ORDER Rajesh Shankar, J. - Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 20.03.2010 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner-cum-Authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (respondent no. 3) in M.W Case No. 89 of 2008, whereby the claim of the respondent no. 4 on behalf of Anil Kumar Pandey was allowed directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 89,687.12 as the difference in minimum wages for the period November, 2005 till November, 2008 and five times compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,48,435.60. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order dated 21.01.2017 passed in M.W Appeal No. 4 of 2012 by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority (respondent no. 2) whereby the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed as barred by limitation. 3. The factual background of the case is that the respondent no. 4 being the General Secretary of Jharkhand General Kamgar Union instituted a case vide M.W Case No. 89 of 2008 under section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") alleging that Anil Kumar Pandey (concerned workman) had worked under the petitioner for 16 hours per day, but he has been paid less wages by the employer petitioner. The respondent no. 3 vide order dated 20.03.2010 accepted the claim of the respondent no. 4 in part and directed the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs. 89,687.12 and five times compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,48,435.60. It is alleged by the petitioner that the case was heard on 06.10.2009 and reserved for the final order. Suddenly, the order was passed on 20.03.2010, but the same was not communicated to it. It is only in the month of July, 2012 when the petitioner received a letter dated 05.06.2012 from the respondent no. 3 for compliance of the order dated 20.03.2010, it came to know about the said order. Thereafter, the petitioner obtained the certified copy of the order dated 20.03.2010 and filed an appeal before the respondent no. 2 vide M.W Appeal No. 4 of 2012. The respondent no. 3 for compliance of the order dated 20.03.2010, it came to know about the said order. Thereafter, the petitioner obtained the certified copy of the order dated 20.03.2010 and filed an appeal before the respondent no. 2 vide M.W Appeal No. 4 of 2012. The respondent no. 2 while taking up the appeal has observed in the impugned order dated 21.01.2017 that the petitioner has made an application for condonation of delay, wherein it has submitted that it got the knowledge of the order in appeal dated 20.03.2010 only in the month of July 2010 and the appeal has been filed on 24.08.2012 i.e., after about 856 days and as such, the same is barred by limitation prescribed under Section 20(6) of the Act, 1948. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent no. 2 has passed the impugned order dated 21.01.2017 on a wrong assumption that the petitioner has stated in the condonation application that it had come to the knowledge of the order dated 20.03.2010 in the month of July 2010. In fact, the petitioner in the condonation application had specifically asserted that it came to the knowledge of the order dated 20.03.2010 in the month of July 2012. It is further submitted that since the impugned order dated 21.01.2017 is based on the wrong assumption, the same cannot be sustained. It is further submitted that the respondents have failed to prove that the order dated 20.03.2010 was duly communicated to the petitioner earlier than April 2012 and as such, the appeal was within time and the same should not have been rejected as barred by limitation. It is further submitted that from the record of the case, it is revealed that after conclusion of hearing on 06.10.2009, the case was not fixed for any further order and despite the fact that the petitioner enquired from the office of the respondent no. 3 about the order, he did not receive any information. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of " Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Anr." reported in AIR 1961 SC 1500 and submits that the limitation can begin to run only from the date of communication of the order. 6. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of " Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Anr." reported in AIR 1961 SC 1500 and submits that the limitation can begin to run only from the date of communication of the order. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent State as well as respondent no. 4-Mr. Anjani Kumar Pandey in person submit that orders passed by the learned courts below are justified within jurisdiction. It is further submitted that as per subsections (6) and (6A) of Section 20 of the Act, 1948 (Bihar Amendment), no appeal would be entertained after the statutory period of limitation provided in the said section. It is further submitted that in the said section, it has been specifically provided that the appeal shall be filed within 30 days from the date of direction and if the sufficient cause is shown, delay of 30 days may be condoned and not thereafter. As such, the respondents had no authority to entertain the appeal after the expiry of 60 days from the date of direction. It is further submitted that it is wrong to say that the order dated 20.03.2010 was not communicated to the petitioner, rather the true fact is that the said order dated 20.03.2010 was communicated to the petitioner by registered post and also to the respondent no. 4 personally, which will be evident from Annexure-A to the supplementary counter affidavit dated 09.08.2017. 7. The aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the respondent no. 2 has been categorically denied by the petitioner through rejoinder affidavit dated 21.08.2017 stating that no such communication was ever received in the office of the petitioner establishment. It has also been stated that if the copy of the order was signed and dispatched on the same date by registered/speed post, the respondent no. 3 could have filed the tracking report or a similar document to prove the service of notice. However, no such document has been filed. The consistent stand of the petitioner has been that it never received a copy of the order dated 20.03.2010. It is further submitted that even assuming that the respondent no. 3 could have filed the tracking report or a similar document to prove the service of notice. However, no such document has been filed. The consistent stand of the petitioner has been that it never received a copy of the order dated 20.03.2010. It is further submitted that even assuming that the respondent no. 4 had received the order dated 20.03.2010 in time, he never raised any demand for compliance of the same and this deliberate omission proves that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 did not bring the order dated 20.03.2010 to the notice of the petitioner and have surreptitiously initiated certificate proceedings against the petitioner. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on going through the relevant documents placed on record, it appears that the respondent no. 2 has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner only on the ground that the appeal has been filed after the prescribed period of limitation. On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the respondent no. 2 was under the wrong impression that the petitioner has stated in the delay condonation petition that it had come to the knowledge of the order dated 20.03.2010 in the month of July 2010 and due to the said reason, the respondent no. 2 neither discussed nor decided the issue as to whether the petitioner has rightly asserted that it came to the knowledge of passing of the order dated 20.03.2010 in July 2012. The petitioner is contending that the order dated 20.03.2010 was not served to it. On the other hand, the respondent no. 3 is claiming that the order dated 20.03.2010 was served to the petitioner by a registered post and in support of which it has filed a copy of Dak Dispatch Register (Annexure-A to the supplementary countera ffidavit dated 09.08.2017). On perusal of record, it appears that after hearing the matter, the respondent no. 3 reserved the order and thereafter, no date was mentioned in the order sheet (annexed with the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner dated 13.07.2017) posting the matter for final order. Though, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 3 that the order dated 20.03.2010 was sent to the petitioner through registered post, but no acknowledgement of receipt has been brought on record. 9. In the case of " Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. Though, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 3 that the order dated 20.03.2010 was sent to the petitioner through registered post, but no acknowledgement of receipt has been brought on record. 9. In the case of " Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. " (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 11 held as under: "A similar question arose before the Madras High Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J.G. Cloete, ILR 6 Mad 189 . Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860 limited the time within which a suit may be brought to set aside the decision of the settlement officer to two months from the date of the award, and so the question arose as to when the time would begin to run. The High Court held that the time can begin to run only from the date on which the decision is communicated to the parties. "If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act", says the judgment, "it could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise they might be barred of their right of appeal without any knowledge of the having been passed". Adopting the same principle a similar construction has been placed by the Madras High Court in Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan Chettiar, ILR 53 Mad 491 : (AIR 1930 Mad 490) on the limitation provisions contained in sections 73 (1) and 77(1) of the Indian Registration Act XVI of 1908. It was held that in a case where an order was not passed in the presence of the parties or after notice to them of the date when the order would be passed the expression "within thirty days after the making of the order" used in the said sections means within thirty days after the date on which the communication of the order reached the parties affected by it. These decisions show that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in the present proceedings was barred under the proviso to Section 18 of the Act." 10. Otherwise also, I also find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if the respondent no. 4 had received the order dated 20.03.2010 personally soon after posting of the order, then he must have pursued the matter earlier for its execution. Thus, the respondents have failed to prove the service of order dated 20.03.2010 to the petitioner earlier than July 2012. 11. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order dated 21.01.2017 passed by the respondent no. 2-Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Appellate Authority in M.W Appeal No. 4 of 2012 is quashed and set aside. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned and the matter is remanded to the respondent no. 2 to decide the appeal on merit after hearing both the sides within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 12. The writ petition is disposed of, in view of the aforesaid observation/direction.