JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for commanding upon the respondents to immediately remove the seal from the lease hold premises of the petitioner and further not to disturb with the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the said premises. 3. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner is an unregistered society having its school of physical education situated at Mouza Hirapur, P.O and P.S Dhanbad, District Dhanbad under Khata No. 91, Plot No. 1118, area 20 Katha 8 Chatak (hereinafter referred to as “the said land”). The District Board, Dhanbad vide Resolution dated 20.03.1938 had given possession of the said land to the petitioner, which was subsequently approved by the State Government and thereafter, the petitioner paid the rent of the premises. During the period 1970, the petitioner was in financial crisis and as such, it constructed four shops in the front side of the said land on an area of approx. 500 sq.ft. and the income derived from it was used for running the school of physical education. In the year 1978, an encroachment proceeding was started against the petitioner vide B.P.L.E Case No. 9 of 1979 before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Dhanbad, which ended with passing of the order dated 17.08.1979, whereby the petitioner was directed to remove the encroachment over the said land. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner filed appeal being M.R.A No. 87 of 1979 in the court of Additional Collector, Dhanbad and vide order dated 12.11.1981, the order of the learned L.R.D.C was modified to the extent that the petitioner was directed to remove the encroachment only from that portion of the land upon which shops were constructed. The President of the petitioner, thereafter, filed writ petition being C.W.J.C No. 1873 of 1981(R) before Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 04.01.1982. Pursuant to the order dated 04.01.1982 in C.W.J.C. No. 1873 of 1981(R), a notice was served to the President of the petitioner on 13.07.1988 to remove the encroachment i.e., the four newly constructed shops on the part of the said land. Since then, the petitioner had no concern with 4 shops constructed over an area of 500 sq.ft. on the land in question. Since then, the petitioner had no concern with 4 shops constructed over an area of 500 sq.ft. on the land in question. However, the said shops were not removed by the Zila Parishad, Dhanbad, rather rents from the said shops were being realized by the Zila Parishad itself which used to be earlier collected by the petitioner. The respondent no. 3 again issued notice dated 13.07.1998 to the petitioner with a direction to remove all the constructions over the said land, but subsequently no step was taken pursuant to the notice. However, vide notice dated 17.03.2005 (Annexure7 to the writ petition), the respondent no. 3 – Zila Parishad, Dhanbad, once again referring to order passed by Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court dated 04.01.1982 in C.W.J.C. No. 1873 of 1981(R), directed the petitioner to vacate the land in question and finally on 09.06.2005, sealed the said premises in presence of the Executive Magistrate as well as the Police Force which gives rise to filing of the present writ petition. 4. During the pendency of the writ petition, one Prem Kumar filed intervention application being I.A No. 3852 of 2013 which was allowed vide order dated 17.10.2013 and thereafter, he was impleaded as respondent no. 4. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been in peaceful possession of the land since 1938 by virtue of a licence and paid rent continuously to the respondent no. 3. It is further submitted that the licence of the petitioner was cancelled without any notice and the premises has been forcefully sealed without taking recourse of law. It is further submitted that it is wrong to say that the respondent no. 3 is in need of land for construction of its office building, rather it intended to use the property for construction of marketing complex. The respondent no. 4 has been set up by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 in order to defeat the legitimate claim of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 4 or his ancestors never came in possession of the said land or paid any rent. The respondent no. 4 has been set up by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 in order to defeat the legitimate claim of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 4 or his ancestors never came in possession of the said land or paid any rent. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the President of the petitioner had preferred C.W.J.C. No. 1873 of 1981(R) against the order passed by the Additional Collector, Dhanbad-cum-Appellate Authority under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the B.P.L.E. Act”), whereby the part of the land in question was found to be encroached by constructing 4 (four) shops. It was clearly held by the Additional Collector, Dhanbad vide order dated 12.11.1981 that the District Board was not justified in cancelling licence with respect to that portion of the land which was directly in occupation of the Hirapur School of Physical Education. It was, therefore, ordered by the Additional Collector to remove the encroachment from that part of the land on which 4 shops/stalls were constructed. It appears that the Zila Parishad, Dhanbad misconstrued the order passed by the Additional Collector, DhanbadcumAppellate Authority under B.P.L.E Act as well as by the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1873 of 1981(R). The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the letter dated 29.08.1962, which is said to have been issued by the then Administrator, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad to the grandfather of the respondent no. 4 appears to be a manufactured document as the land encroachment proceeding initiated in the year 1979 and the order passed therein does not show that the said document was in existence. Even if the said letter dated 29.08.1962 is taken to be true, the respondent no. 4 had never been in possession over the said land. The counteraffidavit filed by the respondent no. 4 also indicates that the respondent no. 4 had not been in possession of the land in question. 6. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following judgments: i. Union Club, Dhanbad Vs. State of Jharkhand [Civil Appeal No. 6626 of 2012] ii. Masonic Lodge Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in 2001 (1) JLJR 67 7. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 6. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following judgments: i. Union Club, Dhanbad Vs. State of Jharkhand [Civil Appeal No. 6626 of 2012] ii. Masonic Lodge Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in 2001 (1) JLJR 67 7. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submits that the land in question i.e., MouzaHirapur, Thana No.7, Khata No.91, Plot No.1118, Area20.08 Katha, DistrictDhanbad was permanently settled vide Letter No. 1130/DB dated 29.08.1962 by the then Administrator, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad in favour of the grandfather of the respondent no. 4 namely, Late Chamru Ram and annual rent was fixed at Rs. 50/per month with a further condition that 5% interest per annum would be chargeable on default in payment of annual rent which had also got the sanction of the State Government. In the year 1962, a measurement of property was done with the help of Amin of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad and the then Administrator of Dhanbad Zila Parishad wrote a letter to the said grandfather of the respondent no. 4 being Letter No. 1107/Zi.Pa. dated 26.09.1962, consenting to the construction of boundary wall around the property in question and also other constructions as per the settlee's wishes and needs. The settlee regularly paid the rent to the District Board/Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 4 was out of Dhanbad for earning his livelihood and in the month of August 2012, he came to know about the ownership of the property and then requested the Zila Parishad, Dhanbad for returning back the said land, however, the Zila Parishad did not pay any heed to the matter. It is further submitted that neither the petitioner nor the respondentZila Parishad is the true owner of the said land. Actually, the respondent no. 4 is the real owner and rightful claimant of the said land. It is further submitted that the action of the respondent no. 3 is collusive as both the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 deliberately indulged themselves in collusive action just to deprive the respondent no. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submits that the petitioner cannot contend that the letter dated 29.08.1962 issued by the then Administrator, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad to the grandfather of the respondent no. 4 is a forged document. 3 deliberately indulged themselves in collusive action just to deprive the respondent no. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submits that the petitioner cannot contend that the letter dated 29.08.1962 issued by the then Administrator, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad to the grandfather of the respondent no. 4 is a forged document. It is further submitted that a matter involving serious disputed question of facts should not be adjudicated by the High Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, the learned counsel puts reliance on the following judgments: (i) “Gunwant Kaur Vs. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda” [ (1969) 3 SCC 769 ] (ii) “Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot” [ (1974) 2 SCC 706 ] (iii) “State of Karnataka Vs. KGSD Canteen Employees' Welfare Assn.” [ (2006) 1 SCC 567 ] (iv) “Real Estate Agencies Vs. State of Goa” [ (2012) 12 SCC 170 ] 8. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that earlier the District Board, Dhanbad was the owner of the said land and subsequently, nomenclature of the District Board has been changed to Zila Parishad and as such, now the Zila Parishad, Dhanbad is the real owner of the said land. The respondent no. 3 is in need of the said land for construction of office building and as such, it issued notice to the petitioner on 29.03.2005, but the petitioner neither received nor replied the notice and as such, after expiry of 10 days’ time, the licence was cancelled. As per the revenue record with respect to the said land, the name of the Zila Parishad, Dhabad is still there. It is further submitted that when the matter was inquired through the Amin, he submitted report dated 16.12.2016 stating that the said land was allotted to Late Chamru Ram who inducted the petitioner on some portion of the land and after the death of Late Chamru Ram, the petitioner continued to use said land perhaps due to ignorance and wrong impression of the then officials of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. The learned counsel further submits that so far as the claim of the respondent no. 4 is concerned, it is a disputed question of fact and the same cannot be adjudicated in the writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent no. The learned counsel further submits that so far as the claim of the respondent no. 4 is concerned, it is a disputed question of fact and the same cannot be adjudicated in the writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 also submits that Annexure1 series to the writ petition shows that the rent receipts were only issued for 9 “Kattha” of land in place of 20 “Kattha”, 8 “Chattak”, as has been claimed by the petitioner in the writ petition. The petitioner has also not brought on record any rent receipt from 1938 till 1973 to establish that it has been in possession of the land in question since 1938 as claimed. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that the present issue involves complicated question of facts. Moreover, there being inter se factual dispute between the parties, this Court should refrain from entertaining the present writ petition. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 puts reliance on the following judgments: (i) “The State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Rajasaheb Chandanmull Indrakumar (P) Ltd. & Anr.” [AIR 1972 Orissa 40 (FB)] (ii) “State of Kerala & Ors. Vs. M.K. Jose” [2015 (4) JCR 161 (SC)] (iii) “Noble Resources Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa & Anr.” [ (2006) 10 SCC 236 ] 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on going through the relevant documents placed on record, it appears that initially, the said land belonged to the District Board and after coming into existence of Zila Parishad, the same devolved in it. Now, the Zila Parishad is willing to take possession of the said land on the ground that it requires the said land for construction of its office building. Both the petitioner and the respondent no. 4 are claiming that the said land was settled to them by the District Board, Dhanbad. The petitioner is claiming that the District Board, Dhanbad vide Resolution dated 20.03.1938 had given possession of the said land to the petitioner, which was subsequently approved by the State Government, however, it has not filed any document to show its legal possession over the said land since 1938. However, the order passed by the Additional Collector on 12.11.1981 as well as letter/notice dated 29.03.2005 contained in Letter No. 189(A) (Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit of respondent no. However, the order passed by the Additional Collector on 12.11.1981 as well as letter/notice dated 29.03.2005 contained in Letter No. 189(A) (Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit of respondent no. 3 dated 26.09.2006) indicate that the Zila Parishad itself is treating the use of the said land by the petitioner on the basis of licence given to him by the Zila Parishad. The petitioner, in support of its contention, has filed rent receipts of the years 1963, 1969 and 1992 (rents for the years 1962-63, 1969-70 and 1991-92 respectively) granted to it by the Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. On the other hand, the respondent no. 4 also claimed that the said land was permanently settled in favour of his grandfather in the year 1962 and in support of his claim, he filed the settlement letter as well as rent receipt issued by Zila Parishad, Dhanbad for the year 1962-64. 10. Be that as it may, the issue in the writ petition is not as to who is legally entitled to own the land in question. The issue for determination in the writ petition is that as to whether the action of the respondent no. 3 in evicting the petitioner from the land in question and locking/sealing the premises has been done after adopting a lawful procedure. It is clear that earlier a land encroachment proceeding being B.P.L.E Case No. 9 of 1979 was initiated against the petitioner with respect to the said land which was decided by the L.R.D.C, Dhanbad directing the petitioner to vacate the said land. However, in appeal, the Additional Collector modified the order of the L.R.D.C and directed the petitioner to vacate only that portion of land on which 4 shops were constructed. The respondent no. 3 never challenged the order of the Additional Collector, however, the petitioner filed writ being C.W.J.C No. 1873 of 1981(R) which was dismissed vide order dated 04.01.1982. Thus, after the dismissal of the writ petition, the order dated 12.11.1981 passed in M.R.A No. 87 of 1979 became final. Consequently, the legal position is that the respondent no. 3 is entitled to take the possession of only that portion of land upon which the shops have been constructed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also fairly submitted before this Court that it is not claiming any right over that portion of the land. 11. Consequently, the legal position is that the respondent no. 3 is entitled to take the possession of only that portion of land upon which the shops have been constructed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also fairly submitted before this Court that it is not claiming any right over that portion of the land. 11. Now, coming to the manner in which the licence of the petitioner was cancelled and the premises was sealed by the respondent no. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has contended that the respondent no. 3 had issued notice to the petitioner giving 10 days’ time to reply the same, but the petitioner neither chose to reply it nor appeared before the authority and as such, after expiry of 10 days, the licence was cancelled vide memo no. 239 dated 19.04.2005 and thereafter, the premises was sealed. The respondent no. 3 in proof of service of notice has filed two receipts (Annexure C and C/1) which is the private document of the respondent no. 3. The petitioner, on the other hand, has denied the issuance of any notice to it. It was upon the respondent no. 3 to prove that the notice was duly served upon the petitioner before cancelling the licence, which it failed to prove. A very well-known maxim governing the principle of natural justice is that “justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” and the administrative authorities are also bound to follow the said principle. 12. Now, the question that falls for consideration before this Court is as to whether a person who is in settled possession of the land with the approval of the respondents by issuing rent receipts, can be dispossessed summarily. In the case cited by the petitioner “Union Club, Dhanbad” (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus, “We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length. The material facts are not in dispute before us. It is not in dispute that the land underlying the structure raised by the appellant club belongs to Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. It is also not in dispute that the Club claims no title over the said land. The material facts are not in dispute before us. It is not in dispute that the land underlying the structure raised by the appellant club belongs to Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. It is also not in dispute that the Club claims no title over the said land. The Club simply claims to have been put in possession of the premises on the basis of a lease said to have been executed in its favour in the year 1955 for the first time and renewed from time to time. The fact that the Club has constructed an extensive building over the site in its occupation is also not in dispute between the parties. These buildings include the Club Building, a Swimming Pool, a Health Club, a Guest House and other facilities for the guests/occupants for their entertainment and for the benefit of its members. The short question that falls for our determination is whether the respondents could have forcibly and without any proceedings before the competent court or authority evicted the appellant club. We are told by counsel for the appearing for the appellant that upon dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the respondents have locked the club premises and the shops which has the effect of dispossessing the club and the occupants of the shops, who have been inducted by the club. We fail to understand how the respondents could have done so. Once a party is found to be in established possession of any State owned property or property owned by an instrumentality of the State, the owner shall have to resort to appropriate proceedings for getting the premises vacated in accordance with the procedure established by law. Neither the State nor its agencies can summarily evict the occupants with the show or use of force. Eviction of an occupant in established possession like the case at hand can be justified only if the State or its instrumentality takes proceedings in accordance with the procedure established by law. No such proceedings have been initiated in this case. All that the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad has done is to issue a letter asking the Club to vacate the premises in question failing which it would be thrown out forcibly. No such proceedings have been initiated in this case. All that the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad has done is to issue a letter asking the Club to vacate the premises in question failing which it would be thrown out forcibly. The said letter does not comply with the basic requirements of a notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 or any analogous provision that may be applicable. The action taken does not even tantamount to termination of the tenancy which the appellant Club claims in its favour. It was contended that the lease deed set up by the Club is not registered. If that be so the Club may not have the benefit of a contractual period of tenancy in its favour but the execution of the lease, if proved could be relied upon to show the nature of the possession of the Club for the purpose of creating and/or proving a month-to-month tenancy in its favour. Termination of a month to month tenancy would in turn require a proper notice to be served upon the Club in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. No such notice has been admittedly issued so far. Suffice it to say that the communication issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer does not satisfy the legal requirement of a valid termination of the tenancy claimed by the Club. Even if the execution of the lease deed itself is denied by the respondents, law would require legal proceedings to be initiated against the occupant before it can be evicted from the premises in question. Putting locks on the Club premises in the circumstances was wholly unjustified, arbitrary and uncalled for. The authorities appear to have given a go-bye to the elementary rules of procedure to be followed in such situations and taken action which was wholly illegal just because there was an allegation that the appellant Club had illegally occupied government land. It follows that the High Court fell in error in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the same involved disputed questions of fact.” 13. A Bench of this Court in the case of “Masonic Lodge” (supra) has held as under: “8. It follows that the High Court fell in error in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the same involved disputed questions of fact.” 13. A Bench of this Court in the case of “Masonic Lodge” (supra) has held as under: “8. 1 fail to understand as to under what authority of law the respondents, namely, the District Administration, forcibly put a lock in the premises and dispossessed the petitioner by opening a revenue office. The highhandedness of the respondents and misuse and abuse of power for extraneous reasons has exposed them and proved that the authorities are not following the rule of law. The Administrative action must be exercised objectively, rationally, fairly and non-arbitrarily. It should not be taken in due haste disregarding the procedures nor it should be ultra vires the powers conferred by the Statute. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and Ors., 1991 (4) SCC 54 . 9. In the case of Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 , the Apex Court held that it is well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. 10. In the case of Samir Sobha Sanyal v. Tracks Trade Private Ltd. and Ors., 1996 (4) S1 CC 144, the Apex Court in similar circumstance observed as under: "Even with regard to that we are not impressed with the same. Since the letter of the law should be strictly adhered to, we find that highhanded action taken by respondents 2 and 3 and 4 in having the appellant dispossessed without due process of law, cannot be overlooked nor condoned. The Court cannot blink at their unlawful conduct to dispossess the appellant from the demised property and would say that the status quo be maintained. If the Court gives acceptance to such highhanded action, there will be no respect for rule of law and unlawful elements would take hold of the due process of law for ransom and it would be a field day for anarchy. If the Court gives acceptance to such highhanded action, there will be no respect for rule of law and unlawful elements would take hold of the due process of law for ransom and it would be a field day for anarchy. Due process of law would be put to ridicule in the estimate of the law abiding citizens and rule of law would remain a mortuary. 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12. For all these reasons I allow this application by passing the followings order (i) the respondents/District Administration immediately and forthwith within 24 hours shall unlock the premises of Masonic Lodge and hand over the possession of the same to the petitioner. (ii) The respondents-State of Jharkhand shall pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/(twenty five thousand) to the petitioner by way of compensation for the loss, damages and mischief committed by them with the property in question by dispossessing the petitioner from the said property. (iii) If the amount of compensation is not paid within two weeks from today the petitioner shall be entitled to execute this order as if it is a decree of a Court of law. Let a copy of this order be immediately communicated by fax by the Registrar of this Court to the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad. 14. From the above judgments, it would appear that if a person is in settled possession of the property over a period of time, even on the assumption that he had no right on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner except by taking recourse of law. Forceful dispossession by the executive authority is the misuse and abuse of the power which should be avoided. The administrative action must be exercised objectively, fairly and non-arbitrarily. On this score alone, the action of the respondent authority is liable to be quashed. In the present case, there has been dispute between the parties regarding respective possession of land. It is also in dispute as to whether the petitioner is in possession of the land having area of 20 “Kattha”, 8 “Chattak” or 9 “Kattha”. It is made clear that neither the right/title nor the area of land possessed by the petitioner is under determination in the present writ petition as it has already been observed hereinbefore that the present writ petition is confined to the issue as to whether the procedure adopted by the respondent no. It is made clear that neither the right/title nor the area of land possessed by the petitioner is under determination in the present writ petition as it has already been observed hereinbefore that the present writ petition is confined to the issue as to whether the procedure adopted by the respondent no. 3 in evicting the petitioner from the land in question pursuant to the notice dated 17.03.2005 is lawful. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 and respondent no. 4 have cited judgments in support of their submission that the scope of judicial review by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited while dealing with the matters involving complicated question of facts in contractual matters. However, in the present case, the issue for determination is only as to whether the respondent no. 3 has adopted lawful procedure in evicting the petitioner from the land in question. Thus, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 and respondent no. 4 are not applicable in the fact situation of the present case. 15. Consequently, I find that the manner in which the petitioner was evicted from the premises in question and the same was locked and sealed at the instance of the respondent no. 3, is illegal and arbitrary and thus, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 16. The writ petition is allowed. The respondent no. 3 is directed to remove the lock/seal from the premises of the petitioner forthwith. However, the respondent no. 3 is at liberty to take appropriate recourse against the petitioner in accordance with law after following the due procedure. So far as respondent no. 4 is concerned, he is at liberty to take recourse before the civil court of competent jurisdiction. 17. In view of the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ petition is accordingly disposed of.