Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 150 (KER)

SURESH, S/O. KOCHUNNI v. STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM

2017-01-18

MARY JOSEPH

body2017
ORDER : This Crl.Appeal is directed against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. II (Adhoc) Thrissur (for short 'the court below') in S.C. No. 610/2008. The accused was found by the court below guilty and convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days for the offence under Section 279 IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- and in case of default to pay the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months for the offence under Section 304A IPC. The appellant is the accused and the respondent is the complainant, represented by the State. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties to this appeal are referred to hereinafter as the complainant and the accused, in accordance with their original status before the court below. 3. The facts of the case in brief are to the following effect :- On 08.01.2004 at about 19.45 hours, the accused was discharging his duties as a driver of the bus bearing Reg.No.KL 8A 687 and while proceeding from Kodungallur to Thrissur, due to his driving in a rash and negligent manner, he caused the bus to hit a pedestrian namely Kuttamani. Fatal injuries were caused to him and he succumbed to those. The prosecution case was originated from an FIR registered as Crime No. 14/2004 of Cherpu Police Station, on the basis of the First Information Statement lodged by the son of Kuttamani, the deceased. The investigation in the case was conducted by the Circle Inspector of Police, Cherpu Police Station. After concluding the investigation, a final report was laid before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court No. I, Thrissur. The offence under Section 304 A being exclusively triable by a court of Session, the Magistrate vide proceedings initiated by it as 7/2004, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Thrissur, wherefrom the case was made over to the court below for trial. 4. The accused entered appearance on summons being served upon him. After hearing the prosecution and the defence, the court below framed charge against him under Section 279 and 304A IPC, and the same when read over and explained to him, he pleaded not guilty and faced trial. 5. 4. The accused entered appearance on summons being served upon him. After hearing the prosecution and the defence, the court below framed charge against him under Section 279 and 304A IPC, and the same when read over and explained to him, he pleaded not guilty and faced trial. 5. On the side of the prosecution, 16 witnesses were examined as Pws. 1 to 16 and 11 documents and 2 material objects were marked respectively as Exts.P1 to P11 and MOs 1 and 2. 6. On closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was subjected to examination under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C., based on the incriminating circumstances brought in evidence against him by the prosecution. The incriminating circumstances put to him were denied, but a specific contention was taken that Kuttamani, the deceased died consequent to a hit by a car. 7. Since grounds are not made out under Section 232 Cr.P.C., to arrive at an order of acquittal, the accused was called upon to enter on their defence. A witness was examined as DW1 and Exts.D1, D1(a)(a) and D2 were marked on his side. After evaluating the evidence and upon hearing the rival contentions advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor and the counsel for the defence, the court below arrived at a finding of guilt against the accused under Section 279 and 304A IPC and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, by the judgment dated 18.03.2009, aggrieved by which, the accused has approached this Court in the captioned appeal seeking to reverse the finding, having due consideration of the grave error committed by the court below while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. 8. Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel for the appellant and Smt. Rekha C.Nair, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the complainant/State were heard. 9. The arguments of the learned counsel for the accused are centered around mainly on two points. The first one is purely a legal one and is based on Section 228 Cr.P.C. The second argument is strictly confined to the inconsistency in the evidence of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. 10. Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel for the accused contended at the outset that the trial in the case was conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. II (Adhoc), Thrissur without any authority to do so and accordingly, is vitiated. 10. Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel for the accused contended at the outset that the trial in the case was conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. II (Adhoc), Thrissur without any authority to do so and accordingly, is vitiated. According to him, the offences alleged by the prosecution and for which the accused was charge-sheeted by the Police are those punishable under Section 279 and 304A IPC. The Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thrissur, who has taken the final report on file, had committed the case to the Sessions court, Thrissur after having been convinced that the offence under Section 304A is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The case thereafter was made over to the court below. 11. The court below after hearing the prosecution and the defence, framed a charge against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. The offences for which the accused was charged by the court below are triable only by a Judicial First Class Magistrate Court. But the court below after framing the charge, proceeded with the trial in violation of the mandate in Section 228 Cr.P.C, which for the sake of convenient reference is extracted hereinbelow:- “228. Framing of charge - (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which - (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate [or any other Judicial Magistrate of first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 12. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 12. It is provided under Section 228 Cr.P.C. that if on a prima facie consideration of the materials of the case on record and the arguments advanced, sufficient grounds are made out, for the court to presume that the accused has committed an offence not exclusively triable by it, it may frame a charge against the accused and transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or to any other Judicial First Class Magistrate and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate or as the case may be, the Judicial First Class Magistrate, on such date as he deems fit and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offences in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted based on a police report. In case, if it is found that offences involved are exclusively triable by the court itself, a charge shall be framed by itself against the accused and the trial shall be proceeded with. 13. In the case on hand, after forming an opinion that sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against the accused for the offences under Sections 279 and 304 A, and framing of charge against the accused for the said offences, though the offences under Section 304 A is not one exclusively triable by the court of session, the court below did not transfer the case by order to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Judicial First Class Magistrate, but proceeded with the trial on its own. Or in other words, the court below has proceeded with the trial after framing the charge for the offences knowingly that those are not exclusively triable by it. Thus the court below has committed an irregularity. 14. The question writs large for consideration in the context on hand is to see whether that irregularity would vitiate the trial. In this connection Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to Section 461 Cr.P.C. which is extracted hereunder for easy reference:- “461. Thus the court below has committed an irregularity. 14. The question writs large for consideration in the context on hand is to see whether that irregularity would vitiate the trial. In this connection Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to Section 461 Cr.P.C. which is extracted hereunder for easy reference:- “461. Irregularities which vitiate proceedings - If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things namely:- (a) attaches and sells property under Section 83; (b) issues a search-warrant for a document, parcel or other thing in the custody of a postal or telegraph authority; (c) demands security to keep the peace; (d) demands security for good behaviour; (e) discharges a person lawfully bound to be of good behaviour; (f) cancels a bond to keep the peace; (g) makes an order for maintenance; (h) makes an order under section 133 as to a local nuisance; (i) prohibits, under section 143, the repetition or continuance of a public nuisance; (j) makes an order under Part C or Part D of Chapter X; (k) takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 190; (l) tries an offender; (m) tries an offender summarily; (n) passes a sentence, under section 325, on proceedings recorded by another Magistrate; (o) decides an appeal; (p) calls, under section 397, for proceedings; or (q) revises an order passed under section 446, his proceedings shall be void.” Section 461 Cr.P.C. describes in precise terms the irregularities that would vitiate the proceedings. It is specifically provided under clause (l) of sub-section(1) of Section 461 Cr.P.C. that when a court tries an offender without being empowered to do so, as per the mandate in Section 228 Cr.P.C., the accused in the case on hand ought to have been tried by the Judicial First Class Magistrate empowered to do so by the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the event of the same having been conducted by the Court of Sessions, without being empowered to do so, proceedings is irregular and is void. 15. On the merits of the case, Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that PWs 2 to 4, the ocular witnesses examined by the prosecution did not give evidence in corroborative terms. 15. On the merits of the case, Sri. V.C. Sarath, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that PWs 2 to 4, the ocular witnesses examined by the prosecution did not give evidence in corroborative terms. According to him, the evidence of each witnesses, if considered independently also, an opinion regarding the occurrence and commission of the offence is difficult to be formed so as to base a finding of guilt of the accused. According to the counsel, several omissions, embellishments and discrepancies have been crept into the evidence of the witnesses examined by the prosecution and the court below ought not to have arrived at a finding of guilt against the accused for the offences with which he was charged. 16. In the backdrop of the contentions so advanced by the learned counsel, it is apposite to have an in-depth analysis of the versions of the witnesses independently. 17. PW2, Francis claimed to have witnessed the incident and deposed accordingly. He has stated in the box that the incident was occurred 30-35 metres away from the shop where he was sitting at the relevant time of the incident. According to him, he rushed out from the shop to the spot on hearing the sound of collision of the vehicles. He would also state that when reached at the spot, the victim was found lying on the road in a pool of blood. If the version of PW1 was appreciated in the proper way, it could be gathered that he reached the spot only after the alleged occurrence. Admittedly, PW1 has no previous acquaintance with the accused and accordingly, has not stated any identification marks of the accused to the police when he was questioned. But, PW1 identified all the accused in the dock. His specific case was that the Investigating Officer has not questioned him showing the accused in the course of the investigation. According to him, the incident was witnessed by him in the street light as well as in the light that emanates from the bus. But, defence has successfully pointed to this Court during cross-examination that, the said statement was only an embellishment. Therefore, the version having been spoken by the witness for the first time in the court and identification of the accused having been done first in point of time in court, those pieces of evidence cannot be given much weight. But, defence has successfully pointed to this Court during cross-examination that, the said statement was only an embellishment. Therefore, the version having been spoken by the witness for the first time in the court and identification of the accused having been done first in point of time in court, those pieces of evidence cannot be given much weight. The definite case of the witnesses was that identification marks of the accused have not been noted by him. Admittedly, previous acquaintance of the accused was not there. He had also no occasion to see the accused during investigation. Therefore, the identification for the first time in the court cannot be given much weight. These circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned counsel, would only tend to disbelieve the version of PW2. 18. PW3, Unnikrishnan claims to have witnessed the incident in the street light and from the light available at the shops and other vehicles situated near to the place of occurrence at the relevant time. The defence has brought to light during cross examination that PW3 had not stated those aspects when questioned by the Investigating Officer. Moreover, a stationery shop alone is described in Ext.P7, the scene mahazar as situated at a distance of 12 metres from the place of occurrence. Ext.P7 is silent about the presence of several shops near to the place of occurrence. PW3's version that the occurrence was witnessed by him in the presence of lights of several shops situated near the place, therefore, cannot be given credence to. Ext.P7, though discloses about the presence of electric posts near to the place of occurrence, does not describe whether the lights thereon were put on. 19. The specific case of PW3 in the box was that the bus proceeded from south to north through the eastern side of the road. According to him, the bus stopped after the incident by proceeding further ahead to a short distance and the driver alighted from the vehicle and proceeded to the northern direction. In cross examination, he has stated that the establishment wherein he was working is situated at the northern side of the place of occurrence at a walk-able distance of 5 minutes. He has also stated that usually he reaches home after his work at 6.30 - 6.45 hours and at times he would reach later than that. In cross examination, he has stated that the establishment wherein he was working is situated at the northern side of the place of occurrence at a walk-able distance of 5 minutes. He has also stated that usually he reaches home after his work at 6.30 - 6.45 hours and at times he would reach later than that. It is pertinent to note that the witness has not stated any reason for his deviation from his usual practice on that day. He has identified the accused in the court and that identification is suspicious when viewed in the backdrop of his version that he has no acquaintance with the driver and at the time when the bus was stopped, by its driver he was behind the bus. It is impossible for a person having no acquaintance with the accused to identify him at a later point of time especially when his first glance of him was from his back side. Therefore, PW3 cannot be said to have identified the accused from the spot in such circumstances, and accordingly credibility is not liable to be fastened on his identification of the person firstly, from the court. PW3's further version that the incident was witnessed by him in the light from the car proceeding from the northern side and that the car reached the spot only after two minutes of the incident is also liable to be discredited on account of the discrepancy involved. PW3 has spoken in the box during investigation that the accused was shown to him by the Police during investigation and therefore, his identification of the accused in the court can only be, from the familiarity gained therefrom. 20. The version of PW3 that the accused was identified in the light from the car proceeding from north to south cannot be believed at all when he himself has stated that the car reached the spot only after two minutes of the incident. The aforesaid aspects are indications to doubt the creditworthiness of PW3. 21. PW4, Sri. Jagadeesan was the driver of the car at he relevant time when he reached the spot after the incident. His version was that a bus proceeded from south in exorbitant speed, hit against a pedestrian at the eastern side of the road. The aforesaid aspects are indications to doubt the creditworthiness of PW3. 21. PW4, Sri. Jagadeesan was the driver of the car at he relevant time when he reached the spot after the incident. His version was that a bus proceeded from south in exorbitant speed, hit against a pedestrian at the eastern side of the road. This version of PW4 turns out to be an embellishment when it was brought to light on confrontation by the defence that such a version does not find a place in the statement given by him to the Police. PW4 has spoken during examination that the car and the bus were proceeding, maintaining a distance of 15 metres. It is also his further case that on watching the incident, he stopped his car by the side of the road. According to him, when he stopped the car, the bus was also stopped at the spot of incident and the driver of the bus got down from the bus and walked to the northern direction. His further version that at the relevant point of time of occurrence, he was standing at a distance of 15 metres away from the place of incident and that the driver proceeded to the northern direction after stopping the bus are circumstances to doubt his credibility as an ocular witness. The credibility of his version that the accused was identified by him in the light of the car also turns doubtful in view of the inconsistency involved in his version that the car reached the spot after two minutes of the incident and that the car was stopped only 15 metres away from the place where the bus was stopped. His version that Kuttamani, the victim was found walking through the mud road of the road at the eastern side is only to be viewed with suspicion when considered in the backdrop of the description of the place of occurrence as the eastern tarred end in Ext.P7 Scene Mahazar. 22. Therefore, the versions of Pws. 2 to 4 being inconsistent in several material particulars are only to be viewed with suspicion and the indication possibly drawn therefrom was that the witnesses have not actually witnessed the incident, but are chance witnesses cited by the prosecution to establish its case. The fact that the incident was occurred at 7.45 p.m. is also a factor liable to view them as untrustworthy witnesses. The fact that the incident was occurred at 7.45 p.m. is also a factor liable to view them as untrustworthy witnesses. 23. In view of the legal flaw pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the trial held is irregular and therefore, is void. In view of the inconsistencies pointed out by the learned counsel in the versions of the witnesses cited and examined as ocular witnesses, the prosecution case fails. The impugned judgment in the said circumstances is only liable to be set aside. In the result, the Crl. Appeal succeeds and stands allowed. The impugned judgment, finding the accused guilty for the offences under Section 297 and 304A IPC is declared as void. The bail bond of the accused shall stand cancelled. He is set at liberty forthwith.