JUDGMENT : 1. The matter comes up on an application I.A.No.3194/2016 filed by the petitioner, seeking appropriate direction to the respondent for releasing her honorarium. 2. Arguing the application filed on 06.07.2016, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has discharging her duties with the respondents, yet no payment has been made to her. In support of the application, the petitioner has produced photocopy of the attendance register, evincing her presence. 3. Hearing contentions of rival counsel on the application, this Court deems it appropriate to decide the writ petition itself in place of passing orders on the application, inasmuch as Mr. V.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents relied judgment dated 15.09.2016 passed by Division Bench of this Court rendered in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.663/2016 titled as “Bidami Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.”, wherein this Court has held that the ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ cannot directly petition and they should avail alternative remedy under the relevant circulars. 4. The facts compelling the petitioner to approach this Court are that the petitioner having passed 8th examination, submitted application in response to a notification dated 30.08.2015 issued by the Child Development Project Officer, Balotra inviting application from desirous candidates. Petitioner also submitted an application, pursuant to which, the Gram Panchayat Gol Station, Panchayat Samiti Balortra recommended petitioner’s name for ‘Aaganwari Assistant’, giving relaxation of two years n her age, in the Gram Sabha on 02.10.2015, clearly indicating that petitioner 21 years of age, which was requisite condition for seeking appointment. 5. In furtherance of the proposal so sent by the Gram Panchayat Gol Station, the Child Development Project Officer (Respondent No.4), selected the petitioner as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ for village Choukadiyo Ki Dhani vide his order dated 26.11.2015. On receipt of the said order dated 26.11.2015, the petitioner immediately joined ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ 27.11.2015. 6. It is the case of the petitioner that when in spite of joining the duties and serving the respondents for more than two months, no honorarium was paid, she met the Sarpanch respondent No.5, who informed the petitioner that her selection/engagement has been aborted vide an order dated 07.12.2015, and provided a copy of the same to the petitioner. 7. The petitioner has placed the said order dated 07.12.2015 provided by the Sarpanch on record, as Annexure-8 and asserted that the same has never been served upon her. 7. The petitioner has placed the said order dated 07.12.2015 provided by the Sarpanch on record, as Annexure-8 and asserted that the same has never been served upon her. Laying challenge to the said order dated 07.12.2015, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 02.02.2016. 8. After hearing the counsel for the petitioner, this court on 08.02.2016 came to pass the following interim order:- “In the meantime, if the petitioner is continuing on the post, she may be allowed to continue on the said post till next date of hearing.” 9. Mr. Ram Prakash Prajapat, learned counsel for the petitioner, while asserting that the petitioner has been discharging her duties, invited attention of this Court towards an affidavit filed by one Pempo Devi, stating inter alia that the petitioner had been working as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been discharging the duties uninterruptedly and marking her attendance while referring the copy of attendance register as Annexures-7 & 9 duly signed by the Sarpanch. Petitioners such assertion was seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents, who submitted that the petitioner herself has forcefully inscribed the signatures on the attendance register. Without going into disputed question as to whether the petitioner has been factually discharging duties after passing of interim order or not, this Court, with a consent of the parties proceeded to decide the writ petition on its merit itself. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset submitted that the order impugned dated 07.12.2015, (copy whereof has not been provided to the petitioner), is ex-faice illegal and arbitrary, inasmuch as, no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner and her engagement as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ has been brought to an end, without even endorsing, much less serving a copy thereof to her. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner’s assertion the said order had never been served upon the petitioner, is evident from the fact that even in their reply, the respondents have simply mentioned that the petitioner’s engagement has been terminated or that the order dated 26.11.2015 has been withdrawn/cancelled vide order dated 07.12.2015; without enclosing any copy of the same. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner’s assertion the said order had never been served upon the petitioner, is evident from the fact that even in their reply, the respondents have simply mentioned that the petitioner’s engagement has been terminated or that the order dated 26.11.2015 has been withdrawn/cancelled vide order dated 07.12.2015; without enclosing any copy of the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Clause-IV of para 2 of the circular dated 06.04.2014, the Gram Panchayat was competent to grant relaxation in the minimum age, which power had been exercised by the Gram Panchayat in its meeting dated 02.10.2015 and her name was forwarded/recommended. 11. Mr. Prajapat, submitted that the respondents, in the reply to the petitioner’s application (I.A. No.3194/2016) for claim of remuneration, have enclosed a copy of order dated 07.12.2015 as Annexure-R 4, and contended that the said order had been served upon the petitioner. He argued that the order dated 07.12.2015 placed on record as Annexure-R 4 is forged; it has never been served upon the petitioner; the petitioner’s signature inscribed thereon are forged. In addition to the foregoing, counsel for the petitioner argued that if the respondent No.4 was of the opinion that petitioner’s appointment was not in conformity with the provisions of the prevalent circular dated 23.07.2015, he himself could not have dispensed with the engagement of the petitioner and the same could have been done as per clause-VII of the circular. Which clause provides for an appeal, if the appointment is not in accordance with the terms of the circular. For ready reference of the provision of appeal, the said clause is being reproduced hereunder:- (vii) foHkkxh; fn'kk funsZ'kksa ds vuq:i p;u ugha gksus ij vihy & (a). ;fn xzkelHkk vFkok 'kgjh p;u lfefr }kjk mi;qDr ik=rk/kkjh efgyk dk p;u ugha fd;k tkrk gSA (b). ;fn xzkelHkk 'kgjh p;u lfefr ,slh efgyk dk p;u izLrko cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh dks nsrh gS tks okafNr ik=rk ,oa ojh;rk Øe esa loZFkk mi;qDr ugha gS ,oa foHkkxh; fu;ekuqlkj ugha gS] (c). ;fn cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk xzkelHkk rFkk rRi'pkr~ xzke iapk;r dh LFkkbZ lfefr@'kgjh p;u lfefr ls izkIr izLrko dk vfrØe.k dj p;u vkns'k tkjh fd;s gksaA (d). ;fn cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk xzkelHkk rFkk rRi'pkr~ xzke iapk;r dh LFkkbZ lfefr@'kgjh p;u lfefr ls izkIr izLrko dk vfrØe.k dj p;u vkns'k tkjh fd;s gksaA (d). ;fn p;u izfØ;k esa foHkkxh; fn'kk&funsZ'kksa dh ikyuk ugha dh xbZ gksA rks ,slh fLFkfr esa dksbZ Hkh izHkkfor i{k vFkok cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh 1 ekg ds Hkhrj v/kksfufnZ"V izkf/kdkjh ds lEeq[k vihy izdj.k cukdj izLrqr djsaxsA izFke vihy ds fuLrkj.k ds 1 ekg ds vUnj f}rh; vihy dh tk ldsxhA blds fy, ifj;kstuk {ks=kuqlkj vihy izkf/kdkjh ,oa vihy fuLrkj.k dh vof/k fuEu izdkj gksxh %& Ø-la {ks= vihy vf/kdkjh fuLrkj.k vf/kdkjh izFke vihy f}rh; vihy 1. xzkeh.k ftyk mi funs'kd] lesfdr cky fodkl lsok,a eq[; dk;Zdkjh vf/kdkjh ftyk ifj"kn 2 ekg 2 ekg 2. 'kgjh vfrfjDr ftyk dyDVj vfrfjDr funs'kd] lesfdr cky fodkl lsok,a 2 ekg 2 ekg ijUrq fof”k"V ifjfLFkfr esa fdlh izdj.k esa jkT; ljdkj dks fdlh Hkh Lrj ij vfu;fer dk;Zokgh dh f'kdk;r izkIr gksrh gS rks vkns'k tkjh gksus ds 90 fnol ds vanj jkT; ljdkj fu;qfDr ls lacaf/kr izdj.kksa dks eaxokdj ijh{k.k dj mfpr vkns'k izLrkfor dj ldrh gSA bl laca/k es izHkkfor i{k dks lquokbZ dk volj iznku djus ds ckn gh fu.kZ; fy;k tk ldsxkA^^ 12. After reading of the aforesaid provision of appeal, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that if the respondent No.4 was of the view that petitioner’s selection was not in terms of Circular, he ought to have preferred an appeal, which lay before the Deputy Director, Child Development Project Department. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondent No.4 proceeded illegally and without authority in an anxiety and haste to bring an end to her engagement vide order impugned dated 07.12.2015. 13. Per-contra, Mr. Vishal Raj Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner has misled this Court and has procured an interim order, while showing the provisions of the circular dated 06.08.2014, whereas petitioner’s engagement was made in terms of the subsequent circular dated 23.07.2015, which does not contain any power of relaxation in the age. 14. Reading the provisions of applicable circular dated 23.07.2015, Mr. Vishal Raj Mehta, contended that on issuance of this circular, earlier circular of 2014 was superseded, leaving no power of relaxation with the Gram Sabha. As per him, the resolution to grant relaxation of two years in petitioner’s age taken by the Gram Sabha on 02.10.2015 was illegal. 14. Reading the provisions of applicable circular dated 23.07.2015, Mr. Vishal Raj Mehta, contended that on issuance of this circular, earlier circular of 2014 was superseded, leaving no power of relaxation with the Gram Sabha. As per him, the resolution to grant relaxation of two years in petitioner’s age taken by the Gram Sabha on 02.10.2015 was illegal. Apart from this, Mr. Vishal Raj Mehta, submitted that though the order dated 07.12.2015 had been served upon the petitioner, yet she had marked her presence on the attendance register for which she is not entitled for any honorarium, much less any relief in the facts aforesaid. Learned counsel for the respondents reiterated that the petitioner is required to prefer an appeal as held by the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 15.09.2016. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 16. Undisputed facts which emerged from perusal of the pleadings and record are that the petitioner had been recommended to work as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’, vide a resolution dated 02.10.2015 adopted by the Gram Panchayat, relaxing petitioner’s age. Pursuant to such recommendation, respondent No.4 has passed order dated 26.11.2015 selecting the petitioner for such engagement and in pursuance thereof she had joined on 27.11.2015. 17. If the proposal of the Gram Panchayat was not in tendum with the circular dated 23.07.2015, it was incumbent upon the respondent No.4 to have examined her credential and apprised the Gram Panchayat about the same, then and there itself. A perusal of the proposal sent by the Gram Panchayat reveals that the petitioner’s name was recommended while giving two years’ relaxation in her age. As such it cannot be said that respondent No.4 was unaware of such relaxation. In other words, issuance of the order of selecting petitioner indicates that respondent No.4 had also accepted such proposal, may be unmindful of the provisions of the new circular dated 23.07.2015. It is also undisputed fact that the petitioner had already joined the duties on 27.11.2016, when the impugned order allegedly came to be passed. 18. In other words, issuance of the order of selecting petitioner indicates that respondent No.4 had also accepted such proposal, may be unmindful of the provisions of the new circular dated 23.07.2015. It is also undisputed fact that the petitioner had already joined the duties on 27.11.2016, when the impugned order allegedly came to be passed. 18. The stand of the respondents that the order dated 07.12.2015 terminating her services had been served upon the petitioner is untenable as while filing reply to the present writ petition in April, 2016, no copy of the said order dated 07.12.2016 has been filed, and the same came to be filed only along with the reply to the petitioner’s application, which came to be filed on 03.10.2016. 19. A perusal of the contentious documents Annexure-R 4 does not inspire confidence, inasmuch as the same bears (v) on all the endorsees, mentioned at serial No.4, 5 & 6. Had it been a copy of communication sent to the petitioner (Smt. Bhanwari Kumari), endorsement (v) would be only against the petitioner’s name. 20. Without going into the fact, as to whether the copy of the same had been sent to the petitioner or not, looking to the controversy involved in the present case, this Court is of the considered view that it is inconsequential and has no material bearing, as the petitioner has filed and assailed the order dated 07.12.2015, by way of the present writ petition, filed on 02.02.2016. 21. A perusal of the impugned order dated 07.12.2015 reveals that the respondent No. 4 has brought to an end, the petitioner’s engagement as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’, on solitary ground that the relaxation in the age limit of two years was not in conformity with the circular dated 23.07.2015, as the new circular does not contemplate and convey any power of relaxation to Gram Sabha. 22. It is needless to observe that the impugned order, which has been passed unilaterally, has resulted in adverse civil consequences to the petitioner, for which, it was required of the respondent No.4 to have given an opportunity of hearing to her. 22. It is needless to observe that the impugned order, which has been passed unilaterally, has resulted in adverse civil consequences to the petitioner, for which, it was required of the respondent No.4 to have given an opportunity of hearing to her. It is an admitted fact that respondent No. 4 had not provided any opportunity of hearing before cancelling the selection of the petitioner and hence, the order under consideration is ex facie against the principles of natural justice, which have been held to be an integral part of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 23. Though this Court finds some force in the argument of Mr. Mehta that at the time of petitioner’s selection, the subsequent circular dated 23.07.2015 was in vogue and in terms whereof the petitioner could not have been given appointment, as she had not attained the requisite age of 21 years. But nevertheless it does not absolve respondent No.4 from adhering to clause (vii) of the said circular which required him to prefer an appeal. The said provisions contained in clause (vii) has already been reproduced in earlier part of the instant judgment. 24. A perusal of Clause 2(vii) of the circular clearly shows that in case, pursuant to the proposal sent by the Gram Panchayat, a selection had been made, which is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the circular, the Child Development Project Officer is required to prefer an appeal before the Deputy Director, Child Development Project Department. 25. In view of the clear stipulation in the circular, if the respondent No.4 had any grievance against the petitioner’s selection, it was incumbent upon him to have preferred an appeal before the competent authority designated under the scheme. The respondent No.4, who is an Officer of the respondent – Department, is required to know and adhere to the provisions of the circular. He cannot be permitted to refer and rely upon a part of the circular to non-suit the petitioner, while giving a complete go by to the other provision which mandates a particular procedure to be followed. 26. This Court is of the considered view that if the petitioner’s appointment, according to respondent No.4 was not in accordance with the circular, he could not have taken unto himself, the powers of termination. 26. This Court is of the considered view that if the petitioner’s appointment, according to respondent No.4 was not in accordance with the circular, he could not have taken unto himself, the powers of termination. There is no provision in the circular, conferring such power of review or cancel the selection already made. 27. A close reading of Clause (vii) reveals that the circular takes care of observance of principles of natural justice, even at the level of State Government and provides that State Government within 90 days of an order, revise the same, after providing an opportunity of hearing, even in case of irregular selection. As such, it would be preposterous to contend that the respondent No.4 is not obliged to follow the principles of natural justice, but the State Government is. 28. Argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner was admittedly not eligible being below the qualifying age, hence providing an opportunity of hearing would have been an empty formality cannot be accepted. This Court is reminded of the celebrated judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court in S.L. Kapoor’s case [AIR 1981(SC) 136], which has been reverberated time and again, that the observance of principles of natural justice is fundamental to our justice delivery system. The following part of para 24 of the said judgment needs special mentioned, which is being reproduced hereunder:- “In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.” 29. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.” 29. As far as, the Division Bench judgment dated 15.09.2016 passed by this Court is concerned, it is true that the Division Bench has held that ‘Aaganwari Assistants’ are required to prefer an appeal before the authorities mentioned in the Scheme, however, the facts of the case before the Division bench were that the petitioner therein had challenged his non inclusion in the select list, whereas in the present, case the petitioner a duly selected candidates has been thrown out, while keeping the provision of the circular and the principles of natural justice in abeyance. 30. It is settled proposition of law that refusal to entertain a writ petition in wake of availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion, depending upon factual and legal matrix of each case. Adverting to the facts of the present case, as the respondent No.4 has not only discharged the petitioner arbitrarily, but has proceeded vindictively, inasmuch as, the said order has not even been served upon the petitioner and she was not even allowed to perform her duties, this Court does not deem it appropriate to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, particularly when the present writ petition is pending since February, 2016. Relegating the petitioner to avail the remedy by filing an appeal at this stage, would amount to undue hardship to the petitioner and inefficacious. 31. As a natural corollary of the above discussions, the order impugned dated 07.12.2015 dispensing with petitioner’s engagement is found to arbitrary without jurisdiction and against the principles of natural justice and declared as such. 32. The respondents are directed to pay the honorarium to the petitioner for the period during which her attendance has been marked in the attendance register, which according to the petitioner’s assertion is unto September, 2016. As a result of quashment of the order dated 07.12.20165 the petitioner shall be treated to be in continuity of her engagement as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ and would be entitled for the honorarium from 27.11.2015 to September, 2016. 33. The respondents are directed to take back the petitioner as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ within a period of one month from today and pay the due amount within a period of three months from today. 34. 33. The respondents are directed to take back the petitioner as ‘Aaganwari Assistant’ within a period of one month from today and pay the due amount within a period of three months from today. 34. Needless to observe that the respondents shall be free to take appropriate proceedings for dispensing with her services, if her selection is not in accordance with the circular dated 23.0.2015, albeit, after following the principles of natural justice and adhering to the provisions of the circular. 35. Writ petition stands allowed in above terms.