JUDGMENT Vijay Bishnoi, J. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 12.01.2017 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Churu (hereinafter referred to as ''the Tribunal'') in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 95/2000, whereby the Tribunal has rejected the application filed by the petitioner for premature release of the amount kept in FDRs in terms of award passed in his favour. 2. The Tribunal has rejected the application of the petitioner while relying on the decision dated 10.03.2014 passed by this Court at Jaipur Bench rendered in Kapil Lodha vs. The Judge, MACT (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 300/2009) while holding that since the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review its order, it cannot order for premature release of the amount kept in FDRs in terms of the award passed by it. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment dated 10.05.2017 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in Vimla & Anr. vs. The Learned Judge, Accidental Claims Tribunal, Churu (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3590/2017) and Hari Ram & Anr. vs. Judge, Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Churu (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3669/2017) and submitted that this Court while dealing with all the issues has held that an application preferred by the claimant for premature release of the amount kept in FDRs can be considered and decided by the Tribunal. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. A Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 10.05.2017 passed in Vimla & Anr. and Hari Ram & Anr. (supra) has held as under :- "5. It is true that the statutory provisions do not confer any power upon the Tribunal to review its own judgment/order/award. But then, the issue regarding the power of the Tribunal to vary the order as to distribution of any sum paid as compensation or as to manner in which sum payable to any such dependent is to be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with needs to be examined yet another perspective. 6.
But then, the issue regarding the power of the Tribunal to vary the order as to distribution of any sum paid as compensation or as to manner in which sum payable to any such dependent is to be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with needs to be examined yet another perspective. 6. As per provisions of section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act of 1988"), after holding an inquiry into the claim, the Tribunal is required to make an award determining amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and thus, the Tribunal is empowered to pass the appropriate order distributing the compensation amount between claimants considering their dependency. 7. Section 169, which deals with procedure and powers of Tribunal provides that in holding an inquiry under Section 168 for determination of claim for compensation subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Tribunal may follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. 8. Section 176 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174 of the Act of 1988. 9. It is to be noticed that in exercise of the powers conferred under the various sections of the Act of 1988 including Section 176, the State Government has framed the Rules. The Chapter X of the Rules, deals with the Claims Tribunals. 10. Rule 10.27 of the Rules, makes provision that the power vested in the Civil Court under Sections 30, 32, 34, 35 (a), 75(a) and (c), 76, 77, 94, 95, 132, 133, 144, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152 & 153 may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal so far as they may be applicable, subject to the provisions of Section 174 of the Act of 1988. By virtue of Rule 10.28, the provisions of Order 21 CPC, are also made applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. That apart, it has been specifically provided that in so far as the Act and the Rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal.
That apart, it has been specifically provided that in so far as the Act and the Rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. Suffice it to say that for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 172 which deal with the determination of claim by the Claims Tribunal, award of interest and compensatory cost so also the disbursement of the amount of compensation, the Tribunal is not precluded from invoking the provisions of CPC so far as may be applied to the proceedings before the Tribunal. 11. Moreover, Rule 10.22 of the Rules, deals with judgment and award of compensation to be passed by the Claims Tribunal. Clause (3) of Rule 10.22 empowers the Tribunal to make appropriate provisions regarding the investment of the amount of compensation deposited where it is payable to a woman or person under legal disability. Further, as per clause (4) of Rule 10.22, where an application is made to the Claims Tribunal in this behalf or otherwise, the Tribunal is satisfied that on account of the negligence of the children on the part of the parents or on account of variation of the circumstances of the dependent or for any other sufficient cause, an order of the Tribunal as to distribution of any sum paid as compensation or as to manner in which sum payable to any such dependant is to be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with ought to be varied, the Tribunal may make such order for variation of the former order as it thinks fit just in the circumstances of the case. 12. It is true that after passing the award, the Tribunal becomes functus officio and it cannot review the determination for entitlement of compensation under the award. But then, so far as the order directing disbursement of the amount of compensation already determined is concerned, invoking the power under Rule 10.22 (4) of the Rules, it is open to be reconsidered and varied by the Tribunal where it is found just in the circumstances of the case in the interest of the claimants. 13.
But then, so far as the order directing disbursement of the amount of compensation already determined is concerned, invoking the power under Rule 10.22 (4) of the Rules, it is open to be reconsidered and varied by the Tribunal where it is found just in the circumstances of the case in the interest of the claimants. 13. Indisputably, while dealing with the issue with regard to pre mature release of the FDR in Kapil Lodha''s case (supra), the provisions of Rule 10.22 of the Rules were not brought to the notice of the court. In the considered opinion of this court, even where no liberty is given by the Tribunal while passing the award to the claimants to apply for withdrawal of amount pre maturely in case of emergency, keeping in view of provisions of Rule 10.22 (4) of the Rules, on an application being made on behalf of the claimants for varying the order passed by the Tribunal as to distribution of any sum paid as compensation or as to manner in which some payable to any such dependent is to be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with, the Tribunal is empowered to vary such order for sufficient cause as it thinks fit in the circumstances of the case. Thus, the applications preferred by the claimants for pre mature release of the FDRs on account of changed circumstances and emergent need as pleaded could not have been dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. 14. Undoubtedly, while passing an order for disbursement of the award amount, the Tribunal has to be keep in view the overall interest of the claimants but while dealing with the amount of compensation, need and wishes of the claimants should also be kept in view inasmuch as, ultimately, the amount of compensation belong to them. Suffice it to say that an application preferred by the claimants for varying the order passed as to disbursement of the award amount needs to be considered by the Tribunal in each case on merits, keeping in view, the larger interest of the claimants." 6. I am perfectly in agreement with the above referred judgments. 7. Resultantly, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 12.01.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Churu in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 95/2000 is quashed.
I am perfectly in agreement with the above referred judgments. 7. Resultantly, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 12.01.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Churu in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 95/2000 is quashed. The application preferred by the petitioner before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Churu is ordered to be restored and the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Churu is directed to decide the said application on merits in accordance with law expeditiously.