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2017 DIGILAW 1592 (ALL)

U. P. RAJKIYA NIRMAN NIGAM LIMITED v. RAJ VEER SINGH

2017-07-04

RAVINDRA NATH MISHRA II, SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2017
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.5.2012 passed by State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as “ Tribunal”) in Claim Petition No. 717 of 2012 whereby it has allowed claim petition of the claimant-respondent and directed petitioner to consider him for promotion by giving benefit of experience he has earned while discharging duties of General Manager pursuant to order dated 29.5.2007 and review application filed by petitioner has also been rejected on 8.10.2012. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that claimant-respondent was never appointed on the post of General Manager either on officiating basis or ad hoc or in any capacity but in addition to duties of his own substantive post i.e Project Manager, he was directed to look after duties of Office of General Manager untill further order for which it was also mentioned that claimant-respondent shall not be entitled for any financial benefit or otherwise. 3. Hence, there was no question of counting said period when claimant respondent was looking after work of General Manager pursuant to the order dated 29.5.2007 and impugned order passed by Tribunal is clearly erroneous and illegal. 4. Sri Shireesh Kumar, Advocate appearing for claimant-respondent on the contrary submitted that claimant-respondent has actually discharged the functions of General Manager, therefore, Tribunal has rightly directed petitioners to consider the said period as experience on the post of General Manager. 5. Mere discharge of duties of an office in addition to discharge of own duties of substantive post on which one is working is not equivalent to discharge duties on the higher post in a full fledged manner. Claimant-respondent was not appointed on the post of General Manager. Admittedly he continued to remain appointed and posted on the substantive post of Project Manager but in addition to his duties of substantive post of Project Manager, he was permitted to discharge function of higher post. It cannot be equated with the experience gain on the higher post. A similar issue came up for consideration in Division Bench judgment in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Region I, Meerut and others, 2007(2) ADJ 473 (DB), where in management asked a senior most teacher to discharge duties of the Office of Principal after retirement of erstwhile principal on attaining the age of superannuation. A similar issue came up for consideration in Division Bench judgment in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Region I, Meerut and others, 2007(2) ADJ 473 (DB), where in management asked a senior most teacher to discharge duties of the Office of Principal after retirement of erstwhile principal on attaining the age of superannuation. The Court in para 16 to 20 of the judgment said as under : “Para-16—From a bare reading, we do not find that it did promote Petitioner-Appellant on officiating basis as Principal of the College. On the contrary, it shows that the Manager of the College directed the Petitioner-Appellant to take over charge as officiating Principal and discharge its duties. Despite of repeated reading of the order, we could not find ourselves in agreement with the learned counsel for the Petitioner-Appellant to read the letter dated 29th June 1988 as order of ad hoc/officiating promotion of the Petitioner-Appellant as Principal of the College. Whenever a person leaves office either on account of retirement, superannuation, leave, transfer etc, he proceeds after giving charge to his successor. Normally a person appointed to succeed in the office or one having a co-ordinate position and status is available to hand over charge, or in the absence of such person, the charge is handed over to the senior most person working in the office. When the Principal of the College was retiring on 30th June 1988, in the absence of any appointment or promotion to the post of Principal, she was required to hand over charge to the senior most teacher, who would have looked after day to day function of the office of Principal. But such a course of mere handing over charge would not result in promotion of such senior most teacher as officiating Principal unless and until an order to this effect is passed. Taking charge of a higher office and discharge its function; and to discharge function of a higher office after promotion pursuant to an order of promotion, whether on regular or ad hoc or officiating basis, are two different things. Taking charge of a higher office and discharge its function; and to discharge function of a higher office after promotion pursuant to an order of promotion, whether on regular or ad hoc or officiating basis, are two different things. In the former, the incumbent continue to possess the status and position of the office in which he/she is appointed substantively but look after the duties of the higher office of which charge has been handed over in addition to her substantive duties, but it does not result in a vacancy of any kind to the post/office, the incumbent is substantively holding, but, in the later case, the incumbent vacates his substantive office and discharge function of higher office by occupying the higher post. If the promotion is officiating or ad hoc such occupancy may be temporary, but the fact remain that it result in a vacancy in the lower post, may be short term and temporary”. “Para-17 ........The aforesaid documents cemented the conclusion that the Petitioner-Appellant was only required to look after and discharge the duties of the officiating Principal but was never promoted/appointed on the said post. In other words, it can be said that the Petitioner-Appellant was given only current duty charge in addition to her substantive post and this arrangement did not result in promotion to the post of which, the current duty charge was handed over. In State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma, AIR 1993 SC 2273 , the Chief Administrator of the Board entrusted Sri S.M. Sharma, with the current duty charge of the post of Executive Engineer, which was subsequently withdrawn as a result of his transfer to other post. He challenged the said order stating that it amounts to reversion. The Apex Court held that Sri Sharma was only having current duty charge of the Executive Engineer and was never promoted or appointed to the aforesaid post and therefore, on transfer to some other post, it did not result in reversion from the post of Executive Engineer”. He challenged the said order stating that it amounts to reversion. The Apex Court held that Sri Sharma was only having current duty charge of the Executive Engineer and was never promoted or appointed to the aforesaid post and therefore, on transfer to some other post, it did not result in reversion from the post of Executive Engineer”. “Para-18 A somewhat similar situation occurred in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India and others, 1991 Supple (2) SCC 733 and the Apex Court observed as under : “The distinction between a situation where a Government servant is promoted to a higher post and one where he is merely asked to discharge the duties of the higher post is too clear to require any reiteration. Asking an officer who substantively holds a lower post merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be treated as a promotion.” “Para-19 It was further held that such situations are contemplated where exigencies of public service necessitate such arrangements and even consideration of seniority do not enter into it sometimes. However the person continues to hold substantive lower post and only discharges duties of the higher post essentially as a spot-gap arrangement. A further contention was raised that if such an arrangement continued for a very long period it would give some kind of right to continue on the post but negativing such contention, it was held that an in-charge arrangement is neither recognition nor is necessarily based on seniority and therefore, no rights, equities and expectations can be built upon it”. “Para-20.In this view of the matter, the Petitioner-Appellant has miserably failed to show that the management ever appointed her as officiating Principal of the College and, therefore, we hold that she was only allowed to discharge duties of the office of officiating Principal, but was never appointed/promoted by the management as officiating Principal of the College. The question No. 1 is answered and decided accordingly. 6. Thus law has been laid down very categorically by Supreme Court also that asking a person who substantively holds a lower post and merely discharged duties of higher post cannot be treated as promotion. That being so it cannot be said that mere discharge of duties on higher post, claimant-respondent has gained experience of working on the higher post. 6. Thus law has been laid down very categorically by Supreme Court also that asking a person who substantively holds a lower post and merely discharged duties of higher post cannot be treated as promotion. That being so it cannot be said that mere discharge of duties on higher post, claimant-respondent has gained experience of working on the higher post. Experience on the higher post can be said to have been gathered only when one is appointed on higher post and discharge duties and functions of such higher post in his/her own rights. 7. In the present case Tribunal has erred in law in inquiring the fact that claimant-respondent while discharging duties of General Manager hold his substantive post of Project Manager, in addition of his duties on substantive post has required requisite experience of working on higher post without appreciating the distinction between the experience gained by working on higher post discharged of duties while holding substantive post and continue to look after the duty of substantive lower post. 8. Accordingly judgment of Tribunal taking otherwise view in impugned judgment in this writ petition cannot be sustained. 9. Writ petition is allowed. Impugned judgment dated 31.5.2012 passed by Tribunal is hereby set aside.