ORDER : RAJESH H. SHUKLA, J. 1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner under Articles 14, 19 and 226 of the Constitution of India as well as under the provision of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 for the prayers as prayed for inter-alia that appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21.08.2017 at Annexure-D passed by the respondent no. 2-Collector in exercise of power under Section 35(5) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and also for the stay of the operation of the order on the grounds stated in the memo of petition. 2. Heard learned advocate, Shri P.C. Champaneri for the petitioner, learned advocate, Shri Sandeep Limbani for the respondent no. 1, learned AGP Ms. Jyoti Bhatt for the respondent nos. 2 and 3 and learned advocate, Shri M.B. Parikh for the respondent no. 4. 3. Learned advocate, Shri P.C. Champaneri has submitted that the respondent no. 1, who is Councillor of the Municipality, has tendered resignation which came to be accepted and, therefore, it would come to an effect on the day on which the President has accepted it. He referred to the communication at Annexure-A dated 27.07.2017 and submitted that however as an afterthought, the respondent no. 1 is said to have contended that it was not a genuine. Learned advocate, Shri Champaneri referred to the communication of the respondent no. 3-Municipality dated 29.07.2017 addressed to the Collector, Amreli, wherein it has been specifically stated that the Councillor had sent resignation through courier, which was received by the President on 27.07.2017 and it was accepted. However it is contended that on the next date, he has addressed a letter dated 28.07.2017 that he has not sent any such resignation and, therefore, the proceedings have been initiated under Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act. Learned advocate, Shri Champaneri referred to the impugned order of the respondent no. 2-Collector dated 22.08.2017 and submitted that in background of this fact, though the Collector is required to take decision, he could not have passed an interim order granting declaration. He submitted that the statutory provision of Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act clearly refers to “Any other councillor may resign his office by tendering his resignation in writing to the president. Such resignation shall take effect on the date on which it is received by the president.” 4. He submitted that the statutory provision of Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act clearly refers to “Any other councillor may resign his office by tendering his resignation in writing to the president. Such resignation shall take effect on the date on which it is received by the president.” 4. Learned advocate, Shri Champaneri, therefore, submitted that it is provided that the resignation would be effective from the day on which the President accepts it and, therefore even if the Appeal as provided under Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act is pending, the decision could have been taken after hearing all concerned and in the meantime, the impugned order which is of mandatory nature could not have been passed. He also referred to another order with regard to other Councillor produced at Annexure-E and submitted that different stand has been taken in similar circumstances. Learned advocate, Shri Champneri therefore submitted that the Collector has exercised the power in arbitrary manner and this colourable exercise of power is mala-fide. He, therefore submitted that it would suggest legal malice in exercise of the statutory power. 5. Learned advocate, Shri Sandeep Limbani submitted that the resignation has not been genuine and it is not given personally but it is said to have sent through courier and, hence when it came to the notice, on the next day the respondent no. 2 was communicated in this regard. He submitted that the resignation has to be genuine before it could be acted upon. In support of his submission, he referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of Rafiqbhai Mogal vs. Jagdishbhai Govindbhai Dharajia, 2001 (3) GLH 690 and pointedly referred to the observations made in Paragraph No. 10. Learned advocate, Shri Limbani submitted that if the interpretation of Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act as sought to be canvased is accepted that such resignation shall take effect on the day on which it is received by the President then, the provision of Section 35(5) read with proviso would be redundant. He pointedly referred to the provision of Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act and submitted that proviso also provides that such resignation, which is not genuine, shall take effect in accordance with the decision of the said Officer. He pointedly referred to the provision of Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act and submitted that proviso also provides that such resignation, which is not genuine, shall take effect in accordance with the decision of the said Officer. He, therefore, submitted that till such decision is taken in an Appeal, it cannot be said to have taken effect and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Collector cannot be said to be mandatory and cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. He submitted that the order is required to be passed after providing an opportunity of hearing and reliance placed on another order at Annexure-E may be in a different situation as in the facts of the that case, there is a resignation of the Councillor i.e. the respondent no. 1 and he has remained personally present before the Collector and, thereafter, the order is passed. He, therefore, submitted that it cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. 6. Learned advocate, Shri Parikh for the respondent no. 4-Chief Officer has referred to the communication at Annexure-C and submitted that as stated, on telephone it was confirmed with the respondent no. 2, where he has confirmed about the resignation on 27.07.2017 He submitted that thereafter on the next day, he is said to have addressed letter and, therefore, the impugned order may not be justified in view of the statutory provision of Section 35 of the Municipalities Act. 7. Learned AGP Ms. Bhatt referred to the impugned order and submitted that the resignation letter sent through courier is said to have received on 27.07.2017 at 05:43 p.m. in the evening and immediately on the next day, the respondent no. 2 has informed about the genuineness of the resignation and, thereafter, he has raised dispute regarding the resignation and it is pending for decision by the respondent no. 2-Collector and hearing is fixed on 05.09.2017 She therefore submitted that the order passed by the respondent no. 2 in exercise of statutory power cannot be said to be in colourable exercise of power and, therefore, the present petition for the prayers of setting aside the interim order cannot be entertained. She submitted that the order is only an interim order till the hearing of the Appeal and, therefore, the petition may not be entertained. 8. 2 in exercise of statutory power cannot be said to be in colourable exercise of power and, therefore, the present petition for the prayers of setting aside the interim order cannot be entertained. She submitted that the order is only an interim order till the hearing of the Appeal and, therefore, the petition may not be entertained. 8. In rejoinder, learned advocate, Shri Champaneri referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of Rafiqbhai Mogal (supra) and made submission that it was on a different consideration. 9. In view of these submissions as well as the issue involved, the provision of Section 35 of the Municipalities Act requires to be considered. 10. The provision of Section 35 of the Municipalities Act provides for acceptance of the resignation of the President and Vice President, which may take effect after a period of 30 days. Whereas the resignation of the Councillor as referred to in Section 35(3) shall have an effect on the day on which it is received by the President. At the same time, the provision of Section 35 has to be read as a whole particularly with Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act, which has a reference to the dispute regarding such resignation. In other words, there is a dispute about the genuineness of the resignation and the dispute could be raised, meaning thereby it could be considered as provided in Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act. It has been provided that such dispute would not be entertained after the period of 30 days, meaning thereby, there is specific time limit for the dispute, which can be raised and considered regarding the resignation. It is in this background, the provision of Section 35(5) proviso clearly provides for raising of an dispute, which could be considered and the proviso also provides such resignation shall take effect in accordance with the decision of such officer. 11. It is well settled that the provision of the statute has to be read as a whole and the interplay of different sub-section requires a harmonious construction, which sub-serve the purpose of the Act or the legislative intent. As stated above, the provision of Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act cannot be read in isolation, which would make subsequent provision redundant. Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act has a reference to the resignation, which is otherwise accepted. As stated above, the provision of Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act cannot be read in isolation, which would make subsequent provision redundant. Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act has a reference to the resignation, which is otherwise accepted. However where there is dispute with regard to the resignation or the genuineness of the resignation, subsequent provision of Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act, which referred to the procedure and the manner in which it would be effective, has to be considered. Thus language employed in Section 35(5) of the Municipalities Act clearly provides that when there is dispute raised with regard to the resignation, it would take effect after the decision is taken by the officer, the respondent no. 2 as provided in Section 35 of the Municipalities Act. Therefore if the President has taken any steps including the intimation to the Election Commission for filling up the vacancy, it would not be justified particularly when the vacancy could be filled in upto a period of six months and, therefore, pending such dispute, if the respondent no. 2-Collector in exercise of statutory prower has passed the impugned order at Annexure-D, it cannot be said to be erroneous, arbitrary or mala-fide exercise of power. In fact the submission which have been made by learned advocate, Shri Champaneri that he has no power to pass interim order or that order is in the form of mandatory order, is misconceived inasmuch as when the effect is not to be given till hearing is provided, the adjudicating authority like the respondent no. 2 has to maintain the position of status quo till the decision is taken. It is in these circumstances, the order came to be passed, which cannot be said to be erroneous. In fact, the petitioner has filed the petition challenging the interim order in the guise of the mandatory nature and the order passed by the respondent no. 2 without waiting for the final order that may be passed after hearing all concerned on 05.09.2017 or thereafter. The decision, which is said to have been taken about the declaration of vacancy, appears to be on a wrong footing and wrong interpretation of the statutory provision. As the issue of resignation is not decided, there could not have been any further steps for declaration of vacancy or filling up the vacancy. 12. The decision, which is said to have been taken about the declaration of vacancy, appears to be on a wrong footing and wrong interpretation of the statutory provision. As the issue of resignation is not decided, there could not have been any further steps for declaration of vacancy or filling up the vacancy. 12. Moreover as useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in case of Rafiqbhai Mogal (supra), wherein same provisions have been considered and it has been observed that the resignation contemplate under Section 35(3) of the Municipalities Act must be genuine and it has also been provided that the resignation take effect only after the adjudication by the officer by the State Government. 13. Therefore as the respondent no. 2 has kept hearing on 05.09.2017, the present petition challenging the impugned order cannot be entertained. However the respondent no. 2 shall proceed with the hearing on 05.09.2017 or any other day and shall decide the issue of resignation of the respondent no. 1 as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 15 days. 14. With the aforesaid observation, the present petition stands dismissed. Notice is discharged.