad for non-joinder of party. 6. Defendant no.9 filed a written statement. The case of the defendant no.9 was that plaintiff, Parikhit and Dharani mortgaged the suit property in the Bank and borrowed a sum of Rs.2000/-. Two instalments were paid and rest was still unpaid. Thus mortgage of the land in favour of defendant no.8 was not valid. 7. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court held that the suit properties are the ancestral properties of Bira and had not been partitioned by metes and bounds. The suit properties were in possession of Dharani and Parikhit. The same fell to their share after death of Bira. The suit properties were mortgaged to defendant no.8 which cannot be declared as illegal. Son of the plaintiff has not been made a party and as such, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.7 of 1982 in the court of learned Subordinate Judge, Anandapur. Learned appellate court held that since the plaintiff was in possession of the suit properties after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short, ‘Act’), she became the absolute owner under Sec. 14 of the Act. The suit properties were joint family properties. There was no partition. The plaintiff is not bound by the mortgage or the mortgage suit. The suit cannot be defeated for non-joinder of necessary party as the same was not raised by the defendants. The suit properties were joint family properties. There was no partition. The plaintiff is not bound by the mortgage or the mortgage suit. The suit cannot be defeated for non-joinder of necessary party as the same was not raised by the defendants. The plaintiff has interest in the suit properties and the prayer for declaration can be allowed without affecting the shares of the parties in the ancestral properties. Held so, it allowed the appeal. 8. The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos.(a) to (g) of the appeal memo. The same are - “a. Whether the present suit where the main dispute pertains to title, rival claimed by the parties, over the suit properties is liable to abate under Sec.4(4) of the Act; b. Whether the present suit is liable to abate under Sec.4(4) of the Act in view of the fact that the actual relief sought for in the present suit can be granted by the consolidation authorities; c. Whether the plaintiff-respondent no.1 is entitled to any interest in the suit properties when her husband and Bira Sa died prior to 1956; d. Whether the court is correct in declaring a mortgage deed invalid without the same being exhibited in accordance with law; e. Whether the plaintiff-respondent no.1’s suit is maintainable in the absence of her son who has a definite interest in the ancestral properties; f. Whether the learned lower appellate court is correct in reversing the finding of partition without giving a finding of disagreement on all the detailed aspects taken into account by the learned lower appellate court; g. Whether the plaintiff-respondent no.1 can get the reliefs prayed for without paying proper court fee.” 9. Heard Mr. Mr. Ramakanta Mohanty, leanred Senior Advocate along with Mr. K.K. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. Mantry, learned counsel for the respondents. 10. Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that during pendency of the first appeal, the suit area came under the purview of consolidation operation. An application was filed for abatement of the suit. The same was rejected on the ground that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the issue involved in the suit. He further submitted that the document sought to be set aside has not been produced in the court below. An application was filed for abatement of the suit. The same was rejected on the ground that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the issue involved in the suit. He further submitted that the document sought to be set aside has not been produced in the court below. Whether plaintiff is obliged to produce the document sought to be set aside in a suit can be deciphered from Sec. 31 of the Specific Relief Act (in short, “the Act”). The essential ingredients of Sec. 31 of the Act are (a) any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable; and (b) any person who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument if left outstanding may cause him serious injury. Such person has been given a right to sue to get the instrument adjudged as void or voidable. A person not a party to a document can ignore it, but the said document cannot be called void by him unless it is set aside by a court of law. The plaintiff had reasonable apprehension that if such instrument left outstanding may cause him serious injury. Therefore, the suit must be held to be one for setting aside the impugned instruments. If it is construed that the impugned documents need not have been produced in court because no relief was claimed on the basis of the documents and title could be decided irrespective of the said documents, then the order dated 15.3.1984 passed by the appellate court becomes contradictory and erroneous inasmuch as the appellate court has refused abatement of the suit under Sec.4(4) of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act (in short, “OCH & PFL Act”). Thus the suit should have abated under Sec. 4(4) of the OCH & PFL Act. He further submitted that the plaintiff is admittedly a pre-Act widow. Her husband died in 1954 prior to coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Sec. 14 of the Act specifically mandates that the property in possession of the female Hindu on the date of the commencement of the Act matures into absolute property. Learned appellate court relying on the evidence of D.W.1 that after death of Gopi his wife is in possession of the share of her husband, came to a conclusion that the plaintiff acquired absolute right under Sec. 14(1) of the Act. Learned appellate court relying on the evidence of D.W.1 that after death of Gopi his wife is in possession of the share of her husband, came to a conclusion that the plaintiff acquired absolute right under Sec. 14(1) of the Act. But the said statement has been misread inasmuch as in the same breath, D.W.1 in his evidence has stated that wife of Gopi has no interest in the suit land and it is not true that there was no partition. He has taken the land which fell to the share of Parikshit and Dharani. Therefore, the learned appellate court misconstrued the evidence of D.W.1 and jumped to a conclusion that the plaintiff’s possession has been admitted by D.W.1. Moreover the so-called admission does not conclude that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land as a widow of Gopi on the date of coming into force of 1956 Act. He further submitted that the plaintiff being pre-1956 Act widow, and the learned appellate court having come to a finding that the joint family existed without any partition, she could not have projected a singular claim over the suit property inasmuch as her son equally inherited a share along with her and Parikhit and Dharani by way of survivorship. Thus in the absence of one of the co-sharers, the suit is clearly barred for non-joiner of necessary parties. He relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. And others v. M.R. Murali and another, AIR 2002 SC 1061 . 11. Mr. Mantry, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that D.W.1 in his cross-examination deposed that after death of Gopi, the plaintiff had been possessing the share of her husband. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiff became absolute owner in respect of the share of her husband, Gopi particularly when the defendant no.8 failed to prove that there was prior partition by metes and bounds among Gopi, Parikhit and defendant no.8 and the suit land fell to the share of Parikhit and Gopi. Therefore, the mortgage deed and the decree in T.M.S No.72 of 1974 are invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. The suit land has been recorded in the names of plaintiff, Parikhit and defendant no.8 in Hal ROR. Ext.1 clearly proves that the plaintiff was in possession of the land of her husband. Therefore, the mortgage deed and the decree in T.M.S No.72 of 1974 are invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. The suit land has been recorded in the names of plaintiff, Parikhit and defendant no.8 in Hal ROR. Ext.1 clearly proves that the plaintiff was in possession of the land of her husband. Thus she acquired absolute title after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. So far as non-production of mortgage deed and decree in T.M.S. No.72 of 1974, defendant no.8 has categorically admitted about the said document in his written statement and evidence that the plaintiff was not a party. According to Sec. 58 of the Evidence Act facts admitted need not be proved and non-production of the same would not lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff has no right or title over the suit land. Defendant no.8 has not pleaded in his written statement specially non-impletion of son (daughter) as a party to the suit and for that reason, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and the defendant no.8 waved the said objection under Order 1 Rule 13 CPC. Further, the suit was not filed for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land but it was prayed to declare the mortgage deed and decree in T.M.S. No.72 of 1974 are invalid, inoperative, unlawful as against the interest of the plaintiff. Thus the son or daughter are not necessary party to the suit. The learned appellate court has rightly rejected the petition of the defendant no.8 under Sec. 4(4) of the OCH& PFL Act as suit was filed for declaration that the mortgage deed and decrees in TMS No.72 of 1974 are unlawful and inoperative against the interest of the plaintiff over the suit land and not binding on her and to set aside the same. He further submitted that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction upon validity of documents. The defendant having not challenged the said order, is estopped to challenge the same in the second appeal. 12. Learned trial court in paragraph-6 of the judgment held that “It is in the evidence that the suit property was the ancestral property of Bira and actually there was no partition by metes and bounds in the court”. The defendant having not challenged the said order, is estopped to challenge the same in the second appeal. 12. Learned trial court in paragraph-6 of the judgment held that “It is in the evidence that the suit property was the ancestral property of Bira and actually there was no partition by metes and bounds in the court”. In the same paragraph it is held that “I find that no reliance can be placed on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that there was no partition during the life time of the husband of the plaintiff. From the evidence I am convinced that there was mutual partition between the husband of plaintiff and the two brothers i.e. Parikhit and Dharani.”. The judgment suffers from internal inconsistencies. The learned appellate court, on a threadbare analysis of the evidence on record and pleadings came to hold that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint and the person asserting separation must prove the same. ROR vide Ext.1 shows that the suit land was joint family properties of the plaintiff, defendant no.1 and Parikhit. D.W 1 is a stranger to the family. He had no special means of knowledge regarding partition. It is not the case of the defendant no.8 that he had lands closed to the lands of the parties or had access to their family. D.W. 2 is also a stranger to the family of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7. Except plaintiff no other co-sharers were examined on either side. Learned trial court is not justified in holding that there was an amicable partition between the families of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 7 relying on the testimony of D.Ws 1 and 2. There was no partition by metes and bounds. It further held that the husband of the plaintiff died in the year 1954. D.W.8 in cross-examination has stated that after death of her husband the plaintiff had been possessing the land. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff became the absolute owner in respect of share of her husband. It further held that non-production of mortgage deed will not affect the merit of the case, since plaintiff does not claim any relief so far as deed is concerned. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff became the absolute owner in respect of share of her husband. It further held that non-production of mortgage deed will not affect the merit of the case, since plaintiff does not claim any relief so far as deed is concerned. Right of the plaintiff over the suit properties is to be considered independent of the deed executed in favour of defendant no.9 and irrespective of execution or non-execution of deed in favour of defendant no.9, the right, title of the plaintiff over the suit land can be determined. The plaintiff was not a party to the transaction made by defendant no.1 and Parikhit in favour of defendant no.8. She is not bound by the same. Non-impletion of the son of the plaintiff is not fatal. There was no pleading. The plaintiff has not claimed title over the suit land. In the event prayer of the plaintiff is allowed, the same would necessarily get a share and his share would not affect in any manner. 13. The plaintiff asserts that there was no partition of the suit schedule properties. Defendants 1 to 7 supported the case of the plaintiff. Defendant no.8 is a stranger to the family. On a scanning of the evidence and pleadings the learned appellate court has rightly come to the conclusion that there was no partition of the suit schedule properties. Admittedly in TMS No.72 of 1974 the plaintiff was not a party. Thus the judgment and decree of the learned court below is binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration the decree passed in TMS No.72 of 1974 as well as mortgage deed executed in favour of defendant no.8 are illegal. In the event decree is set aside and declared as illegal then it will enure the benefit to the son of the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not claim the suit properties of her exclusive property. There is no conflict of interest between the mother and son. Thus the suit will not fail for non-impletion of the son of the plaintiff. 14. The submission of Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate that the learned appellate court was not justified in rejecting the application of the application under Sec. 4(4) of the OCH& PFL Act is difficult to fathom. Jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities is well settled. Thus the suit will not fail for non-impletion of the son of the plaintiff. 14. The submission of Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate that the learned appellate court was not justified in rejecting the application of the application under Sec. 4(4) of the OCH& PFL Act is difficult to fathom. Jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities is well settled. Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and others, AIR 1973 SC 2451 is a locus classicus on the subject. The apex Court held : “……We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction; by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiff's claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative, and void. Such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts. We find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagarnath Shukla's case, 1969 All LJ 768 (supra), that it is the substance of the claim and not its form which is decisive.” 15. Such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts. We find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagarnath Shukla's case, 1969 All LJ 768 (supra), that it is the substance of the claim and not its form which is decisive.” 15. The consolidation authorities under provisions of the OCH & PFL Act have no jurisdiction to declare the decree passed by the competent civil court in TMS No.72 of 1974 as void. 16. The apex in the case of V. Tulasamma & others v. Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs (1977) 3 SCC 99 held : “Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that ‘property’ includes both movable and immovable property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act. The language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the Act and promote the socio-economic ends, namely, to enlarge her limited interest to absolute ownership in consonance with the changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation. xxx xxx xxx” 17. Plaintiff’s husband died in the year 1954. She is a pre-Act widow. Evidence on record shows that she is in possession of the property of her husband. Thus the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the property after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. 18. J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was a landlord tenant dispute. The decision is distinguishable on facts. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 19. In the wake of the aforesaid the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. The suit is decreed. 18. J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was a landlord tenant dispute. The decision is distinguishable on facts. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 19. In the wake of the aforesaid the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. The suit is decreed. There shall be no order as to costs.