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2017 DIGILAW 1605 (ALL)

STATE OF U. P. v. RANDHIR SINGH, CONSTABLE

2017-07-05

ARUN TANDON, RITU RAJ AWASTHI

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JUDGMENT By the Court.—The State of Uttar Pradesh has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 3.10.2013 passed in Writ - A No. 27940 of 2010. 2. We have heard learned Standing Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Vijay Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner. 3. Facts in short leading to the present appeal are as under: The petitioner before the High Court, namely, Sri Randhir Singh was employed as police constable in U.P. Police service. It is not in dispute that the service conditions of the police officers of the rank to which the petitioner belongs are regulated under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1991’). 4. We may at the very outset record that the Rules of 1991 were not under challenge in the writ petition, giving rise to this appeal. 5. The petitioner, Randhir Singh, was charge-sheeted for an offence under Section 302/324 IPC in Sessions Trial No. 53 of 1992. The trial resulted in conviction of Sri Randhir Singh and vide judgment and order dated 3.7.1996 he was held guilty of firing from his service rifle upon the victim, and was convicted for life for the offence under Section 302/324 IPC. Not being satisfied, Sri Randhir Singh preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1262 of 1996 which is pending before this Court. He has been released on bail. 6. After his conviction for the aforesaid offence the disciplinary authority in exercise of powers under Rule 8 (4) (b) of Rules of 1991 took a decision to dismiss Randhir Singh. 7. On being released on bail, the petitioner, Randhir Singh, filed Writ Petition No. 27940 of 2010 alleging therein that the order of dismissal dated 3.8.1996 was bad in view of the fact that the conduct of the Government servant resulting in punishment had not been examined by the disciplinary authority and, therefore, bad in view of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel; AIR 1985 SC 1146 followed by Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shyam Narain Shukla v. State of U.P.; (1988) 6 LCD 530 and in the case of Sadanand Mishra v. State of U.P.; 1996 LCD 70. The learned Single Judge has come to a conclusion that in absence of conduct of the petitioner which lead to his conviction having been examined by the disciplinary authority before inflicting the punishment of dismissal from service, the same cannot be legally sustained and accordingly the order of punishment has been set aside. It is against this order of the writ Court that present intra Court appeal has been preferred by the State Government. 8. We may at the very outset record that the conviction for an offence under Section 302 IPC amounts conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. The issue in this regard has been settled by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ran Vijay Chandra v. State of U.P. and others; 2003 (2) AWC 1385 . Once it is found that the police officer has been convicted by a competent Court of Law for an offfence involving moral turpitude, the provisions of Rule 8 (4) (b) of Rules of 1991 will come into play. For ready reference Rule 8 (4) (b) of Rules of 1991 is quoted hereinbelow: “8 (4) (b) Every Officer convicted by the Court for an offence involving moral turpitude shall be dismissed unless the punishing authority for reasons to be recorded in writing considers it otherwise.” 9. On a simple reading of the aforesaid Rule, it will be seen that it leaves no discretion in the hands of the disciplinary authority but to dismiss the police officer on his being convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude except when the disciplinary authority may decide otherwise for the reasons to be recorded in writing. Therefore, what falls from the simple reading of the aforesaid statutory provision is that on conviction by the competent Court of Law of a police officer for the offence involving moral turpitude action to be normally taken by the disciplinary authority is to dismiss him from service except when for cogent reasons which must be reproduced in writing a different view can be taken. 10. The aforesaid statutory provision which was not subjected to challenge in the writ petition and which is binding upon the disciplinary authority being statutory in nature as the Rules of 1991 have been framed in exercise of powers under the Police Act, 1981. 11. 10. The aforesaid statutory provision which was not subjected to challenge in the writ petition and which is binding upon the disciplinary authority being statutory in nature as the Rules of 1991 have been framed in exercise of powers under the Police Act, 1981. 11. This leads the Court to consider as to what would be the impact of the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned Single Judge in his judgment in appeal. 12. So far as the judgment in the case of Tulsi Ram Patel (supra) is concerned, we may only record that the judgment was delivered in the year 1985 when the Rules of 1991 had not seen the light of the day. There has been material change in the legal position with regards to disciplinary action to be taken against police officers covered by the Rules of 1991. The Rules of 1991 provide of different modes for dealing with police officers convicted by the competent Court, one convicted for the offences involving moral turpitude i.e. under Rule 8 (4) (b) of Rules of 1991 and the other for those convicted for offences not involving moral turpitude. 13. The Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and others; 2003 (2) SCC 111 , has explained that a little difference in the facts will make a lot of difference in the precedential value of the decision. 14. So far as the judgments in the case of Shyam Narain Shukla (supra) and Sadanand Mishra (supra) are concerned, we find that the judgments have not taken note of the change in legal position introduced by the Rules of 1991 and, therefore, the said judgments also cannot be said to be binding upon us. 15. In our opinion, there has to be consideration of the statutory rules specifically Rule 8 (4) (b) of Rules of 1991 and its impact on the discretion of the disciplinary authority in respect of the imposition of the penalty after conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. 16. 15. In our opinion, there has to be consideration of the statutory rules specifically Rule 8 (4) (b) of Rules of 1991 and its impact on the discretion of the disciplinary authority in respect of the imposition of the penalty after conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. 16. Since the learned Single Judge has failed to take note of the aforesaid change in legal position introduced by the Rules of 1991 and the discretion which is left with the disciplinary authority thereafter in respect of an order of punishment to be made against the police officer convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude by a competent Court of Law, the judgment impugned cannot be legally sustained and is hereby set aside. The writ petition is restored to its original number. Let the writ petition be decided in the light of the aforesaid observations afresh. 17. We may, however, record that mere grant of bail in the pending appeal filed against the order of conviction will not amount to conviction or punishment of the writ petitioner being wiped out and, therefore, grant of bail does not assist the petitioner in any manner. 18. The special appeal is accordingly allowed.