JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. S. Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. P.S. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This petition under Section 115 CPC read with Section 151 CPC is filed against the judgment & decree dated 13.03.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jorhat in Title Appeal No. 16/2012 reversing the judgment & decree dated 05.05.2012 passed by the learned Munsiff No.2, Jorhat in Title Suit No. 26/2010 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 3. During the pendency of this revision petition, both the original plaintiff and defendant had expired and their legal representatives had been substituted. 4. The plaintiff had filed the suit for ejectment of the defendant and his employees from the suit premises described in Schedule A to the plaint and for restoration of vacant possession thereof, for recovery of compensation amounting to Rs.3,000/- as per Schedule B to the plaint at the rate of compensation of Rs.100/- per day from 01.08.2010 to 31.08.2010, future compensation at the rate of Rs.100/- per day from 01.09.2010 till restoration of vacant possession, etc. 5. The suit premises, as described in Schedule A, is an RCC room measuring 5 ft. in breadth and 12 ft. in length bearing Jorhat Municipal holding No. 237 of Ward No.12. 6. The case of the plaintiff as projected in the suit is that the defendant came to occupy the suit premises as monthly tenant under the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into an agreement dated 01.08.2008 for a period of two years up to 31.07.2010 at a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- per month payable within the tenth day of succeeding month. It is stipulated therein that if the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own use, he can terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days notice in writing and on such determination, the defendant shall vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit premises. It is further stipulated that the defendant cannot sub-let the suit premises or any part thereof and he could run only the business of sale of Ayurvedic medicine in the suit premises. It is further stipulated that the defendant cannot sub-let the suit premises or any part thereof and he could run only the business of sale of Ayurvedic medicine in the suit premises. The plaintiff had retired from service on 31.12.2002 and his son, who is a Science graduate, is an unemployed youth and in order to settle him in life, set up a medicine business in the year 2004 for him, in which he was also involved, in a small room behind the suit premises which measures 9 ft. in breadth and about 10 ft. in length. In front there is a space measuring 4 ft. in breadth and 12 ft. in length. It is pleaded that after a few months, business gradually expanded and thereafter, the son of the plaintiff had taken loan from bank and had invested in the said business but because of lack of space, sufficient stock of medicines could not be kept which hampered the business and furthermore, in view of small frontage, the plaintiff faced a lot of inconvenience in doing his business and as such needs the suit premise for his own use. 7. While not disputing the description of the suit premises in occupation of the defendant, in the written statement it is stated that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant late Girish Chandra Bhattacharya had come to occupy the suit premise in the year 1947 for running the Ayurvedic business in the name and style of “Padmanath Ayurvedic Aushadhalaya” as a tenant under the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. After the death of Girish Chandra Bhattacharya in the year 1996, the defendant along with his brother Sri Mohini Bhattacharya, became the tenants under the plaintiff and subsequently, in terms of a family arrangement, the defendant became the sole tenant under the plaintiff. While admitting the tenancy agreement dated 01.08.2008, it is stated that prior to fixation of rent at Rs.2,000/- in terms of the agreement dated 01.08.2008, the rent was earlier fixed at Rs.1,300/- per month. Though it is admitted that the medicine business was started by the plaintiff in the year 2004, it is, however, denied that it is not in a small room behind the suit premises but in a room measuring more than 300 sq. ft. in the western side of the suit premises. Though it is admitted that the medicine business was started by the plaintiff in the year 2004, it is, however, denied that it is not in a small room behind the suit premises but in a room measuring more than 300 sq. ft. in the western side of the suit premises. Allegation of lack of sufficient space as pleaded by the plaintiff is denied and it is asserted that the plaintiff has sufficient space to run the business and he had also set up two chambers for doctors, namely, Dr. Anirban Mahanta and Dr. S. Das. It is stated that a letter dated 13.07.2010 was issued by the plaintiff informing him that as the tenancy was going to expire on 31.07.2010, he may indicate within 26.07.2010 whether he was willing to renew the tenancy. The defendant responded by his letter dated 14.07.2010 expressing his willingness to renew the agreement but at the same time, requested sorting out certain problems in respect of the suit premises. In response to another letter of the plaintiff dated 28.07.2009 (should have been 2010), the defendant, by his letter dated 29.07.2010, expressed his willingness to renew the agreement with an enhanced rent of Rs.2,300/-. However, as the tenancy agreement was not prepared by the plaintiff till the first week of September, 2010, the defendant offered rent for the month of August, 2010 at the rate of Rs.2,300/-. As the same was refused, the defendant started depositing rent in Court on a regular basis. 8. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff needs the suit premises for his own use on bona-fide ground? 2. Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises? 3. To what relief’s the parties are entitled to?” 9. The plaintiff examined three witnesses and exhibited five documents. No witnesses were examined by the defendant but he exhibited four documents at the time of cross-examination of the witnesses of the plaintiff. 10. At this stage, it will be appropriate to record that the suit filed by the plaintiff is governed by the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (for short, “the Act”). 11. No witnesses were examined by the defendant but he exhibited four documents at the time of cross-examination of the witnesses of the plaintiff. 10. At this stage, it will be appropriate to record that the suit filed by the plaintiff is governed by the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (for short, “the Act”). 11. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under the Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy. The proviso (c) to Section 5(1) of the Act provides that nothing in the Sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house where the house is bona-fide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court. 12. On the basis of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court decreed the suit directing that the defendant shall be ejected from the suit premises and that the plaintiff shall be put in vacant possession of the suit premises. However, no relief was granted in respect of the prayer for compensation made by the plaintiff. In fact, no issues were also framed in respect of the prayer for compensation. 13. In appeal, however, the learned appellate Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his genuine need of bona-fide requirement of the suit premises and accordingly, while allowing the appeal, dismissed the suit. 14. Mr. Ali has submitted that the learned appellate Court misconstrued the concept of bona-fide requirement and on perverse appreciation of evidence on record held that the plaintiff had failed to prove bona-fide requirement. By placing reliance on Exhibit-D, which is a letter issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, Mr. 14. Mr. Ali has submitted that the learned appellate Court misconstrued the concept of bona-fide requirement and on perverse appreciation of evidence on record held that the plaintiff had failed to prove bona-fide requirement. By placing reliance on Exhibit-D, which is a letter issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, Mr. Ali submits that because the plaintiff had requirement of the suit house bona-fide for developing and smooth running of the medicine business, had held discussions with the defendant for executing an agreement for only eleven months in order not to inconvenience the defendant with whom there was a long association but the defendant insisted for execution of the agreement for two years. Mr. Ali has placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252 , A.K. Jain Vs. Prem Kapur, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 593 and Krishna Kumar Rastogi Vs. Sumitra Devi, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 309 . 15. Per contra, Mr. Deka has supported the findings of the learned lower appellate Court and contends that the suit was filed only to evict the defendant and the plea of bona-fide requirement is a mere ruse. Placing reliance on Exhibit-A, which is a letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant, he submits that if there was really genuine requirement of the plaintiff, then he would not have issued the Exhibit-A letter dated 13.07.2010 requesting the defendant to meet him on or before 26.07.2010 for renewal of the tenancy agreement. 16. The only issue that begs an answer is as to whether the plaintiff requires the suit premises bona-fide for his own use and occupation. 17. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that it is the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for bona-fide use for expansion of business, this is no ground to say that the landlord is already having business elsewhere and, therefore, requirement of the suit premises in another place is not a genuine need. It is further stated that it is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not and that it is the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature and place of business. 18. It is further stated that it is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not and that it is the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature and place of business. 18. When the plea set up by the landlord that the house is bona-fide required for his own use and occupation, the Court has to see whether the plaintiff genuinely and honestly needs the accommodation. It is for the Court to determine the truth of assertion and also whether it is bona-fide. The test that is to be applied in determining the question is objective and not a subjective one. Bona-fide requirement must be manifested in actual and not in mere desire to have the accommodation. The requirement must be the outcome of a sincere and honest requirement qua a mere pretence or pretext. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement and the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. Undoubtedly, it is the burden of the landlord to prove his genuine requirement but this burden does not warrant a presumption that his need is not bona-fide. 19. In his evidence, the PW-1 who is the plaintiff, had deposed in tune with pleadings that the business is set up in a room which measures 9 ft. in breadth and 10 ft. in length and because of lack of space, sufficient stock cannot be kept though the business is expanding. As the space in front of the room measuring 4 ft. in breadth and 12 ft. in length is not sufficient, the customers also find great difficulty. In his cross-examination, however, the PW-1 had stated that the width of the house in which the suit premises is located is 9 ft. wide and 60 ft. in length and the suit premises measures 5 ft. wide and 12 ft. in length. He also stated that he is in possession of the rest of the house apart from the suit premises where he has a pharmacy by the name of M/s Rajlaxmi Drugs. He also stated that there is a corridor in the western side measuring 3 ft. wherefrom also business transactions are carried out. wide and 12 ft. in length. He also stated that he is in possession of the rest of the house apart from the suit premises where he has a pharmacy by the name of M/s Rajlaxmi Drugs. He also stated that there is a corridor in the western side measuring 3 ft. wherefrom also business transactions are carried out. In his cross-examination, he had admitted that there was a doctor’s chamber, namely, of Dr. Anirban Mahanta, where he examines patients. He has also stated that medicines are stocked in the area behind the back side of the pharmacy. 20. From the above evidence of PW-1, it is apparent that the size of the pharmacy is not 12 ft. in length behind the suit premises as the size of the house is 60 ft. in length and admittedly, length of the suit premises is only 12 ft. Thus, the plaintiff has been doing his business in a much larger room than what is pleaded in the plaint. 21. In his cross-examination, PW-2, who is the son of PW-1, stated that there is a small room towards the northern side of the pharmacy. PW-3, who is the brother of PW-1, in his cross-examination, had also stated that the room to the northern side of the pharmacy is in possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had not stated anything about this room in the plaint. Thus, projected picture in the plaint that there is lack of space for running the business is belied by the evidence on record. 22. It also appears that the plaintiff or his son does not have any drug licence as PW-2, in his cross-examination, stated that the drug licence for running the aforesaid business is in the name of one Manik Chandra Nath, who is to be paid every month. From the cross-examination of PW-3, it appears that the defendant was the tenant from the year 1956 – 1957. 23. It appears from Exhibit-A, which is a letter issued by the plaintiff on 13.07.2010, that the defendant was informed to contact the plaintiff within 26.07.2010 if he wanted to renew the tenancy. From the cross-examination of PW-3, it appears that the defendant was the tenant from the year 1956 – 1957. 23. It appears from Exhibit-A, which is a letter issued by the plaintiff on 13.07.2010, that the defendant was informed to contact the plaintiff within 26.07.2010 if he wanted to renew the tenancy. While acknowledging the said letter and expressing willingness to renew the tenancy, the defendant wrote a letter dated 14.07.2010 (Exhibit-B) expressing a grievance relating to dilapidated condition of the approach road to the tenanted premises as well as difficulties faced in respect of payment of electricity bills as a result of installation of the meter beyond the suit premises. The plaintiff replied back by his letter dated 28.07.2010 (Exhibit-C) stating that the work of the road was already done and that the electricity meter, which is installed in the corridor, and connected only to his premises, can be verified at any time and same cannot be shifted inside the suit premises. Exhibit-D, dated 29.07.2010, on which much reliance is placed by Mr. Ali, goes to show that the defendant had raised questions as to whether it was justifiable to enhance rent by 75% within a period of two years from the earlier fixation and also as to whether it is justifiable to limit the tenancy period for only eleven months with a tenant of 60 years. By the said letter, the defendant agreed for enhancing rent by Rs.300/- and requested period of tenancy for at least two years. However, it appears that there was no agreement between the parties and consequently, Exhibit-3, a legal notice, dated 16.08.2010, was issued for vacating the suit premises. In Exhibit-3, there is no reference to Exhibits-A, B and C. 24. There is no evidence that because of long association with the tenant and as the house was needed for own use for the purpose of business, the plaintiff wanted the lease to be only for a period of one year in order to enable the defendant to look for alternative arrangement, as sought to be argued by Mr. Ali on the basis of the request made by the defendant for lease of two years by Exhibit-D. Rather, from Exhibit-D, it appears that rent was sought to be enhanced by 75% over the existing rent, which was fixed two years earlier. Ali on the basis of the request made by the defendant for lease of two years by Exhibit-D. Rather, from Exhibit-D, it appears that rent was sought to be enhanced by 75% over the existing rent, which was fixed two years earlier. There is no material on record to suggest that prior to issuance of legal notice, Exhibit-3, dated 16.08.2010, the requirement of the house for the own use and occupation of the landlord was even broached. It appears that terms, as indicated in Exhibit-D, having not been accepted by the plaintiff, plaintiff made a volte-face and within a period of one month three days from 13.07.2010 (Exhibit-A), issued the legal notice Exhibit-3 dated 16.08.2010, diametrically shifting the stand to the effect that the suit premises is required bona-fide. 25. The learned trial Court did not consider the cross-examination of PW-1 as discussed hereinabove as well as the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 regarding the existence of another room in possession of the plaintiff other than the room where pharmacy business is carried out while coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff required the suit premises bona-fide. The learned trial Court, without any discussion whatsoever discarded Exhibits-A, B, C and D by holding that the said exhibits do not show that the plaintiff had no bona-fide requirement of the suit premises. The learned trial Court failed to consider Exhibits-A, B, C and D in its correct perspective. The learned trial Court, however, had recorded the finding that Exhibit-2, the statement of loan account and Exhibit-5, statement of account, are not admissible. 26. In A.K. Jain (supra), the Supreme Court had set aside the order of the High Court on the ground that the finding of the High Court that led to the dismissal of the landlord’s case was based on an error on record in that the High Court had taken note of a different eviction petition filed by the landlord at a later date. This case is not relevant for the purpose of the present adjudication. 27. In Krishna Kumar Rastogi (supra), the elder son of the landlord was running a business as a tenant in a shop opposite to the disputed shop. This case is not relevant for the purpose of the present adjudication. 27. In Krishna Kumar Rastogi (supra), the elder son of the landlord was running a business as a tenant in a shop opposite to the disputed shop. The Supreme Court held that for the reason that the son was running a business in a rented accommodation, it cannot be held that the landlord’s requirement was not genuine and that it could have been so construed if it had been found that the son for whom the landlord needed the shop had already got his own shop. This case has also no application in the facts of this case. 28. On consideration of the evidence on record, I find that the learned appellate Court rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove his genuine need or bona-fide requirement of the suit premises. 29. Accordingly, finding no merit, this revision petition is dismissed. No cost. 30. Registry will send back the lower Court records.