ORDER : B. Veerappa, J. The petitioners have field the present writ petitions against the award dated 27.08.2014 Vide Annexure-A made in C.R. Nos. 9,22,24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,42,99,101,103,104 of 2007 and CR. Nos. 25, 27, 28 of 2008 on the file of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court allowing all the 33 references holding that the Management of Mysore Minerals Limited is not justified in terminating the services/premature superannuating/Discharge of services discharge of all of the applicants/workmen and also directed the Management to reinstate them into service/designation that they were holding at the time of impugned termination/discharge from service and to continue their services till they attain the age of superannuation and it also observed that in case of workmen who died before the date of superannuation till the date of their death and pay them 30% of the salary I wages payable to them from the date of their respective references for adjudication with all other consequential benefits that they would have received in the absence of their impugned termination/discharge from service deducting the benefits already given to them and etc., 2. It is the case of the petitioner-Management that the respondents are workmen who worked as mining workers in different units of the petitioner company. The respondents have joined the services of the petitioner company on different dates by giving wrong date of birth and they have not produced any authenticated document in respect of their date of birth and that upon the intervention and recommendation of the Employees Union and also as per rules, the respondents were subjected to medical examination through qualified medical officers. As per the medical report, the respondents who worked as workmen were found to be incapacitated to work in mines due to the age factor and they were unfit medically. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the petitioner-Management took a decision to terminate the services of the respondents after giving an opportunity to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority within 30 days. However the respondents without availing the said opportunity got settled the terminal benefits from the petitioner-Management. 3. Thereafter, after lapse of 7 to 9 years, the respondents raised an individual disputes before the Conciliation Officer of the Central Government. However the respondents without availing the said opportunity got settled the terminal benefits from the petitioner-Management. 3. Thereafter, after lapse of 7 to 9 years, the respondents raised an individual disputes before the Conciliation Officer of the Central Government. After failure of the conciliation proceedings, the Central Government referred the dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Bangalore, for adjudication under the provisions of Clause-(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section-10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947('I.D. Act' for short). The Tribunal permitted both the parties to adduce evidence and marked the documents produced by them in support of their respective cases. The Tribunal after considering the entire material on record directed the petitioner-Management to reinstate the respondents in terms of the impugned Award. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-Management filed the present writ petitions. 4. Some respondents though served, have remained unrepresented. The writ petitions against respondent Nos. 14 and 24 stands abated. Notice to respondents Nos. 9, 11, 19, 21, 30 and 32 dispensed with vide order dated 17.06.2016. 5. I have heard Sri. L. Venkatarama Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court failed to consider that as per the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and Mines Rules, 1955, every employee employed at Mines required to undergo periodical medical examination to ascertain their physical fitness to work at Mines. The said aspect has not been considered by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The learned counsel for petitioner-Management further contended that the respondents after termination got settled their respective terminal benefits with the petitioner and received the entire terminal benefits and after 7 to 9 years, they have raised the dispute. The Tribunal entertained the dispute even though there was delay in raising the dispute and proceeded to pass the impugned award erroneously. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner-Management has raised objections regarding delay in raising the dispute and receipt of terminal benefits by the respondents/workmen in the written statement filed by it to the claim petition filed by the respondents/workmen. The Tribunal without considering the objections and without considering the evidence adduced on behalf of the Management with regard to the receipt of the terminal benefits by all the respondents, proceeded to pass the impugned Award erroneously. The Tribunal without considering the objections and without considering the evidence adduced on behalf of the Management with regard to the receipt of the terminal benefits by all the respondents, proceeded to pass the impugned Award erroneously. In support of his contention regarding delay, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others AIR 2000 SC 839 (1), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though the law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the I.D. Act, it does not mean that the power can be exercised at any point of time; A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the I.D. Act; As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore he sought to allow the writ petitions by setting the impugned award passed by the Tribunal in all these cases. 8. In view of the aforesaid contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the only point that arises for consideration in all these writ petitions is: "Whether the Tribunal is justified in passing the impugned Award by setting aside the termination orders with a direction to the petitioner to reinstate the respondents and continue their services till they attain the age of superannuation and grant other consequential benefits, in the facts and circumstances of the present case?" 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the entire material on record carefully. 10. It is an undisputed fact that the respondents are workmen who worked as mining workers in different units of the petitioner company. The respondents have joined the services of the petitioner company on different dates by giving wrong date of birth. After coming to know the said fact, the Management in terms of the rules, conducted medical examination through qualified medical officials in respect of all the workmen and on the basis of the medical report submitted by the competent authority, they have terminated the services of the respondents holding that they were not fit to continue in the mining industry. After coming to know the said fact, the Management in terms of the rules, conducted medical examination through qualified medical officials in respect of all the workmen and on the basis of the medical report submitted by the competent authority, they have terminated the services of the respondents holding that they were not fit to continue in the mining industry. According to the petitioner, after termination, all the respondents have received all the terminal benefits. It is the specific case of the petitioner before the Tribunal that there was an inordinate delay of about 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute and the respondents have received the entire terminal benefits and therefore the very dispute raised is a stale dispute and is not alive as on the date of the dispute raised by the respondents. 11. Though the petitioner has raised a specific contention in the objections and adduced the evidence and produced the material documents in support of its contentions, the Tribunal has not considered the same while passing the impugned Award. The Tribunal only on the basis of the evidence of MW. 1, has proceeded to hold that the termination is bad and the petitioner - Management is not justified in terminating the services of the respondents. The material on record clearly indicates that the Tribunal has not considered the delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute and has also not recorded any finding whether the dispute was alive as on the date of the dispute raised. It is also not in dispute that though the law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the I.D. Act, it does not mean that the power can be exercised at any point of time. The words, "at any time" used in Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act do not mean that the laws of limitation are not applicable to the proceedings under the I.D. Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Tribunal while considering the dispute has to record reasons and give a finding as to whether the claim is still alive or has become stale. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Tribunal while considering the dispute has to record reasons and give a finding as to whether the claim is still alive or has become stale. In the present case, the Tribunal has not recorded any finding with regard to the existence of the industrial dispute between the parties for adjudication. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another AIR 2016 SC 2984 while considering the provisions of Section 10(l)(a) of the I.D. Act, has held as under: "42.1 An Industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2 Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. 42.2 Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3 Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workmen to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, not withstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4 Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5 Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the civil court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal 18 service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6 In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the Act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "Industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted." 13. A careful reading of the entire impugned Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court does not disclose the consideration of the delay in raising the dispute. It is the specific contention of the petitioner before the Tribunal that the respondents have received all the terminal benefits and once they have accepted the termination after receiving the entire terminal benefits, there cannot be any dispute for re-adjudication. It is the specific contention of the petitioner before the Tribunal that the respondents have received all the terminal benefits and once they have accepted the termination after receiving the entire terminal benefits, there cannot be any dispute for re-adjudication. The said aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Tribunal and no finding is recorded by the Tribunal with regard to the existence of dispute between the parties. Further, the Tribunal has not appreciated the evidence adduced and the documents produced by both the parties in the proper perspective. In the absence of the same, the impugned Award passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law. 14. In view of the above, all the point raised in the present writ petition has to be held in the negative holding that the Tribunal is not justified in passing the impugned Award by setting aside the termination orders passed by the disciplinary authority/petitioner and also not justified in reinstating the respondents into service and granting them consequential benefits. 15. For the reasons stated above, all the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned Award vide Annexure-A dated 27.08.2014 made in C.R. Nos. 9, 22, 16. All the contentions of both the parties are left open.