JUDGMENT : Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising our of a suit for injunction regarding a rasta, filed on the ground that the defendant's house exists towards south of the plaintiff's house, the plaintiff approaches her house through X a rasta, 14 ft. wide and 36 ft. long. The defendants were tying cattle etc. on this rasta, which leads upto defendants' house creating a problem for the plaintiff regarding this rasta proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973were initiated at the instance of the plaintiff and therein, an order of status quo, is operating. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants raised a wall on account of which the ventilator and main door of the plaintiff's house have been blocked and the rasta which was 14 ft. wide stands reduced to only 3 ft. in width. 2. The suit was decreed by the trial court. However in appeal the judgement and decree of the trial court has been reversed and the suit was dismissed. 3. The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the defendants had admitted the existence of the rasta and, therefore, the lower appellate court had committed manifest illegality in reversing the decree of the trial court. Reliance has been placed upon Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1954 (SC) 355 . This judgement holds that an admission by a party must be presumed to be true unless the contrary is shown. 4. Reliance is also placed upon Babu Ram v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1964 (Alld) 534 (FB). Paragraph 9 of this judgment, which is relied upon lays down that a Court of appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the court below. 5. The second contention raised is that an admission made in proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 operates as estoppel. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon Thayyullathil Kunhikannan and Others v. Thayyullathil Kalliani and Others, 1990 AIR (Kerala) 226. It has been held therein that a party who takes under a document cannot be allowed to disaffirm the other portions of the same document. He cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate and that a party shall not at the same time affirm and disaffirm, the same transaction. 6. It has been held therein that a party who takes under a document cannot be allowed to disaffirm the other portions of the same document. He cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate and that a party shall not at the same time affirm and disaffirm, the same transaction. 6. The last and most fantastic submission raised that an admission made in proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 would operate as res judicata. In support of this contention. Learned counsel has relied upon Baidyanath Rai and Anr. v. Satyanarain Rai and Ors., 1960 AIR (Patna) 36. 7. This judgement is on the question as to when the provisions of section 11 CPC would be attracted. It provides that the matter must be directly and substantially in issue in both suits and must also be litigated under the same title in Court of competent jurisdiction for section 11 CPC to be attracted. 8. The other judgement cited is Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.S. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 (SC) 2355 . This decision lays down that a previous decision on a matter in issue operates as res judicata: The reasons for the decision are not res judicata. 9. The first appellate court upon appreciation of the evidence on record found that the alleged rasta is not a public rasta and exists over the bhumidhari plots of the parties, which has admittedly been partitioned between the 7 brothers, the sons of Raghuvar, more than 7 to 8 years before the suit was filed. 10. Relying upon the oral testimony of Laxman Das, S/o Raghuvar, father-in-law of the plaintiff, herself, the lower appellate court have recorded a finding that no rasta, as alleged in the plaint, was stated to be in existence by her father-in-law in his oral testimony. 11. The lower appellate court has also observed that since the father-in-law of the plaintiff was still alive, she had no right to institute the suit itself. 12. It is also sought to be argued that the findings returned by the lower appellate court are vitiated in view of what has been stated in the Amin's report available on record. 13. As regards the Amin's report, the lower appellate court has observed that this report was obtained after the evidence of the parties have been adduced. The report was confirmed subject to the evidence of the parties. 13. As regards the Amin's report, the lower appellate court has observed that this report was obtained after the evidence of the parties have been adduced. The report was confirmed subject to the evidence of the parties. The plaintiff never filed any objections to the report. Objections thereto, were filed by the defendants stating that the report was incorrect. Neither the plaintiff filed any evidence nor the defendants were granted time to adduce any evidence and the suit was fixed for final hearing. This was one of the reasons why the report was found to be unreliable. 14. I do not find any illegality in the reasoning given by the lower appellate court, in this regard. 15. It is not the appellant's case that any evidence of the parties has escaped consideration, apart from the initial submission that the admission of the defendants have been ignored. 16. However the copy of the statement which is alleged to contain the admission made by the defendants, has not been filed on record. 17. Upon a perusal of the appellate order, this Court finds that the oral testimony of the parties has been discussed threadbare and, therefore, I do not find any substance in the submission made that there was a categorical admission of the plaintiff's case by the defendants and for this reason no benefit accrues to the appellant by the judgement in Nathu Lal (supra). 18. The contention that an admission made in criminal proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 would operate as res judicata, is wholly misconceived. It is a finding on an issue, recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction which alone operates as res judicata as has been laid down in Mathura Prasad Bajoo (supra). 19. The proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 are concerned only with the question of possession. These proceedings are summary proceedings and the findings therein do not bind the civil court. Besides, the proceedings are still pending at the revisional stage and have not attained finality. 20. The judgement in Babu Ram deals with the question of interference by an appellate Court in exercise of discretion by the court below. This judgement has no application in the facts of the instant case. The trial Court had decreed the suit as it found the plaint allegations proved. This judgement was reversed in appeal upon appreciation of the evidence on record and for cogent reasons. This judgement has no application in the facts of the instant case. The trial Court had decreed the suit as it found the plaint allegations proved. This judgement was reversed in appeal upon appreciation of the evidence on record and for cogent reasons. The findings are not proved to be perverse. The other two judgements cited deal with the issue of res judicata which does not arise in the case at hand. 21. Moreover, a judgment of the criminal court in summary proceedings is not binding upon the civil court. A court exercising jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 exercises a summary jurisdiction and is not competent to decide questions which are within the domain of the civil Court. Its findings, therefore, cannot operate as res judicata. 22. Even estoppel which has been pleaded is not made out as the lower appellate court has dismissed the suit finding that the plaint case has not be proved and also because the plaintiff had no right to maintain it during the lift time of her father-in-law the admitted owner of land and house where the plaintiff resides. 23. In view of the discussion above and since no substantial questions of law arises for consideration in second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.