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2017 DIGILAW 1644 (RAJ)

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MADAN SINGH

2017-07-25

GOVERDHAN BARDHAR

body2017
ORDER : Goverdhan Bardhar, J. This Misc. Appeal under Section 30(aa) of the Workman Compensation Act 1923 has been filed against the judgment/award dated 08.03.04, passed by the Commissioner, Workman Compensation, Jaipur, in claim Case No. W.C.C.N.F. 54/2002 whereby the claim application filed by the claimant respondent No.1 has been partly allowed alongwith interest at the rate of 12% p.a. 2. The brief and relevant facts of the case are that the claimant-respondent No.1 filed a claim application before the Workman Compensation Commissioner, Jaipur against the appellant and respondent No.2 claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,42,008/- on account of injuries sustained by him during the course of employment under respondent No.2 as Driver on Bus No. RJ-19-P-8229, on 06.04.2002 when the bus met with an accident near Nathwara. Due to which the claimant-respondent sustained 25% permanent disability and as per Medical Board's report he became unable to drive any vehicle in future. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that as per the disability certificate, the disability was sustained to the extent of 25% whereas the learned Commissioner has calculated and awarded the compensation by considering the loss of income as 100%. He has further argued that the claimant himself filed the disability certificate of 25% then the whole approach of the learned Commissioner is absolutely wrong to believe it 100% loss of earning capacity. He has further argued that the Commissioner has illegally fastened the liability to pay the interest on the appellant-Insurance Company as it is not statutory liability of the Insurance Company. He has further argued that there was no contract between the insurer and insured to indemnify the insured in respect of interest. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-claimant has opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the impugned award has rightly been passed by the Commissioner in favour of the claimant. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material placed before me. 6. Exhibit -9, disability certificate has been issued by the Medical Board of which one of the member was cross-examined by the advocate of insurance company who stated that the claimant sustained serious injuries due to which operation of stomach was done. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material placed before me. 6. Exhibit -9, disability certificate has been issued by the Medical Board of which one of the member was cross-examined by the advocate of insurance company who stated that the claimant sustained serious injuries due to which operation of stomach was done. It is not in dispute that the claimant was driver under the employment of respondent no.2 and suffered 25% disablement and in view of the material available on record it cannot be said that the Commissioner has erroneously come to the conclusion that the loss of earning capacity shall be 100%. In the case of Hukum Singh v. Deepak Agrawal & Anr. (S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.2215/2005) decided on 08.09.2016, this court has observed as under: "I am of the considered view that the WCC misdirected himself in treating the appellant's functional disability at 40 per cent on the basis of the medical certificate of 40% physical disability issued on 26.07.2002 by a duly constituted Medical Board. For the purpose of compensation, functional disability of the claimant resulting from the nature of the injury has to be considered with reference to the job/work being discharged by the claimants at the time of the accident. In the instant case the appellant was admittedly working as a driver of a heavy vehicle at the time of the accident and having lost the right leg below 6 the knee to amputation in the accident on 04.01.2002 the WCC ought to have taken the claimant as suffering 100% functional disability and not reduced the compensation determined under Section 4 of the Act of 1929 prorata with reference to the percentage of the overall physical disability." 7. In the case of United India Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Kesi & Ors. reported in 2017 (2) RAR 549, this court has held as under: "The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that that the interest on the amount compensation could not be directed to be paid from the date of accident but it was payable from the date of application filed before the Workmen's compensation commissioner. The issue in this regard is settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas V. Premier Insurance Co. The issue in this regard is settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas V. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd reported in AIR 1982 SC 836 in which it has been held as under :- "Thus obviously, it is the date of accident which is the relevant date giving rise to cause of action on which date the compensation falls due and date of adjudication is a fortuitous circumstance depending upon litigatory process and same cannot deprive the claim of the interest, which is the part of the compensation, which falls due on the date of accident itself. The later decision in the cases of Mubasir (4 of 4) [CMA-589/2008] Ahmed and Kamla Chaturvedi (supra) rendered by the Two Judges Bench of Apex Court obviously ignored the relevant part of statutory provision and the binding precedents including one by the Constitution Bench and therefore, have to be held per-in curium to that extent, and they cannot lend any assistance to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance company. Learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was justified in directing the payment of compensation from the date of accident itself." 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Saberabibi Yakubbhai Shaikh v. National Insurance Company and Ors., in Civil Appeal 8/2014 decided on 2/1/2014 wherein it has been held as under: "We have perused the aforesaid judgment. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. This Court considered the earlier judgment relied upon by the High Court and observed that the judgments in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed [ (2007) 2 SCC 349 ] and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [ (2009) 6 SCC 280 ] were per incuriam having been rendered without considering the earlier decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata [ (1976) 1 SCC 289 ]. In the aforesaid judgment, upon consideration of the entire matter, a four-judge Bench of this Court had held that the compensation has to be paid from the date of the accident.......... In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. In the aforesaid judgment, upon consideration of the entire matter, a four-judge Bench of this Court had held that the compensation has to be paid from the date of the accident.......... In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appellants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% from the date of the accident." 9. The High Court exercises a limited jurisdiction while exercising the jurisdiction under section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act in relation to finding of fact. Ordinarily, unless there exists a sufficient and cogent reasons, the finding of fact arrived at by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner are prohibited to be interfered with. 10. In view of the above, this court is of the view that there is no manifest error in the impugned judgment/award passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and the Commissioner has rightly awarded the compensation along with reasonable rate of interest after one month from the date of accident. 11. Appeal being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed.