JUDGMENT : Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, J. The appellant challenges the legal pregnability of the judgment and order of conviction dated 20.05.2005 and 21.05.2005, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bankura in Sessions Trial No. 2 of April 2002, which arose out of Sessions Case No. 17 of December, 2001. By the impugned judgment learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. and has sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. 2. According to the appellant, learned Trial Court has mainly relied on the purported extra judicial confession made by the appellant and has arrived at such a conclusion where there is no direct evidence regarding the involvement of the present appellant. The appellant has also taken the stand that the evidence of P.W. 6 has to be ignored because it is opposed to rule of law and that the scribe has admitted in his evidence that the F.I.R. was written as per the dictation of the police personnel. He has also taken the plea that the appellant went to the place of occurrence some three or four hours after the arrival of P.W. 9. Ventilating his such grievances, he has prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment and order. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, Mr. Subir Banerjee, submitted that the judgment passed by the Trial Court is well-reasoned and the learned Trial Court has taken care of all the material particulars in arriving at such a conclusion. According to him, the impugned judgment is totally unimpeachable and it does not require any interference. 4. In the interest of effective adjudication, the factual aspects of the prosecution case are required to be revisited. Sieving out the unnecessary details, the prosecution case in a capsulated form is that the marriage of the victim was held with the present accused appellant nearly two years before the fateful incident. According to the father of the victim there was a love affair between the victim and the appellant but it became a jinxed matrimony. The victim was subjected to torture by the appellant as well as by his family inmates and she returned to her parents. According to the father of the victim there was a love affair between the victim and the appellant but it became a jinxed matrimony. The victim was subjected to torture by the appellant as well as by his family inmates and she returned to her parents. After convincing the victim, he took her to the in-law’s. On the morning of 29.11.1999, he came to know from the local villagers that his daughter had breathed her last. He then accompanied his co-villagers to the victim’s father-in-law’s house and found his daughter lying dead with a black bruise around her neck. He did not see the accused at that time. According to the F.I.R. maker, his son-in-law had killed his daughter some time on 20.11.1999/21.11.1999. The father claims that his son-in-law arrived shortly thereafter and in the presence of the victim’s father and co-villagers, he confessed that he had committed the offence. The father of the victim lodged the F.I.R. and in this way the process of law was set into motion. 5. In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer examined 15witnesses and out of them 13 witnesses deposed at the trial. The Investigating Officer seized the offending articles (gloves and muffler), examined the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., collected the inquest and post mortem reports and submitted a charge-sheet under Section 302 of the I.P.C. He also arrested the accused appellant. It appears from the L.C.R. that the learned Trial Court duly considered the materials on record and framed the charge under Section 302 of I.P.C. The charge so framed was read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The defence case as it appears to us from the trend of cross-examination and examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is his innocence and that he had been falsely implicated in the case. Since the witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice, so we should now listen to the witnesses. 7. P.W. 1 stated in his evidence that his house is intervened by 8 to 10houses from the house of the victim’s in laws. He did not immediately get the news of the death of his beloved daughter. He has put his signature on the F.I.R., which was scribed by one Tarani Bagdi. He further stated that the F.I.R. was written as per his instructions. He did not immediately get the news of the death of his beloved daughter. He has put his signature on the F.I.R., which was scribed by one Tarani Bagdi. He further stated that the F.I.R. was written as per his instructions. Before the death of his daughter, she was hale and hearty. He also identified the accused person. In course of his evidence, he further stated that the police called him at the police station after the death of his daughter. When Tarani scribed the F.I.R. he was not present. He could not recollect the contents of the F.I.R. In course of argument, learned Counsel appearing on the behalf of the appellant contended that this informant cum father of the victim, did not know the contents of the F.I.R. and as a result the same cannot be taken into consideration. We are in respectful disagreement with him on the ground that it matters little even if he did not repeat the contents of the F.I.R. The F.I.R. bears his signature and in his evidence, he ventilated that he did not immediately get the news of the death of the victim, although his house is just intervened by 8 to 10 houses. It is not the dictum of the law, that the F.I.R. should be the encyclopaedia of the prosecution case. 8. P.W. 2 accompanied the then O.C. to the house of the appellant and after conducting inquest of the dead body of Mithu Laha (deceased) one P.R. Barman sent the dead body to the morgue for post-mortem examination through him. 9. P.W. 3 in his evidence in chief stated that he is of the same village but failed to recollect if the victim was detained by the villagers after the death of his wife. He was declared hostile by the prosecution. From his evidence after being declared hostile by the prosecution, defence could not get any dividend. 10. P.W. 4 was not a witnesses to the occurrence. He was just a scribe. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had written the complaint at the dictation of the police. Raising a serious doubt in this regard, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the F.I.R. contained a cooked-up story because it was dictated by the police. He was just a scribe. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had written the complaint at the dictation of the police. Raising a serious doubt in this regard, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the F.I.R. contained a cooked-up story because it was dictated by the police. P.W. 1 in his evidence stated that as per his instruction, this P.W. 3 had written the F.I.R. The writing of a complaint as per dictation of police is not fatal because sometimes if any cognizable offence is reported to the police, it is the duty of the police to record the same. Such recording cannot mean that the police favours the prosecution in any way or had incorporated a cooked-up story therein. 11. P.W. 5 deposed in this case but his evidence does not support the prosecution or the defence so far as commission of the offence is concerned. He was also declared hostile by the prosecution and simply some denials were taken. Evidence of P.W. 6 is relevant. She was the president of Onda Block Panchayat Samiti village, Baruipara. The incident took place within the area of the Onda Block Panchayat Samiti. In her evidence, she specifically stated that due to dispute between the victim and the appellant one or two salish took place in their village. In course of cross-examination she was asked whether she had delivered any resolution to the police or not. In reply, she stated that she did not hand over such resolution to the police as no such resolution was reduced to writing. Such cross-examination does not help the appellant on the ground that she never stated that there was no salish at all. She was asked whether any resolution was taken or not. But the question of salish was not disputed by the defence so far as the cross-examination was concerned. In her evidence in chief, she specifically stated that the victim was throttled to death and, on being asked by the villagers, the appellant confessed before them that in the preceding night he had committed the murder of Mithu (deceased) by throttling her with the help of a muffler. On being asked by the Court, she was very categorical in saying that she found a black mark on the neck of Mithu and so she guessed that the victim was strangulated. On being asked by the Court, she was very categorical in saying that she found a black mark on the neck of Mithu and so she guessed that the victim was strangulated. A suggestion was given to her that no salish took place, which she denied. 12. P.W. 7 prepared the inquest report being the Executive Magistrate. He has proved inquest report which is marked Ext. 4. He found, in course of preparation of inquest, that the bloody froth came out from mouth and nostril. He has also noticed continuous black mark on the neck of the dead body of Mithu. 13. P.W. 8 is one of the Investigating Officers of this case. According to him, he took up the investigation of this case from the then O.C. He had gone through the result of the investigation conducted by P.R. Barman (former I.O) and he collected the post-mortem report from the autopsy surgeon and thereafter he submitted charge-sheet. In his cross-examination, he made it clear that he had only collected the post-mortem report and the on the basis of investigation conducted by the former Investigating Officer he had submitted the charge-sheet. 14. P.W. 9 in his evidence stated, that after hearing the news of death ator about 8 a.m., he went there and at that time he found the dead body of victim inside the bed room of Buddhadev. She was covered by cloth. He was also declared hostile by the prosecution. According to him, he was not examined by the Investigating Officer. 15. P.W. 10 in his evidence stated that he along with the then O.C. went to village Baruipara. The accused brought out one muffler and the O.C. seized the same. The then O.C. prepared the seizure list and put his signature on the seizure list. The seizure list bears his signature, which is marked Ext. 5. On being asked by learned Defence Counsel he could not show any paper that he accompanied the O.C. to the said village. In the stand, he stated that he did not find the seized muffler in court on that day. Referring to such part of such evidence, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that if at all any muffler was seized that ought to have been produced before the Court on the relevant day. The seizure list speaks otherwise. In the stand, he stated that he did not find the seized muffler in court on that day. Referring to such part of such evidence, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that if at all any muffler was seized that ought to have been produced before the Court on the relevant day. The seizure list speaks otherwise. Muffler was seized and that too in terms of the statement made by the appellant. The seizure list bears the signature of the accused appellant as well as the signature of the Investigating Officer. The non-production of alamat before the Court is not fatal in all cases. When there is clinching evidence regarding recovery of any article and that too in terms of Section 27 of Evidence Act, it is inconsequential. P.W. 11 was tendered for cross-examination. 16. P.W. 12 is the former Investigating Officer cum O.C. of the police station. After getting the written complaint from one Bankim De, F.I.R. maker put his signature on the written complaint, which is marked Ext.1/2. It was prepared by the former F.I.R. which is marked Ext. 6. In course of investigation, he visited the P.O., held inquest over the dead body of Mithu Laha, examined witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and, pursuant to the statement of the accused, he recovered one muffler and black gloves. He proved the seizure list which is marked Ext. 5. He recorded the statement of the appellant and the said statement is marked Ext. 7. He handed over the case diary to the next Investigating Officer who submitted the charge-sheet. In course of cross-examination, he stated that he had examined Prasanta Dutta (P.W.3) and Prasanta Dutta had made a statement that there was dispute between the accused appellant and the victim. He also stated that on inquiry, the appellant had admitted that in the intervening night of 20/21.11.1999, the appellant had killed the victim by wearing gloves in his hands and strangulating the victim. In course of cross-examination, the appellant could not make out any defence in his favour. 17. P.W. 13 is the doctor who conducted the post mortem. In course of cross-examination in chief he categorically stated that he found following injuries : A ligature mark 13" X 1" over mid part of neck, the ligature mark was low down continuous / and circular. The ligature mark was deeply furrowed abraded and dark brown colour. 17. P.W. 13 is the doctor who conducted the post mortem. In course of cross-examination in chief he categorically stated that he found following injuries : A ligature mark 13" X 1" over mid part of neck, the ligature mark was low down continuous / and circular. The ligature mark was deeply furrowed abraded and dark brown colour. On dissection : The skin and the site of mark was deeply perchmentised and the tissues beneath the skin on hardened whitened thickening and glistening in character. 2. A crescentic nail mark 2" X 1/2" over right angle of lower jaw. 3. A crescentic nail mark 1/2” X 1/2" over upper part of neck at mid region. 4. A crescentic 1/2” X 1/2" over left side of neck at mid region. On dissection : 1. Fair amount of extravagated clotted and liquid blood seen to infiltrate the tissues whole front of neck and sides of neck. 2. Fair amount of extravagated clotted and liquid blood seen to infiltrate into the tissues larynx and trachea. 3. Fracture (subluxation) of getter corneous and hyoid bone on both sides. 4. Subluxation of cartridges of larynx and trachea. Fair amount of extravagated clotted and liquid blood seen to infiltrate into the tissues in an around fractures and subluxation. According to him the death was due to the effect of strangulation. He was not cross-examined by the defence. 18. At the time of hearing, learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant made a bolstered submission that there were enough contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which ought to have gone in his favour i.e. accused appellant. He has further contended that the alleged weapon (muffler) was not produced in Court. The seizure list speaks that such muffler and gloves were seized leading to the statement of the appellant. That seizure list was not challenged specifically by the defence while the Investigating Officer adduced evidence. A suggestion was given to the Investigating Officer that he never seized any muffler, which was turned down by the Investigating Officer. It has not been challenged by the defence that the accused appellant did not put his signature in the said seizure list. P.W. 10 referred to the seizure list in his evidence. In cross-examination, he stated that he did not find that the muffler in court. It has not been challenged by the defence that the accused appellant did not put his signature in the said seizure list. P.W. 10 referred to the seizure list in his evidence. In cross-examination, he stated that he did not find that the muffler in court. When the seizure list was there and when the signature of the accused was not challenged, the mere non-production of alamat would not be fatal. It was the duty of the Court to take effective steps to produce the alamat because it was in custody of the court and not in the custody of the prosecution. In this content, we may refer to the decision in Shyamal Ghosh & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal ( 2012 (7) SCC 646 ) where the Hon’ble Apex Court held even if there is remissness on the part of the Investigating Officer that can never be construed as a passport to acquittal. 19. On perusal of the impugned judgment we find that the learned Trial Court mainly relied on extra judicial confession and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. The incident took place in the house of the accused appellant and admittedly the victim had been residing with him before her death. It is normal that the husband and wife resided in the same room. Therefore, it was the duty of the appellant to show his special knowledge and unless it is explained as to how Mithu died, the court shall infer the normal chain of events unless such inference is disproved. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a decision reported in 2000 C.Cr.L.R. (S.C.) 469, State of West Bengal Vs. Mr. Muhammed Omar, has been pleased to observe as follows :- “The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the order hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be roped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries, and the society would be the casualty.” In that judgment on the Hon’ble Apex Court has relied on the judgment reported in 1956 SCR 199 (Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of the duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.” The word ‘especially’ means that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.” 20. It was also argued that there was no independent witness in this case. On perusal of the entire evidence led by prosecution we find that there were independent witnesses. This apart, in view of the decision in Dalip Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SCC at Page 364, the evidence of interested witnesses may not be totally discarded unless demonstrated to be false. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court held “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless witness shows the cause, an enmity against the accused to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily the close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” The doctrine of rejecting the evidence of interested witnesses is a dangerous one. If we apply the said theory in all cases, the administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. The pertinent thing is that evidence has to be sifted with great care and caution. An attempt has to be made to – in terms of felicitous metaphor to separate the grain from the chaff – distinguish the truth from falsehood. The pertinent thing is that evidence has to be sifted with great care and caution. An attempt has to be made to – in terms of felicitous metaphor to separate the grain from the chaff – distinguish the truth from falsehood. This is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence, but a rule of caution. Minor variations and contradictions must be there when truth is projected through human process. More often than not the memory betrays, fades and becomes dimmer due to passage of time. These factors come within the normal discrepancies. It does not corrode the credibility of a testimony. 21. A witness is not expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the minutest detail of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. Besides that, in such cases the witness may not anticipate the occurrence which has an element of surprise. That apart, on some occasions a witness is liable to be overawed by the Court atmosphere, piercing cross-examination coated with artful advocacy made by counsel. These are all relevant factors to be kept in mind at the time of appreciation of evidence. 22. Ld. defence Counsel has bolstered his submission and argued that the accused deserves acquittal under the canopy of benefit of doubt. It is very difficult to define the term ‘benefit of doubt.’ It would be an auto-limitation if one ventures to define it. Hon’ble Apex Court held in a decision reported 1990 SCC Criminal 151 that ‘exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punishing an innocent.’ Doubt would be called reasonable if they are free from zest for abstract speculation. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. When there is clinching evidence of the crime, there is hardly any scope to set the accused scot free under the canopy of benefit of doubt. 23. On the basis of such analogical deduction, we find that the prosecution has been able to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt and dispute. When there is clinching evidence of the crime, there is hardly any scope to set the accused scot free under the canopy of benefit of doubt. 23. On the basis of such analogical deduction, we find that the prosecution has been able to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt and dispute. We have no option left with except to put a seal of approval in the judgment and order impugned judgment and order of the learned Trial Court is hereby affirmed. 24. The appellant shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for life as well as pay a fine of Rs. 5,000, in default whereof he shall serve out rigorous imprisonment for one year more. 25. Let a copy of this order and L.C.R. be sent to the learned Court below for information and taking necessary action in accordance with law. 26. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Siddhartha Chattopadhyay & Sanjib Banerjee, JJ. I Agree.