JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. By way of this appeal Nagar Palika, Mainpuri, the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, has challenged the judgment and award dated 5.9.1988 passed by the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mainpuri/Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’) in claim petition No. 194 of 1986 wherein the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,75,000/-. to the heirs of deceased claimants. 3. Brief facts which are germane for the purpose of this Court are that accident occurred is not in dispute. The date of accident is not in dispute. The involvement of vehicle though is disputed but in appeal the same is given a go by as the main contention relates to negligence and non joinder of Insurance Company. For that view, skeletal facts are that on the fateful day namely on 17.5.1986 at about 3.15 p.m. when the deceased was plying his cycle, a tractor-trolley bearing No. U.S.K. 1759 driven by the driver employed by the Nagar Palika, Mainpuri caused the accident. The Nagar Palika took the stand that the deceased slipped on the road as there was water sprinkled and that is how the wheel of the tractor crushed him. The driver of the said vehicle brought the deceased to the hospital where the other relatives of the deceased reached. 4. Written statement was filed by the counsel of the Nagar Palika disputing the claim. On being satisfied that the Nagar Palika would not pay for the motor accident, the said claim petition was filed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal after scrutinizing the evidence led by the claimants and owner of the said vehicle, held in favour of the claimant. It is in this backdrop, this appeal is filed challenging the award both on issue of negligence and on the quantum awarded. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has made two fold submissions; (i) that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Nagar Palika, Mainpuri by which the death occurred and (ii) vehicle though being insured, Insurance Company was not made party. 6. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has made two fold submissions; (i) that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Nagar Palika, Mainpuri by which the death occurred and (ii) vehicle though being insured, Insurance Company was not made party. 6. While dealing with submission on issue of negligence raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be relevant to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 7. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 8. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 9. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. 9. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 10. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 11. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was ‘new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 12. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 12. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 ACJ (SC) 1840). 13. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle. 14. The deceased was a cyclist. Just because he was taken to the hospital by the driver of the appellant, it cannot be said that the cyclist had contributed to incident having taken place. The finding of facts in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment which reads as follows: “I, therefore, find that motor accident took place on 17.5.1986 at about 5.16 p.m. by truck No. U.S.K. 1759 near Gari Daiba situated near Bara Chauraha at Agra Road, Mainpuri and that the tractor was being driven by O.P. No. 2 negligently and rashly. Issue No. 1 and 2 are decided accordingly. I also find that the accident did not take place due to rash and negligent cycling by deceased Narendra Singh and answer issue No. 5 in negative.” 15. This issue goes very clear to indicate that the driver of the Nagar Palika drove the tractor in rash and negligent manner and therefore, in that view of the matter I concur with the Tribunal. 16. This issue goes very clear to indicate that the driver of the Nagar Palika drove the tractor in rash and negligent manner and therefore, in that view of the matter I concur with the Tribunal. 16. So far as the submission with respect to impleadment of Insurance Company as party, the Nagar Palika has not raised this issue before the Tribunal. They never filed any application for impleading the Insurance Company as party. It is not necessary for the claimant under Section 110-C of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1939’). It may be that the widow may not be aware about the Insurance Company with which the vehicle was insured. While going through the record and the written statement, there is no whisper about their vehicle being insured with any Insurance Company. Now at the fag end, appellant’s contention that Insurance Company was not made party, and that to without any plea being taken, is not permissible. The claimant can claim from the owner of the vehicle as per the provision of Section 110-C of Act, 1939 and in turn, the owner if has any claim may claimed it from the Insurance Company. 17. As far as quantum is concerned, nothing is pointed out to show that it is not according to the principles enunciated by this Court and the Apex Court. On contrary, the Tribunal has been over conscious in considering the income of the deceased as Rs. 1,000/- per month and he would have spent Rs. 500/- on himself. The multiplier is also on the lesser side. However, as there is no cross appeal preferred, this Court does not delve further into the issue of quantum but held that the quantum and the rate of interest cannot be said to be excessive calling interference of this Court under Section 110 of Act, 1939. 18. In view of the above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. 19. This Court had granted conditional stay. The remaining amount be deposited within eight weeks from today with the Tribunal and the same be disbursed to the claimant. No further fixed deposit shall be made and if the amounts are already deposited and lying in fixed deposit, the same be encashed and paid to the claimants after proper scrutiny.