JUDGMENT By the Court.—This intra Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Allahabad High Court Rules has been filed by the Committee of Management through its Manager and by one Sri Gyan Prakash Govil describing himself as Manager of the same Institution against the judgment and order dated 5.5.2017, passed in Writ-A No. 19142 of 2017. 2. The facts relevant for deciding this special appeal are as under : Janta Inter College, Cherat, Aligarh is an aided and recognized intermediate College. The said institution is run and managed in accordance with the approved scheme of administration framed under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1921). It is not in dispute that the Committee of Management of Janta Inter College with Sri Gyan Prakash Govil as Manager was managing the said Institution till passing of the order dated 20.4.2016 under Section 6 (3) of the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1971). By means of the order under Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1971 dated 20.4.2016, the Committee of Management of the Institution was superseded and authorized controller was appointed. Not being satisfied with the order, the Committee of Management preferred Writ Petition No. 20014 of 2016 which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 24.5.2016 providing therein that the petitioner Committee of Management may represent its grievance before the Joint Director of Education who in turn was required to decide the matter in a time bound manner and till such decision the order of appointment of authorized controller was kept in abeyance. 3. The Joint Director of Education rejected the representation so made by the petitioner vide order dated 30.6.2016 and as result of which the authorized controller was appointed in the Institution. The Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No. 41261 of 2016 wherein an interim order was granted by High Court on 1.9.2016. 4. In the meantime, the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 16-D (4) of the Act of 1921 appointed an authorized controller for the Institution vide order dated 20.4.2016. Against the said order the Committee of Management preferred Writ Petition No. 52774 of 2016 which was allowed vide order dated 5.11.2016 and the State Government was directed to reconsider the matter. 5. Against the said order the Committee of Management preferred Writ Petition No. 52774 of 2016 which was allowed vide order dated 5.11.2016 and the State Government was directed to reconsider the matter. 5. The State Government passed a fresh order on 28.12.2016 again superseding the Committee of Management for a period of six months. The Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No. 2330 of 2017 wherein an interim order was granted on 18.1.2017. Against the order dated 1.9.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 41261 of 2016 special appeal was filed by the respondents to the writ petition. The appeal was disposed of after vacating the interim order with direction upon the Committee of Management to avail its statutory remedy by way of appeal before the State Government. 6. The Committee of Management has filed an appeal before the State Government which is pending, however no interim order has been granted by the State Government, at least nothing has been brought on record. Therefore, the authorized controller is stated to have resumed the control over the Institution. 7. While all these proceedings were being taken against the Committee of Management, it decided to hold disciplinary enquiry against the Principal of the Institution, namely, Dr. J.P. Yadav and that vide resolution dated 28.2.2017, he was placed under suspension pending enquiry. The papers for approval of the suspension affected by the Committee of Management were transmitted to the District Inspector of Schools as contemplated under Section 16-G (5) & (7) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. 8. The District Inspector of Schools under order dated 27.4.2017 has held that since the statutory period of sixty days has expired from the date of passing of the order of suspension the same has become redundant and has refused to approve the suspension. It has also been mentioned that reasons have not been disclosed as to why departmental enquiry has not been completed within time. 9. The Committee of Management and Mr. Gyan Prakash Govil not being satisfied with the order passed by District Inspector of Schools filed Writ Petition No. 1942 of 2017. This writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge only on the ground that once the Committee of Management has been superseded and authorized controller has been appointed the writ petition at the behest of the Committee of Management or Mr. Govil as Manager would not be maintainable. This writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge only on the ground that once the Committee of Management has been superseded and authorized controller has been appointed the writ petition at the behest of the Committee of Management or Mr. Govil as Manager would not be maintainable. It has been held that even if the statutory period as prescribed has expired there has to be an order of the State Government to restore back the Committee after removal of the authorized controller. The Committee cannot claim automatic restoration of effective control over the Institution. 10. We may record that learned Single Judge has not gone into the merits or otherwise of the order of the DIOS impugned in the writ petition. 11. Mr. Prabhakar Awasthi, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the judgment and order of learned Single Judge proceeds on complete non-consideration of the issue that it is not only the Committee of Management which can claim to be restored back once the period for which the authorized controller under Section 16-D of the Act of 1921 was appointed has expired, every member of Committee of Management/members of general body has a right to see that the institution is run in a proper manner and that any person including the Principal if involved in misconduct is dealt with in accordance with law. 12. It is in this background that the Committee of Management claimed that it was in effective control and the Manager in his individual capacity questioned the order of DIOS. The writ petition in his official capacity as well as individual capacity as manager/member of the general body was maintainable. 13. He explains that locus of a person to maintain a writ petition before the High Court has to be judged in the context of the statutory provisions and the facts of the case. There cannot be any hard and fast rule in all cases that a Committee of Management superseded at some point of time or the member of Committee of Management cannot maintain a writ petition in any circumstance. 14. He further submits that in the facts of the case the Committee of Management and Sri Govil who represents the members of the general body have all along been fighting against the misconduct of the Principal of the institution. 14. He further submits that in the facts of the case the Committee of Management and Sri Govil who represents the members of the general body have all along been fighting against the misconduct of the Principal of the institution. They cannot be said to be rendered remedy-less because the DIOS would not take action on the papers transmitted for the approval of the suspension within the statutory period prescribed. 15. He would explain that the full bench of the Court in the case of Chandra Bhushan Misra v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and others, (1995) 1 UPLBEC 460 ; has laid down that the DIOS does not become funcuts officio after the expiry of period of sixty days. He can approve the suspension even after expiry of sixty days. The only consequence for not passing the order within sixty days would be that during the period subsequent to the expiry of sixty days from the date of suspension till the date the DIOS approves the suspension is that it ceases to be operative in the eyes of law, Principal/Teacher would be entitled to full salary. He would therefore submit that the learned Single Judge was not correct in recording the finding that the writ petition as presented was not maintainable. 16. Mr. R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Rajesh Yadav on the contrary would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly come to conclusion that the writ petition as presented on behalf of the Committee of Management was not maintainable as there was no lawful recognized Committee of Management in existence on the date the writ petition was filed as it stood superseded under the orders of the State and authorized controller had taken over the charge. 17. Mr. R.K. Ojha submits that the issue with regard to rights of Committee of Management which had been superseded has been examined by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Desh Deepak Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others, 2015 (3) UPLBEC 2068, specifically paragraph 9 of the said judgement. He has also referred to the judgement of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 625 of 2010; Chhotey Lal Maurya v. Kisan Gaddopur Bal Vidyalaya Samiti and others, decided on 6.5.2010 for the same proposition. He has also referred to the judgement of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 625 of 2010; Chhotey Lal Maurya v. Kisan Gaddopur Bal Vidyalaya Samiti and others, decided on 6.5.2010 for the same proposition. It is therefore submitted that in the facts of the case this Court may not interfere with the order of learned Single Judge in exercise of powers under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Allahabad High Court Rules. 18. We have heard learned counsel for parties and examined the records. 19. The issue with regards to maintainability of writ petition on the ground of locus standi has been examined by the Apex Court in the case of Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., 2001 (4) SCC 734 , as also in the case of Aanyaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (4) SCC 465 and Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, 2002 (1) SCC 33 . 20. The Apex Court in the case of Vinoy Kumar (supra) has held that a person will generally have no locus to file writ petition if he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially invaded nor is there any eminent danger of such rights being invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring the applicable rules. It has been held that as a matter of prudence, Court confine the writ jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injuries are caused to a particular person or his fundamental rights are violated and not to entertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of third party. 21. In the case of Ghulam Qadir (supra) it has been held that the Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of the litigant merely on hyper technical grounds. It has been held that if a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his rights which is shown to be having source in some statutory provision the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi provided the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property. 22. 22. Similarly in the case of Aanyaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) it has been held that there must be a judicial enforceable right available for enforcement on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. 23. In the case of Thammanna v. K. Veerareddy, 1980 (4) SCC 62 , the Apex Court has explained that the expression ‘person aggrieved’ may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case nevertheless normally a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused to him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. 24. On simple reading of the aforesaid judgements of the Apex Court, it will be seen that if a person is able to demonstrate that his right has been adversely affected and that he is not an stranger and that the rights sought to be enforced is with reference to the statutory provisions the technical plea, of locus standi being not available, has to be rejected. It is further clear from the judgments of the Apex Court, as noticed above, that issue of locus standi is dependant to be adjudged on the statutory provisions applicable with reference to the particular facts of the case. 25. It is in the aforesaid legal background that the ‘locus standi’ of Committee of Management and of Mr. Govil as the Manager, who had been contesting the orders passed by the Educational Authorities as well as by the State Government superseding the Committee of Management repeatedly before this Court as well as before the authorities concerned under the statutory provisions has to be examined. The committee of Management and Mr. Govil have not been sitting idle in the matter of suspension of the Principal of the institution. 26. We may record that the order of the State Government dated 20.10.2016 superseding the Committee of Management of the Institution in exercise of powers under proviso to Section 16-D (4) of Act 1921, enclosed as Annexure SA-4 to the supplementary-affidavit filed in the writ petition, specifically mentions that the supersession is for a period of six months only. The subsequent order of the State Government dated 28.12.2016 records that against the order dated 20.10.2016 the Committee of Management had filed Writ Petition No. 52774 of 2016. The subsequent order of the State Government dated 28.12.2016 records that against the order dated 20.10.2016 the Committee of Management had filed Writ Petition No. 52774 of 2016. The writ petition has been disposed of vide order dated 5.11.2016 setting aside the order dated 20.10.2016 with a direction to pass a fresh order. The State Government in exercise of powers under Section 16-D (4) has decided to place the Committee of Management under suspension for a period of six months. 27. It is, therefore, writ large on record that the cloud in respect of the Committee of Management to espouse the cause stands removed with the expiry of six months from the date of the last order. 28. We are of the opinion that once the period provided in the statutory order passed under Section 16-D (4) has expiredýÿ the authorized controller looses all legal rights to continue in the Institution. The Committee of Management is not wrong in espousing the cause as such. 29. The learned Single Judge does not appear to be correct in recording that even if the period for which the authorized controller was appointed has expired there has to be a separate order for restoring the Committee of Management by the State Government. 30. The right of the authorized controller to continue ceases with the effflux of maximum time as provided under the statue or the period for which he is appointed under the statutory order. 31. We also have no hesitation to record that every member of the general body and every office bearer of the Committee of Management which had been superseded has a right to see that the institution is run and managed in accordance with the statutory provisions applicable and if he finds that the Committee of Management, authorized controller or educational authorities are violating the statutory provisions with impunity then such a person can always approach this Court for ensuring that the Committee of Management, authorized controller and educational authorities act in conformity with the statutory provision while dealing with the institution and not otherwise. 32. 32. A member of general body cannot be permitted to suffer at the hands of the Committee of Management or the authorized controller or the educational authorities for their inaction and thereby rendered a mere spectator in the mismanagement of the institution, which would ultimately result in the quality of education to be imparted in Institution itself being degraded. 33. Members of general body get themselves enrolled for the purpose of ensuring equal participation in the management and smooth running of institution. They are not mere spectators who are appointed only to watch the acts of Committee of Management or the authorized controller or the DIOS or the educational authorities. 34. Every member has right and obligation to ensure that the institutions are run and managed in accordance with the statutory provisions and not de horse the same. For example, if it is found that the Committee of Management of the institution in collusion with the DIOS is proceeding to sell the property of the institution or its assets or is involving itself in the mass-copying etc. a member can approach the writ Court asking for appropriate action against the person guilty. Likewise, if a Prabhand Sanchalak appointed for holding fresh elections of the Committee of Management of an Institution fails to hold elections, an ordinary member would have the cause to approach the writ Court for asking the Prabhand Sanchalak to discharge the function for which he was appointed by the statutory authority. 35. It has to be kept in mind that the general body and the Committee of Management of a recognized Intermediate College is constituted under the Statutory provisions of Section of 16-A Act 1921 read with Section 16-CC and IIIrd Schedule thereunder. The enrolment of members to the general body also takes place as per the scheme of administration which needs to be approved by the Regional Joint Director of Education. 36. Therefore, the Committee of Management has a statutory background and the members of the general body can never be termed as stranger who have nothing to do with management of the Institution. The lawful members cannot be termed as rank outsider with no interest in the management of the Institution or to have no right to interfere if there is mismanagement of the Institution in violation of the Statutory provisions. 37. The lawful members cannot be termed as rank outsider with no interest in the management of the Institution or to have no right to interfere if there is mismanagement of the Institution in violation of the Statutory provisions. 37. There cannot be any hard and fast rule that in no case a member of the general body, or a superseded office bearer cannot approach this Court for relief under writ jurisdiction whatever the cause may be. 38. The Management/Manager who had actually suspended the Principal when the Committee of Management was in effective control, has sufficient cause to approach this Court with the prayer that the DIOS is not discharging his statutory duty as enshrined under Section 16-G (5) & (7) of Intermediate Education Act. In our opinion, in the facts of the case having regard to the context in which the provision under Section 16-G (5) has been framed the writ petition as filed by Committee of Management and Sri Govil who was admittedly the Manager of Committee of Management which had suspended the principal of the institution had sufficient locus to maintain the writ petition. 39. The description of the petitioner No. 1 also cannot be said to be bad in the facts of the case as the Committee of Management was claiming that since the period for the continuance of the authorized controller statutorily prescribed has expired the Committee of Management stood restored in the eyes of law. 40. We may highlight that it has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that where technicalities and substantial justice are pitted against each other, it the interest of substantial justice which must prevail. The Courts exercising constitutional powers must not discourage the litigants who come up with bona fide legal grievance before the Court on hyper technical grounds. 41. We find that the Division Bench in the case of Desh Deepak Srivastava (supra) in the facts of that case had found that there was concealment of facts and the Committee which had been restrained from functioning had misrepresented to be in control. Therefore, the judgment is distinguishable in the facts of this case. 42. 41. We find that the Division Bench in the case of Desh Deepak Srivastava (supra) in the facts of that case had found that there was concealment of facts and the Committee which had been restrained from functioning had misrepresented to be in control. Therefore, the judgment is distinguishable in the facts of this case. 42. It is worthwhile to mention that one of facts which has escaped the attention of the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition on the ground of locus is that according to the petitioner the statutory period for continuance of authorized controller under the provision of Act of 1971 had expired and, therefore, the authorized controller would cease to exist in the eyes of law. No vacuum is expected. The Committee did have right to claim that it was restored back. We are not expressing any final opinion on this aspect as Sri R.K. Ojha, Sr. Advocate contended that facts need to be considered by the learned Single Judge as whether the statutory period had expired or not on the date writ petition was filed in the light of the statutory provision. 43. For all the aforesaid reasons, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. The writ petition is restored to its original number. We request the learned Single Judge to consider the matter afresh at the earliest and for that purpose we direct the Registry to list the writ petition before appropriate Bench on 17.7.2017. The special appeal is allowed.