JUDGMENT Hon’ble Virendra Kumar-II, J.—Heard Mr. Sudhir Pandey, learned counsel for petitioner, Ms. Pushpila Bisht, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 as well as learned Chief Standing Counsel. 2. Petitioner has assailed his transfer order dated 30.6.2017 passed by opposite party No. 1 by way of instituting this writ petition. It is pleaded that petitioner was appointed initially on the post of Fertilizer Analyst (Class-II), Chemistry Branch, after successful competing in the examination conducted on 1.5.2000 by Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. He is presently posted as Senior Pesticide and Fertilizer Analyst (Class-I) at Pesticide Fertilizer and Quality Control, Alambagh, Lucknow. His pay scale on the post of Deputy Director (Class-I) in Chemistry Wing in the agricultural department is in the pay scale of Rs. 10000-15200. Petitioner has unblemished service record. His work and conduct remained excellent. Therefore, he was promoted on the post of Deputy Director (Class-I) vide order dated 13.6.2006, whereof 20.5.2006. The opposite party No. 1 has transferred petitioner vide transfer order dated 30.6.2017 from the post of Senior Pesticide and Fertilizer Analyst, Alambagh (Lucknow) to Deputy Director Agriculture, Shahjahanpur. 3. It is further contended that Sri Santosh Kumar Rai opposite party No. 3 has been posted by replacing petitioner. He is Deputy Director (Krishi Raksha), Varanasi, and is not qualified for that post. It is mentioned that there are four pesticides and fertilizer quality control laboratories in the State of Uttar Pradesh, which are located at Alambagh, Rahmatkhera, Meerut and Varanasi. The number of sanctioned posts of Senior Pesticide Officer/Fertilizer Analysis, (Shreni-1), Fertilizer/Pesticide Analysis, Shreni-2, Fertilizer/Pesticide Analysis Asstt. Varg-1 is mentioned in para-9 of petition. It is relied upon by petitioner that only one post of pesticide and fertilizer analyst is available in four laboratories of agriculture department of Uttar Pradesh alongwith sanctioned post of Pesticide and Fertilizer Analysis Class-2 and Pesticide and Fertilizer Analysis Assistant Varg-1. 4. Sri S.B. Singh is presently posted as Pesticide and Fertilizer Analysis Class-2 at Varanasi lab and he is going to retire on 31.7.2017. It is further pleaded that petitioner obtained training from National Plant Protection Training Institute, Hyderabad in Instrumental Analysis of pesticide formulation analysis course. Petitioner and Sri S.B. Singh are doing work in these four laboratories of agriculture department. None other is qualified for this work. Petitioner has also relied upon U.P. Agricultural Group-B Service Rules, 1995 to regulate recruitment condition of service, qualification etc. Petitioner and Sri S.B. Singh are doing work in these four laboratories of agriculture department. None other is qualified for this work. Petitioner has also relied upon U.P. Agricultural Group-B Service Rules, 1995 to regulate recruitment condition of service, qualification etc. of U.P. Agricultural Group-B Service, which provides the strength of service in each categories, which are indicated in appendix-A and B of these rules. 5. The petitioner has also stated that he possesses degree in M.Sc. Agriculture in subject soil conservation, whereas opposite party No. 3 Santosh Kumar Rai belongs to development section, for which essential qualification is Bachelor degree in agriculture. The opposite party No. 3 do not possess Post Graduate degree in agriculture chemistry in soil science or soil conservation. 6. It is also contended that Section 19 of Insecticide Act, 1968 provides that the Central or State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint persons in such number as it thinks fit and possessing such technical and other qualification as may be prescribed to be Insecticide Analyst for such areas and in respect of such insecticides or class of insecticides as may be specified in the notification. No gazette notification has been published by the State Government appointing/posting Sri S.K. Rai on the post of Senior Pesticide & Fertilizer Analyst. He has been posted as such simply by a common transfer order dated 30.6.2017. 7. It is further mentioned that it is the duty and responsibility of Senior Pesticide and Fertilizer to inspect and provide technique and guidance to all four laboratories in the State. Opposite party No. 3 does not possess essential requisite qualification. Hence, he would not be able to provide guidance to all four quality control laboratories. Therefore, provisions of Service Rules, 1995, Insecticide Act, 1968, Insecticide Rule 1971, Fertilizer Control Order 1985 are violated. It also violates clause 10 of transfer policy dated 3.5.2017. On these grounds following reliefs have been sought by petitioner : (i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned order of transfer dated 30.6.2017 passed by the opposite party No. 1 as contained in Annexure 2 to this writ petition so far as the petitioner is concerned. On these grounds following reliefs have been sought by petitioner : (i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned order of transfer dated 30.6.2017 passed by the opposite party No. 1 as contained in Annexure 2 to this writ petition so far as the petitioner is concerned. (ii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to allow the petitioner to continue to work on the post of Senior Pesticide & Fertilizer Analyst at Pesticide & Fertilizer Quality Control Lab, Alambagh, Lucknow. 8. Learned Standing Counsel has produced instructions dated 14.7.2017 and informed that there are four wings available in Class-2 of agricultural department of Uttar Pradesh i.e. Development Abhiyantran Agricultural Protection Wing, Vanaspati Shashya and Chemical. These wings are having separate seniority list. The petitioner was appointed in Chemical Wing and after his promotion on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture (Class-1), he may be posted according to provisions of U.P. Agriculture Service (Class-1) Rules, 1992 on any post of department. It is wrong to say that on the basis of educational qualification of petitioner, he can only be posted on the post of Senior Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst. 9. It has also been pointed out that petitioner was earlier posted from period 13.7.2006 upto 15.7.2007 on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture (Research), Varanasi and then he was posted during period from 15.7.2007 upto 5.7.2010 on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture, Lucknow. The petitioner during this period had not raised any objection that he should be posted on the post of Senior Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst. It is also contended that officers of Class-2 belonging to concerned wing are posted in all laboratories of department for analysis work. These officers are posted from chemical section. Senior Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst (Class-1) only supervise work of other officers of class-2 posted in the laboratory. 10. Learned Standing Counsel has produced details of posting of petitioner which supports argument of Standing Counsel that petitioner was also earlier posted on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture, Lucknow and Deputy Director Agriculture (Research), Varanasi. 11. Senior Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst (Class-1) only supervise work of other officers of class-2 posted in the laboratory. 10. Learned Standing Counsel has produced details of posting of petitioner which supports argument of Standing Counsel that petitioner was also earlier posted on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture, Lucknow and Deputy Director Agriculture (Research), Varanasi. 11. Learned counsel for petitioner has argued on the facts narrated in pleadings of this petition and main thrust of his argument was only on the fact that opposite party No. 3 is not having requisite qualification to be posted as Senior Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst. It is also main argument of learned counsel for petitioner that after retirement of Sri S.B. Singh, work of four laboratories would be collapsed. 12. It is undisputed fact that petitioner has been transferred on the same post of Senior Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst from Laboratory Alambagh (Lucknow) on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture, Shahjahanpur. On perusal of letter dated 23.6.2017, which is forwarded by Joint Director Agriculture Quality Control, Uttar Pradesh to Agriculture Director, U.P., sanctioned post of laboratory at Alambagh, Rahmatkheri, Meerut and Varanasi has been mentioned. At Alambagh laboratory, two posts of Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst (Class-2) are sanctioned and for Pesticides Fertilizer Analyst Assistant Varg-1, eight posts are sanctioned. Although, there are two posts of Class-2, seven posts of Assistant Varg-1, Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst were vacant on date 23.6.2017. Therefore, it is pre-regotavie of Government to fill up the vacant post at Alambagh (Lucknow). 13. The posting of opposite party No. 3, posted in place of petitioner does not affect the rights of petitioner on the basis of impugned transfer order, because his involvement or malice for transfer of petitioner has not been substantiated by adducing any evidence, since petitioner has been transferred on the same post and his financial status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospect such as seniority scale of pay and secured emolument. Therefore, no legal or constitutional right of petitioner is adversely affected. 14. It is outlook of competent authority, in which circumstances, it would run laboratory at Alambagh (Lucknow) with two vacant posts of Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst (Class-2) and seven posts of Assistant Varg-1. Therefore, no legal or constitutional right of petitioner is adversely affected. 14. It is outlook of competent authority, in which circumstances, it would run laboratory at Alambagh (Lucknow) with two vacant posts of Pesticides and Fertilizer Analyst (Class-2) and seven posts of Assistant Varg-1. It is also pre-regative of State Government that if opposite party No. 3 Sri S.K. Rai would not be able to supervise work of Pesticides and Fertilizer in Class-2 and Assistant Varg-1, then what would be done in this contingency. The petitioner has no business to think over running of four laboratories of State Government. 15. On the other hand, it is also relevant to mention here that even after retirement of Sri S.B. Singh on 31.12.2017, services of petitioner may be obtained by the Government if official exigency would require, he would get admissible T.A./D.A. as per rules. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court has laid down following expositions of law in case of transfer policy of State Government : 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1991 SC 532 , has observed as follows : 2. ........ On their request they(appellants) were transferred to places where their husbands were posted by the District Education Establishment Committee. Respondents Nos. 4 to 18 who were displaced by the appellants challenged the validity of the transfer Orders before the High Court by means of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution........... 3 ........There is no dispute that the District Education Establishment Committee is competent to transfer Primary School teachers from one place to the other but merely because such transfers were made on the request of teachers, the committee is divested of its jurisdiction. The Director of the Primary Education had issued directions that lady teachers posted in distant areas or rural areas may be accommodated to the place of their request to avoid hardship to them. ...................If the competent authority issued transfer Orders with a view to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and should not be interfered by the Court merely because the transfer Order were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. The respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. Since they hold transferable posts they are liable to be transferred from one place to the other.........” 4. In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer Order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer Orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory Rule or on the ground of mala fide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer Orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer Order is passed in violation of executive instructions or Orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the Order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer Orders. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 , has observed as follows : 3. ......He (respondent transferred employee) submitted that the guidelines contained in Government of India O.M. dated 3.4.1986 have not been kept in mind while ordering his transfer. He complained that some other officials who have been serving at Shillong for a longer period, have been allowed to continue at Shillong. He attributed ‘mischief to his Controller Officer, Shri B.M. Wadhwa (third respondent in the O.M.). 6. An order of transfer is an incident of Government Service. Fundamental Rule 11 says that “the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government which pays him and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority”. Fundamental Rule 15 says that “the President may transfer a Government servant from one post to another”. That the respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India is not in dispute. Fundamental Rule 15 says that “the President may transfer a Government servant from one post to another”. That the respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India is not in dispute. It is not the case of the respondent that the order of his transfer is vitiated by mala fides on the part of the authority making the order, though the Tribunal does say so merely because certain guidelines issued by the Central Government are not followed, with which finding we shall deal later. The respondent attributed “mischief to his immediate superior who had nothing to do with his transfer.....” 7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated of by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee as a legally enforceable right. 9..... Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered also argument of learned counsel for respondent who rely upon the case Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, (1992) I LLJ 329 SC and observed as follows : .........The desirability of such a course is obvious. However, this does not mean that their place of posting should invariably be one of their choice, even though their preference may be taken into account while making the decision in accordance with the administrative needs........one of them cannot be transferred to the place of the other’s posting. While choosing the career and a particular service, the couple have to bear in mind this factor and be prepared to face such a hardship if the administrative needs and transfer policy do not permit the posting of both at one place without sacrifice of the requirements of the administration and needs of other employees. In such a case the couple have to make their choice at the threshold between career prospects and family life. In such a case the couple have to make their choice at the threshold between career prospects and family life. ........subordinating the need of the couple living together at one station, they cannot as of right claim to be relieved of the ordinary incident of all-India service and avoid transfer to a different place on the ground that the spouses thereby would be posted at different places.— No doubt the guidelines requires the two spouses to be posted at one place as far as practicable,, but that does not enable any spouse to claim such a posting as of right if the departmental authorities do not consider it feasible. The only thing required is that the departmental authorities should consider this aspect alongwith the exigencies of administration and enable the two spouses to live together at one station if it is possible without any detriment to the administrative needs and the claim of other employees. 10. The said observations in fact tend to negative the respondent’s contentions instead of supporting them. The judgment also does not support the Respondents’ contention that if such an order is questioned in a Court or the Tribunal, the authority is obliged to justify the transfer by adducing the reasons therefor. It does not also say that the Court or the Tribunal can quash the order of transfer, if any of the administrative instructions/guidelines are not followed, much less can it be characterised as mala fide for that reason. To reiterate, the order of transfer can be questioned in a Court or Tribunal only where it is passed mala fide or where it is made in violation of the statutory provisions. 19. Law laid down herein above has consistently been followed subsequently also, inasmuch as, in National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sri Bhagwan and another, AIR 2001 SC 3309 , Apex Court held as under : “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable post from one place to other is not only an incident but a condition of service necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the tribunal cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine as though they are the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (emphasis added) 20. Then in State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2004 SC 2165 , it was held : “It is too late in the day for any Government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing of conditions of service. Unless the order if transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide, exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the office or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of admnistrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision”. (emphasis added) 21. This Court has reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of admnistrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision”. (emphasis added) 21. A Division Bench of this Court also in Special Appeal No. 1293 2005 of Gulzar Singh v. State of U.P and others. decided on 7.11.2005 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68143 of 2005 R.K. Pandey v. New India Insurance Company Ltd. and others, decided on 26.10.2005, have also taken the same view. 22. It would be appropriate at this stage to reproduce caution in the words of the Apex Court as expressed in State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal (supra) as under : “A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer.” 23. Hon,ble supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2004 SC 2165 , has observed as follows : 2. ...... despite such views expressed, the transfer order came to be made for extraneous purposes, at the behest of and in order to oblige the local MLA. Carried away by the copies of the letters filed as Annexures before the High Court, allegedly written by the MLA, the Court, while issuing notice, seems to have granted interim orders of stay as well. Carried away by the copies of the letters filed as Annexures before the High Court, allegedly written by the MLA, the Court, while issuing notice, seems to have granted interim orders of stay as well. The respondents filed counter-affidavit disputing the claims made in the Writ Petition as to the alleged motives and baseless accusations relating thereto, and as found noticed in the order under challenge, it was categorically asserted for the respondents before the High Court that the so-called letter said to have been written by the MLA is a fake one and it was neither written by him nor was it available in the files. That apart, it was also, among other things, contended that the performance of the respondent in the previous stations as well came under a cloud and as a matter of fact, he was suspended on 10.2.1997 for alleged serious irregularities and misconduct while he was District Supply Officer at Hamirpur and Gonda. Though, subsequently reinstated on 11.7.1997 and departmental proceedings instituted were pending, once again he was said to have been suspended on 15.12.1997 for irregularities committed and reinstated on 20.3.1999, subject to the condition that the departmental proceedings pending against him will continue and as a matter of fact, two departmental proceedings were said to be pending against him. The respondent (Writ Petitioner before the High Court) himself is said to be the real brother of an MLA, by name Shri Ram Pal Verma, and through him and another MLA he was said to be bringing a lot of pressure to bear on the authorities, at every stage to get favourable treatment. In the light of the above and the further claim made that the criminal proceedings have also been sanctioned against him, it was contended that his transfer was purely in public interest and necessitated by the exigencies of service to keep him away from the field work and to take him into the Head Quarters Office on the administrative side. 3. 3. ......it was not possible for them to decide the disputed question of facts in writ jurisdiction as to whether the transfer order was passed due to political pressure or not, the Bench, in our view, fell into an error in attempting to lay down general principles relating to transfers and postings of Government Servants keeping in view, as found noticed in the order under challenge, some large-scale transfers said to have been taking place due to political interference in the State as disclosed from certain proceedings said to have been brought before the Court as well as some of the newspaper reports. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State contended that once the High Court had come to the conclusion that disputed questions of facts have been raised rendering it not possible to adjudicate on the facts as to whether the transfer order was passed due to political pressure or not as also in the other case relating to the promotion, the High Court ought to have rejected the Writ Petitions leaving liberty with the parties concerned, if they felt so aggrieved, to vindicate their rights, if any, in any other manner known to and in accordance with law and ought not to have embarked upon generalising the problems stated to be prevailing in the State with reference to transfer of public servants or promotions and given such sweeping directions whittling down the existing well-settled policies and guidelines regulating transfers and overriding the competence, authority and powers vested with the concerned and competent authorities of the State to deal with transfers of their subordinates, as was permissible in law.....” 6........ were not that serious as to defending the general directions of the nature given in this case by the High Court. Keeping in view all this, we find it necessary to deal with the legality and propriety of the directions issued and also the desirability or otherwise of the Court embarking upon such ventures, without affecting the rights of individual parties, who approached the Court for relief in these matters. ........ Keeping in view all this, we find it necessary to deal with the legality and propriety of the directions issued and also the desirability or otherwise of the Court embarking upon such ventures, without affecting the rights of individual parties, who approached the Court for relief in these matters. ........ We reiterate that the prime concern in these appeals, at the present stage, is only with reference to the omnibus and general directions issued by the High Court placing an embargo on the right of the competent and concerned authorities of the Government to pass orders of transfers and also as to the remedial or other measures, if any, to be provided for in such cases, apart from those as are available in law. 7. It is too late in the day for any Government Servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or Tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that Courts or Tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer. 9. The very questions involved, as found noticed by the High Court in these cases, being disputed questions of facts, there was hardly any scope for the High Court to generalise the situations based on its own appreciation and understanding of the prevailing circumstances as disclosed from some write ups in journals or newspaper reports. Conditions of service or rights, which are personal to the parties concerned, are to be governed by rules as also the inbuilt powers of supervision and control in the hierarchy of the administration of State or any Authority as well as the basic concepts and well-recognised powers and jurisdiction inherent in the various authorities in the hierarchy. All that cannot be obliterated by sweeping observations and directions unmindful of the anarchy which it may create in ensuring an effective supervision and control and running of administration merely on certain assumed notions of orderliness expected from the authorities effecting transfers. ...... Attempting to undertake an exercise of the nature could even be assailed as an onslaught and encroachment on the respective fields or areas of jurisdiction earmarked for the various other limbs of the State. Giving room for such an impression should be avoided with utmost care and seriously and zealously Courts endeavour to safeguard the rights of parties. ...... Attempting to undertake an exercise of the nature could even be assailed as an onslaught and encroachment on the respective fields or areas of jurisdiction earmarked for the various other limbs of the State. Giving room for such an impression should be avoided with utmost care and seriously and zealously Courts endeavour to safeguard the rights of parties. 24. Hon,ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Roy v. Union of India (UOI) and another, JT 1992 (6)SC 732, has observed as follows : 2....... The appellant belongs to the Central Information Service since renamed as Indian Information Service. On December 17, 1990, the appellant was transferred to the post of Inspector of Exhibitions DAVP Calcutta and prior to the impugned order of transfer he held the post of Inspector of Exhibitions DAVP New Delhi. The appellant has challenged the order of transfer inter alia on the ground that such order of transfer was not passed for administrative reasons in the interest of public service but the same was passed mala fide in order to get rid of him because the respondent No. 2 had a personal score against the appellant and he manipulated the impugned order of transfer. 4. ......The respondents have denied that the impugned order of transfer was passed mala fide and for any oblique purpose or for wrecking vengeance on the appellant by the respondent No. 2 as sought to be alleged. 5.... appellant appearing in person has submitted that although the appellant holds a transferable post, the order of transfer cannot be made mala fide and for an oblique purpose. An order of transfer may appear innocuous on the face of it but it on scrutiny of the facts it transpires that the order of transfer has been passed in order to penalise a concerned employee and not for administrative exigencies, the order of transfer is liable to be struck down. The appellant has contended that an order of transfer has various consequences and the concerned employee and the members of the family often suffer seriously by the order of transfer. ......” 7. The appellant has contended that an order of transfer has various consequences and the concerned employee and the members of the family often suffer seriously by the order of transfer. ......” 7. After considering the respective contentions of the parties, it appears to us that the appellant has not been able to substantiate that the impugned order of transfer was passed mala fide against him for an oblique purpose and/or for wrecking vengeance against him because the respondent No. 2 was anxious to get rid of him and he seized the opportunity of transferring him from Delhi to Calcutta by transferring Shri Patra back to Orissa from Calcutta. It is true that the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and dislocation in the family set up of the concerned employees but on that score the order of transfer is not liable to be struck down. Unless such order is passed mala fide or in violation of the rules of service and guidelines for transfer without any proper justification, the Court and the Tribunal should not interfere with the order of transfer. In a transferable post an order of transfer is a normal consequence and personal difficulties are matters for consideration of the department. .........It may not be always possible to establish malice in fact in a straight cut manner. In an appropriate case, it is possible to draw reasonable inference of mala fide action from the pleadings and antecedent facts and circumstances. But for such inference there must be firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. Such inference cannot be drawn on the basis of insinuation and vague suggestions. In this case, we are unable to draw any inference of mala fide action in transferring the appellant from the facts pleaded before the Tribunal.......” 25. Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 243 (SB) of 2007 Uma Shankar Rai v. State of U.P. and others decided on 31.7.2007 has relied upon case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court which are as follows : 1. Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1991 SC 532 2. Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 3. State of U.P. and others v. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2004 SC 2165 4. Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1991 SC 532 2. Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 3. State of U.P. and others v. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2004 SC 2165 4. Rajendra Roy v. Union of India (UOI) and another, JT 1992 (6)SC 732 The exposition of law above mentioned have been quoted by the Division Bench and observed on page 2 .....The impugned order of transfer have been assailed and to accommodate repondent No. 4 at Mirzapur, and also in utter violation of transfer policy of the State Government contained in its latter dated 11.5.2006, as also the election Commission’s declaration of election on 21.2.2007. .....Dr. L.P. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner seriously contended that though the transfer of Government servant is made in exigencies of service, yet where transfer policy has been framed, the same is expected to be adhered to and cannot be defied in a discriminatory and selective manner. Any action of the authorities, even in respect of the matter of transfer, if is inconsistent to such policy would vitiate the order of transfer since it would render the same arbitrary and illegal. Referring to para 2 and 3 of the transfer policy dated 11.5.2006, he contended that the respondent No. 4 having completed his tenure of six years in the District and ten years in the Commissionary even at Mirzapur yet he has again been sought to be posted at Mirzapur to accommodate him and the petitioner has been transferred to Varanasi, therefore, the impugned order is patently illegal. In support of the submission that order of transfer, if has been issued in violation of transfer policy, the same can be assailed since the transfer policy was laid down to adhere to and not to violate, reliance has been placed on the Apex Court’s decision in Home Secretary, U.T. of Chandigarh and another v. Darshjit Singh Grewal and others, (1993) 4 SCC 25 ; N.K. Singh v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC 98 ; R. v. Secretary of State, (1985) 1 All. ER 40; and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Gayatri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, (1998 (16) LCD 17). ER 40; and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Gayatri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, (1998 (16) LCD 17). In other words the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even through the order of transfer may not be challenged on the ground of mere violation of transfer policy, yet such order can be interfered with if the authorities who are supposed to adhere with the guidelines, have failed to do so. .....In our view the submission is mutually destructive and self contradictory. What the petitioner in fact has sought to argue is that the Executive once has laid down certain standards for guidance in its functioning, it must adhere to and any deviation thereof would vitiate the consequential action, which may be challenged in writ jurisdiction. The argument though attracting but in the matter of transfer, however, in our view, the same has no application. Transfer of Government servants in the State of U.P. is governed by the provisions contained in Fundamental Rule 15, which reads as under:— 15. (a) A Government servant may be transferred from one post to another; provided that, except- (1) on account of inefficiency of misbehaviour; or (2) on his written request, a Government servant shall not be transferred substantively to, or except in a case covered by Rule 49, appointed to officiate in, a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien, or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended under Rule 14. (b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, the Governor may in the public interest transfer a Government servant to a post in another cadre or to an ex-cadre post. (c) Nothing contained in Clause (a) of this rule or in Clause (13) of Rule 9 shall operate to prevent the retransfer of a Government servant to the post on which he would hold a lien, had it not been suspended in accordance with the provisions of Clause (a) of Rule 14. It is not disputed that the post held by the petitioner is transferable and he is liable to be transferred from one place to another. It is not disputed that the post held by the petitioner is transferable and he is liable to be transferred from one place to another. The employer once possess right to transfer an employee from one place to another, in our view, there is no legal or otherwise corresponding obligation upon him to inform his employee as to why and in what circumstance an employee is being transferred from one place to another. Shifting and transferring of the employee from one place to another involves more than thousand reasons and it is difficult to identify all of them in black and white. .....The question as to whether in any of the circumstances when a person is transferred from one place to another without casting any stigma on him, does it infringe, in any manner, any right of such employee which may cause corresponding obligation or duty upon the employer to do something in such a reasonable manner which may spell out either from its action or from the record and when challenged in a Court of law, he is supposed to explain the same, In our view, the answer is emphatic No. ......The Division Bench of this Court on page 4 has considered earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka, JT 1986 (1) SC 249, E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 and 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1991 SC 532 , has observed as under : “Transfer order issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights.” .....In view of aforesaid well-settled principles governing the matter of transfer, the consistent opinion of the Courts in the matter of judicial review of the transfer orders has been that the order of transfer is open for judicial review on very limited grounds; namely if it is in violation of any statutory provisions or vitiated by mala fides or passed by an authority holding no jurisdiction. Since the power of transfer in the hierarchical system of the Government can be exercised at different level, sometimes for the guidance of the authorities for exercise of power of transfer, certain executive instructions containing guidelines are issued by the Government so that they may be taken into account while exercising power of transfer. Since the power of transfer in the hierarchical system of the Government can be exercised at different level, sometimes for the guidance of the authorities for exercise of power of transfer, certain executive instructions containing guidelines are issued by the Government so that they may be taken into account while exercising power of transfer. At times orders of transfer have been assailed before the Court on the ground that they have been issued in breach of the conditions of such guidelines or in transgression of administrative guidelines. Looking to the very nature of the power of transfer, the Courts have not allowed interference in the order of transfer on the ground of violation of administrative guidelines and still judicial review on such ground is impermissible unless it falls within the realm of malice in law. The reason behind appears to be that order of transfer does not violate any right of the employee and the employer has no corresponding obligation to explain his employee as to why he is being transferred from one place to another. 27. Further the Division Bench of this Court has also considered earlier decisions of Hon’able Apex Court in Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 , Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, (1992) I LLJ 329 SC, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, 2001 (8) SCC 574 and State of U.P. and others v. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2004 SC 2165 , to appreciate controversy of parties. .....All the judgments (of Hon’ble Supreme Court quoted by Division Bench of this Court on page-7) have been quoted and followed in the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3341 . A Division Bench of this Court also, in which (Hon’ble Sudhir Agrawal J.) was a member, in Special Appeal No. 1293 2005 of Gulzar Singh v. State of U.P and others, decided on 7.11.2005 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68143 of 2005 R.K. Pandey v. New India Insurance Company Ltd. and others, decided on 26.10.2005, have also taken the same view. ......... Writ Petition No. 68143 of 2005 R.K. Pandey v. New India Insurance Company Ltd. and others, decided on 26.10.2005, have also taken the same view. ......... In Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, 2005 (7) SCC 227 , is a judgment rendered by three Hon’ble Judges of the Apex Court and, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to read the law laid down in N.K. Singh v. Union of India, JT 1994 (5) SC 298, in the manner he suggested, cannot be accepted. The judgment in R. v. Secretary of State, (1985)1 All ER 40, also has no application, ....... ...... In the matter of transfer it cannot be said that Government servant would have legitimate expectation in any manner when it is well-settled that he has no legal right at all at his transfer from one place to another. after considering the case law of Shilpi Bose (supra) ........Now coming to another basic issues, we find that in the case in hand even the submission that the impugned order of transfer is in violation of transfer policy and therefore, is liable to be set aside is not correct, inasmuch as, the same policy provides in para -15 that with the approval of the Chief Minister, any person may be transferred at any time in public interest . ......in para-7 and 16 that the impugned order of transfer has been passed in public interest with the approval of the Chief Minister. ....Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that transfer of respondent No. 4 is also on account of mala fide or malice of the authorities who have been favouring him. suffice it to notice that plea of mala fide cannot be entertained by this Court unless authority against whom allegation is made, is impleaded eo nomine i.e. by name. None of the authorities have been impleaded by name and, therefore, plea of mala fide cannot be entertained. 28. The Division Bench of this Court has considered earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to appreciate controversy of the parties. In State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma, IAS and another, 1992 Supp(1) SCC 222, in para 55 of the judgement, the Apex Court held as under : .... 28. The Division Bench of this Court has considered earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to appreciate controversy of the parties. In State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma, IAS and another, 1992 Supp(1) SCC 222, in para 55 of the judgement, the Apex Court held as under : .... It is a settled law that the person against whom mala fides or bias was imputed should be impleaded economize as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegation would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity. Admittedly, both R.K. Singh and G.N. Sharma were not impleaded. On this ground alone the High Court should have stopped enquiry into the allegation of mala fides or bias alleged against them. 29. In Dr. J.N. Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, AIR 1996 SC 326 , in para 21 of the judgement, it has been held as under : 21....Further, in the absence of impleadment of the junior doctor who is alleged to have been favoured by the course of action leading to removal of the appellant and the person who had allegedly passed mala fide order in order to favour such junior doctor, any contention of mala fide action in fact i.e. malice in fact should not be countenanced by the Court. 30. In All India State Bank Officers’ Federation and others v. Union of India (UOI) and others, JT 1996 (8) SC 550, in para 23,.....the relevant observation of the Apex Court relevant are reproduced as under : 23.....the person against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. The allegation that the policy was amended with a view to benefit respondents 4 and 5 would amount to the petitioners contending that the Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put before it. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fide, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.” Recently in Federation of Railway Officers Association and others v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344 , it has been held as under : 20......... Allegations regarding mala fides cannot be vaguely made and it must be specific and clear. In this context, the concerned Minister who is stated to be involved in the formation of new Zone at Hazipur is not made a party who can meet the allegations. In the case in hand, since no authority has been impleaded by name in the wit petition, therefore, in view of above noticed exposition of law, plea of mala fide can neither be allowed to be considered and the order of transfer, cannot be said to be vitiated on account of mala fide. Hon’ble(Justice Sudhir Agrawal who had delivered judgment as member of division Bench of Writ petition 243 (S/B) of 2007 Uma Shanker Rai v. State of U.P and others) has considered this earlier judgement and applied it as single judge in the case of Satish Pal v. State of U.P. and others, (2009) ILR 3 All 847 and Tahsildar Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, (2009) ILR 3 All 883, has observed in Satish Pal’ case as follows— 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute that the general power of transfer of a Government servant is contained in Fundamental Rule 15, which reads as under: 15. (a) A Government servant may be transferred from one post to another; provided that, except- (1) on account of inefficiency of misbehaviour; or (2) on his written request, a Government servant shall not be transferred substantively to, or except in a case covered by Rule 49, appointed to officiate in, a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien, or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended under Rule 14. (b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, the Governor may in the public interest transfer a Government servant to a post in another cadre or to an ex-cadre post. (b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, the Governor may in the public interest transfer a Government servant to a post in another cadre or to an ex-cadre post. (c) Nothing contained in Clause (a) of this rule or in Clause (13) of Rule 9 shall operate to prevent the retransfer of a Government servant to the post on which he would hold a lien, had it not been suspended in accordance with the provisions of Clause (a) of Rule 14. 13. He also could not dispute that in view of Rule 28 of 1978 Rules, the petitioner’s service is transferable under Fundamental Rule 15 since the petitioner is also a Government servant. 14. Fundamental Rule 15 does not confer power of transfer only on the appointing authority. A perusal of Fundamental Rule 15 shows that an order of transfer can be passed by an authority, who is competent to transfer a Government servant. Clause (b) empowers specifically the Governor to transfer a Government servant in public interest even outside the cadre. The provision under Clause (b) confers power upon the Governor which is not to be exercised by the Governor himself, but has to be exercised in accordance with provision of the Constitution meaning thereby on the advice of the Council of the Ministers. Thus the above provision confer power upon the Government to transfer an employee from his cadre even to another cadre. This provision shows that not only the appointing authority but even the higher authorities, i.e., the authorities who have appellate or revisional power against the order passed by the appointing authority can also exercise power of transfer. Such power can be exercised even by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, if such power has been delegated to such subordinate authority. 18. Consistently, transfer of an employee and in particular a Government employee has been held to be an incident of service, which does not affect any of his legal rights whatsoever. 31. Learned Single Judge has considered earlier decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court to appreciate controversy of the parties. 19. Initially, in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , the Apex Court said that it is an accepted principle that in a public service transfer is an incident of service. 31. Learned Single Judge has considered earlier decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court to appreciate controversy of the parties. 19. Initially, in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , the Apex Court said that it is an accepted principle that in a public service transfer is an incident of service. It is also an implied condition of service and appointing authority has a wide discretion in this matter. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. .... Thereafter, dealing with the transfer of the Hon’ble Judges of High Court, in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, 1977 (4) SCC 193 , the Apex Court observed that transfer is an incident of service. It was further held that once a person has entered service he is bound by the conditions imposed either by the Service Rules or the Constitutional provisions. No person after having joined the service can be heard to say that he shall not be transferred from one place to another in the same service without his consent. Having accepted the service, the functionary has no choice left in the administrative action that can be taken by empowered authorities namely, transfer from one place to another, assignment of work and likewise. 32. In B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka, JT 1986 (1) SC 249, the Court said that it is now well-settled that a Government servant is liable to be transferred to a similar post in the same cadre. It is a normal feature and incident of Government service. No Government servant can claim to remain at a particular place or in a particular post unless, of course, his appointment itself is to a specified, non-transferable post. 33. In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , the Apex Court further said that transfer from one place to another is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. If the order of transfer is not stayed, modified or cancelled the concerned public servant must carry out the order of transfer. If the order of transfer is not stayed, modified or cancelled the concerned public servant must carry out the order of transfer. In the absence of any stay of the transfer order a public servant has no justification to avoid or evade the transfer order merely on the ground of having made a representation, or on the ground of his difficulty in moving from one place to the other. If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance to the transfer order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant Rules. 34. In Rajendra Rai v. Union of India, 1993 (1) SCC 148 and Union of India v. N.P. Thomas, 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 704, it was said that the Court should not interfere with the transfer orders unless there is a violation of some statutory rule or where the transfer order was mala fide. 35. In N.K. Singh v. Union of India, JT 1994 (5) SC 298, the Court said, “Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm of principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising all transfers....” 36. In Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa and others, 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 169, the Court observed “It is settled law that a transfer which is an incident of service is not to be interfered with by the Courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer.” 37. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, 2001 (8) SCC 574 , the Apex Court held that transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. 38. In Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and another, 2003 (4) SCC 104 , the Court said, “Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the Courts. This Court consistently has been taken a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.” 39. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the Courts. This Court consistently has been taken a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.” 39. In Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath, JT 2004 (2) SC 371, the Apex Court said, “No Government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management....” 34. Thus, the scope of judicial review in the matter of transfer is restricted inasmuch if an order of transfer is challenged on the ground of violation of statutory provision or lack of competence of person who has passed the order or mala fide, only then the Court should interfere otherwise it is not liable to be interfered in judicial review. The reason for such a view taken by the Courts repeatedly is that no Government servant has a right to be posted in a particular post or position once appointed in service. He cannot claim that he should continue at same place as long as he desire. .... Noticing distinction in respect to the transgression of civilian employee or those working in public sector undertakings and those of disciplined forces, in Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, 2005 (7) SCC 227 , the Apex Court said “The scope of interference by Courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The Courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made.” ....a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 1296 of 2005 (Guljar Singh v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 7.11.2005 in respect to member of police force observed as under: The present case, if not strictly identical to the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India and others (J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, 2005 (7) SCC 227 ), is quite nearer to the same. The petitioner-appellant in the present case is a member of a discipline force, namely, U.P. Police. His requirement and urgency as well as the exigency regarding posting would be totally different than other civil employees. There may be numerous factors on account whereof the competent authority has to post a particular member of Police Force at a particular place and unless and until a case of mala fide is made out or there is violation of statutory provision, there would be no occasion for this Court to interfere in the case of transfer of a member of a Police Force. The scope of judicial interference would definitely be limited and narrow in case of a disciplined Force comparing to scope available in the case of other civil servants. It is not the case of the petitioner-appellant that the impugned order of transfer is in contravention of any statutory mandatory provision. 40. In Prabir Banerjee v. Union of India, 2007 (8) SCC 793 , transfer of a member of central service, namely, Central Excise, from one zone to another zone was challenged on the ground that inter zonal transfer was prohibited in the department of Central Excise and Customs pursuant to the circular dated 19.2.2004 issued by the department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. The Court held that it is no doubt true that transfer is an incident of service in all India service under the Central Service Rules, but in the absence of any direct rule relating to transfer between the two collectorates, the field may be covered by the administrative instructions. 41. In Mohd. The Court held that it is no doubt true that transfer is an incident of service in all India service under the Central Service Rules, but in the absence of any direct rule relating to transfer between the two collectorates, the field may be covered by the administrative instructions. 41. In Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2007 (12) SC 467, the Apex Court said “Transfer is an exigency of service and is an administrative decision. Interference by the Courts with transfer order should only be in very rare cases.” It further held “This Court has time and again expressed its disapproval of the Courts below interfering with the order of transfer of public servant from one place to another. It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer.” 42. In Prasar Bharti v. Amarjeet Singh, the Court said that an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt that the transfer being an incident of service should not be interfered except some cases where, inter alia, mala fide on the part of the authorities is proved. 43. In Union of India and another v. Murlidhar Menon and others, 2009 (11) SCALE 416 , the Court observed that even if the conditions of service are not governed by the statutory rules, yet the transfer being an incident of service, an employee can be transferred which may be governed by the administrative instruction since an employee has no right to be posted at a particular place. 44. Recently, in Rajendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2009 (10) SC 187, the Court observed that a Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to other. .... The Court in Rajendra Singh (supra) also observed that the transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of the legal rights of the concerned employee. If a transfer order is passed in violation of a executive instruction or order, the Court ordinarily should not interfere with the order and the affected party should approach the higher authority in the department. ..... If a transfer order is passed in violation of a executive instruction or order, the Court ordinarily should not interfere with the order and the affected party should approach the higher authority in the department. ..... Thus, from the above it is evident that since an employee holding a transferable post has no right to continue at a particular place or position, an order of transfer does not violate any of his legal right whatsoever. That being so, an order of transfer cannot be interfered except of the contingency of mala fide, violation of Rule and competence since it cannot be said to be an order affecting the legal rights of an employee. The limited scope of interference in a judicial review, therefore, has been left to the cases where the order is either violative of statutory provision or is vitiated on account of mala fide or has been issued by a person incompetent. The transgression of administrative guidelines at the best provide an opportunity to the employee concerned to approach the higher authorities for redressal but its consequences would not go to the extent to vitiate the order of transfer. The question as to whether violation of transfer policy or guide lines relating to transfer contained in an executive order or executive instructions or policy for a particular period laid down by the Government would result in vitiating the order of transfer has also been considered repeatedly in past by Apex Court as well as this Court. ..... The enforceability of a guideline laid down for transfer specifically came to be considered by the Apex Court in Shilpi Bose (supra) and it was held that even if transfer order is passed in violation of the executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order and instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. .... Besides the judgments of the Apex Court, this Court has also considered the same time and again and has reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. Some of such authorities are as under. 45. Some of such authorities are as under. 45. In Rajendra Prasad v. Union of India, 2005(2) ESC 1224 , a Division Bench observed, “Transfer policy does not create legal right justiciable in the Court of law.” ... In Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52249 of 2000 (Dr. Krishna Chandra Dubey v. Union of India and others) decided on 5.9.2009 said, “It is clear that transfer policy does not create any legal right in favour of the employee. It is well-settled law that a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by an employee that there is a breath of statutory duty on the part of the employer.” .... In W.P. No. 35254 of 2009 Gulab Singh v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 16.7.2009 and Ram Niwas Pandey and others v. Union of India and others (Special Appeal No. 769 of 2005) decided on 29.11.2005 also this Court held that transgression of transfer policy or executive instructions does not give a legally enforceable right to challenge an order of transfer. .......certain judgments of this Court in Akash Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(3) ESC 1730 (All); Mohd. Zeeshan v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(4) ADJ 536 ; Writ Petition No. 4405 (SS) of 2008 Satya Dev Pandey v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 6.8.2009 and W.P. No. 35254 of 2009 Gulab Singh v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 16.7.2009 in support of the submission that the transfer in violation of executive instructions can be challenged since the authorities cannot ignore the executive instructions or the policy laid down by themselves and must observe the same. Disregard of the transfer policy without any proper justification would render the order of transfer arbitrary. Once the guidelines have been laid down by the Government in the form of transfer policy, they are bound to follow and observe the same in words and spirit and in any case in substantial manner. .... In Mohd. Zeeshan (Mohd. Zeeshan v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) UPLBEC 2290), the Court found that the order of transfer vitiated since it was passed at the instance of politicians who were not representative of the people at the relevant time. .... In Mohd. Zeeshan (Mohd. Zeeshan v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) UPLBEC 2290), the Court found that the order of transfer vitiated since it was passed at the instance of politicians who were not representative of the people at the relevant time. I do not find it as a proposition of law that this Court nowhere in the above judgment held that the transfer policy, if not followed, would confer a legally enforceable right to challenge an order of transfer. .... Similarly, in Akash Sharma (Akash Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(3) ESC 1730 (All)), the Court after analysing the facts of a particular case found that the petitioner Akash Sharma within a short span of time was frequently transferred and sometimes the order of transfer was changed within few days. Further not being satisfied with the stand taken by the Government the Court perused the record of the State Government and based on the facts recorded the following finding: ....The transfer orders has been amended, cancelled at the whims of the local politician who did not want the Government employee to be transferred. The cancellation, modification or amendment in the transfer orders was not in public interest or on administrative grounds, but on account of personal interest of the politician or of the Government employee itself. ..... It is, therefore, in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the Court directed the Government to abide by its policy of transfer of the employees who have completed a particular period at a particular place, but it has not been said anywhere that a mere non compliance of observations of transfer policy would vitiate the order of transfer. .... In Satya Dev Pandey (Writ Petition No. 4405 (SS) of 2008 Satya Dev Pandey v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 6.8.2009) again the Court found that the decision of transfer was not taken in public interest or administrative exigencies and though by the Government Order dated 10.6.2008 clerical cadre, paramedical cadre and nurse cadre were exempted from transfer, though were transferred without looking into the said order. In the said judgment also, I do not find any proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Single Judge that an order of transfer would be vitiated in law and cannot be changed unless on the ground that it has violated the transfer policy. .... In the said judgment also, I do not find any proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Single Judge that an order of transfer would be vitiated in law and cannot be changed unless on the ground that it has violated the transfer policy. .... Besides, the averments in respect to the allegations which according to the counsel for petitioner are in regard to his plea of malice in law are contained in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. .....Those facts, thus, have to be pleaded or sworn either on the basis of personal knowledge or record or informations received as the case may be. Whether those facts collectively would constitute malice in law or not is a legal issue but existence of facts has to be pleaded as fact existed and in my view cannot be sworn on the basis of legal advice....” . .....that there was no adverse material nor enquiry etc. against him and, therefore, he ought not to have been transferred is noted to be rejected for the simple reason that the order of transfer is not punitive, but is a general order whereby about 191 Registration Clerks have been shifted from one place to another. Therefore, the submission that in the absence of any adverse material he ought not to have been transferred is wholly misconceived. If an order of transfer is passed in public interest or due to some administrative exigency, there is no requirement or condition precedent that the same can only be passed if there is some complaint or enquiry against the person concerned. ......So far as the matter of personal hardship etc. is concerned, it is well-settled that it is always open to the concerned employee, who has been transferred from one place to another to approach the higher authorities of the department appraising them of the hardship, if any, being faced by the employee concerned on account of transfer from one place to another and it is always open to the higher authorities to look into grievance of the concerned employee and pass appropriate order.....” 45. Learned Single judge in the case of Tahsildar Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(1) ADJ 330 , has observed as follows- ....Fifteen petitioners working as Constable posted in District Etah have been transferred by means of the impugned orders dated 18.9.2009, 20.9.2009 and 22.9.2009, copy whereof has been filed collectively as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The aforesaid orders of transfer have been passed in public interest by the Superintendent of Police (Establishment), acting on behalf of Deputy Inspector General of Police (Establishment), U.P. Police Head Quarters, Allahabad. It is also evident from the impugned orders that the same have been issued after concurrence of the Police Establishment Board which has been obtained in view of the Apex Court decision in Prakash Singh and others v. Union of India and others, (2006) 8 SCC 1. ....” .... It is no doubt true that an employee and in particular a Government servant is entitled to be treated fairly, impartially, free from any external influence and strictly in accordance with his service conditions, and rules and regulations framed in this regard. Like any other person, various fundamental rights are applicable to the Government servants also and in particular Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. If there is a case demonstrating that a Government servant has been dealt with unfairly or has been discriminated on one or the other ground, which are impermissible under Article 16(2) of the Constitution like, caste, religion, race, sex, descent place of birth etc. this Court would not hesitate to interfere and restrain the State from doing so immediately. However, all these question pre conceive one fact that the Government employee has some kind of right which is being interfered either by singling him out or on account of mala fide etc. There are several aspects in service and in particular Government service. Some arise out of the rights of the Government servant and in some he has no right but exist there merely because one is a Government servant holding a position and status and by virtue thereof such incident of service has fallen upon him. Further, there are a number of incidents of service, some of which confer a legal right upon the Government servant and some do not result in a legal right. Further, there are a number of incidents of service, some of which confer a legal right upon the Government servant and some do not result in a legal right. For example once a person is appointed as Government servant, his seniority by virtue of his date of entering the service is an incident of service. It confers a legal right upon him to claim that his seniority should be determined in accordance with the rules or the executive instruction in the absence of the statutory rules laying down the criteria for determining seniority. ..... Similarly, another incident of service is that he is entitled to claim salary or wages as prescribed under statutory rules or executive orders. This also confer upon him a legally enforceable right whether flows from statutory rules or from executive instructions. Then if there is a hierarchy of posts and the rules allow a Government servant working on a particular post to be considered for promotion to a higher post, in certain circumstances, in such a case consideration for promotion is also an incident of service and here also it confers a legally enforceable right whether it emerges from rules or executive instructions. Simultaneously there are certain aspects which though are incidents of service but do not result in conferring any legal right upon the Government servant concerned, Enforceability in later cases varies from case to case. In some matters to a limited extent they may be enforceable and in some matters they may not be enforced at all. For example if by an executive order it is provided that a Government servant holding a particular post will have to show his performance upto a particular level, compliance thereof on the part of the Government servant is also an incident of service but its enforceability varies from case to case. For example the executive higher authorities may take action against such Government servants who fail to perform upto the desired level and such failure may result in adverse consequences in the matter of promotion, crossing of efficiency bar etc. For example the executive higher authorities may take action against such Government servants who fail to perform upto the desired level and such failure may result in adverse consequences in the matter of promotion, crossing of efficiency bar etc. Similarly such matter may also be considered by an executive higher authority at the time of considering whether the Government servant concerned has rendered a dead wood necessitating compulsory retirement or not but Government servant cannot challenge the said standard in a Court of law on the ground that those standards according to capacity of the Government servant are excessive etc. and cannot be followed uniformly by all the Government servant since the capacity of every person varies depending on various aspects of the matter. Similarly another Government servant or the people at large may not claim something in his favour on the ground that a particular Government servant has not been able to discharge as per desired the level. For example if in a territorial jurisdiction of a particular Police Station, number of offenses in a particular period are more than another Police Station, the citizens residing in the former Police Station cannot come to a Court of law and say that in view of the executive instructions issued by the State Government, the Officer In-charge of the Police Station having failed to achieve the target or show his performance according to desired level and, therefore, he should be proceeded against in one or the other manner or should be removed from his office or from that Police Station. Similarly, if a member of a Subordinate Judiciary, who is supposed to decide certain number of cases in a month, fails to achieve the target, no litigant or advocate can come to a Court of law to ask that such judicial officer is not able to hold the office and should be removed or should be transferred to some other place. The executive orders, in this regard though require performance upto a particular standard for the public benefit and interest but non achievement thereof is not enforceable. In the administrative side, the executive authority higher in office may take into consideration the above executive instructions and the performance of the Government servant concerned while assessing his performance, but otherwise the executive instructions of the nature stated above are not enforceable since they do not result in creating a legally enforceable right. In the administrative side, the executive authority higher in office may take into consideration the above executive instructions and the performance of the Government servant concerned while assessing his performance, but otherwise the executive instructions of the nature stated above are not enforceable since they do not result in creating a legally enforceable right. The executive instructions providing certain monetary benefit to Government servants or their family members are enforceable. However, the executive instructions constituting guidelines for the authority competent to transfer a Government servant from one place to another do not fall in the same category i.e. enforceable as they do not confer any legal right upon a Government servant. This is what the law has been in the matter of transfer throughout in the light of the authorities of the Apex Court as well as this Court. I will not burden this judgment with number of authorities on this subject but would like to come straightway on the main issue but before doing so, I propose to refer certain authorities to show how the matter of transfer of a Government servant has been treated by the Courts in India. After having in-depth study on the subject I find it beyond doubt that throughout it has been held that transfer is an incident of service, which does not affect any legal right of a Government servant holding a transferable post. 46. Learned Single judge of this Court has considered earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court to appreciate controversy of the parties. .... In Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2007 (12) SC 467, the Apex Court said “Transfer is an exigency of service and is an administrative decision. Interference by the Courts with transfer order should only be in very rare cases.” It further held “This Court has time and again expressed its disapproval of the Courts below interfering with the order of transfer of public servant from one place to another. It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer.” ..... In Prasar Bharti v. Amarjeet Singh, 2007 (9) SCC 539 , the Court said that an order of transfer is an administrative order. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer.” ..... In Prasar Bharti v. Amarjeet Singh, 2007 (9) SCC 539 , the Court said that an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt that the transfer being an incident of service should not be interfered except some cases where, inter alia, mala fide on the part of the authorities is proved. .... In Union of India and another v. Murlidhar Menon and others, 2009 (11) SCALE 416 , the Court observed that even if the conditions of service are not governed by the statutory rules, yet the transfer being an incident of service, an employee can be transferred which may be governed by the administrative instruction since an employee has no right to be posted at a particular place. ..... The Court in Rajendra Singh (supra) also observed that the transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of the legal rights of the concerned employee. If a transfer order is passed in violation of a executive instruction or order, the Court ordinarily should not interfere with the order and the affected party should approach the higher authority in the department. ..... Now coming to the authorities cited by Sri Nisheeth Yadav, this Court finds that in Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra), the case before the Apex Court was not of transfer of Government servant but transfer of students from one affiliated College to another. In order to govern migration of students from one college to another, certain rules were framed by Syndicate of Punjab University in exercise of its power under Section 20 of the Punjab University Act, 1947. Similarly for migration of students in various technical/profession college under the control of Chandigarh Administration, since Chandigarh Administration provides finance to the engineering colleges within the union territory of Chandigarh, it has issued a policy vide letter dated 6.9.1991 governing such migration. It was found that said guideline was not inconsistent with the Rules and Regulations made under the Punjab University Act, 1947 but contains similar provisions. The students for Medical Colleges are normally not liable to be transferred from one College to another during the Course they are studying in particular College and in a particular discipline since it has various repercussions. The students for Medical Colleges are normally not liable to be transferred from one College to another during the Course they are studying in particular College and in a particular discipline since it has various repercussions. Students while seeking admission in Medical Colleges are entitled to give their option for admission against a seat in a particular Medical College and allotment is normally made on the basis of the merit of the students concerned. Migration, if allowed in a routine course, would be destructive to the said scheme where the students are given admission in a particular Medical College based on their merit position and their option etc. The rules, regulations and scheme for migration, thus, were bound to affect the right of the concerned students of one or the other Medical College or those students who were seeking admission in a particular Medical College, but may not get due to migration allowed by the authorities concerned to that College. The rules and regulations, therefore, had the effect of directly effecting the rights of the students community undergoing medical education in the State of Punjab or otherwise. Thus, in the absence of any otherwise right of seeking transfer to some extent the same was allowed by the rules and regulations which were found statutory and the policy guidelines issued by the Chandigarh Administration, which, therefore, conferred a limited right upon a student studying in a particular College to seek migration in given certain circumstances and following the conditions laid down therein. Thus, here was a case where the executive instructions conferred though limited but a right upon the student community and in these context, the executive order was held to be binding upon the administration. It is in these circumstances, the Court held that the policy of general application having been enunciated and communicated to all, the administration was bound by it and until changed, it is bound to adhere to it. Thereafter, considering the validity of the order of transfer i.e. migration of the students from one college to another, the Court found the same to be contrary to the statutory rules and, therefore, judgment in Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra), in my view, has no application at all to the cases of the transfer of Government servants. Thereafter, considering the validity of the order of transfer i.e. migration of the students from one college to another, the Court found the same to be contrary to the statutory rules and, therefore, judgment in Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra), in my view, has no application at all to the cases of the transfer of Government servants. In the matter of transfer of Government servant, since they have no legal right whatsoever to seek their posting at a particular place. The order of transfer does not affect their legal rights, this question does not arise at all. The executive orders and guidelines which were available in the case of Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra) cannot be placed at par with the guidelines pertaining to transfer of Government servants issued by the State Government though by an executive order. When the Government Servant has no right in the matter of posting etc. the guidelines cannot create something which was not already existed and, therefore, will not result in creating a better right to the Government servant which otherwise is not there even though the matter of transfer is governed by the statutory rules. ..... In Virendra S. Hooda (supra), the matter pertains to appointment to the post of Haryana Public Service Commission. A circular was issued by Haryana Government that if the vacancies arise within six months from receipt of recommendation of Public Service Commission, they have to be filled in out of waiting list recommended by the Commission. 12 vacancies arose but the said circular was not given effect to and in these circumstances a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the issue. It was held in para 4 of the judgment that when a policy has been declared by the State as to the manner of filling of the post, so long these instructions are not contrary to the rules, the respondents ought to have followed the same. Here we find that a right to be considered for appointment of a person was under consideration. The said right is enforceable in a Court of law in accordance with the rules and regulations. Since, there was a right, if an executive order or policy also support such right, the same ought to have been followed unless found otherwise inconsistent with law. The said right is enforceable in a Court of law in accordance with the rules and regulations. Since, there was a right, if an executive order or policy also support such right, the same ought to have been followed unless found otherwise inconsistent with law. Here was not a case where enforcement of a policy was sought to be enforced in a matter where the person has no legal right at all to the real issue. In my view, the judgment in Hooda’ case (supra) therefore has no application. ..... It would also be prudent to refer at this stage that under Article 16(4) the provision for reservation can be made by the State and it is now well-settled in the light of the Constitution Bench judgment in Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 597 that such reservation can be provided even by an executive order and such an executive order relating to appointments in service is enforceable as it does confer a legally enforceable right. The enforceability of executive orders thus would depend on the existence of a right and that too a legal right. 47.... The case of (Union of India v. Mamta Anurag Sharma and another, (2001) 2 UPLBEC 2559). deserve special attention since apparently, it appears to be a case of transfer of a member of All India service, but it has to be considered in the light of the statute dealing with the members of All India Services. The matter pertains allotment of cadre in Indian Police Service. Smt. Mamta Anurag Sharma joined Indian Police Service (hereinafter referred to as “IPS” in short) on 1.9.1982 and was allotted West Bengal cadre of IPS, though her home State was Andhra Pradesh. In the year 1985, she got married to Mr. Anurag Sharma who was also an IPS officer in Andhra Pradesh Cadre. After marriage, Smt. Mamta requested for change of her cadre from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh on the ground of marriage with a IPS officer of Andhra Pradesh cadre. ......The Government of India by order dated 10.3.1998 permitted transfer of husband of Smt. Mamta Sharma from Andhra Pradesh to West Bengal. But this order was declined by Sri Anurag Sharma. After marriage, Smt. Mamta requested for change of her cadre from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh on the ground of marriage with a IPS officer of Andhra Pradesh cadre. ......The Government of India by order dated 10.3.1998 permitted transfer of husband of Smt. Mamta Sharma from Andhra Pradesh to West Bengal. But this order was declined by Sri Anurag Sharma. Smt. Mamta Sharma filed an Original Application before the Tribunal at Hyderabad contending that she ought to have been transferred to Andhra Pradesh IPS cadre but application was rejected by the Tribunal on 15.9.1999. ....... The Apex Court found that the High Court’s direction was contrary to the policy of the Government of India regarding inter-cadre transfer of All India Service which prohibit transfer of spouse to their home State and, thus, set aside the judgment of the High Court. Here was not a case of a transfer of a Government servant in his own cadre in a routine manner. ..... No authority of this Court or the Apex Court has been placed before me which has considered this question in the matter of transfer and has taken a different view and is binding on me. In the absence of any otherwise binding precedent, I feel myself bound to follow the law laid down by the Apex Court in Shilpi Bose (supra), S.L. Abbas (supra), Gobardhan Lal (supra) etc. and this Court’s Division Bench judgments as discussed above. ..... The matter can be considered from another angle. Here is a case dealing with transfer of a member of the police force. The transfer of the members of police force is governed by the provisions made in the Police Regulations. The service conditions of petitioners are admittedly governed by the provisions of Police Act, 1861 (hereinafter referred to as “1861 Act”) and rules and regulations framed thereunder. Considering the provisions of 1861 Act, this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29506 of 2009 (Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P. and others) and other connected matters decided on 9.6.2009 in para 22 of the judgment has found that the terms “police officer” includes a “constable”. This is also evident from Regulations 397 and 398 which shows that the Officers of police force are divided in two categories namely Gazetted Officers and Non-gazetted Officers and the said provision reads as under: 397. The gazetted officers of the Force are- 1. Inspector-General. This is also evident from Regulations 397 and 398 which shows that the Officers of police force are divided in two categories namely Gazetted Officers and Non-gazetted Officers and the said provision reads as under: 397. The gazetted officers of the Force are- 1. Inspector-General. 2. Deputy Inspectors-General. 3. Superintendents. 4. Assistant Superintendents. 5. Deputy Superintendent. 398. The non-gazetted officers of the Force are- 1. Inspectors. 2. Sub-Inspectors. 3. Head Constables. 4. Constables. 47. The Apex Court in Jasveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(2) ADJ 484 (SC), has held that Regulations 525 Chapter XXXIV of the Police Regulations are statutory. Following the decision in Jasveer Singh (supra) this Court in Jay Narayan Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(5) ESC 3052 : 2008(9) ADJ 267 , held in para 56 that all the provision under Chapter XXXIV are statutory being part and parcel of the same Chapter in the Police Regulations. Para 66 of the judgement in Jay Narayan Prasad (supra) reads as under: .... In Jasveer Singh (case) the Apex Court held Regulation 525 statutory. Since Regulation 525 is a part and parcel of Chapter XXXIV of the Regulations which deals with “transfer” it cannot be said that only one part of Chapter is statutory and not rest of the provisions. In my view, therefore, all the provisions under Chapter XXXIV are statutory in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Jasveer Singh case. .... Without diluting the provisions of Chapter XXXIV of the Police Regulations, in order to save the members of police force, the Apex Court in Prakash Singh (supra), in para 31 (5) observed that there shall be a Police Establishment Board which shall decide all transfers, postings, promoting and other service matters relating to the officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. ........petitioners have been transferred after a decision has been taken by the Police Establishment Board for their transfer. ....... It is well-settled that an executive instruction or order cannot prevail over statutory provision and has to be sub surveyed thereto. Besides, if a power or discretion has been conferred upon a particular authority under the rules, the same cannot be required to depend upon the orders or directions of another authority and that too by means of an executive order. Besides, if a power or discretion has been conferred upon a particular authority under the rules, the same cannot be required to depend upon the orders or directions of another authority and that too by means of an executive order. .......Meaning thereby that in respect to members of subordinate rank of police officers, since they are governed by the provisions of 1861 Act, the matter has been dealt separately and their conditions of service have not been treated to be covered or governed by the rules and regulations applicable generally to the Government servants or the executive orders which are applicable to all other Government servants in general This is consistent to the law laid down by the Apex in Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla, AIR 2002 SC 2322 and by a Full Bench judgement of this Court in Vijay Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 (2) AWC 1191 (FB). ....In view of the above, the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 apparently can be said to be applicable to the members of the police force of subordinate rank, who are governed by the provisions of 1861 Act and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. .....The aforesaid powers are statutory and do not admit of any interference of any other authority. Considering the nature of the service, it is well understandable. Within the zone, a Inspector General of Police is responsible for the administration of Police force and same is the position in respect to the Deputy Inspector General of Police posted in a range and Superintendent of Police and Senior Superintendent of Police in a district as the case may be as is evident from Section 4 of 1861 Act. If there is any disturbance or deficiency in of law and order situation etc. it is not only the individual lowest police officer in the rank would be responsible but even the officers in the hierarchy would be responsible. If there is any disturbance or deficiency in of law and order situation etc. it is not only the individual lowest police officer in the rank would be responsible but even the officers in the hierarchy would be responsible. In order to ensure the law and order and proper administration, if higher authority finds transfer and posting of a police officer at a particular place necessary, under the statute he can be transferred by such an authority and so long as the decision is bona fide, I do not find as to how such exercise of power by such authority under the statute can be set at naught by referring to an executive order introducing a third authority. That would amount to interference in the discretion of the authority in exercise of statutory power on the basis of an executive order though not provided by the Statute. This would vitiate the executive order itself. It is well-settled that an executive order cannot be enforceable if it is inconsistent with the statutory provisions. Similarly, a discretion conferred by a statute on a particular authority cannot be made dependent upon the direction and dictates of higher authorities by means of an executive order unless and until the statutory rules are amended. Such an inclusion of third, may be a higher authority, is impermissible as that would amount to enforcing executive order which are in the teeth of the statutory rules. Considering from this angle also, in my view, the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 cannot be enforced in the matter of members of police officers of subordinate rank whose matters of transfer are governed by the statutory rules contained in Chapter XXXIV of the Police Regulations. Moreover, the Apex Court has made it clear that the transfer of police officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police would be approved by a Police Establishment Board. If the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 is made applicable to the police force, that would also infringe the Apex Court’s decision in Prakash Singh (supra) since the very reason for giving such direction in Prakash Singh (supra) was to protect the members of police force of subordinate rank from political influence. .... So far as the contention of the petitioners that only members of a particular caste have been transferred, suffice is to mention that each and every order is in respect to an individual petitioner. .... So far as the contention of the petitioners that only members of a particular caste have been transferred, suffice is to mention that each and every order is in respect to an individual petitioner. The petitioners have not stated that to how many orders of transfer have been issued and whether all such persons, who have been transferred belong to any particular caste. There is nothing to show that the transfers which have been effected are only that of a police offices of a particular caste and not otherwise. By simply collecting transfer orders of persons belong to a particular caste and filing a single writ petition challenging them collectively on the ground that the transfers of officers of only a particular caste have been effected would neither be proper nor would prove that the impugned orders of transfer have been issued only to victimize the police officers of subordinate rank of a particular caste. ...... Besides, the petitioners have also not placed relevant material on record to show as to what is strength of the police force in the State of U.P., what is the strength of the members of police force belong to the caste to which the petitioners belong etc. In the absence of adequate relevant on vague pleading, in my view, such a serious issue ought not to have been raised and it would not appropriate for this Court to adjudicate the same. .... Lastly, so far as the plea pertaining to personal hardship is concerned, it is suffice to mention that now it is well-settled that the issue of personal hardship, if any, must be raised by the employee concerned before the higher authorities in the department and it is for the departmental authorities to consider this aspect and take appropriate decision. .... Lastly, so far as the plea pertaining to personal hardship is concerned, it is suffice to mention that now it is well-settled that the issue of personal hardship, if any, must be raised by the employee concerned before the higher authorities in the department and it is for the departmental authorities to consider this aspect and take appropriate decision. This observation also apply to the petitioners’ complaint of mid session transfer inasmuch the judgments of the Apex Court in O. Karuppa Thevan (supra) has been considered by this Court in Gulzar Singh (supra) and this Court observed as under: .....The case before the Hon’ble Apex Court pertains to education department and while granting indulgence clearly took into consideration the factum of absence of any urgent exigency of service in the case before it as is apparent from the following; .....We are of the view that in effecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent.” 48. On the basis of above mentioned expositions of law propounded by Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, it is trite of law that on the transfer of public servant from one place to another by not following transfer policy of Government does not create any enforceable right in favour of Government employee. The petitioner is unable to establish this fact that he was transferred due to involvement or malice of opposite party No. 3. Petitioner has been transferred on the same post and earlier, he had been posted on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture at Lucknow also. Objection raised by petitioner in this petition was not raised during his posting from 15.7.2007 upto 5.7.2010 on the post of Deputy Director Agriculture, Lucknow and likewise, during the period from 13.7.2006 upto 15.7.2007 while he was posted as Deputy Director Agriculture (Research), Varanasi. In these facts and circumstances as well as above mentioned discussions, this writ petition devoid merits. 49. Dismissed accordingly.