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2017 DIGILAW 1665 (PNJ)

Tara Singh (deceased) through LRs v. Swaran Singh (deceased) through his LRs

2017-08-01

ANIL KSHETARPAL

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JUDGMENT : ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. 1. The defendant-petitioner has filed the present revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 20.07.2016 passed by the trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession by redemption of land measuring 24 kanals as described in the plaint. It was pleaded that originally the land was owned and possessed by Swaran Singh. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff No.1 was co-sharer in possession and he had mortgaged the land in favour of defendant Tara Singh for a consideration of Rs.8,000/- vide registered mortgage deed dated 20.11.1979. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant is setting up an another mortgage deed dated 03.05.1991 for further period of 18 years. The execution and existence of the subsequent mortgage deed is specifically denied by the plaintiffs. 3. In the written statement, the defendant admitted the execution of the mortgage dated 20.11.1979. The defendant further pleaded that there was another registered mortgage deed dated 03.05.1991 for a further period of 18 years in favour of the defendant. Therefore, the defendant had pleaded that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was premature. The learned trial Court after examining the pleadings framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession by redemption as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff has suppressed material facts from the Court? OPP 3. Whether the suit is pre-mature? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff No.1 has no locus standi? OPD 6. Relief.” 4. The plaintiffs led their evidence in affirmative. Thereafter the defendant also led their evidence and concluded the same. When the case was fixed for rebuttal arguments, plaintiffs filed an application for permission to get the signatures appearing in the mortgage deed dated 03.05.1991 compared with the signatures appearing in the mortgage deed dated 20.11.1979 from Handwriting and Finger Print Expert. It was further prayed that Handwriting and Finger Print Expert should be allowed to compare the signatures on the plaint, power of attorney and the affidavit submitted in the Court. 5. The learned trial Court allowed the application by recording following reasons:- “Now applicants/plaintiffs want to compare signatures of plaintiff No.1 Swaran Singh on both the said mortgage deeds alongwith his signatures on documents on record of this file, in rebuttal evidence. 5. The learned trial Court allowed the application by recording following reasons:- “Now applicants/plaintiffs want to compare signatures of plaintiff No.1 Swaran Singh on both the said mortgage deeds alongwith his signatures on documents on record of this file, in rebuttal evidence. A copy of mortgage deed pleaded by defendants is already on record as Ex.D1 which is original document and produced by defendants during their evidence. Present stage is appropriate for examination of expert to prove signatures of plaintiff No.1 on above said documents. No prejudice will be caused to any party, rather same will help this Court for proper decision of this case. So present application is allowed. Applicants/plaintiffs are allowed to examine expert as pleaded in present application. Application is disposed of accordingly. Only one opportunity shall be given for the same failing which same shall be closed by order. On request, case to come upon 28.07.2016 for taking photographs of documents.” 6. The defendant had challenged the aforesaid orders. The scope of rebuttal evidence has been examined in detail by two Division Benches of this Court. It has been held by the Division Benches reported as 2007 (1) RCR (Civil) 537, Surjit Singh and others Vs. Jagtar Singh and others, and 2007(1) RCR (Civil) 794, Jagdev Singh and others Vs. Darshan Singh and others. The plaintiff can only be permitted to lead rebuttal evidence with respect to the issue (i), onus to prove whereof was on the defendant. The conclusion of the Hon'ble Division Bench in the judgment reported as 2007 (1) RCR (Civil) 537, is extracted as under:- “13. xxx xxx xxx 7. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has misconstrued the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur (supra). In the case of Narender Singh v. Randhir Singh and others (CR No.1767 of 2004 decided on 25.2.2005), Hemant Gupta J. has followed the law laid down in the case of Smt. Kashmir Kaur (supra) and M/s Punjab Steel Corporation (supra) and held that the plaintiff is entitled to lead evidence in rebuttal, even on issues where the onus of proof is on the plaintiff. We are unable to read into the aforesaid judgment any implied reservation of the right to lead evidence in rebuttal. We are unable to read into the aforesaid judgment any implied reservation of the right to lead evidence in rebuttal. We are also unable to read into Order 18 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code any inherent right in the plaintiff to lead evidence in rebuttal on issues in which the onus of proof is on the plaintiff. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned Single Judges in the cases of Kashmir Kaur (supra), M/s Punjab Steel Corporation (supra) and Narender Singh (Supra).” 8. In the judgment reported as 2007(1) RCR (Civil) 794, it was laid down as under:- "6. In the present case, the question that is involved is whether the plaintiffs-respondents could examine the handwriting expert in the rebuttal evidence after having led their evidence in the affirmative on the issues the onus of which was on them. The plaintiffs in support of their case want to prove the memo of partition dated 12.5.1989 and the rapat roznamcha which was entered with the Halqa Patwari on 29.7.1994. The onus of proving the said documents was on them. Therefore, it is for them to prove the said documents in accordance with law. The scope and ambit of the right of the plaintiffs to lead evidence in rebuttal on issues, the onus of proof of which is on the plaintiffs was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Surjit Singh and ors. Vs. Jagtar Singh and ors., 2007 (1) RCR (Civil) 537: AIR 2007 Punjab and Haryana 1. After elaborate consideration of the entire matter, one of us (S.S. Nijjar, J) speaking for the Bench observed as follows :- "In our opinion, Order 18 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code would not give a right to the plaintiff to lead evidence in rebuttal on issues in which the onus of proof is on the plaintiff. Accepting such an interpretation would be to ignore a vital part of Order 18 Rule 3 of the CPC. The rule clearly postulates that "the party beginning, may, at his option, either produce his evidence on these issues or reserve it by way of answer to the evidence produced by the other parties". No matter, how liberally a provision in the statute is required to be interpreted, by interpretation it cannot be amended. The rule clearly postulates that "the party beginning, may, at his option, either produce his evidence on these issues or reserve it by way of answer to the evidence produced by the other parties". No matter, how liberally a provision in the statute is required to be interpreted, by interpretation it cannot be amended. Whilst construing a statutory provision the Court cannot reconstruct it. The rule consciously provides the parties with an option either to produce the evidence in support of the issues or to reserve it by making a statement to that effect. The statement itself may well be liberally construed to avoid any unnecessary technical obstacles. One such example has been given by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur (supra) (AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana 210). It has been held that if a statement is made by the Advocate for the plaintiff that "the plaintiff closes its evidence in the affirmative only," the same would be read to mean that the plaintiff had reserved its right to lead evidence in rebuttal. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Kashmir Kaur, (2000(2) RCR (Civil) 133) (supra) that he is entitled to lead evidence in rebuttal as a matter of right. In our opinion, this observation runs contrary to the observations of the Division Bench in Jaswant Kaur's case (supra). The Division Bench has even fixed the maximum time on which the plaintiff has to exercise his option to reserve the right to lead evidence in rebuttal. It has been clearly held that such a reservation has to be made at the time of the close of the evidence of the plaintiff. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the learned Single Judge in the case of M/s Punjab Steel Corporation (2002(1) PLR 99) (supra). In that case the plaintiff sought to lead evidence in rebuttal, after the close of the evidence of the defence. At that stage the plaintiff cannot be permitted to reserve the right to lead evidence in rebuttal. The observations of the learned Single Judge run contrary to the law laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur (supra). At that stage the plaintiff cannot be permitted to reserve the right to lead evidence in rebuttal. The observations of the learned Single Judge run contrary to the law laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Jaswant Kaur (supra). No doubt, the Division Bench clearly lays down that an overly strict view cannot be taken about the modality of reserving the right of rebuttal. But at the same time, it has been held that the last stage for exercising option to reserve the right of rebuttal can well be before the other party begins its evidence. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench in the case of Jaswant Kaur (supra) and R.N. Mittal, J. in National Fertilizers Ltd. (supra) (AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 432)." 9. In terms of the aforesaid dictum, it is evident that the plaintiffs- respondents cannot as a matter of right lead evidence in rebuttal on issues, the onus of proof of which is on them. The plaintiffs-respondents had concluded their evidence in the affirmative on 11.3.1998 and reserved their right to produce evidence in rebuttal. However, the onus to prove the memo of partition dated 12.5.1989 and the rapat roznamcha which was got entered with the Halqa Patwari on 29.7.1994 was on them (plaintiffs-respondents). Therefore, they could not examine the handwriting expert as a matter of right. Therefore, it is to be seen in the facts and circumstances of each case whether the plaintiffs can examine a handwriting expert in rebuttal. The ground for examination of the handwriting expert is that the defendant-Jagdev Singh while appearing in the witness box did not give clear answer as regards his signatures on the memo of partition dated 12.5.1989 and the rapat roznamcha which was got entered with the Halqa Patwari on 29.7.1994. In this regard, it is appropriate to note that it is for the plaintiffs to prove their case in accordance with law on the basis of evidence. The fact that Jagdev Singh in his cross-examination did not make clear the point as to whether the said documents bear his signatures would not per se entitle the plaintiffs to examine a handwriting expert in rebuttal although for not giving answers to the questions posed during cross- examination may entail the drawing of an adverse inference for the purposes of appreciation of evidence. However, it would not give a right to the plaintiffs to make clear the point by producing a handwriting expert at that stage. In the circumstances, the learned trial Court while passing the impugned order has violated the procedure provided for leading evidence which has resulted in causing prejudice to the petitioners and would vitiate the impugned order." 10. When the present case is examined on the aforesaid principle as laid down by the Hon'ble Division Bench, the order passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside. The plaintiffs were to lead evidence in affirmative when opportunity was given to the plaintiffs. The onus to prove issue Nos.1 and 2 was on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were conscious of mortgage deed dated 03.05.1991. The plaintiffs themselves had pleaded in the plaint that the mortgage deed dated 03.05.1991 is result of fraud and fabrication. The plaintiffs were required to lead evidence in support of their assertions. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to lead evidence in rebuttal when defendant would not get any chance to counter the same. 11. Learned counsel for the LRs of respondent No.1 has vehemently argued that the plaintiffs are trying to lead evidence in rebuttal under issue No.3. Issue No.3 is reads as under:- “3. Whether the suit is premature? OPD.” 12. Learned counsel for the respondent is incorrect in contending that the plaintiffs are leading evidence under Issue No.3. The plaintiffs are trying to prove that the registered mortgage deed dated 03.05.1991 was not executed by the Executants. This was the plea taken by the plaintiffs in the plaint also, therefore, the evidence sought to be led in rebuttal with the comparison of signatures through Handwriting and Finger Print Expert cannot be said to be under Issue No.3. 13. Therefore, the order passed by the learned trial Court is erroneous. Hence, the same is set aside. Revision petition is allowed.