Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1565 (GUJ)

Kiran Babulal Shah v. R. K Tripathi or His Successor in Office

2017-09-04

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.S SUPEHIA, J. 1. Present petition assails the order of compulsory retirement dated 30.09.2004 retiring the petitioner compulsory at the age of 55 years. The said order is passed under Chapter-4 of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Manual Vol.2 which is issued under Section 465(1)(g) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. 2. The petitioner was appointed in the service of the respondent Corporation as Section Officer on 21.06.1972 Thereafter, he was promoted Assistant City Engineer on 12.12.1980, further promoted as Deputy City Engineer in December, 1990 and lastly, promoted as Additional City Engineer in the Year-1997. Thereafter, a charge-sheet came to be issued to the petitioner on 10.07.2001 by the respondent-Corporation for the alleged negligence in performance of his duties as Additional City Engineer. A Specific allegation was levelled against him in respect of heavy rainy water accumulated near Odhav Fire Brigade Circle due to which the local residents had to face tremendous difficulties. The petitioner accordingly submitted his reply on 21.06.2001 explaining the entire situation and the said departmental inquiry was pending at the stage of examination of witnesses. Another charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner on 10.07.2002 in respect of dereliction and negligence in performance of the duties when the petitioner was working as Additional City Engineer in the East Zone Engineering Department of the respondent Corporation. A specific allegation was levelled against the petitioner that he recommended higher rate for removing silt from the drainage line to the Contractor. The said inquiry was also not completed and it was at the stage of submission of the inquiry report. 3. Ms. Mohini Bhavsar, learned advocate for Mr. Bharat Jani, learned advocate for the petitioner has stated that during the pendency of the aforesaid two departmental inquiries, all of a sudden the respondent passed a Resolution bearing G.D Est No. H/3332 on 30.09.2004 stating that as per the decision taken on the same by the Review Committee, the petitioner is prematurely retired (compulsory retired) after office hours of 30.09.2004 by dropping the departmental inquiries pending against him. Recovery of the dues of the Municipal Corporation from the retirement benefits was also ordered. 4. Learned advocate Ms. Recovery of the dues of the Municipal Corporation from the retirement benefits was also ordered. 4. Learned advocate Ms. Bhavsar has placed reliance on the Regulation No. 455-2003/2004 of the Corporation dated 08.03.2004, stating that with the rules of state government will apply with respect to all the employees Class-I and II Officers of the Corporation who are sought to be compulsory retired on attaining age of 50-55 years age. Thus, Ms. Bhavsar has contended that the provision made in Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services rules, 1959 will apply to the petitioner. She has stated that as per the provisions of Rule 161(1)(a) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, the appointing authority has to form an opinion that it would be in the public interest to compulsory retire any officer, and such order can be passed after giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. She has stated that no such notice was at all issued to the present petitioner, hence, the order compulsory retiring the petitioner from the service is against the aforesaid provision hence, the same is liable to quash and set aside. 5. She has also stated that order of compulsory retirement was issued on 30.09.2004 on the basis of the decision taken by the Review committee on 30.09.2004 stating that the petitioner stands retired after the office hours of 30.09.2004 She has stated that the impugned order is passed in due haste, since on the very same day the respondent constituted a Review Committee, assessed the record of the petitioner, and in order to avoid department inquiry, the same was passed. 6. She has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 1999 (2) GLR 1453 in the case of Narendrakumar V. Parikh v. State of Gujarat, wherein this Court has taken a view that when the order of compulsory retirement is passed when departmental enquiry for misconduct is pending, the order can be said absolutely bad in law and can be said to be punitive in nature. 7. She has also placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2003 (1) G.L.H 466 in the case of J.K Rasonia v. Gujarat Housing Board. 7. She has also placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2003 (1) G.L.H 466 in the case of J.K Rasonia v. Gujarat Housing Board. She referred to Paragraph No. 5.1 and contended that the very fundamental foundation of the exercise of the power is not only the existence of such an opinion, but the existence of such an opinion which is both expressed and reflected in the resultant order. There must be both form of opinion on the part of the appointing authority and also expression of the opinion on his part before the power of compulsory retirement can be exercised. 8. She has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 1991 (1) G.L.H 361 in the case of J.M Mehta v. State of Gujarat holding that if the order of premature retirement is found to be made camouflage for order of dismissal/removal, the said impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside on the ground that it is in violation of Art.311 of the Constitution of India. She has also urged that the petitioner was never communicated any adverse remark in his entire service career, and if Review committee has taken into consideration the adverse remarks appearing in the service book of the petitioner and when the same is not communicated to the petitioner, the decision of compulsory retiring him on the basis of which adverse remarks is absolutely bad in law and is in violation of Art.311 of the Constitution of India. 9. She has placed reliance on the judgment reported in (2001) 3 SCC 314 in the case of State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that ordinarily the order of the compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. However, the said order shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is not desirable. 10. Per contra, Ms. Disha Nanavati learned advocate for Mr. Mitual Shelat, learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation has urged that impugned order does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. She has stated that Review Committee has compulsorily retired the petitioner from the service after considering his entire service record. 10. Per contra, Ms. Disha Nanavati learned advocate for Mr. Mitual Shelat, learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation has urged that impugned order does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. She has stated that Review Committee has compulsorily retired the petitioner from the service after considering his entire service record. She has stated that the authority is competent to prematurely retired the employee despite the fact that the inquiry is pending against him. She has relied upon affidavit filed by the respondent-Corporation, wherein is incorporated that decision to prematurely retire the petitioner is based upon the entire service record of the petitioner and is not in the nature of punishment on account of the allegation made against him in the inquiries referred to herein above. The municipality, after considering the report of the committee and other factors indicated in the regulation has taken a decision to prematurely retire the petitioner. She has placed reliance on the judgment reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299 in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada for the proposition of law that an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of mis-behaviour. Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retire. Since the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective sanctification of the government, there is no room for importing the audi alteram partem rule of the natural justice in such a case. 11. She has further placed reliance on the judgment reported in (2012) 8 SCC 58 , in the case of R.C Chandel v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, more particularly Paragraph No. 19 for the same proposition of law that an order of compulsory retirement being not an order of adverse consequence, principles of natural justice have no application. 12. In view of the said proposition of law, she has contended that there was no necessity of issuing any notice to the petitioner before compulsory retiring him from service. The report of the committee was suffice to pass the order of compulsory retiring the petitioner from the service. Hence, she has urged that the same may not be interfered by this Court. 13. Heard learned advocates for the parties at length. The report of the committee was suffice to pass the order of compulsory retiring the petitioner from the service. Hence, she has urged that the same may not be interfered by this Court. 13. Heard learned advocates for the parties at length. I have perused the documents on record. 14. A close scrutiny of the impugned order dated 30.09.2004 will reveal that the same is passed pending two departmental inquiries against the petitioner. It also reveals that Review Committee met on the 30.9.2004, and the order is also passed on the same day i.e on 30.09.2004 The order portrays the haste shown by the respondent-Corporation while adopting short-cut to put an end to the service of the petitioner when the departmental proceedings were pending against him. It seems that in order to cut short the departmental proceedings, the petitioner was compulsory retired and further recovery from the retirement benefits were also ordered. 15. At this, it would be opposite to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 314 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the issue of compulsory retirement under Rule 161(1)(aa)(i) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959, (now Rule 10 of Sub Rule 4 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002 has broadly summerized the law relating to compulsory retirement which reads thus: “11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles, which could be broadly summarised thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead-wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even un-communicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (v) Even un-communicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.” 16. The principle analogous at Clause No. VI of the said Paragraph clearly stipulates that the order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. Clause No. VII of the said Paragraph clearly stipulates that if the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. Clause No. VIII of the said Paragraph clearly stipulates that compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure. In presence case, undisputed fact remains that the petitioner was not communicated any adverse remark in his confidential report. He was regularly promoted on the posts. Two charge-sheets were issued against him for holding departmental inquiry which had substantially at the stage of pay finalization. Thus, it can be said that the impugned order of compulsory retirement is passed as a punitive measure in order to cut-short or to avoid the departmental inquiry pending against the petitioner. The action of the respondent-corporation is in clear violation of the law explicated by the Apex Court in the foregoing judgment, hence, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 17. It is no more res integra that the order of compulsory retirement is not a penalty order and the same can be passed keeping in view entire service record of employee even communicated adverse remark can be considered while compulsory retiring an employee from the service. There can be no cavil on the proposition of law as canvassed by learned Advocate Ms. Nanavati that compulsory retirement being not an order of adverse consequence, principles of natural justice have no application. 18. Learned advocate Ms. Nanavati has also pointed out that the petitioner was paid three months pay allowances as per the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002 and also paid all the retirement benefits. Nanavati that compulsory retirement being not an order of adverse consequence, principles of natural justice have no application. 18. Learned advocate Ms. Nanavati has also pointed out that the petitioner was paid three months pay allowances as per the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002 and also paid all the retirement benefits. The petitioner had accepted the same, and thereafter, he has challenged present order. She has stated that in view of such position, the petitioner is precluded from challenging the order of compulsory retirement, after accepting all his retirement benefits on 12.01.2005 19. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned advocate Ms. Bhavsar has pointed the receipt produced at Annexure-I, Page No. 69, which shows that the petitioner while accepting the said benefits has made endorsement stating that “Without prejudice to my right to challenge the order GDEST No. 3332 DATED 30.09.2004 Thus, the contentions raised by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation that the petitioner was precluded from challenging his compulsory retirement, after accepting all his retirement benefits, is misconceived in wake of his endorsement on the receipt. 20. Learned advocate Ms. Nanavati as submitted that even if the impugned order is set aside by this Court, the petitioner would not be entitled to any benefits on the principle of “No Work No Pay”, as the petitioner has not worked from the date of impugned order till his actual retirement. 21. At that juncture, it would be opposite to refer the judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. Union of India, reported in AIR 2015 SC 2907, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in appropriate cases, a court of law may take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no pay” would not be attracted where the respondent were in fault in not consider the case of the appellant for promotion and not allowing the appellant to work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher pay-scale. 22. Thus, as per the observations made by the Apex Court the facts in entirety are to be taken in account before allowing the back wages. In present case, the petitioner was facing two departmental inquiries when he was compulsory retired from the service. The said departmental inquiries were dropped and were not taken to its logical end. 22. Thus, as per the observations made by the Apex Court the facts in entirety are to be taken in account before allowing the back wages. In present case, the petitioner was facing two departmental inquiries when he was compulsory retired from the service. The said departmental inquiries were dropped and were not taken to its logical end. In the event if the charges would have been proved, it would have attracted some penalty. At this stage, after passage of 13 years, it would not be apposite to direct the respondents to restart the department inquiries or to re-initiate the same. 23. In view of foregoing observations and reasons, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has carved out a fit case for exercising the discretion conferred upon this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the impugned order dated 30.09.2004 is quashed and set aside. The petitioner will not be entitled to actual salary from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of his superannation i.e 31.12.2006 However, his pension and retirement benefits shall be revised on the basis of notional pay, which shall be fixed by granting him regular increments for the said period. Necessary consequential benefits shall be calculated, and paid to the petitioner within a period of three months from today. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.