ORDER : 1. By this writ petition, a direction is sought on the respondents to take a decision on the applications for grant of sanction for prosecution of the officers, named therein. It is in reference to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act of 1988”). 2. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner company made two applications for grant of sanction for prosecution but the respondents are sitting tight over it thus appropriate direction may be given for a decision in the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Vineet Narain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 1998(1) SCC 226 and Subramanian Swamy Vs. Manmohan Singh & Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 64 . 3. It is stated that two officers, namely, Mr. Punit Sharma and Mr. Yogendra Singh have committed offence under the Act of 1988 thus the petitioner company intends to maintain a complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The Court would not proceed in absence of sanction for prosecution. In view of the above, the petitioner company made applications to seek sanction for prosecution of the offence. Those applications have not been considered by the respondents despite direction of the Apex Court to decide such applications within time frame. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vineet Narain & Ors. (surpa) has been relied in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) and, according to those judgments, the applications have to be decided within time frame. Accordingly, a direction may be given to the respondents to consider and decide the applications within time frame. 4. A further reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. Vs. MK Aiyappa & Anr. reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705 has been given. Therein, it was held that even an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed unless sanction for prosecution exists. In the case of L. Narayana Swamy Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in (2016) 9 SCC 598 , the judgment in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. (supra) has been relied. 5. I have considered the submissions made and perused the record. 6. It is a case where the petitioner company made applications to seek sanction for prosecution. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in (2016) 9 SCC 598 , the judgment in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. (supra) has been relied. 5. I have considered the submissions made and perused the record. 6. It is a case where the petitioner company made applications to seek sanction for prosecution. When no decision on it was taken by the respondents, present writ petition has been filed. It is admitted by learned counsel for the petitioner company that no FIR or a private complaint has been lodged either before or subsequent to the applications to seek sanction for prosecution. In view of the above, the question for my consideration is as to whether a sanction for prosecution is required even before lodging of an FIR or filing of a complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. 7. To answer the question aforesaid, a reference of Section 19 of the Act of 1988 would be relevant, thus it is quoted hereunder for ready reference : “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction 1 [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)]— (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 8. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1988 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction for prosecution. In view of the provision aforesaid, sanction for prosecution is a precondition for taking cognizance of offence by the Court. The word “cognizance” is relevant thus needs to be considered. 9. The word “cognizance” has neither been defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 nor the Act of 1988 thus was given interpretation by the Apex Court. It is when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in the complaint or to a police report or upon the information received from any other person that offence has been committed. In view of the above, cognizance is a stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind. 10. It is when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in the complaint or to a police report or upon the information received from any other person that offence has been committed. In view of the above, cognizance is a stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind. 10. In the case of RR Chari Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1951 SC 207 , the word “cognizance” was elaborately discussed and, therein, the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Emperor Vs. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty reported in ILR 37 Cal. 412 and Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Abani Kumar Banerjee reported in AIR 1950 Cal. 437 has been relied. It was held that in a case of complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C., the cognizance of offence would be when Magistrate applied his mind to the contents of the complaint for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way. If an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been passed or the matter has been sent for enquiry under Section 200 Cr.P.C., it would not amount to taking cognizance of offence. The effect of the judgment aforesaid is that on receipt of a complaint, if an order under Section 156(3) or under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is passed, it would not amount to cognizance of offence. Para Nos.9 and 10 of the judgment in the case of RR Chari (supra) are relevant thus quoted hereunder for ready reference : “9. In Gopal Marwari v. Emperor A.I.R. 1943 Pat. 245, it was observed that the word 'cognizance' is used in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is a different thing from the initiation of proceedings. It is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate. The court noticed that the word 'cognizance' is a word of somewhat indefinite import and it is perhaps not always used in exactly the same sense. 10. After referring to the observations in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty I.L.R. 37 Cal. It is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate. The court noticed that the word 'cognizance' is a word of somewhat indefinite import and it is perhaps not always used in exactly the same sense. 10. After referring to the observations in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty I.L.R. 37 Cal. 412, it was stated by Das Gupta J. in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee : AIR1950 Cal 437, as follows :- "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter - proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. In our opinion that is the correct approach to the question before the court.” 11. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. Vs. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors. reported in 1976(3) SCC 252 . It was specifically on a complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. Therein, it was held that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or issuance of search warrant for the purpose of investigation would not mean cognizance of offence. Such an order is considered to be at the precognizance stage. Para Nos.12 to 17 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference : “12. This raises the incidental question : What is meant by "taking cognizance of an offence" by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190?. This expression has not been defined in the Code. Such an order is considered to be at the precognizance stage. Para Nos.12 to 17 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference : “12. This raises the incidental question : What is meant by "taking cognizance of an offence" by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190?. This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a Court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. 13. This position of law has been explained in several cases by this Court, the latest being Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal and Anr. [1973]2SCR66 14. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction, to send a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence-whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session-to the Police for investigation under Section 156(3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. [1973]2SCR66 14. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction, to send a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence-whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session-to the Police for investigation under Section 156(3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. The distinction between a police investigation ordered under Section 156(3) and the one directed under Section 202, has also been maintained under the new Code; but a rider has been clamped by the 1st Proviso to Section 202(1) that if it appears to the Magistrate that an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session has been committed, he shall not make any direction for investigation. 15. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: "Information to the Police and their powers to investigate"; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrates". The power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the precognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under Sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge sheet under Section 173. On the other hand Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. On the other hand Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not here is sufficient ground for proceeding". Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. 16. In the instant case the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding; but only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3). He did not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV. He did not examine the complaint or his witnesses under Section 200, Cr.P.C., which is the first step in the procedure prescribed under that Chapter. The question of taking the next step of that procedure envisaged in Section 202 did not arise. Instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he has, in the exercise of his discretion, sent the complaint for investigation by police under Section 156. 17. This being the position, Section 202(1), 1st Proviso was not attracted. Indeed, it is not necessary for the decision of this case to express any final opinion on the ambit and scope of the 1st Proviso to Section 202(1) of the Code, of 1973. Suffice it to say, the stage at which Section 202 could become operative was never reached in this case. We have therefore in keeping with the well-established practice of the Court, decided only that much which was essential for the disposal of this appeal, and no more.” 12. As per the judgments in the case of RR Chari (supra) and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. (supra), an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or a search warrant is not considered to be cognizance of offence. 13. In the background aforesaid, the petitioner’s apprehension that on filing of complaint, the Court would not proceed in absence of sanction for prosecution cannot be accepted. (supra), an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or a search warrant is not considered to be cognizance of offence. 13. In the background aforesaid, the petitioner’s apprehension that on filing of complaint, the Court would not proceed in absence of sanction for prosecution cannot be accepted. It is, otherwise, a fact that sanction for prosecution is required only when the Court has to take cognizance of offence. The stage comes only when something comes before the Court and not otherwise. In the present case, nothing is pending before the Court thus a direction to the respondents to take a decision on the applications for sanction for prosecution cannot be directed. In the light of the aforesaid, I do not find that a case is made out for a direction, as prayed. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner/s, however, made a reference of the judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra). The issue involved therein was different. It was a case where despite initiation of proceedings, decision on sanction for prosecution was not taken. The petition was filed at that stage. The Apex Court therein considered the earlier judgment in the case of Vineet Narain & Ors. (supra). A direction was given that as and when an application comes before the administration, it should be decided within time frame given therein. A specific reference of para 56 of the judgment has been given, though in the said case, the Special Judge, CBI had already taken cognizance of offence. A reference of the issue raised herein has also been made in the said judgment thus would be relevant to quote the paras where such discussion has been made and, accordingly, para Nos.35 to 42 of judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) are quoted hereunder for ready reference : “35. In R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. : (1951) SCR 312, the three Judge Bench approved the following observations made by the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abni Kumar Banerjee (supra): What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1) (a), Code of Criminal Procedure, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter - proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 36. In Mohd. Khalid's case, the Court referred to Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and observed: In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. 37. In Pastor P. Raju's case, this Court referred to the provisions of Chapter XIV and Sections 190 and 196 (1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and observed: There is no bar against registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the police on completion of investigation, as contemplated by Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. If a criminal case is registered, investigation of the offence is done and the police submits a report as a result of such investigation before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate, there will be no violation of Section 196 (1-A) Code of Criminal Procedure and no illegality of any kind would be committed. 38. 38. The Court then referred to some of the precedents including the judgment in Mohd. Khalid's case and observed: It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out. 39. In Kalimuthu's case, the only question considered by this Court was whether in the absence of requisite sanction under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the alleged offences. The High Court had taken the view that Section 197 was not applicable to the Appellant's case. Affirming the view taken by the High Court, this Court observed: The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where offences under the Act are concerned, the effect of Section 197, dealing with the question of prejudice has also to be noted. 40. In Raj Kumar Jain's case, this Court considered the question whether the CBI was required to obtain sanction from the prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for accepting the report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This question was considered in the backdrop of the fact that the CBI, which had investigated the case registered against the Respondent under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act found that the allegation made against the Respondent could not be substantiated. This question was considered in the backdrop of the fact that the CBI, which had investigated the case registered against the Respondent under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act found that the allegation made against the Respondent could not be substantiated. The Special Judge declined to accept the report submitted under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure by observing that the CBI was required to place materials collected during investigation before the sanctioning authority and it was for the concerned authority to grant or refuse sanction. The Special Judge opined that only after the decision of the sanctioning authority, the CBI could submit the report under Section 173(2). The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the CBI and confirmed the order of the Special Judge. 41. This Court referred to Section 6(1) of the 1947 Act and observed: From a plain reading of the above section it is evidently clear that a court cannot take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein without sanction of the appropriate authority. In enacting the above section, the legislature thought of providing a reasonable protection to public servants in the discharge of their official functions so that they may perform their duties and obligations undeterred by vexatious and unnecessary prosecutions. Viewed in that context, the CBI was under no obligation to place the materials collected during investigation before the sanctioning authority, when they found that no case was made out against the Respondent. To put it differently, if the CBI had found on investigation that a prima facie case was made out against the Respondent to place him on trial and accordingly prepared a charge-sheet (challan) against him, then only the question of obtaining sanction of the authority under Section 6(1) of the Act would have arisen for without that the Court would not be competent to take cognizance of the charge-sheet. It must, therefore, be said that both the Special Judge and the High Court were patently wrong in observing that the CBI was required to obtain sanction from the prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for accepting the report under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It must, therefore, be said that both the Special Judge and the High Court were patently wrong in observing that the CBI was required to obtain sanction from the prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for accepting the report under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. 42.In our view, the decisions relied upon by the learned Attorney General do not have any bearing on the moot question whteher Respondent 1, being the competent authority to sanction prosecution of Respondent 2, was required to take appropriate decision in the light of the direction contained in Vineet Narain case.” Para 42, referred above, shows as to what was the moot question raised before the Apex Court in the case supra. The issue was as to whether the competent authority is required to take appropriate decision for sanction for prosecution in the light of the direction given by the Apex Court in the case of Vineet Narain & Ors. (supra). In the earlier paras, the issue as to when cognizance of the offence is taken, was considered in reference to the earlier judgment in the case of RR Chari (supra). In the case of State Through CBI Vs. Raj Kumar Jain reported in 1998(6) SCC 551 , same view was taken and relevant para of the judgment has been quoted above. In view of the aforesaid, it becomes clear that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is at the precognizance stage and, in view of the above, sanction for prosecution would not be required at that stage. 15. The issue, however, needs further discussion in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. (supra). Therein, an order under Section 156(3) was challenged before the High Court on the ground that it could not have been passed without sanction for prosecution. The writ petition was allowed. The order of the High Court was challenged before the Apex Court. The Apex Court did not interfere in the order passed by the High Court and it was held that an order under Section 156(3) cannot be passed unless sanction for prosecution is given. Therein, the judgments in the cases of Subramanian Swamy (supra) and State of UP Vs. Paras Nath Singh reported in (2009) 6 SCC 372 were also referred. The Apex Court did not interfere in the order passed by the High Court and it was held that an order under Section 156(3) cannot be passed unless sanction for prosecution is given. Therein, the judgments in the cases of Subramanian Swamy (supra) and State of UP Vs. Paras Nath Singh reported in (2009) 6 SCC 372 were also referred. The assistance was, however, not provided by referring earlier judgments of the Apex Court in the case of RR Chari (supra) and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. (supra) where the Bench of three Judges has decided the issue. In those cases, an order under Section 156(3) or an order for search warrant to hold enquiry was considered to be at the precognizance stage. Therein, even judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajkumar Jain (supra) was not referred. 16. It is settled law that whenever there exists two views of the Supreme Court on the issue, the judgment given by the Bench of larger number of Judges should be relied. The judgments in the cases of RR Chari (supra) and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. (supra) are by the Bench of three Judges, whereas, judgment in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. (supra) is by the Bench of two Judges. In the light of the aforesaid and as the judgments in the cases of RR Chari (supra) and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. (supra) were not brought to the notice of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. (supra), what is required to be relied is the earlier judgments. 17. The sanction for prosecution is not required for passing an order under Section 156(3) or for the search warrant, rather, it would be at the stage of taking cognizance of offence, when the Magistrate applies his mind to the legal proceedings and considers the police report or the material brought before it. In view of the discussion made above, the prayer made in the writ petition cannot be accepted, hence, it is dismissed.