JUDGMENT : Leave granted. 2. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 3. On the basis of a complaint dated 19th December, 2014, an FIR No.199 of 2015 dated 9th February, 2015 was registered by P.S. Sahibabad against the accused appellant and others under Sections 494, 495 and 496 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC" for short). Subsequently, offences under Section 420, 520, 493 of the IPC and under Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 were also added. On completion of the investigation, charge-sheet dated 19th November, 2015 was filed finding prima facie case against the accused under the aforesaid provisions of the IPC. Thereafter, it appears that supplementary charge-sheet dated 22nd April, 2016 was filed under Section 376 of the IPC against the accused appellant. The appellant moved the High Court for quashing the supplementary charge-sheet dated 22nd April, 2016 which prayer having been refused this appeal has been filed. 4. Having considered the matter we are of the view that there is inherent improbability in the version of the respondent - complainant insofar as the offence under Section 376 IPC is concerned. This is because, according to the complainant, she came to know about the factum of the earlier marriage of the accused appellant in the year 2014 though the parties were married in the year 2009. That apart, in the complaint dated 19th December, 2014 it is stated that the same has been lodged after one year of the knowledge of the previous marriage of the accused appellant. 5. In view of the inherent improbability in the case of the complainant we are of the view that though the trial against the accused appellant under Sections 493, 494, 495, 496, 420, 506 IPC and under Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 should continue the supplementary charge-sheet insofar as the offence under Section 376 IPC is concerned ought to be interfered with by us. We order accordingly. 6. Consequently and in the light of the above we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court to the above extent.