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2017 DIGILAW 1610 (RAJ)

GIRDHAR GOPAL JHAMB MEDICAL STORE v. MOHANLAL SANGHI MEMORIAL DHARAMSHALA TRUST NAYAPURA KOTA

2017-07-20

GOVERDHAN BARDHAR

body2017
ORDER : Goverdhan Bardhar, J. Since all these revision petitions have been filed under section 115 of CPC against the order dated 26.3.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 4, Kota upholding the order dated 24.5.2010 passed by the Civil Judge (JD), Kota (North), whereby standard rent has been determined @ 2000/- per month of each suit shop from July,2000. 2. That brief and relevant facts of the case (S.B. Civil Revision No. 110/2015) are that on 03.07.2000, plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for fixation of standard rent under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Premises (Rent Control and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short "the Act of 1950) stating that the suit shop was let out to the defendant at monthly rent of Rs. 400/-. It was further stated that the rent of the suit shop is very low and looking to the location of the suit property as well as prevalent rent in the locality, suit shop can fetch up to Rs. 2000/- per month. Since the defendant was paying less amount of rent, the plaintiff served legal notice on 01.06.2000 for enhancement of rent but the defendant denied for the enhancement and stated that rent so agreed is appropriate. Plaintiff further stated that since section 6(2) of the Act of 1950 has been declared ultravirus by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court, therefore, plaintiff has no other remedy except to file a suit for standard rent and prayed for fixation of standard rent @ Rs. 2000/- per month. After service, the defendant filed written statement on 25.07.2000 stating that the suit shop has been let out to the petitioner/defendant in the year 1985 and prior to this, the suit shop was let out to some other tenant on less rent. On the contrary, the defendant stated that in the same vicinity, which are situated on better location and having more area, maximum rent is below Rs. 400/- per month. 3. The plaintiff in support of the case examined PW-1 Balchand Nagar, PW-2 Banarsiram and exhibited documents Ex-1 to Ex-7. Defendant examined himself as DW-1, DW-2 Sharad Chatwani, DW-3 Sanjay Saxena and exhibited document of receipt of Trishul Electricals as Exhibit A-1A. 4. 400/- per month. 3. The plaintiff in support of the case examined PW-1 Balchand Nagar, PW-2 Banarsiram and exhibited documents Ex-1 to Ex-7. Defendant examined himself as DW-1, DW-2 Sharad Chatwani, DW-3 Sanjay Saxena and exhibited document of receipt of Trishul Electricals as Exhibit A-1A. 4. Four suits filed were consolidated on 05.09.02 and after hearing the arguments, the learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 24.04.2009 partly decreed the suit, against which the landlord filed appeals which were allowed and the matter was remanded back vide order dated 05.03.2010. 5. After remand of the case, the learned trial court by its impugned judgment dated 24.05.2010 determined the standard rent @ Rs. 2000/- per month w.e.f. July 2000 for each suit shop, against which, appeal was preferred by the petitioner/defendant which was dismissed vide order dated 26/3/2015. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the court below has not considered the provision of Section 6 of the Act of 1950 and fixed the standard rent for each suit shop @ Rs. 2000/- per month w.e.f. July 2000 without appreciating the fact that in the same locality the prevalent rent is not more than Rs. 400/- per month. He has further argued that the court below has erred in fixing the rent @ Rs. 2000/- per month whereas the same presiding officer in the cases of same plaintiff and different tenants has fixed standard rent with lesser rate of rent @ Rs. 675/- as well as Rs. 1500/- per month and Rs. 1600/- per month and as such the impugned judgment is self contradictory and required to be set aside. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material placed before me. 8. In the case of Khem Chand v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. 1999(2) WLC(Raj.) 228, this court has held as under: "13. In the light of the decisions aforementioned, particularly the decision of the Apex Court, we have no hesitation in striking down the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. 14. Accordingly, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act are struck down as ultra vires and unconstitutional." 9. In the light of the decisions aforementioned, particularly the decision of the Apex Court, we have no hesitation in striking down the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. 14. Accordingly, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act are struck down as ultra vires and unconstitutional." 9. While deciding the issue no.1, the trial court has observed that the provisions of section 6(2) has been stuck down as ultra vires and unconstitutional, the standard rent can be fixed under section 6(3) of the Act of 1950, the provisions of section 6(3) reads as under:- "(3) Where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any premises on the principal set out in Sub-section (2) the Court shall determine such rent having due regard to the prevailing rent or standard rent for similar premises in the same locality, the various amenities (such as electricity, water connection, sanitary fitting, and the like) attached to the premises the cost of construction, maintenance and repairs thereof, the special reasons if any, proved by the plaintiff and other relevant consideration. 10. In the case of Om Prakash Taneja v. Saraogi Mansion Estate Pvt. Ltd. 2007(1) DNJ (Raj.) 292, it has been observed: "16. Fourthly, Section 6(5) empowers the court to determine the applicability of the standard rent from an "appointed date". Such a power can be exercised by the court in a case instituted either by the landlord or the tenant. The proviso further grants the power to the court to apply the standard rent from "the date of institution of the suit, or such later date as the court may deem reasonable," in case the tenant institutes the suit under Section 6 of the Act after the expiry of six months from the commencement of his tenancy. Hence, when the suit has been Tiled by the tenant after the expiry of six months of tenancy, the court is empowered to decide the date of applicability of the standard rent. 27. .......... Hence, when the suit has been Tiled by the tenant after the expiry of six months of tenancy, the court is empowered to decide the date of applicability of the standard rent. 27. .......... It unequivocally states that "all applications, suits or other proceedings under the repealed Act pending on the date of commencement of this Act before any court shall be continued and disposed of, in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act, as if the repealed Act had continued in force and this Act had not been enacted." 11. While determining the standard rent from the date of filing of the suit, the trial court has rightly exercised its power as enumerated in section 6(5) of the Act of 1950. The provision of Section 6(5) of the Act of 1950 reads as under: "(5) In every case in which the court determines the standard rent of any premises under this section, it shall appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect; Provided that such date shall, in the case of a tenant who institutes a suit under this section after the expiration of six months from the commencement of his tenancy on the ground of the rent agreed upon being excessive, be the date of institution of such suit or such later date as the court may in the circumstances of the case deem reasonable." 12. While upholding the findings given by the trial court, the appellate court observed that rent determined for disputed premises by the trial court is less than from the first floor of same premises rented out to the son of the petitioner. 13. In view of the above, this court is of the opinion that the standard rent determined by the trial court from the date of filing the suit and rightly upheld by the appellate court is just and proper and this court does not find any good ground to interfere in the impugned orders. 14. Consequently, the revision petitions are dismissed.