JUDGMENT : Tashi Rabstan, J. 1. Detenu-Dilbag Singh S/o. Janak Singh R/o Ward No. 4, Simbal Camp at present Makhanpur Gujran Miran Sahib Tehsil R.S. Pura District Jammu, seeks quashment of detention order No.)9/PSA of 2016 dated 15th July 2016, passed by District Magistrate, Jammu (for brevity "Detaining Authority"), directing preventive detention of detenu, as well as extension orders bearing Government Order No. Home/PB/V/1579 of 2016 dated 14th October 2016 and No. Home/PB/V/179 of 2017 dated 14th January 2017. The case set up by petitioner is that he has been falsely implicated in some cases, only to harass and humiliate him. Without appreciation of fact that petitioner is a law abiding citizen and has not become threat to public order and not been convicted so far by any court of law, submitted a false and frivolous dossier to learned District Magistrate, Jammu-respondent No. 3, contending therein that petitioner would manage his bail from the court and again indulge in some criminal activities and recommended placing petitioner under preventive detention. The detaining authority vide impugned detention order placed petitioner under preventive detention and notice of detention order was asked to be given to petitioner by reading and explaining him the language, which he understands. The detention order and recommendation under Public Safety Act made by Senior Superintendent of Police, Jammu, alongwith dossier, various FIRs and police challan attached with the recommendation were neither directed to be read over and explained to petitioner nor were same read over and explained to petitioner in the language which he understands. Aggrieved by detention order, petitioner states to have made a representation to respondent No. 2, for revocation of detention order. Petition, being HCP No. 39/2016, is stated to have been filed throwing challenge to detention order No.)9/PSA of 2016 dated 15th July 2016. The petition was disposed of with a direction to respondent No. 2 to consider and decide representation in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. However, respondent No. 2 without deciding representation, has passed impugned extension orders, extending preventive detention of petitioner without deciding his representation. 2. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondents. The petition was disposed of with a direction to respondent No. 2 to consider and decide representation in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. However, respondent No. 2 without deciding representation, has passed impugned extension orders, extending preventive detention of petitioner without deciding his representation. 2. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondents. They aver that petitioner had earlier filed HCP No. 39/2016, which was disposed of with a direction to consider and decide the representation in accordance with law and that in response to letter dated 18th October 2016, Inspector General of Police, CID, has communicated that petitioner is involved in numerous activities of serious/heinous nature, which are prejudicial to maintenance of public order and advised that petitioner may not be released. The case is said to have been further examined in light of response of Inspector General of Police, CID, and it has been decided that the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant release of detenu at this stage and that petitioner's representation was considered and found devoid of merit and rejected vide Government order No. Home/PB-V/401 of 2017 dated 6th February 2017. Further submission of respondents is that petitioner is notorious/hard-core habitual criminal and desperate character and he has no respect for the law of land and large number of criminal cases has been registered against him. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and considered the matter. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner states that petitioner has been implicated in false cases and recommended to be placed under preventive detention inasmuch as he has not been held guilty by any court. Detention order, according to learned counsel, cannot be passed unless detaining authority did not come to subjective satisfaction qua detenu's preventive detention having necessitated notwithstanding his being already in police custody. Learned counsel contends that inordinate and unexplained delay in disposal of representation, as is well settled law on the subject, makes continued detention of a person illegal and unconstitutional. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places reliance on Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of W.B. (1972) 2 SCC 656 ; Vijay Kumar v. State of J & K & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 407 : 2010 (6) JKJ 431 [SC]; Jai Singh v. State of J & K (1985) 1 SCC 561 : 2010 (6) JKJ 226 [SC]; Yousuf Abbas v. Union of India & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 407 : 2010 (6) JKJ 431 [SC]; Jai Singh v. State of J & K (1985) 1 SCC 561 : 2010 (6) JKJ 226 [SC]; Yousuf Abbas v. Union of India & Ors. (1982) 2 SCC 380 ; Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh v. Distt. Magistrate, Ahmedabad (1996) 3 SCC 194 ; Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. 1984 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 84; Hakim Ghulam Hassan v. State & Anr. 1988 (1) Crimes 736 : JKJ Soft JKJ/24377; Faqir Singh v. District Magistrate, Jammu & Ors. 1989 (3) Crimes 479 : JKJ Soft JKJ/10733; Saleem v. Union of India & Ors. 2002 (sup) ACrC 286; Abdul Aziz Shah v. State 2006 (I) SLJ 161 : 2010 (4) JKJ [HC] 430; and Manzoor Ahmad Mir v. State of J & K & Ors. 2011 (2) JKJ 290 [HC]. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents states that detention order has been passed on subjective satisfaction by detaining authority and the petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 6. Before adverting to present case it is appropriate to mention here that preventive detention, as held in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 88 and reiterated in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 2011 SCW 2262 ), is, by nature repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. The Supreme Court in Rekha's case (supra), while emphasising that Article 22(3)(b) Constitution of India is to be read an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and not allowed to nullify the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21, observed since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India, permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which was won after long, arduous, historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (Indian Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (Indian Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal. The Supreme Court further observed that it must be remembered that in case of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention case is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction, which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as "jurisdiction of suspicion", the detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since Clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes applicability of Clauses (1) and (2), detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with procedural safeguards, however, technical, is mandatory and vital. The Supreme Court making reference to law laid down in Kamleshwar Ishwar Prasad Patel v. Union of India and Others (1995) 2 SCC 51, observed the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of alleged activities of the detenu. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation made in Ratan Singh v. State of Punjab and others 1981 (4) SCC 1981, emphasising the need to ensure that the Constitutional and Statutory safeguards available to a detenu were followed in letter and spirit, observed: "But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenu's." 7. The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the Court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of Detaining Authority. As laid down by the Apex Court in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha & Anr. The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the Court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of Detaining Authority. As laid down by the Apex Court in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha & Anr. (1987) 2 SCC 22 , the procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with, if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the Constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. 8. The baseline, that emerges from the above overview of case law on the subject of preventive detention, is that whenever preventive detention is called in question in a court of law, first and foremost task before the Court is to see whether procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Preventive Detention Law pressed into service to slap the detention, are adhered to. 9. In addition to above, the Supreme Court Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi & Ors. 1953 SCR 708 , while interpreting Article 22(5) of the Constitution, observed as under: ".......Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meager safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the petitioner has the right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court by majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him." We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of article 22. That not having been done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of grounds, the petitioner's detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith." 10. The right which the detenu enjoys under Article 22(5) is of immense importance. In order to properly comprehend the submissions of the detenu, Article 22(5) is reproduced as under: "22(5). The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith." 10. The right which the detenu enjoys under Article 22(5) is of immense importance. In order to properly comprehend the submissions of the detenu, Article 22(5) is reproduced as under: "22(5). When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." This Article of the Constitution can be broadly classified into two categories: (i) the grounds on which the detention order is passed must be communicated to the detenu as expeditiously as possible; and (ii) proper opportunity of making representation against the detention order be provided. 11. The person detained is not required to be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours, so as to give an opportunity to the Magistrate to peruse the record and decide whether the detenu is to be remanded to police or judicial custody or allowed to go with or without bail. The detenu cannot engage a lawyer to represent him before the detaining authority. In the said background it is of utmost importance that whatever procedural safeguards are guaranteed to the detenu by the Constitution and the preventive detention law, should be strictly followed. The Supreme Court in Rekha's case (supra), while laying emphasis on a need to adhere to the procedural safeguards, observed:- "It must be remembered that in case of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention case is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as "jurisdiction of suspicion", The Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since Clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of Clauses (1) and (2), the detenue is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however, technical, is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital." 12. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however, technical, is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital." 12. The Constitution of India--Article 22(5) and Section 13, J & K Public Safety Act 1978, guarantee two important safeguards to the detenu first that the detenu is informed of grounds of detention that prompted the-detaining authority to pass the detention order and second that the detenu is allowed to represent against his/her detention immediately after the detention order is made or executed. The Constitutional and Statutory safeguards guaranteed to the detenu are to be meaningful only if the detenu is handed over the material referred to in the grounds of detention that lead to subjective satisfaction that the preventive detention of detenu is necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or public order and further it is ensured that the grounds of detention are not vague, sketchy and ambiguous so as to keep the detenu guessing about what really weighed with the detaining authority to make the order. 13. Detaining Authority--respondent No. 3, did not inform detenu that detenu independent of his right to file representation against his detention to the Government, has also right to submit a representation to detaining authority till detention was considered by Government and approved. Respondent No. 2 has, in essence, violated Constitutional and Statutory rights of detenu, guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, and Section 13 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act. Reference in this regard may be made to the law laid down in State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Santosh Shankar Acharya AIR 2000 SC 2504 . 14. Now in the present case, petitioner has made representation to respondent No. 2 immediately after passing of impugned detention order, which is not in dispute. Non-disposal and non-consideration of representation, so made by petitioner against his detention, forced him to file petition (HCP No. 39/2016), which was disposed of vide order dated 16th September 2016 with a direction to respondents to decide and consider the petitioner's representation expeditiously. Non-disposal and non-consideration of representation, so made by petitioner against his detention, forced him to file petition (HCP No. 39/2016), which was disposed of vide order dated 16th September 2016 with a direction to respondents to decide and consider the petitioner's representation expeditiously. Instead of considering and deciding petitioner's representation respondents, after a month of this Court order dated 16th September 2016 in HCP No. 39/2016, came up with Government order No. Home/PB-V/1579 of 2016 dated 14th October 2016, extending period of detention for further period of three months, without considering and deciding representation. This order of extension of preventive detention was issued in the month of October 2016 and thereafter again vide Government order No. Home/PB-V/179 of 2017 dated 14th January 2017, detention of petitioner was further extended by three months without considering and deciding petitioner's representation. 15. It is apt to mention here that the principal contention raised by counsel for petitioner is that the representation made by petitioner against order of detention was not dealt with expeditiously and was not disposed of by respondents at the earliest notwithstanding direction of this Court. Glance of Government Order No. Home/PB-V/1579 of 2016 dated 14th October 2016 divulges that on receipt of representation, the same was forwarded to Inspector General of Police, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu, for comments/views and that the decision on representation, so filed by petitioner, would be preferred to be taken as and when comments were received from IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu, and in the interregnum petitioner's detention was extended for a further period of three months with a miniature rider that it would be subject to a decision on petitioner's representation on receipt of comments/views from IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu. This order of extension was issued in the month of October 2016. Again Govt. Order No. Home/PB-V/179 of 2017 dated 14th January 2017 was issued. The second extension order, on its plain reading, reveals that comments from IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu, has been made use of by respondents as one of the pretexts to delay disposal of petitioner's representation. Again Govt. Order No. Home/PB-V/179 of 2017 dated 14th January 2017 was issued. The second extension order, on its plain reading, reveals that comments from IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu, has been made use of by respondents as one of the pretexts to delay disposal of petitioner's representation. It is pertinent to mention here, as reiterated herein above as well, that Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, envisages that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. This is the Constitutional right provided and guaranteed to a person, who is ordered to be placed under preventive detention. Does Statute, viz. J & K Public Safety Act, provide such guarantee. For that we have to go through it. Section 13 of J & K Public Safety Act envisages: "13. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order.-- (1) when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall......communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the Government." 16. From the above, it will be seen that the right to make representation against detention order is not only a constitutional right but a statutory right as well. Since the Constitution as also the Act specifically provide that detenu is to be given earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, it is implicit that there is a corresponding duty on the authorities to whom representation is made to dispose of the representation at the earliest or else the constitutional and the statutory obligation to provide the earliest opportunity of making a representation would lose both its purpose and meaning. Section 13(1) is on a par with the constitutional protection conferred by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Section 13(1) is on a par with the constitutional protection conferred by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The contention is that the obligation on detaining authority to afford to detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against detention order aims at not to render it illusory; simultaneously obliges the authority, to whom the representation is made, to consider the same expeditiously. The earliest opportunity to be afforded for making representation inheres corresponding duty of the Government to consider the representation so received expeditiously. While dealing with the same subject, the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar case (supra) has held: "12. The provision contained in Section 13(1) is on par with the constitutional protection conferred by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The contention is that the obligation on the detaining authority to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention in order not to render it illusory simultaneously obliges the authority to whom the representation is made to consider the same expeditiously. Submission is that a statutory right conferred on the detenu enabling him to make a representation which of necessity must be giving an opportunity to point out to the Government as to why the detention order was not justified and that it must be revoked and the personal liberty deprived under the detention order must be restored, is to convince the Government to take into consideration the facts and contentions set out in the representation, which must imply that the Government must consider the same. The earliest opportunity to be afforded for making representation inheres the corresponding duty of the Government to consider the representation so received expeditiously. The reason behind enacting this provision is manifest. When power to detain without trial is exercised, the authority exercising the power must afford an opportunity to the detenu to convince the Government/detaining authority that the power was not justifiably exercised or no occasion arose for exercise of the power. The reason behind enacting this provision is manifest. When power to detain without trial is exercised, the authority exercising the power must afford an opportunity to the detenu to convince the Government/detaining authority that the power was not justifiably exercised or no occasion arose for exercise of the power. In a punitive detention which is the end product of a trial in which the convict participates and has full opportunity to present his side of the case while preventive detention ordinarily described as jurisdiction based on suspicion does not afford any opportunity to the detenu to explain his side of the matter before he is deprived of the liberty and; therefore, so soon after the detenu is deprived of his personal liberty the statute makes it obligatory on the authorities concerned to afford him an earliest opportunity to represent his side of the case and which inheres the corresponding obligation on the authority to consider the same. The word 'earliest' which qualifies the opportunity must equally qualify the corresponding obligation of the State to deal with the representation if and when made, as expeditiously as possible. The opportunity contemplated by the section is the opportunity to make a representation against the detention order to the Government and therefore ex hypothesis soon after the person is deprived of his personal liberty he must be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation. The representation is to be made to the Government. Therefore the detenu who has already been served with the detention order and thus deprived of his liberty would ordinarily be in a position to send his representation through the jail authorities. The jail authority is merely a communicating channel because the representation has to reach the Government which enjoys the power of revoking the detention order. The intermediary authorities who are communicating authorities have also to move with an amount of promptitude so that the statutory guarantee of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation and the same reaching the Government is translated into action. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. The corresponding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. If the Government enacts a law like the present Act empowering certain authorities to make the detention order and also simultaneously makes a statutory provision of affording the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make his representation against his detention, to the Government and not the detaining authority, of necessity the State Government must gear up its own machinery to see that in these cases the representation reaches the Government as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with equal promptitude. Any slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of the protection conferred by the statute and would result in invalidation of the order." 17. The right to represent, therefore, has been given and guaranteed by both Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 13(1) of the Act. For that reason, the same is to be treated as an extension of the constitutional right already available to a detenu under Article 22(5). The legislature has, in fact, given effect to the constitutional right by providing in Section 13 of the Act that detenu shall have right of making a representation to the government. The matter does not conclude here. The main question relates to early disposal of the representation. The Supreme Court, in a large number of cases, has already laid down the principle in clear and specific terms that the representation has to be disposed of at the earliest and if there has been any delay in the disposal of representation, the reasons for delay must be indicated to the court or else unexplained delay or unsatisfactory explanation in the disposal of the representation, would fatally affect the order of detention, and in that situation, continued detention would become bad. This has been the consistent view of the Supreme Court all along from its decision in Sk. Abdul Karim & others v. State of West Bengal (1969) 1 SCC 433 ; In re: Durga Show and others (1970) 3 SCC 696 ; Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 219 ; Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal (1974) 1 SCC 637 ; Raisuddin @ Babu Tamchi v. State of U.P. & Anr. Abdul Karim & others v. State of West Bengal (1969) 1 SCC 433 ; In re: Durga Show and others (1970) 3 SCC 696 ; Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 219 ; Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal (1974) 1 SCC 637 ; Raisuddin @ Babu Tamchi v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1983) 4 SCC 537 ; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra & Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 275 ; Mohinuddin alias Moin Master v. District Magistrate, Beed & Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 58 ; Rama Dhondu Board v. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police and others (1989) 3 SCC 173 ; Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 277 ; Mahesh Kumar Chauhan alias Banti v. Union of India & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 148 ; Gazi Khan alias Chotia v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (1990) 3 SCC 459 . Almost all these decisions were again looked at and the above view was reiterated and repeated in State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. A Vadivel alias Sundaravadive JT 1992(5) SC 318; K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 476 , Julia Jose Mavely v. Union of India & Ors. (1992) Crl.LJ. 109 SC, and Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2013) 4 SCC 435 . It was provided in these decisions that inordinate and unexplained delay in disposal of representation would make continued detention of a person, illegal and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court even went further ahead in Devi Lal Mahto v. State of Bihar & another AIR (1982) SC 1548, by holding that the detention has become bad on account of indifferent attitude of the Government in not attending to representation for about ten days. 18. Not only this, the Supreme Court in Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh case (supra), proceeded to held that in spite of law laid down repeatedly over the past three decades, the executive, namely, the State Government and its officers continue to behave in their old, lethargic fashion and like all other files rusting in the secretariat for various reasons including red tapism, the representation made by a person deprived of his liberty, continues to be dealt with in the same fashion. The Government and its officers will not give up their habit of maintaining a consistent attitude of lethargy. So also, the Court will not hesitate in quashing the order of detention to restore the "liberty and freedom" to the person whose detention is allowed to become bad by the government itself on account of his representation not being disposed of at the earliest. Same is the situation in the present case. Respondents, with their counter affidavit, have enclosed copy of Government Order No. Home/PB-V/401 of 2017 dated 6th February 2017. It is mentioned therein that on the recommendations of IGP, CID, period of detention of detenu was extended for a further period of three months vide Govt. Order No. Home/PB-V/1579 of 2016 dated 14th October 2016, subject to a decision to be taken on the representation filed by petitioner and vide communication dated 18th October 2016, a copy of representation was forwarded to IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu, for comments/views and that vide reminders dated 20th October 2016 and 17th November 2016, IGP, CID was again requested to favour with comments/views on petitioner's representation. Again vide communication dated 10th January 2017, as is mentioned in the said Government order dated 6th February 2017, IGP, CID, and District Magistrate, Jammu, were requested to submit comments/views and on the recommendation of IGP, CID, period of detention of detenu was again extended for a further period of three months vide Government Order No. Home/PB-V/179 of 2017 dated 14th January 2017. In terms of Government Order No. Home/PB-V/401 of 2017 dated 6th February 2017, petitioner's representation, after inordinate delay, has been rejected by respondent No. 2. There is no reason shown or coming forth from Government Order No. Home/PB-V/401 of 2017 dated 6th February 2017, for delay in disposal of petitioner's representation. Rather than disposing of petitioner's representation at earliest, respondents kept it pending on the ground of non-receipt of comments from IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu. The order dated 16th September 2016 in HCP No. 39/2016, was passed by this Court in presence of learned counsel representing respondents. Rather than disposing of petitioner's representation at earliest, respondents kept it pending on the ground of non-receipt of comments from IGP, CID and District Magistrate, Jammu. The order dated 16th September 2016 in HCP No. 39/2016, was passed by this Court in presence of learned counsel representing respondents. For next little less five months, while respondents did not dispose of petitioner's representation, they passed two orders extending period of detention of detenu and it is only by virtue of third extension order of detention bearing Government Order No. Home/PB-V/401 of 2017 dated 6th February 2017, that respondents have rejected petitioner's representation, which they brought to the notice of this Court by way of their counter affidavit, filed by them on 1st March 2017. This shows glaring example of lethargy on part of respondents, as a result of which petitioner's representation could not be disposed of expeditiously by respondents, with the obvious consequence that petitioner's right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with Section 13 of the Act, has been violated. Same are the views of the Supreme Court as well in Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh case (supra). The Supreme Court held that when it comes to fundamental rights under the Constitution, the Court, irrespective of enormity and gravity of allegations made against detenu, has to intervene as was indicated in Mahesh Kumar Chauhan's case (supra) and Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. District Magistrate, Kamrup and others AIR 1974 SC 183 , wherein it was observed that gravity of evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities, cannot furnish sufficient reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law particularly as normal penal laws would still be available for being invoked rather than keeping a person in detention without trial. 19. Thus, from the above backdrop, the mandatory provisions of law have not been complied with. Respondents rejected petitioner's representation. However, they did not convey information to petitioner as to decision taken by respondents rejecting his representation and they, in result, kept petitioner waiting for the result of representation. This unexplained and inordinate delay in communication also vitiates continued detention. Regard being had to Nihal (Nihal Kasai) v. Union of India & Ors. 2002 (45) ACC 424 (LB), and State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 231 . This unexplained and inordinate delay in communication also vitiates continued detention. Regard being had to Nihal (Nihal Kasai) v. Union of India & Ors. 2002 (45) ACC 424 (LB), and State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 231 . In Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCC 81 , the Supreme Court held that one of the basic requirements of Clause (5) of Article 22 is that the authority making detention order must afford detenu earliest opportunity of making representation against detention order and this requirement would become illusory unless there is a corresponding obligation on the authority to consider the representation of detenu as early as possible and in the event representation is not dealt with as early as possible or as expeditiously as possible, there would be contravention of Section 13 of J & K Public Safety Act, which would result in the invalidation of order of detention. For the reasons discussed above, the petition is allowed and detention order No.)9/PSA of 2016 dated 15th July 2016, passed by District Magistrate, Jammu respondent No. 3, directing detention of Shri Dilbag Singh S/o. Janak Singh R/o Ward No. 4, Simbal Camp at present Makhanpur Gujran Miran Sahib Tehsil R.S. Pura District Jammu, as also extension orders bearing Government order No. Home/PB-V/1579 of 2016 dated 14th October 2016; No. Home/PB-V/179 of 2017 dated 14th January 2017 and No. Home/PB-V/401 of 2017 dated 6th February 2017, are quashed. Respondents are directed to set the detenu at liberty. Disposed of.