JUDGMENT : 1. This judgment disposes of First Appeal filed by the insurer and the X-Objection preferred by original claimants (respondents no. 1 to 7). Parties shall be hereinafter referred to as per their status in first appeal. 2. Appellant is the insurer of TATA chasis bearing temporary registration No. MH-12/ 623 which was involved in the accident. It was owned by respondent no. 9. Respondent no. 1 is the widow of deceased Bhagwan Kharde; respondents no. 2 to 6 are the children of the deceased and respondent no. 7 is the mother of the deceased. Respondent no. 10 is also joined as party-respondent to the claim petition. As per her case, she was the first wife of the deceased. The Award has been passed for Rs. 1,82,500/- in favour of respondents no. 1 to 7 and respondent no. 10. The liability to pay the amount of the Award has been fastened jointly and severally upon the appellant-insurer and respondent no. 8 Prithvi, driver of the TATA Chasis involved in the accident. 3. On 3.7.1997 at about 02.30 pm, deceased Bhagwan, wanting to return home as soon as possible in order to see his sick mother, was waiting for ST Bus to arrive at the spot where he was standing. This spot was on Jalna-Deulgaonraja Road. The ST Bus did not arrive, but one TATA chassis, the vehicle involved in the accident, did come from jalna side. Deceased Bhagwan raised his hand and stopped the TATA chassis. Deceased requested the driver of the TATA chasis to give him lift and started boarding the chasis. But, the driver, it appears, refused to oblige the deceased. Not only this, the driver of TATA chasis suddenly accelerated the speed of the vehicle and the deceased lost his balance and fell off the chasis. Even the truck driver lost control over the steering wheel and the chasis dashed against a road side tree situated nearby. In this accident, deceased Bhagwan sustained grievous injuries. It is claimed by respondents no. 1 to 7 that deceased Bhagwan at the time of accident was 35 years old and earned handsomely, about Rs. 4000-5000 per month from his agriculture and allied activities including dairy business. The claimants submitted that they were dependents upon income of the deceased and, therefore, they filed claim petition for compensating their loss. Respondent no. 1 to 7 that deceased Bhagwan at the time of accident was 35 years old and earned handsomely, about Rs. 4000-5000 per month from his agriculture and allied activities including dairy business. The claimants submitted that they were dependents upon income of the deceased and, therefore, they filed claim petition for compensating their loss. Respondent no. 10 was also later on allowed to be added to the claim petition as, according to her, she was the first wife of the deceased and, therefore, interested in receiving the compensation. As a result of such intervention, respondent no. 10 withdrew the claim petition filed by her at Jalna and presented her claim in this matter. 4. The claim petition was opposed by the appellant on the ground that the driver of the TATA chais did not hold valid driving licence at the relevant time to drive heavy motor vehicle and he held driving licence only to drive light motor vehicle. According to it, there was breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and, therefore, driver and owner of the TATA chasis truck were responsible to pay compensation to the claimants. 5. On merits, the Tribunal rejected such opposition of the appellant and found that it was along with the driver of the truck, liable to pay the compensation to the claimants as well as the first wife of the deceased on account of loss they suffered owing to the death of Bhagwan. Accordingly, by the Award dated 1st August 2005, the claim petition was partly allowed. Not being satisfied with the same, the insurer is before this Court in the appeal. Respondents no. 1 to 7 are also not satisfied with the compensation that is awarded by the Tribunal and they have preferred cross-objection claiming compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- upon modification of the Award. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for respondents no. 1 to 7/cross-objectors. Shri Khapre submits that respondent no. 7 Smt Kalabai, mother of the deceased, as per his information very recently received, has died. He, therefore, prays for deletion of the name of respondent no. 7 from the array of respondents. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that suitable orders be passed. Accepting the statement of Shri Khapre, name of respondent no. 7 Smt Kalabai, mother of the deceased, as per his information very recently received, has died. He, therefore, prays for deletion of the name of respondent no. 7 from the array of respondents. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that suitable orders be passed. Accepting the statement of Shri Khapre, name of respondent no. 7 Smt Kalabai is directed to be deleted at the risk of these respondents from the array of parties. Deletion be caused forthwith. Respondent no. 8 is deleted from the array of parties. None appears for respondents no. 9 and 10. I have gone through the record of the case. 7. Now, the following points arise for my determination: (1) Whether the appellant has proved that it is not liable to pay any compensation in the present case? (2) Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper? 8. Shri Pophaly, learned counsel for the appellant in his detailed arguments has made a valiant effort to convince this Court that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation in the present case. In the process, however, learned counsel for the appellant has graciously conceded to the fact that the vehicle involved in the present case is a light motor vehicle as defined under Section 2 (21) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with its admitted weight of not exceeding 7500 kilograms and that the driver on the vehicle was holding valid driving licence for light motor vehicle. Now, that it is clear that the vehicle involved in the present case was light motor vehicle, the defence of the insurance company taken in this regard holds no water. 9. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant the accident had occurred at the time when the process of boarding the truck was completed and thus, the deceased could be treated as a gratuitous passenger. Alternatively, he submits that even if it is assumed just for the sake of argument that there was no permission given by the driver of the chasis to the deceased to get on to the chasis, it would have to be accepted that since the process of boarding the chasis was completed and the accident had occurred about 300 feet away from the spot where the deceased was standing, it was owing to the complete negligence on the part of the deceased who was a gratuitous passenger. He has invited my attention to the evidence brought on record by the parties. This evidence is of PW 3 Santosh Deshmukh, the pancha witness, evidence of PW 1 Samindrabai, widow of the deceased, First Information Report (exhibit 26) and spot panchanama (exhibit 27). He also invited my attention to the pleadings made in the petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act wherein the claimants had contended that the accident had occurred when the deceased was clinging on to the body of the chasis. 10. Shri Khapre, learned counsel for respondents no. 1 to 7 submits that the evidence brought on record by the parties does not lead to any such inference that the process of boarding was complete and that it was with the permission of the driver of the chasis truck. He submits that on the contrary, the evidence is of such nature as would show that the driver had refused entry of deceased Bhagwan into the chasis truck and that he had accelerated the speed of the truck so as to get rid of the deceased because of which deceased was thrown off the chasis and perhaps came under the wheels of the chasis and met with his instantaneous death. He submits that the pleadings under Section 166 would also not show any such facts as would give any indication that deceased Bhagwan had already got into the truck when the accident occurred. He further submits, even otherwise, there being no specific defence taken in the Written Statement of the appellant in this regard, now the appellant cannot be permitted to take the same. He has also placed reliance upon the same evidence as has been relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. 11. It is true that no specific defence that the deceased himself being negligent, was taken by the appellant. The law on the point is also clear. So, now the appellant cannot be heard on the issue. Even otherwise, if one considers the evidence available on record, one would see that this defence now raised at appellate stage is not worth its salt. 12. But, let us first consider the issue of the deceased being or not being the gratuitous passenger. So, now the appellant cannot be heard on the issue. Even otherwise, if one considers the evidence available on record, one would see that this defence now raised at appellate stage is not worth its salt. 12. But, let us first consider the issue of the deceased being or not being the gratuitous passenger. The contents of spot panchanama of accident (exhibit 27) show that the spot of accident was situated about 300 feet away from Anil Dhaba, the alleged boarding point of the deceased and that even the pancha witness P.W. 3 Santosh has admitted in his evidence that he had seen some brake marks on the road and according to him, portion marked 'A' in the spot panchanama about tyre marks being present upto the distance of 80 feet is correct. This evidence, however, does not throw any light on the crucial aspects of the case as to whether or not deceased Bhagwan had really succeeded in boarding the chasis and if yes, whether or not it was with the consent of the driver. Then, it is also a specific case of the claimants that in fact, the boarding was never over, rather an attempt was made to climb over the frame of the chasis, but the driver of the chasis foiled it by giving a blow to the deceased and then he sped away with the chasis because of which deceased fell down on the road and sustained fatal injury. This is also the evidence given by P.W. 2 Rodba. In examination-in-chief he has stated that after the chasis came to a halt, he saw that there was a talk between Bhagwan and the driver. He further states that he saw Bhagwan getting into the chasis, but the driver drove his vehicle fast and it dashed against a tree and Bhagwan fell down. There was a suggestion given to this witness by the appellant to the effect that the accident occurred at the time when the deceased was clinging on to the chasis and this suggestion was denied by P. W. 3 Rodba. But denial of this suggestion would not positively prove the fact that the accident occurred when deceased Bhagwan had already with the consent of the driver got on to the chasis. But denial of this suggestion would not positively prove the fact that the accident occurred when deceased Bhagwan had already with the consent of the driver got on to the chasis. It can also mean that attempt to climb over the body of the chasis was possibly curbed at the initial stage and the deceased even did not get an opportunity to hang on to the frame of the chasis. So, some more circumstances to clarify the position should have been brought on record, but they were not. It is significant to note at this juncture that the case of the claimants that the accident occurred when deceased Bhagwan was in the process of boarding the chasis and that there was sudden acceleration of the chasis has not been specifically denied by the appellant. The cumulative effect of such evidence would be that there was a refusal of the driver to accede to the request of deceased Bhagwan to allow him to board the chasis and travel by the same. This would then mean that deceased Bhagwan was not a gratuitous passenger and was in the category of “third party”. 13. Now, the alternate submission of learned counsel for the appellant that deceased himself was responsible for causing of the accident as he had tried to force his entry into the body of the chasis needs attention. On merits, the submission has no force in it, because the evidence suggests, as discussed earlier, that the accident occurred not because the deceased tried to enter the chasis, but because of the fact that the driver of the chasis upon his refusal to board the chasis by Bhagwan, accelerated it as he wanted to show to the deceased that he was not welcome on board the chasis. Then, as stated earlier, such defence would also not be available to the appellant in view of the fact that no direction was passed by the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents, conferring right on the appellant to contest the claim on this ground. 14. Then, as stated earlier, such defence would also not be available to the appellant in view of the fact that no direction was passed by the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents, conferring right on the appellant to contest the claim on this ground. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, what I clearly see is that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the accident occurred only because of the negligence shown by the chasis driver is neither perverse nor illogical nor of the nature which does not naturally arise from the evidence available on record. I do not see any error in such a finding by the Tribunal and the same is confirmed. 15. Once it is found that the accident occurred only because of the negligence on the part of the chasis driver and it is also seen that the deceased was third-party, the appellant being insurer of the chasis would be liable to make good the loss suffered by the claimant as a result of death of Bhagwan, their solitary bread-earner. Therefore, appellant cannot escape from its liability to pay compensation in the present case to the claimants. First point is answered accordingly. 16. Now, it would have to be decided as to whether or not the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was just and proper. Shri Pophaly, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no documentary evidence brought on record proving the income of the deceased. He also submits that no receipts for sale of goods or any other agricultural produce were adduced in evidence. Thus, according to him, the oral testimony of P.W. 1 Samindrabai on the point of income of the deceased in the absence of necessary documentary proof cannot be relied upon and at the most, the notional income of the deceased can be considered. Learned counsel for the claimants, however, does not agree. According to him, 7/12 extract (exhibit 32) would show that deceased owned two large pieces of land one admeasuring 4.35 HR and the other 1.98 HR and that the deceased himself used to cultivate the agricultural lands. He submits that apart from the cultivation of lands, the deceased also owned 45 buffaloes from which he used to get supplementary income. According to him, 7/12 extract (exhibit 32) would show that deceased owned two large pieces of land one admeasuring 4.35 HR and the other 1.98 HR and that the deceased himself used to cultivate the agricultural lands. He submits that apart from the cultivation of lands, the deceased also owned 45 buffaloes from which he used to get supplementary income. Thus, according to him, at any rate, the income of the deceased could not be considered to be less than Rs. 4000/per month. 17. It is true that no documentary evidence in the nature of crop sale or agricultural produce sale receipts has been tendered in evidence by the claimants. It is also true that no receipts whatsoever in respect of purchase or sale of buffaloes or their milk were adduced in evidence by the claimants. But, it is not disputed that the deceased was ablebodied man and was not sitting idle. 7/12 extracts show that the deceased was the owner of two large pieces of agricultural lands together comprising 16 acres and that deceased himself used to till and cultivate these lands by taking such crops as cotton, tur (gram) etc. This would certainly show that the deceased was engaged in activity of earning and he himself was a tiller. If this is so, it would be very easy for this Court to visualize the annual income of the deceased which could be about Rs. 48,000/- per annum. At the time of accident, as per the 7/12 extracts, deceased appeared to be taking crops only for one season i.e. kharip season. One does not know whether or not he would have intensified his activity of cultivation in future. But, considering the fact that he had large family to support, it would be reasonable to expect that the deceased would have been fain to expand the agricultural activity and, therefore, some provision for future prospects, in these facts, can be reasonably made. As per Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , such future prospects would be @ 50% of the annual income. Learned counsel for the appellant at this stage points out that out of the above 16 acres of land, land admeasuring 4 acres had fallen to the share of the deceased. There is no evidence available in this regard. Learned counsel for the appellant at this stage points out that out of the above 16 acres of land, land admeasuring 4 acres had fallen to the share of the deceased. There is no evidence available in this regard. Nevertheless, if it is accepted as true, still, the position on the point of income and future prospects would not change, if one considers the evidence that the deceased himself was the tiller of all the lands. Therefore, it may not be unjust to draw an inference that in the present case the deceased must be earning annual income of Rs. 48,000/- from his agricultural activities. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the income of Rs. 48,000/- per annum cannot be taken to be actual loss of the claimants, because the lands are still available for cultivation and can certainly be cultivated by the claimants or any of them or near relatives. I would have accepted the argument had there been effective cross-examination on his issue made by learned counsel for the appellant before the Tribunal or some suggestions given by him in that regard. But, that is not the case here. It is not known as to whether or not the respondents or any of sons or any relative were or would be in a position to cultivate the land in the absence of the deceased. Only because the deceased left behind some legal heirs would not by itself be sufficient to infer that any of the legal heirs possessed the inclination, skill and capability to cultivate the lands. There has to be some positive evidence brought on record in this regard. Of course, the claimants on their part have also not said anything about the possibility of the lands being cultivated or otherwise. There are no 7/12 extracts placed on record by the appellant either showing the position about cultivation of lands after the death of Bhagwan. If the appellant wishes to put forward the point of cultivability of lands after Bhagwan, it should have brought on record some circumstances showing such possibility. But, it has not. So, this Court would have to decide this issue on the basis of facts and circumstances presently available on record. If the appellant wishes to put forward the point of cultivability of lands after Bhagwan, it should have brought on record some circumstances showing such possibility. But, it has not. So, this Court would have to decide this issue on the basis of facts and circumstances presently available on record. Admittedly, the children were minor at the time when the claim petition was filed and one does not know, when they would have attained the inclination and skill to cultivate the lands, if at all. In these circumstances, this Court would have to conclude that what used to be earned by deceased Bhagwan from the cultivation of lands, is now a loss of income for respondents no. 1 to 7. Argument of learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, rejected. 19. Although it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that on the basis of Sarla Varma (supra), addition of 50% by way of future prospects is not permissible, law in this regard has been clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh & ors v. Rajbir Singh & ors reported in (2013) 9 SCC 54 when it observed in paragraph 8 that in the case of self-employed one or a person with fixed wages where the age of the deceased was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. So, addition of future prospects even in case of a self-employed person is a must and that is the law which is no longer res integra. 20. Thus calculated, the annual income (Rs. 4,000/-) along with future prospects of the deceased (Rs. 2000/-) would have to be taken at Rs. 72,000/- (Rs. 6000 x 12). From this amount, considering the large family of the deceased in which there were at least six members, 1/5th amount would have to be deducted on account of personal expenses of the deceased. There is no dispute that at the time of accident, deceased Bhagwan was 35 years old. As per Sarla Verma (supra), the appropriate multiplier for the age group of 31-35 years is “16”. By applying this multiplier, total loss of dependency in the instant case can be calculated. To this amount, further addition of the amounts on account of such heads as loss of consortium for respondent no. 1 at Rs. As per Sarla Verma (supra), the appropriate multiplier for the age group of 31-35 years is “16”. By applying this multiplier, total loss of dependency in the instant case can be calculated. To this amount, further addition of the amounts on account of such heads as loss of consortium for respondent no. 1 at Rs. 1,00,000/and loss of love and affection for five children @ Rs. 100,000/- per child, will have to be added. 20. The compensation payable to the respondents computed in the manner stated above, would be in the following terms: (1) Annual income of the deceased of Rs. 48,000/- plus Rs. 24,000/- on account of 50% future prospects, would come to Rs. 72,000/- (2) Deduct Rs. 14,400/- (1/5th of annual income) from the above on account of personal expenses and the annual loss of dependency would come to Rs. 57,600/- (3) Appropriate multiplier for the age group of 3135 years would be “16”. (4) Hence, the total loss of dependency would come to Rs. 9,21,600/- (A). (5) Loss of consortium for respondent .. Rs. 1,00,000/- no. 1 (6) Loss of love and affection for five .. children @ Rs. 100,000/- each child’ Rs. 5,00,000/- (7) Total of (5) and (6) Rs. 6,00,000/.. (B) Total of (A) and (B) viz. Rs.8,64,000 + Rs. 6,00,000/- Rs. 15,21,600/- 21. Thus, I find that the total compensation payable to the original claimants (respondents no. 1 to 7) would be of Rs. 15,21,600/-. 22. Respondent no. 10 Kaushalyabai is the first wife of deceased. But, the evidence available on record does not show that she was in any manner dependent upon the deceased. The compensation granted under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is for indemnifying the loss suffered by the legal heirs who were dependent upon the deceased. Therefore, the compensation payable under Section 166 cannot be equated with a right a legal heir may have in the property left by the deceased. In fact, for the purposes of inheritance and succession, the compensation awarded under such claim could not be considered as the property which, as a matter of right, the legal heirs would inherit. Therefore, the compensation payable under Section 166 cannot be equated with a right a legal heir may have in the property left by the deceased. In fact, for the purposes of inheritance and succession, the compensation awarded under such claim could not be considered as the property which, as a matter of right, the legal heirs would inherit. The law of compensation as developed under the Motor Vehicles Act arises from a claim based on the principle of indemnity and not on the principle of inheritance and succession, and a person can be indemnified only when he or she directly or indirectly suffered loss for the wrong committed by another. A person who is not a dependent upon the deceased who has expired in an accident, cannot be said to be a person who has suffered any loss. Therefore, I do not think that respondent no. 10 Kaushalyabai (widow) would be entitled to receive any compensation in law in the facts and circumstances of the present case and as such, her claim deserves to be rejected. 23. The compensation determined under this order shall be payable by the appellant. The New India Assurance Company Limited together with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of application till actual realization together with respondent no. 9 jointly and severally, the owner of the TATA chasis. This amount shall be paid after adjusting the amount already deposited in this Court or in the Tribunal by the appellant Insurance Company, within one month from the date of payment of requisite court fees on the enhanced compensation by the respondents no. 1 to 7. The respondents/cross-objectors shall pay the requisite court fees on the enhanced compensation amount within one month from the date of this order. 24. First Appeal is dismissed and X-Objection is partly allowed in the above terms. The impugned award stands modified accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs of this appeal and x-objection.