JUDGMENT : Alok Sharma, J. Under challenge is the judgment passed by the Rent Tribunal, Ajmer on 26.10.2009 as affirmed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer (hereinafter 'the Appellate Tribunal') on 21.2.2017 directing issuing of certificate of possession of tenanted premises for the landlord and the tenant's eviction. 2. Perused the impugned judgments and heard counsel for the tenant as also the landlord. 3. Aside of generally asserting that the impugned judgment are illegal, perverse and based on no evidence, counsel for the tenant submitted that no clause of the rent note Exhibit -1 was violated entailing a ground of nuisance of the tenant's eviction being made out. Further the issue of nuisance was framed only at the time of rendering the judgment by the Rent Tribunal, nor the landlord Kailash required the tenanted premises for his bona fide and reasonable necessity. It was submitted that Kailash whose purported bona fide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted premises to run a hotel and restaurant was propagated, was neither unemployed nor required the premises. The whole case was a sham-falsely invoking grounds of eviction set out under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 as Kailash had three other properties standing to his name which were all suppressed from the Court. 4. Counsel for the landlord obviously supported the impugned judgments, stating that they are founded on appreciation of evidence and based on objective consideration of the evidence on record. It was submitted that the finding of bona fide and reasonable necessity of Kailash is based on the evidence that Kailash was a costermonger with no permanent abode for a sustainable business for the needs of his family and it was fully proved that the tenanted premises situate on Station Road were appropriate to Kailash's reasonable and bona fide necessity to set up a hotel and restaurant business. Further the evidence established that even though an earlier suit was filed, it was for the joint need of all the plaintiffs therein including Kailash-who had subsequently through an application sought to withdraw from the said suit. Further the said suit for eviction is still pending. If at all in the meantime Kailash came into possession of the tenanted premises as directed by the Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal and commenced his hotel and restaurant business thereupon, consequences would flow to the earlier pending suit and nothing more.
Further the said suit for eviction is still pending. If at all in the meantime Kailash came into possession of the tenanted premises as directed by the Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal and commenced his hotel and restaurant business thereupon, consequences would flow to the earlier pending suit and nothing more. and in any event it is well-settled that a landlord is the best judge for assessment of the manner of satisfaction of his bona fide and reasonable necessity. For that reason the argument on behalf of the tenant of an earlier pending suit based on similar ground - overlooking Kailash's withdrawal therefrom was wholly untenable and rightly did not find favour with the Tribunal. Counsel further submitted that on construction of the rent note dated 13.5.1972 to which the tenancy related read with Explanation to Section 2(f) of the Act of 2001 the Rent Tribunal as also the Appellate Rent Tribunal have rightly held that despite the roof and staircase thereto in the tenanted shop not being part of the tenancy as per the rent note, the tenant had trespassed thereon and thus committed nuisance as understood in law. It was submitted that the trespass of the tenant was part of pleadings and evidence led thereon and no prejudice can be alleged to having been caused to the tenant only because the issue was subsequently struck. It was submitted that eviction petitions under the Act of 2001 are to be summarily tried and application of the CPC has been eschewed except as provided to a limited extent which does not include Order 14 CPC where under issues are to be framed. On the aforesaid submission it has been submitted that the petition being one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India be dismissed as neither are the impugned judgments vitiated by any patent illegality nor even remotely perverse. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. The landlord tenant relationship was not in dispute. From the evidence on record it has been found by the Tribunals, Rent and Appellate that Kailash for whose bona fide and reasonable necessity of starting a hotel and restaurant the petition was filed, was a costermonger in which capacity he could not generate adequate income to sustain his family consisting of wife and two children.
From the evidence on record it has been found by the Tribunals, Rent and Appellate that Kailash for whose bona fide and reasonable necessity of starting a hotel and restaurant the petition was filed, was a costermonger in which capacity he could not generate adequate income to sustain his family consisting of wife and two children. The tenant's defence of other shops in Kailash's ownership or his engagement in 3 other purported business was not proved by leading any evidence at the tenant's instance. Kailash's bona fide and reasonable necessity of the tenanted premises was thus made out. Further Exhibit-1 before the Rent Tribunal being the rent note did not evidence that the roof and stairs leading thereto were part of the tenancy. Explanation to Section 2(f) of the Act of 2001, provides that except for an agreement to the contrary, the roof shall not be part of the tenancy. The tenant did not thus have any rights under the tenancy on the roof and stairs thereto. Evidence showed and the tenant admitted that he had excluded the landlord therefrom for reason of his purported tenancy and even built a bathroom on the roof. That tant-amounted to a clear trespass and made a ground of nuisance against the tenant for his eviction. 7. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no ground to interfere with the judgment passed by the Rent Tribunal dated 26.10.2009 as affirmed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, more-so within the limited scope of interference by the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.