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2017 DIGILAW 158 (HP)

Dila Ram v. Rekha Devi

2017-03-10

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR

body2017
Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is award, dated 15th December, 2011, made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal") in MACT No. 21 of 2005, titled as Rekha Devi and others versus Dila Ram and another, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.8,97,000/with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization came to be awarded in favour of the claimants and the respondents in the claim petition were saddled with liability (for short “the impugned award”). 2. The claimants and the driver of the offending vehicle have not questioned the impugned award on any count, thus, has attained finality so far it relates to them. 3. The appellant-owner-insured of the offending vehicle has called in question the impugned award on the grounds taken in the memo of the appeal. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant-owner-insured, argued that the vehicle in question was not involved in the accident and the claimants have failed to prove the factum of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle. Further argued that the amount awarded is excessive. 6. In order to determine this appeal, it is necessary to give a brief resume of the facts of the case, which have given birth to the instant appeal. 7. The claimants invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”) for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.15,00,000/, as per the breakups given in the claim petition, on the ground that they became the victim of the vehicular accident, which was caused by the driver, namely Shri Inder Dev, while driving tractor, bearing registration No. HP332405, rashly and negligently on 28th July, 2002, at place Garkotha and hit the stationary motorcycle, on which deceased-Ram Lal was travelling as a pillion rider, due to which he sustained injuries, was taken to CHC Ratti, from where he was referred to Zonal Hospital, Mandi and thereafter, was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, where he remained admitted upto 16th September, 2002. Further averred that deceased-Ram Lal again remained admitted at Zonal Hospital, Mandi, with effect from 14th October, 2002 to 22nd October, 2002, and was taken to PGI, Chandigarh on 1st November, 2002, and ultimately, he succumbed to the injuries on 14th March, 2003. 8. The claim petition was resisted by the respondents on the grounds taken in the memo of the objections. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal: “1. Whether late Sh. Ram Lal died on account of injuries sustained by him due to the rash and negligent driving of tractor No. HP332405 at about 10.30 P.M. at place Garkotha, falling within the jurisdiction of PS Balh, being driven by respondent No. 2 as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled to and from whom? OPP 3. Whether this petition is bad for non joinder and misjoinder of necessary parties? OPR 4. Relief.” 10. The claimants examined Shri Sanjeev Kapoor as PW1; Dr. Harish Behl as PW2; Dr. D.R. Sharma as PW3, Shri Suresh Kumar as PW4; Shri Yogender Thakur as PW5; Shri Baldev Chand as PW6 and one of the claimants, namely Smt. Niki Devi, herself stepped into the witness box as PW7. The driver and owner-insured of the offending vehicle have not examined any witness, however, they themselves have appeared in the witness box as RW1 and RW2, respectively. 11. The Tribunal, after scanning the evidence, oral as well as documentary, has awarded compensation in favour of the claimants and saddled the owner-insured and the driver of the offending vehicle with liability in terms of the impugned award. 12. Being aggrieved, the owner-insured of the offending vehicle has filed the instant appeal. Issue No. 1: 13. The Tribunal has held that the claimants have proved that driver, namely Shri Inder Dev, had driven the offending vehicle rashly and negligent at the relevant point of time and caused the accident. FIR, Ext. PW4/ A, was also lodged against him. He has faced the trial before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 4, Mandi, H.P. (for short “the trial Court”) and after facing trial, he was acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt. 14. The standard of proof in the claim petitions is different than that of the criminal cases. PW4/ A, was also lodged against him. He has faced the trial before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 4, Mandi, H.P. (for short “the trial Court”) and after facing trial, he was acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt. 14. The standard of proof in the claim petitions is different than that of the criminal cases. It is beaten law of land that the Tribunal has to conduct the trial of the claim petitions and determine the same by adopting summary procedure. 15. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 16. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 17. A Single Judge of this Court in FAO No. 127 of 1999, titled as Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, decided on 22.08.2005, held that the claimants have to prove the case by leading cogent evidence and applied the mandate of CPC read with the Evidence Act, was questioned before the Apex Court by the medium of Civil Appeal No. 2538 of 2009, titled as Bimla Devi & Ors. versus Himachal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in FAO No. 127 of 1999 whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred against a judgment and award dated 28.10.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II [MACT (I), Nahan] in MAC Petition No. 21NL/2 of 1997, was set aside. xxx xxx xxx 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of a constable has taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the First Information Report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." 18. The claimants have, prima facie, proved that the driver of the offending vehicle had driven the same rashly and negligently at the relevant point of time, hit the same with stationary motorcycle, due to which deceased-Ram Lal sustained injuries and succumbed to the same. 19. Moreover, the findings recorded by the Criminal Court in acquittal cannot be a ground to defeat the rights of the claimants. Even if the driver is acquitted in the criminal proceedings, that may not be a ground for dismissal of the claim petitions. 20. My this view is fortified by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. versus M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980 SC 1354 , wherein a bus hit an overhanging high tension wire resulting in 26 casualties. The driver earned acquittal in the criminal case on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Apex Court held that the plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. The driver earned acquittal in the criminal case on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Apex Court held that the plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. It is apt to reproduce para 2 of the judgment herein: “2. The Facts: A stage carriage belonging to the petitioner was on a trip when, after nightfall, the bus hit an overhanging high tension wire resulting in 26 casualties of which 8 proved instantaneously fatal. A criminal case ensued but the accused-driver was acquitted on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God. The Accidents Claims Tribunal which tried the claims for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, came to the conclusion, affirmed by the High Court, that, despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous overhanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spot. Some lost their lives instantly; several lost their limbs likewise. The High Court, after examining the materials, concluded: "We therefore sustain the finding of the Tribunal that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of R.W.1 (driver) and consequently the appellant is vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimant." The plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected and rightly. The requirements of culpable rashness under Section 304A, I.P.C. is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The quantum of compensation was moderately fixed and although there was, perhaps, a case for enhancement, the High Court dismissed the crossclaims also. Being questions of fact, we are obviously unwilling to reopen the holdings on culpability and compensation.” 21. It is also profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 8 of the judgment rendered by the High Court of Karnataka in a case titled Vinobabai and others versus K.S.R.T.C. and another, reported in 1979 ACJ 282: “8. ......................... Thus, the law is settled that when the driver is convicted in a regular trial before the Criminal Court, the fact that he is convicted becomes admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it becomes prima facie evidence that the driver was culpably negligent in causing the accident. ......................... Thus, the law is settled that when the driver is convicted in a regular trial before the Criminal Court, the fact that he is convicted becomes admissible in evidence in a civil proceeding and it becomes prima facie evidence that the driver was culpably negligent in causing the accident. The converse is not true ; because the driver is acquitted in a criminal case arising out of the accident, it is not established even prima facie that the driver is not negligent, as a higher degree of culpability is required to bring home an offence.” 22. Reliance is also placed on the judgment made by this Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation and another versus Jarnail Singh and others, reported in Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 174, wherein it has been held that acquittal of the driver in the criminal trial will have no bearing on the findings to be recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whether the driver was negligent or not in causing the accident. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 15 of the judgment herein: “15. In view of the definitive law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the judgments cited hereinabove, it is now well settled law that the acquittal of the driver in the criminal trial will have no bearing on the findings to be recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whether the driver was negligence or not in causing the accident. ................” 23. Learned counsel for the appellant-owner-insured argued that there was delay in lodging the FIR, thus, the claim petition was not maintainable. The argument is not tenable for the reason that the MV Act has gone through a sea change in the year 1994 and sub section (6) to Section 158 and sub section (4) to Section 166 of the MV Act have been added, whereby the Claims Tribunal can treat report of accident forwarded to it under Section 158 (6) of the MV Act as an application for compensation. 24. In the instant case, FIR was lodged, investigation was conducted and after completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer presented the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”) before the Court of competent jurisdiction. After conducting the trial, the driver was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt. 25. 24. In the instant case, FIR was lodged, investigation was conducted and after completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer presented the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”) before the Court of competent jurisdiction. After conducting the trial, the driver was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt. 25. Having said so, the Tribunal has rightly made the discussions in paras 20 to 22 of the impugned award. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 1 are upheld. 26. Before dealing with issue No. 2, I deem it proper to determine issue No. 3. Issue No. 3: 27. Learned counsel for the appellant-owner-insured has not argued issue No. 3. However, I have gone through the record. The claim petition is not suffering from non-joinder or mis-joinder of necessary parties. Accordingly, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 3 are upheld. Issue No. 2: 28. The claimants have pleaded that deceased-Ram Lal was a driver by profession and was earning Rs.6,000/per month. They have examined Shri Baldev Chand as PW6, who has categorically stated that he has employed deceased-Ram Lal as driver with his JCB and was paying Rs.6,000/to him as salary. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly held that the income of the deceased was Rs.6,000/per month. 29. The claimants are three in number. Therefore, onethird is to be deducted towards the personal expenses of the deceased, in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case titled as Sarla Verma (Smt) and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , which was upheld by a larger Bench of the Apex Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. versus Madan Mohan & Anr., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 3120. Thus, it can be safely held that the claimants have suffered loss of dependency/income to the tune of Rs.4,000/per month. 30. The copy of matriculation certificate of deceased-Ram Lal is on record as Mark-Y, which depicts the date of birth of deceased-Ram Lal to be 8th September, 1972. Thus, the claimants have proved that the deceased was 29 years of age at the time of the accident. 30. The copy of matriculation certificate of deceased-Ram Lal is on record as Mark-Y, which depicts the date of birth of deceased-Ram Lal to be 8th September, 1972. Thus, the claimants have proved that the deceased was 29 years of age at the time of the accident. The Tribunal has wrongly applied the multiplier of 17' as the multiplier of 16' is just and appropriate in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's and Reshma Kumari's cases (supra) read with the Second Schedule appended with the MV Act. 31. Having said so, it is held that the claimants are entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.4,000/x 12 x 16 = Rs.7,68,000/under the head 'loss of dependency/income'. 32. The perusal of the record does disclose that after the accident, deceased-Ram Lal was taken to CHC Ratti, from where he was referred to Zonal Hospital, Mandi and thereafter, was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, where he remained admitted upto 16th September, 2002. Further averred that deceased-Ram Lal again remained admitted at Zonal Hospital, Mandi, with effect from 14th October, 2002 to 22nd October, 2002, and was taken to PGI, Chandigarh on 1st November, 2002, and ultimately, he succumbed to the injuries on 14th March, 2003. The amount of compensation awarded towards cost of attendant to the tune of 21,000/, cost of medicine and cost of transportation to the tune of Rs.40,000/- is meagre, but, is maintained, as the claimants have not questioned the same. 33. The claimants are also held entitled to Rs.10,000/- each under the heads 'loss of consortium', 'loss of estate', 'loss of love and affection' and 'funeral expenses'. 34. Viewed thus, it is held that the claimants are entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.7,68,000/ + Rs.21,000/ + Rs.40,000/ + Rs.10,000/ + Rs.10,000/ + Rs.10,000/ + Rs.10,000/= Rs.8,69,000/with interest as awarded by the Tribunal and the respondents in the claim petition have to satisfy the impugned award. 35. The awarded amount be deposited within eight weeks. On deposit, the same be released in favour of the claimants strictly as per the terms and conditions contained in the impugned award after proper identification through payee's account cheque or by depositing the same in their respective bank accounts. 36. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned award is modified, as indicated hereinabove, and the appeal is disposed of accordingly. 37. 36. Having glance of the above discussions, the impugned award is modified, as indicated hereinabove, and the appeal is disposed of accordingly. 37. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on Tribunal's file.