JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. In question in this appeal is the rejection of the nomination of the appellant to the elections scheduled to the Managing Committee of the Kalloorkad Farmers Co-operative Bank Ltd., the 4th respondent herein. We force ourselves to be as brief as we can in this judgment for the reason that the elections are stated to be scheduled on 16.12.2017 and the directions, if any, that we propose in this judgment will have to be implemented without delay. 2. First an apercus of the most essential facts as are involved: The appellant is the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No.39027 of 2017. This writ petition was filed challenging the rejection of her nomination to the elections to the Managing Committee of the 4th respondent Society and a copy of the said rejection order has been appended to the writ petition as Ext.P2. The reason for rejection, as is discernible from Ext.P2, is that the appellant has been found to be a member of another credit society by name Kumaramangalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Kumaramangalam Society’ for short), which according to the Returning Officer is a disqualification under the provisions of Rule 27 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ for brevity). The appellant challenged Ext.P2 on various grounds but primarily asserting that membership in two different societies, even if they are credit societies, do not entail an automatic disqualification under the provisions of Rule 27 of the Rules, as is contended by the respondents, but that she will continue to be a member of both societies until such time as action is taken by the Registrar as sanctioned under sub clause (2) of the said Rule. Since this assertion is edifixed on the provisions of Rule 27, we deem it appropriate to extract it as under:- “27. Prohibition of membership in two credit (x) societies :- (1) A person applying for admission as a member of any credit society (not being a Financing Bank) shall be admitted as such member only with the previous sanction in writing of the Registrar, if on the date of such application such person is a member of any other credit society. Such sanction may be accorded by the Registrar either in relation to any individual credit society or in relation to class of credit societies. Such sanction may be accorded by the Registrar either in relation to any individual credit society or in relation to class of credit societies. [xxxx] (2) Where a person has become a member of any society referred to in sub-rule (1) in contravention of the provisions of that sub-rule, such society shall remove him from membership upon a written requisition from Registrar.” 3. An examination of Ext.P2 would make it ineluctable that the only reason stated therein is that the appellant is disqualified to stand as a candidate for elections to the 4th respondent Society because she is already a member of the Kumaramangalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. The question is whether this would amount to an automatic disqualification. 4. We have heard Sri. George Poonthottam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Sri. George Poonthottam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, zealously asserts that there is a conspicuous distinction between disqualification of membership to a society and disqualification to be a candidate to a member of a managing committee as per the Scheme of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for convenience) and the Rules. He says that these are not identical or similar notions under the various provisions of the Act and the Rules. He points out to us that disqualification as a member of the society is governed by Section 16 and Section 19 of the Act as also Rule 16 and Rule 18 of the Rules. He tells us that while Section 16 and Section 19 itemizes the various criterion attracting disqualifications as a member of the society, Rule 16 enumerates more categories to these disqualifications and Rule 18 provides for the procedure for expulsion from membership. Sri. George Poonthottam thereafter refers to the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Pradeep Vs. Kerala State Co. operative Election Commission [2016 (3) KLT 551] which was authored by one among us [Justice P.R. Ramachandra Menon] and contends that the law declared in the said judgment is that a member will continue to be a member, even if he or she has attracted some disqualification, till he is removed from the membership in accordance with law, after being afforded an opportunity of being heard. He says that therefore, even assuming that there is any such disqualification, which he of course does not admit, that the appellant has been burdened on account of her alleged membership in the Kumaramangalam Society, that would not be an automatic embargo in her standing for elections to the Managing Committee of the 4th respondent Society. He predicates that the only disqualifications that can be ascribed to a candidate in offering himself or herself as a candidate for an election to the Managing Committee of the Society are provided under Section 28(2) of the Act and Rule 44 of the Rules. As regards Section 28 of the Act is concerned, it creates an embargo for persons to be members of committees of different societies of the same time. The provision of sub clause (2) of the said Section is the most relevant for our examination and therefore we deem it appropriate to extract it as under:- “notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a person shall be disqualified for appointment as, or for being, a member of a committee if he is a member of the committee of more than one society of the same type, or if he is a member of the committee of more than two societies of different types. Going by the proviso to sub-section (2), nothing contained in the sub-section shall be deemed to disqualify a person for election as or for being, a delegate of a society.” 6. The provisions of this sub clause makes it luculent that a person will be disqualified for being appointed as a member of the Managing Committee, if he or she is a member of the committee of more than one other society of the same type or if he is a member of the committees of more than two other societies of different types. The facts involved in this case would not make these provisions attract is the singular submission of Sri. George Poonthottam and we also agree with this because there is no allegation against the appellant that she is the member of a Managing Committee of any other Society. 7. Mr. Poonthottam then refers to Rule 44 of the Rules to say that the disqualifications contained therein are the only other which could stop the appellant from being allowed to contest as a candidate in the ensuing elections. 7. Mr. Poonthottam then refers to Rule 44 of the Rules to say that the disqualifications contained therein are the only other which could stop the appellant from being allowed to contest as a candidate in the ensuing elections. Rule 44 of the Rules starts with the heading ‘disqualification of membership of committee’. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the disqualifications under that Rule is squarely with respect to the membership in the Managing Committee of a Society. The relevant provision, at least for the purposes of the case before us, is sub clause (j) of Clause 1 of Rule 44. This sub clause says that a member of a society shall not be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee if he is disqualified under any other provisions of the bye-laws of the society. On the interpretation of this particular Clause will hinch the answer to the controversy in this case, asserts Sri. George Poonthottam. 8. From the judgment that is impugned in this appeal, we notice that the learned Single Judge had examined the provisions of the bye-laws of the 4th respondent Society, the extracts of which are available in the judgment itself, under which a disqualification for being a member of that Society is specifically ingrained therein that if a person who is a member of another society does not obtain the prior permission of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, he would not be eligible to be a member of the 4th respondent Society. The learned Single Judge, as we see it, thereafter went into an enquiry as to whether, since the appellant has admitted that she is a member of the Kumaramangalam Society, she would be eligible to continue as a member of the 4th respondent Society, thereby attracting the disqualification under Rule 44(1)(j). Sri. Poonthottam's immediate response to this before us is that there is no admission anywhere in the pleadings that his client is a member of the Kumaramangalam Society. He says that the specific assertions of the appellant in the writ petition as well as in this appeal is that she does not concede to be a member of the Kumaramangalam Society and that on question of law his contention is that even if that be so it would not be a disqualification under Rule 44(1)(j) of the Rules. 9. 9. Before we embark upon an enquiry on the factual situation as to whether the appellant is a member of the Kumaramangalam Society or otherwise, we deem it appropriate to have a quick glance on the impact of Rule 44(1) (j) in analogous situation, taking it hypothetically that a person is a member of two different societies. Even if we assume that the provisions of the bye-laws of a society prescribes a clear prohibition in applying and in obtaining membership in that Society, the question is, such membership having been granted for whatever reason, would amount to being an embargo for standing in elections as a candidate or for being nominated for such elections on account of the provisions of Rule 44(1)(j) of the Rules. 10. As we have already indicated above, Rule 44 provides for disqualification from the membership of a Managing Committee of a Society. Obviously, therefore, all the disqualifications mentioned under that head, which includes sub-clause (j), would be with respect to the disqualification relating to a member of the managing committee and no other. What we mean to say is that whatever be the disqualifications that are provided under Rule 44(1)(j) it would apply only for being a member of the managing committee but not for being a member of the society. This is the distinction that Sri. Poonthottam also shows us and we have no doubt that this submission of the learned counsel is well founded. 11. Viewed from the above angle, when the disqualification under Rule 44 is only with respect to the membership in a managing committee and not to the membership in a society, we will have to examine whether the holding of membership in a different society at the same time would amount to be a disqualification for contesting an election. The way Rule 44(1)(j) is drafted would make it inevitable that a member of the society would become ineligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the managing committee if he is disqualified under any of the provisions of the bye-laws of the society. This would necessarily lead to the inescapable incident that the disqualification mentioned in clause (j) would be the disqualifications enumerated in the bye-laws for being a member of the managing committee and not for being a member of the society. This would necessarily lead to the inescapable incident that the disqualification mentioned in clause (j) would be the disqualifications enumerated in the bye-laws for being a member of the managing committee and not for being a member of the society. In other words, a member who, even if he faces a cloud as regards his membership in the Society, is not, however, found ineligible to be a member of the Managing Committee of the Society as per the provisions of the byelaws, would still be entitled to contest the elections, notwithstanding his apparent disqualification to be a member of the society. For illustration, we will take the facts of this case itself. The appellant is stated to be a member of another society before she became a member of the 4th respondent. As per the bye-laws of the 4th respondent Society, which is extracted in the impugned judgment, there is a prohibition prescribed for a person in applying to obtain membership in the said Society, without securing a prior permission from the Registrar, if he or she is a member of another Society. Therefore, the disqualification under those provisions of the bye-laws is for being a member of the 4th respondent society; but if by any reason, as is apparent in this case also, he or she has been admitted as the member of the Society, the question is whether that person can be then interjected from standing as a candidate under the provisions of Rule 44(1)(j). Our answer to this question will have to be to the negative because the only disqualification to attract the provisions of Rule 44(1) (j) will have to be the disqualification prescribed by the byelaw with respect to standing or contesting an election to the Managing Committee of the society. 12. We notice that the provisions contained under Rule 44(1)(j) has already gained the attention of this Court in several cases before. Sri. Poonthottam cites before us three judgments, namely, Natarajan v. Returning Officer (1997 KHC 361), Ambatt Asokan v. Oachira Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another (2008 (3) KHC 563) and Subhash K.S. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kottayam and others (2010 (1) KHC 291). We have examined the ratio in these cases very closely. 13. Sri. Poonthottam cites before us three judgments, namely, Natarajan v. Returning Officer (1997 KHC 361), Ambatt Asokan v. Oachira Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another (2008 (3) KHC 563) and Subhash K.S. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kottayam and others (2010 (1) KHC 291). We have examined the ratio in these cases very closely. 13. As regards Natarajan and Ambatt Ashokan’s (supra) are concerned the findings of this Court was that dual membership, namely in two different Societies, is not a disqualification for being a member of the society and therefore, for being a member of the managing committee of the society. However, the facts of that case would show that this conclusion was arrived at because the bye-laws of the societies in question in those cases did not have any specific provision which prohibited membership in two different societies. The facts of this case are entirely different. It is indubitable that the bye-laws of the 4th respondent Society prohibits dual membership without the express prior permission of the Registrar and, therefore, strictly going by the terms of those provisions in the bye-laws, the appellant, if she is found to be a member of the Kumaramangalam Society as she is alleged, would certainly face the prospect of action for disqualification as a member of the society. However, the question is whether this by itself alone can be used against her to disqualify her from standing in the elections. We do not have to travel far to obtain the answer to this because this issue has also been, though, not directly, answered by this Court in Subhash’s case (supra). In that judgment the learned Judge who considered the law in this area comprehensively concluded, without leaving any leeway for doubt, that the inhibition in Rule 27(1) of the Rules would not make the admission to membership void and that the penalty for violation of this Rule indwells in the next sub-clause, namely, Rule 27(2) which empowers the Registrar to issue a written requisition for removal of such person from the membership of the society. It, therefore, becomes perspicuous that as long as the person continues to be a member of the society without being sought to be removed by the Registrar, under the provisions of Rule 27(2), dual membership per se may not be a reason why he or she can be restrained from offering his or her candidature or nomination to the elections of the society. 14. Once we have surveyed the provisions and the precedents as above and we are on course to a conclusion that merely because a person may have attracted disqualification to be a member of a society, as long as he or she continues to be a member legally without the proceedings to remove him or her from such membership having been concluded in one manner or the other, the right of that person to contest the election would remain unimpeachable notwithstanding such apparent disqualification to the membership of the society, unless the specific disqualifications as provided under the byelaws or Section 28 of the Act or Rule 44 of the Rules, for being a member of the Committee is attracted. 15. In the facts of this case we notice that there is no allegation against the appellant that she is disqualified either under Section 28 of the Act or Rule 44 of the Rules. The disqualification that is now sought to be fastened upon her, through Ext.P2, is that she is ineligible to be a member of the 4th respondent Society because she is alleged to be a member of the Kumaramangalam Society also. The reasons in Ext.P2 order rejecting her candidature therefore would appear to be completely untenable and inconsistent with the specific mandate of the Act and Rules. Ext.P2 therefore would not obtain legal sanction and would normally be deserving of being set aside and we would have ordered so in normal circumstances. 16. When the forensic scenario becomes clear as above, we would generally have only been justified in finding in favour of the appellant and allowing her to contest the elections. However, unfortunately this is one case where even though we find the law in favour of the appellant we are constrained to deviate and find on the facts that the appellant may not be entitled to contest for reasons that we will say presently. 17. However, unfortunately this is one case where even though we find the law in favour of the appellant we are constrained to deviate and find on the facts that the appellant may not be entitled to contest for reasons that we will say presently. 17. Before we proceed, we will also need to assess the submissions and contentions of the respondents which are as below. The learned Special Government Pleader submits, supporting Ext.P2, that it was issued only because the appellant has been found to be disqualified to be a member of the 4th respondent Society. He says that the provisions of Rule 35A(6)(d) enable the returning officer to reject the nomination if a person is found to be disqualified to be a member of the society. We are not impressed with this submission for the same reasons as we have already recorded above because the provisions of Rule 35A relate to the procedure for conducting election to the committee of the society. Rule 35A(6) provides that no member shall be nominated as a candidate for election to fill a seat in the committee if, he is, inter alia, disqualified to be a “member” under the provisions of the Act and the Rules. This disqualification mentioned in this sub-clause, according to the learned Government Pleader, is to be a member of the society. We are, however, unable to accede to the submission because, since Rule 35A encompasses the provisions relating to the conduct of elections to the committee of the society, the disqualification mentioned herein can only be axiomatically construed to be a disqualification to be a member of the committee. 18. Faced with this, the learned Government Pleader then submits that even assuming that this is so, no relief may be granted in this appeal because the proceedings for elections have now reached the last leg; the ballot papers having been all printed and that the returning officer is ready to conduct it on 16.12.2017. He relies vehemently on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha, and another v. State of Maharashtra [ (2001) 8 SCC 509 ] to contend that once the election process has commenced, this Court is proscribed from issuing any further orders. He relies vehemently on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha, and another v. State of Maharashtra [ (2001) 8 SCC 509 ] to contend that once the election process has commenced, this Court is proscribed from issuing any further orders. We are not proposing to delve deep into these submissions in view of the nature of the final directions that we propose in this judgment, but suffice to say that we are of the view that our hands cannot be tied even when the rejection of a particular candidature has been made by the returning officer without authority and in complete abuse of jurisdiction. We do not intend to say anything further and we refrain from making any more observations on this because we do not intend to allow the appellant to contest the elections for the reasons as will become clear in the following paragraphs of this judgment. 19. The learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent Society also has made submissions supporting the learned Government Pleader and adds that the provisions in Rule 44 should apply in full force against the appellant especially when she has obtained membership of the society through unfair and illegal methods by allegedly not disclosing that she was already a member of the Kumaramangalam Society. 20. We have, as already indicted above, noticed that the specific allegation against the appellant is that she was a member of the Kumaramangalam Society before she became a member of the 4th respondent Society. The embargo for admission to membership of the 4th respondent Society being so explicit in its bye-laws, her admission to the membership of the 4th respondent Society will always be under a cloud. If this is found to be true, then the Registrar would be entitled to invoke the provisions of Rule 27(2) of the Rules to remove her from the membership of the 4th respondent Society and consequently from its Managing Committee and the 4th respondent Society themselves will become empowered, under the provisions of Rule 16(3) of the Rules, to remove her on account of the fact that she has obtained admission through the violation of bye-law. The power of the Registrar under Rule 16(4) is also available under which a removal is certainly possible. 21. The power of the Registrar under Rule 16(4) is also available under which a removal is certainly possible. 21. Viewed from the above perspective we are firm in our mind that even when we find favour with the legal contentions of the appellant, our judgment should not turn futile because, assuming that she wins the elections, she still would be liable to be removed and continues to be susceptible to such action under the Act and the Rules and in such event, our exercise would become completely pointless. We, therefore, asked Sri. Poonthottam, learned counsel for the appellant whether the appellant would be willing to file an affidavit on record that she is not a member of the Kumaramangalam Society, as is now alleged by the respondents. Sri. Poonthottam said that this is not possible because, according to him, that would amount to the divulgence of defences, both factual and legal, that are available to the appellant. We certainly respect the need of the appellant to maintain confidentiality and secrecy with respect to her defences, and we cannot force her to file anything that may incriminate her in future. However, even when that being so, we are certainly of the firm view that if the facts as are now stated in this proceedings, that the appellant is a member of the Kumaramangalam Society is true, then it would be completely futility to allow her to contest the elections under our orders, since immediately after the elections or even before that, it would be possible that some action may be taken against her for her removal from the membership of the 4th respondent Society itself. 22. We say this also for the reason because we also notice that in the writ petition that the averments of the appellant, which is available in paragraph 4 thereof is that “there is no material to show that the petitioner is a member of Kumaramangalam society and the petitioner with member No. 12394 of the 4th respondent society is one and the same person.” However, when it comes to the pleadings in the appeal there is a complete departure from this, as is discernible from Ground-C, where the averments are on a completely different layer as under:- “The appellant is not a member in the Board of Directors of another credit society. A mere membership in another credit society is no disqualification for being a candidate in another society. The contention on behalf of the official respondents that the appellant will be eventually removed from the membership and therefore the returning officer is justified in rejecting the nomination was the extreme of a contention which cannot be sustained.” 23. The obvious inconsistency in the pleadings made by the appellant also persuades us not to exercise our discretion in her favour by granting any relief allowing her to contest the ensuing elections. 24. In the view that we have taken above and in the conspectus of our observations as afore, while we are compelled to vacate the conclusions and observations of the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned in this appeal, which we do so, we deem it idoneous, for the specific cause mentioned herein, to decline our discretion or jurisdiction to allow the appellant to contest the elections, which is scheduled on 16.12.2017. 25. Needless to say, the appellant is at liberty to invoke any other remedy as is available to her and which is permitted in law and any such invocation would be without prejudice or without being in any manner being hampered by any of our observations herein, save the declaration of law made in this judgment. This appeal is thus disposed of.