JUDGMENT : S.B. Shukre, J. Heard. 2. Admit. 3. There is no need to call for record and proceedings. Heard finally by consent. 4. The only point which arises for my determination is : Whether the impugned judgment and decree are so illegal and perverse as to pre-judicially affect the interest of the appellant original plaintiff ? 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and order are illegal and perverse because the original defendant No. 3, which is the respondent No. 3 in this appeal, has not come forward with any case that the allotment of the suit property made under its letter dated 26.3.1989 was subsequently cancelled by it on 5.6.1989 and in any case, allotment of the property and its subsequent cancellation, if at all it was there, was a matter exclusively between the appellant and the respondent No. 3 and, therefore, for strangers like respondent Nos. 1 and 2, no right accrued to say anything about existence or cancellation of the lease in favour of the appellant. He also submits that the appellant is under a legal obligation under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to deliver peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property to the respondent No. 3 original less or as and when the latter chooses to claim back the possession from the appellant. 6. Shri A.M. Ghare, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that right of the plaintiff to seek possession of the suit property is based upon the allotment letter dated 26.3.1989, which allotment came to be subsequently cancelled by the N.I.T. by its another letter dated 5.6.1989 and, therefore, now it would have to be adjudicated by the trial Court, on the basis of evidence adduced by both the parties, whether or not the right to seek back the possession and also get further relief of the mandatory injunction against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has still continued to be with the original plaintiff i.e. the appellant and this could be possible only when the matter is relegated to the trial Court for considering the effect of subsequent cancellation of the lease. 1 and 2 has still continued to be with the original plaintiff i.e. the appellant and this could be possible only when the matter is relegated to the trial Court for considering the effect of subsequent cancellation of the lease. He submits that such an order of the First Appellate Court cannot, therefore, be termed to be arbitrary or perverse or illegal order rather, the order would have to be considered as fair as it balances the interests of both sides and serves to remove the prejudice, if any, occurring to any of the parties. 7. Shri R.O. Chhabra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 points out that no relief against the respondent No. 3 has been claimed in the instant suit and, therefore, the respondent No. 3 is only a formal party. 8. On considering the facts and circumstances of this case, and upon applying mind to the reasons which weighed with the First Appellate Court, as stated in the impugned judgment and order, I find that there is no force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and great merit in the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 9. After all, the suit has been filed by the appellant seeking such relief’s as recovery of possession and issuance of mandatory injunction in favour of the appellant against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. For securing such relief’s, the appellant would be required in law to establish his right to claim back his possession from the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The right to seek and retain the possession of the suit property asserted by the appellant flows from the allotment letter dated 26.3.1989 issued by the respondent No. 3. Now, this allotment letter has itself been claimed to be recalled in view of the cancellation of the allotment made earlier by a subsequent letter issued on 5.6.1989. The effect of cancellation of allotment of lease suit property to the plaintiff would certainly have to be considered in order to adjudicate upon the basic issue of existence or continuation of the right of the appellant to get back possession of the suit property. The effect of cancellation of allotment of lease suit property to the plaintiff would certainly have to be considered in order to adjudicate upon the basic issue of existence or continuation of the right of the appellant to get back possession of the suit property. If it is found that such right which was initially created in favour of the appellant was subsequently taken away by the N.I.T. or the respondent No. 3, the trial Court would have to decide as to whether or not in such circumstances, the appellant would be entitled to the relief which he has claimed in the present suit. This would be possible only when the parties are given an opportunity to lead the evidence in the matter. Therefore, a remand order passed under the impugned judgment and order cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary or perverse. 10. It is true that the matter of grant of cancellation of lease has been always and for all purposes be a matter only between the less or and the lessee and the strangers like respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the present case would have no say therein. If the lease in favour of lessee, in the present case, the applicant, has been cancelled by the less or, in the present case, respondent No. 3, it is not for the strangers like respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to rake up the issue of cancellation of the lease. This will, however, be true only when a suit for possession simplicitor is filed. This would not be applicable to a suit wherein possession has been claimed back on the basis of title or on the basis of it being settled. In the present case, the basis of the right of the applicant to seek possession as well as permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is the allotment of the suit property on lease to the applicant by allotment letter dated 26.3.1989 issued by respondent No. 3. Now, as a subsequent development, it has been claimed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that such allotment of property on lease came to be cancelled by respondent No. 3 by its another letter dated 5.6.1989. Now, as a subsequent development, it has been claimed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that such allotment of property on lease came to be cancelled by respondent No. 3 by its another letter dated 5.6.1989. Considering the fact that the basis of the suit filed in the instant case is the right acquired by the applicant after the letter of allotment dated 26.3.1989 was issued, now it has become necessary to examine the effect of cancellation of the lease subsequently. In the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, through LRs., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 70, has held that it is imperative for one who claims possession to give all such details as are enumerated by way of illustration in that paragraph. One of the details that must be imperatively brought out by the plaintiff relates to any event which might have extinguished entitlement of the plaintiff to possession or caused shift therein. Such details could be put forth by the parties only when the evidence is allowed to be brought on record by the parties. After such evidence is adduced by the parties, the trial Court would be in a position to properly consider the effect of cancellation of the lease of the property by the respondent No. 3 and adjudicate upon the continuing entitlement of the applicant to the possession of the suit property. Therefore, I find that there is nothing wrong or illegal about remand order passed by the Court below, which is impugned herein. 11. There is one more reason which, in my opinion, should indicate that the impugned order is not so arbitrary or perverse as is tried to be made out by the applicant. The prayer clause (2) of the suit has been made in the following words : "The defendants 1 and 2, or any person/persons on their behalf or for them be restrained permanently and mandatorily from disturbing the peaceful, legal legitimate possession of the suit plot by the plaintiff for ever." It would be clear from this prayer clause that permanent prohibitory injunction has been sought against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that possession of the applicant is legal and legitimate. 1 and 2 on the ground that possession of the applicant is legal and legitimate. The plaint pleadings also do not show that basis of possession of the applicant is the applicant being in settled possession of the suit property. These pleadings only show that the basis of possession is the lease of the suit property in favour of the applicant. Therefore, it would be necessary for the applicant to prove such basis of his possession and for that matter, even the claim made by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that this basis has been wiped away by the subsequent development, would require consideration by the trial Court. After all, the perpetual injunction under section 38(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can be granted only for preventing the breach of obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff and the obligation that a defendant owes to a plaintiff can be proved only when the right to claim back the possession is proved by the plaintiff. An obligation of one party is the right of the other party, and if right of one party cannot be proved, the obligation of another to the former would not be there and so the issue of breach of obligation and further question of need for preventing it's breach would not arise. In the present case the right to get back possession originates from a lease in favour of the appellant and when the existence of lease itself is questioned, the issue of continuation or extinguishment of right of possession has assumed importance and that is the reason why the effect of cancellation of lease subsequently would be required to be considered by the trial Court. This would constitute additional reason for me to uphold the impugned order. 12. As regards the argument about the obligation of the lessee under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, I find that as the respondent No. 3, original lessor, having not said anything about the obligation of the lessee under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, no issue in this regard has arisen so far and therefore, there is no need to consider this argument at this stage. 13. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal. The point is answered accordingly. 14. The appeal stands dismissed. 15. The parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.