JUDGMENT Saumitra Dayal Singh, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the award of the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, Meerut dated 22.4.2017 in Case No. E.C. No. 186 of 2006. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the claimant Sansar Singh had been engaged on the post of driver by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and that while on duty/driving the bus of the said corporation bearing registration No. UP- 25T-5451, the said bus met with an accident on 11.02.2006 while on way from Bareilly to Delhi. In that accident the claimant Sansar Singh was seriously injured. He was initially admitted in a Government Hospital at Bareilly and thereafter he was shifted to Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital Delhi and thereafter to Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi owing to his serious medical condition. In the course of treatment both legs of Sansar Singh were amputated and thus he became 100% disabled. On the date of accident, according to the service book the age of Sansar Singh was 42 years. 3. Arising from the above accident, claim petition was filed by Sansar Singh in the year 2006 which remained pending for unduly long period. During the pendency of the claim petition, the claimant Sansar Singh expired on 26.05.2012. Resultantly his legal representatives were substituted. The impugned award has been passed in their favour by awarding Rs. 4,06,656/- together with 12% interest from 11.03.2006 till the date of payment. In the proceedings before the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner, Meerut, objections were raised by the insurer to the effect that on the date of the accident Sansar Singh did not have a valid driving licence; that the injury report of the Bareilly Hospital was not filed and therefore, the fact of the injuries received as a result of accident was not proved and further it was submitted; and that the age of Sansar Singh was 61 years on the date of accident and therefore, the compensation, if any, ought to be awarded accordingly. 4. The Employee’s Compensation Commissioner has after allowing the parties opportunity to lead evidence and after considering the evidence so led has dealt with objections raised by the insurer. 5. 4. The Employee’s Compensation Commissioner has after allowing the parties opportunity to lead evidence and after considering the evidence so led has dealt with objections raised by the insurer. 5. In respect of the objection that the driving licence of Sansar Singh had not been produced, the Commissioner specifically took note of the evidence led by Sansar Singh that he lost some money and his driving licence at the time of accident. In this regard the statement of Sansar Singh, a copy of which has been annexed with this appeal clearly establishes that such statement was made. The Commissioner had also thereafter taken note of the fact that inasmuch as Sansar Singh was driving the bus of the Corporation, and he was also found to be an employee of that Corporation, it may be presumed that he had a valid driving licence as in normal course the Corporation would not engage a person to drive the bus, if he did not possess a valid driving licence. Also, it cannot be lost sight of that the injuries suffered by Sansar Singh were serious in which he had lost both his legs. Eventually, considering the seriousness of the accident, it is not unnatural to accept the explanation of Sansar Singh that he did not get issued a duplicate driving licence as the person who had no legs and had no use of the same. 6. In view of the above, I do not find any error in the finding of the Commissioner that on the date of accident Sansar Singh had a valid driving licence and therefore, the insurer was liable to pay compensation. 7. As far as the second objection is concerned, it is of no relevance that the claimant did not produce the injury report of the Bareilly hospital as undisputedly, he was injured in the accident and was treated for the same at two hospitals at Delhi which fact was duly proved. 8. In respect of the third objection as to the age of Sansar Singh on the date of accident, the insurer only relied on the admission slip of the hospital at New Delhi where the claimant was shifted to in a serious condition after being referred from Bareilly Hospital to Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital, Delhi and thereafter to Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi. Normally the admission documents are got prepared by the attendant. Normally the admission documents are got prepared by the attendant. The claimant himself having suffered serious injuries in his both legs, it may be safely assumed that he would have not got admission documents prepared himself. On the other hand the service book of the claimant maintained by the U.P.S.R.T.C. was on record and the insurer never challenged the correctness of entries made in the said document. Resultantly, the age of claimant Sansar Singh as disclosed in his service book being 45 years according to his service book recorded with his date of birth 20.07.1961, and consequential applicability of statutory factor of 169.44 is absolutely correct and it does not suffer from any infirmity. 9. Then, it has been submitted by the appellant that under Rule 24 of the Workman Compensation Rule, 1924, the Commissioner was first obliged to frame the issues and then decide the claim petition. While, it is true that the Rules provide for framing of issues insofar as it is clearly seen that the objection raised by the insurer have been dealt with and decided by the Commissioner, no further purpose would have been served, if the issues had been first framed and then decided. Here it may be noted that it is not the case of the appellant that the objections raised by the appellant have not been dealt with or decided. 10. Then, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the insurer has also raised objection to the proceedings having abated on the death of the claimant and that his legal representatives could not have been entitled to any relief. In this regard he has relied upon two judgments, one is Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Bhagwati Bai and another v. Bablu alias Mukund and others reported in 2007 (2) TAC 71 (MP) and another is of Gauhati High Court in the case of Sipra Bhowmik v. Soumendra Ch. Saha in MAC Appeal No. 64 of 2000 decided on 12th March, 2012. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Bhagwati Bai (supra) had taken a view that under the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim of personal injury would abate on the death of the claimant and would not entitled by the legal representatives of claimant except of pecuniary loss to estate. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Bhagwati Bai (supra) had taken a view that under the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim of personal injury would abate on the death of the claimant and would not entitled by the legal representatives of claimant except of pecuniary loss to estate. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of that judgment it has been held as below: - “The aforesaid Section inter alia provides that all rights to prosecute any action or special proceeding existing in favour of a person at the time of his death, survive to his executors or administrators except causes of action for personal injuries not causing the death of the party. Thus, under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the executors or administrators of a deceased will have a right to prosecute or continue any action or special proceeding existing in favour of the deceased at the time of his death, except causes of action for personal injury not causing death of the party. Therefore, where the accident does not cause death of a party but only causes personal injury to him, his executors or administrators will not have a right to prosecute or continue to prosecute an application for compensation for personal injury suffered by the party in a motor accident. 11. In Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 411, the Supreme Court observed that the principle contained in Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925, will apply not only to executors or administrators but also to other legal representatives. 11. In Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 411, the Supreme Court observed that the principle contained in Section 306 of Indian Succession Act, 1925, will apply not only to executors or administrators but also to other legal representatives. Paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair (supra) as reported in the A.I.R., is quoted herein below: - “Section 306 further speaks only of executors and administrators but on principle the same position must necessarily prevail in the case of other legal representatives, for such legal representatives cannot in law be in better or worse position than executors and administrators and what applies to executors and administrators will apply to other legal representatives also.” Hence by virtue of the principle in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the legal representatives of a deceased, who suffers personal injury in a motor accident and who dies subsequently for some other reason, cannot prosecute or continue to prosecute an application for compensation under sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.” 11. Similarly, the Gauhati High Court in the aforesaid judgment has dealt with as follows: - “Only question, which has arisen in course of arguments for decision, as to whether a claimant-petitioner, who has claimed compensation under the M.V. Act for the personal injury suffered by him, died during pendency of the claim, not inconsequence of the injuries suffered by him due to Motor Vehicle accident, but for some other cause, can his successors/legal representatives continue with the claim case for compensation” 12. Thereafter, followed the principles laid down by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it appears that the aforesaid judgment is based on the reasoning that in the case of injury the claimant filed a claim petition and during the pendency of the same and after death of the injured, the legal representatives would not be entitled to any claim of compensation for death caused by other cause not related to the accident. 13. The aforesaid judgments make it clear that so far as the pecuniary loss to the claimant is concerned, there would not be impediment to such claim being made or being pursued by the legal representatives of the claimant. 13. The aforesaid judgments make it clear that so far as the pecuniary loss to the claimant is concerned, there would not be impediment to such claim being made or being pursued by the legal representatives of the claimant. In the instant case, the claim made under the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner Act is on account of injury suffered during the course of employment and for nothing more. Such compensation claimed by the claimant clearly falls in the description of pecuniary loss to the estate of the claimant. 14. Thus legal issue raised by the appellant though not decided by the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner, again lacks merits and is rejected. 15. Lastly, it has been submitted by the appellant that the insurer could not be made liable for interest, inasmuch as, it is the employer who would be liable for such liability. I do not find force in the submission advanced by learned counsel for the insurer. Under the Employees Compensation Act an award is not a mandatory precondition for payment of compensation amount and it is in fact upon failure to pay such compensation that claim petition is required to be filed. 16. Also the Supreme Court in the case of the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Siby George and others has clearly held that the liability to pay compensation arises as soon as personal injury is caused to workman by accident which arose out of and in course of employment. The insurer also had due notice of the claim petition but both the employee and the insurer have unduly allowed the matter to stay pending for long without making any payment to the claimant though, as is apparent on the face of record it was the case of the serious injury in which the claimant became 100% disabled upon loss of both his legs and as such there was no room for the insurer or employer to resist the claim. In fact there is no case either of employer or of the insurer at any stage that claimant had not suffered any injury during the course of employment. In any case, this would be a matter/issue between the insurer and the insured. In fact there is no case either of employer or of the insurer at any stage that claimant had not suffered any injury during the course of employment. In any case, this would be a matter/issue between the insurer and the insured. Having it open to the appellant to proceed against the insured and claim interest, in accordance with law, if so advised, so far as the claimant is concerned, the insurer is liable to satisfy the award of interest as well. 17. In view of the above, the award by the Employee’s Compensation Commissioner has been passed on due and correct appraisal of evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. The impugned award does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity in law. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly.