JUDGMENT Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.: (Oral) - Instant civil revision petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India at the hands of plaintiff, is directed against the order dated 03.07.2017 passed by the learned trial Court, whereby his application for amendment in the plaint, at the stage of rebuttal evidence, was dismissed. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the very outset, fairly conceded that it is a matter of record that suit was at the stage of rebuttal evidence, when the application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’ for short) was moved by the petitioner, seeking amendment in his plaint. However, he tried to justify filing the application for amendment in the plaint at a belated stage on the ground that the petitioner wanted to incorporate some later events, which took place during pendency of the suit. If such an argument is accepted and amendment is permitted at the stage of rebuttal evidence, then it would be an unending exercise. Suit filed by the petitioner- plaintiff is pending for the last more than nine years. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the learned trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld. 4. So far as the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in Imamuddin through LRs and another v. Addl. Civil Judge (J.D.), Bhilwara and another, 2010 (58) RCR (Civil) 302, Raj Kumar v. Kamlesh Kumari, [2012(4) Law Herald (P&H) 2986] : 2012 (55) RCR (Civil) 540 and Baldev Singh v. Kanwar Pal Singh and others, 2013 (26) RCR (Civil) 373 are concerned, there is no dispute about the observations made therein. However, on close perusal of the cited judgments, none of them has been found of any help to the petitioner, being distinguishable on facts. It is settled proposition of law that peculiar facts and circumstances of each case are to be examined, considered and appreciated first before applying any codified or judgemade law thereto. However, on close perusal of the cited judgments, none of them has been found of any help to the petitioner, being distinguishable on facts. It is settled proposition of law that peculiar facts and circumstances of each case are to be examined, considered and appreciated first before applying any codified or judgemade law thereto. Sometimes, difference of even one additional fact or circumstance can make the world of difference, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padmausundrao Rao and another v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533 , Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda and others, 2004 (3) SCC 75 , State of Orissa v. Md. Illiyas, 2006 (1) SCC 275 and State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi Lal, [2008(1) Law Herald (SC) 275] : 2008 (2) SCC 533 . 5. With a view to avoid repetition and also for the sake of brevity, the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 and 12 of its later judgment in Ganeshi Lal’s case (supra), reiterating its earlier view taken in Amrit Lal Manchanda’s case (supra) and Mohd. Illiyas’s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:- “11. “12….Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates; (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and others ( AIR 1968 SC 647 ) and Union of India and others v. Dhanwanti Devi and others. ( 1996 (6) SCC 44 ). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Coming to the peculiar fact situation obtaining on record of the present case, it is unhesitatingly held that learned Permanent Lok Adalat discussed, considered and appreciated each and every relevant aspect of the matter, before passing the impugned award. The only endeavour made by the learned Permanent Lok Adalat was to do complete and substantial justice between the parties and this approach adopted by learned Permanent Lok Adalat has been found well justified on facts as well as in law. Ed. See State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 at p.282, para 12. 12. 15….Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: (AII ER p. 14 C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.” 16. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said (at All ER p.297g-h), “Lord Atkin’s speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No.2) (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: (AII ER p. 1274d-e) “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board ( 1972 (2) WLR 537 ) Lord Morris said: (AII ER p. 761c) “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 15. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 15. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT, AIR 1962 SC 680 “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.” “Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it Ed. See Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75 , pp. 83-84, paras 15-18.” 6. Coming back to the facts of the case in hand, it is a matter of record that suit of the petitioner is pending for the last more than nine years. He started and concluded his evidence, treating the plaint to be correct one. Thereafter, defendants started and concluded their evidence. When the case came at the stage of rebuttal evidence, plaintiff moved the application for amendment of the plaint, which was highly belated and in view of amended provisions of law contained in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, particularly the proviso added thereto, such an application could not have been allowed. Had the learned trial Court allowed such an application for amendment in the plaint, said order would have been an order without jurisdiction. Under these undisputed facts and circumstances of the case, it can be safely concluded that the learned trial Court committed no error of law, while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld, for this reason also. 7. Under these undisputed facts and circumstances of the case, it can be safely concluded that the learned trial Court committed no error of law, while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld, for this reason also. 7. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any patent illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court, which may warrant interference at the hands of this Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court has been found based on sound reasons, because of which the impugned order deserves to be upheld, for this reason as well. 8. No other argument was raised. 9. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that since no illegality has been found in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court, the same deserves to be upheld. The revision petition having been found wholly misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance, must fail. No ground for interference has been made out. 10. Resultantly, with the abovesaid observations made, present civil revision petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.