Research › Search › Judgment

Meghalaya High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 17 (MEG)

Shella Action Committee, Rally of Shella Village Natives v. State of Meghalaya

2017-04-12

DINESH MAHESHWARI, S.R.SEN, VED PRAKASH VAISH

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. The questions regarding applicability of the Law of limitation, to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya and to an application for review of the order passed in a Public Interest Litigation ['PIL'], having arisen in this case, a Division Bench of this Court has referred the following questions for determination by a Larger Bench of this Court: (a) As to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the tribal areas now comprising the State of Meghalaya; and (b) As to whether the Law of Limitation is not applicable to the application seeking review of the order dated 05.03.2014 passed in PIL No.2 of 2013? The relevant background aspects 2. In view of the pure questions of law referred for determination by the Larger Bench, dilatation on all the factual aspects of the matter is not necessary. Only a brief reference to the relevant background would suffice. 3. The petitioner herein filed the review application bearing No. 20 of 2014 on 11.12.2014, seeking review of the order dated 05.03.2014 as passed in PIL No.3 of 2013 (old No.40 of 2007), whereby the proceedings in the said PIL were closed with the observation that no further directions were required to be issued in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited v. Union of India and others: (2011) 7 SCC 338 . 4. The petitioner earlier attempted to question the aforesaid order dated 05.03.2014 by way of a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 23685 of 2014 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court but, on 27.10.2014, sought permission to withdraw, so as to file a review application in this Court because, according to the petitioner, the issues involved in PIL No. 2 of 2013 were not similar to those involved in Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited (supra). Taking note of the submissions so made, the Supreme Court dismissed the aforesaid Petition for Special Leave to Appeal as withdrawn but while providing that in case of rejection of the review application, it would be open for the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court again in challenge to the validity of the impugned order dated 05.03.2014. 5. Taking note of the submissions so made, the Supreme Court dismissed the aforesaid Petition for Special Leave to Appeal as withdrawn but while providing that in case of rejection of the review application, it would be open for the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court again in challenge to the validity of the impugned order dated 05.03.2014. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the review application in this Court on 11.12.2014 with an application for condonation of delay of 16 days (while computing limitation from the date of order of the Supreme Court). The aforesaid application for condonation of delay [MC (Review Petition) No.1 of 2015] was found carrying rather objectionable expressions and hence, was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court on 27.07.2015 but with liberty to the petitioner for filing a fresh application. The petitioner has now filed the fresh application on 27.08.2015, again with the prayer for condonation of delay of 16 days in filing the review application. It is noticed that a question regarding the starting point of limitation was raised during the course of consideration of this application and the office later on reported that the review application was delayed by a period of 249 days. However, all these aspects as to the length of delay are not required to be dealt with in this order and are left at that only. 6. The referred questions cropped up for consideration because, while contesting the question of limitation as also while seeking condonation of delay, learned counsel for the petitioner maintained that the Law of Limitation was not applicable as such to the State of Meghalaya and was not applicable to this application for review of an order passed in a writ petition entertained as PIL in this Court. In support of these submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner essentially referred to a letter dated 22.05.1989 as sent by the Secretary, Law Department, Government of Meghalaya to the Regional Manager, State Bank of India, stating that in view of the Government of Assam's Notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated 14.03.1966, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 [hereinafter also referred to as 'the Limitation Act'] do not apply to the tribal areas now forming part of the State of Meghalaya. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong: (1987) 2 GLR 221 in support of his submissions that the Limitation Act does not apply to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. 7. In response to these contentions, it was submitted on behalf of the contesting respondents that with coming into existence of the State of Meghalaya by virtue of the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 [hereinafter also referred to as 'the Reorganisation Act of 1971'], a fresh judicial determination was required on the question as to whether the aforesaid notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated 14.03.1966 continues to operate over the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya so as to exclude the application of the Limitation Act to these areas. Reference was also made to the decision in the case of J. Thansiama v. State of Mizoram and others (Civil Appeal No.3536 of 2008): 2015 SCC Online SC 796 wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the State of Mizoram; and it was submitted that the ratio in U. William Mynsong's case, which has been doubted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, would require reconsideration in the light of the decision rendered in an analogous background in J. Thansiama's case. 8. A Division Bench of this Court took note of the decision in Mynsong's case (supra) wherein, the Gauhati High Court has held that the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 applies to the State of Meghalaya by virtue of the provisions contained in North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971; and the Division Bench also took note of the decision in J. Thansiama's case (supra) wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the areas within the erstwhile Mizo District of the State of Assam ceased to be so and came to comprise the territory of Mizoram from the year 1972, the said notification dated 14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to such areas. It was also noticed that in the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated its doubts on the ratio in U. William Mynsong's case (supra) but did not pronounce finally thereupon because applicability of the Limitation Act in the State of Meghalaya was not the question for consideration before it. It was also noticed that in the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated its doubts on the ratio in U. William Mynsong's case (supra) but did not pronounce finally thereupon because applicability of the Limitation Act in the State of Meghalaya was not the question for consideration before it. The Division Bench also observed that in the communication dated 22.05.1989, the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya in Law Department had suggested non-applicability of the Limitation Act in the State of Meghalaya only with reference to the said notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated 14.03.1966 as issued by the Governor of Assam but the question remained as to whether the said notification would apply and would continue to operate for the tribal areas in the State of Meghalaya? 9. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Division Bench of this Court found it imperative that the question as regards applicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas now comprising the State of Meghalaya be given quietus so far this Court is concerned. The Division Bench also found it necessary to address to the other question as suggested on behalf of the petitioner that the Law of Limitation would not be applicable to the application seeking review of an order passed in the PIL. In this background, the questions aforesaid have been referred to this Bench. The submissions 10. While taking up this Larger Bench reference for consideration, we permitted the learned counsel for the parties as also the learned members of the Bar to address the Court on the questions aforesaid. We may briefly take note of the material part of the submissions made before us. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that by virtue of Section 66 of the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969 [hereinafter also referred to as 'the Reorganisation Act of 1969'], the existing laws continued to operate, as were applicable before the appointed day of formation of the Autonomous State of Meghalaya; and hence, the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, excluding the Limitation Act, 1963 from its operation to the tribal areas of the then State of Assam, continues to operate in regard to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya that have been carved out of the erstwhile State of Assam. The learned counsel also contended that the Limitation Act having not been made applicable to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya by any specific notification, it would not apply to these areas; and, while relying on the decision in Mynsong's case (supra), the learned counsel submitted that the then jurisdictional High Court clearly held that Limitation Act was not applicable to the tribal areas in the State of Meghalaya, as the said notification continues to operate over such areas. Learned counsel also referred to the communication dated 22.05.1989 wherein, the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya in its Law Department stated that the Limitation Act does not apply to the tribal areas of Meghalaya in view of the said notification dated 14.03.1966. The learned counsel further contended that no specific period for limitation having been prescribed for an application for review of an order passed in a PIL petition, the period of limitation as prescribed in the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable thereto. 12. Per contra, the learned GA painstakingly referred to the provisions contained in the Limitation Act, the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and Paragraph 12-A of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India as also to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama's case (supra) and submitted that the Limitation Act, which extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, does apply to the State of Meghalaya including the tribal areas therein. Learned GA submitted that after coming into force of the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and Paragraph 12-A of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, if the Limitation Act is to be excluded in its operation over the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya, a notification to that effect shall have to be issued by the President of India; and, for no such notification having been issued, the Limitation Act does apply to the entire State of Meghalaya. As regards the question of limitation for an application for review, the learned GA submitted that no limitation is prescribed for the proceedings for writ under Article 226 but the doctrine of delay and laches is applicable thereto and same would apply to the application for review also. As regards the question of limitation for an application for review, the learned GA submitted that no limitation is prescribed for the proceedings for writ under Article 226 but the doctrine of delay and laches is applicable thereto and same would apply to the application for review also. The learned counsel has, inter alia, referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Bhai Lal Bhai: AIR 1964 SC 1006 . 13. Learned counsel Ms. A Paul strenuously supported the submissions that the Limitation Act does not apply to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. While particularly referring to Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, the learned counsel submitted that the decision in J. Thansiama's case does not apply to the State of Meghalaya and even the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would not be decisive of the matter because the operation of Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971 were not placed for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. According to the learned counsel, the notification dated 14.03.1966, by implication, stands carried over to the State of Meghalaya so far the Law of Limitation is concerned. 14. Learned counsel Shri K Khan made the submissions that though Rule 4 (2) in Chapter-III of the Rules of High Court of Meghalaya 2013 provides for limitation of 30 days for an intra-court appeal, but no such limitation has been prescribed as regards an application for review governed by Chapter-XI of these Rules. However, according to the learned counsel, the period of limitation shall have to be read in such provisions and it cannot be said that a review application could be filed at any time. 15. Another aspect has been projected before us that several procedural laws, which are in force in the State of Meghalaya, carry in-built limitation periods for filing of appeal, revisions etc. and that there are several special laws in Central as well as State Legislations which are self-contained as regards the period of limitation. 15. Another aspect has been projected before us that several procedural laws, which are in force in the State of Meghalaya, carry in-built limitation periods for filing of appeal, revisions etc. and that there are several special laws in Central as well as State Legislations which are self-contained as regards the period of limitation. However, these and other different submissions made and view-points projected for and against the question of applicability of the Law of Limitation to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya are not being elaborated upon because, the question, in our view, needs to be determined with reference to the provisions of law and the principles expounded and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16. Before proceeding further, we may take note of the referred notification dated 14.03.1966 and the communication dated 22.05.1989, which have formed the basis of the submissions about inapplicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. The Notification dated 14.03.1966 and the letter dated 22.05.1989 17. The referred communication dated 22.05.1989 from the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Law Department to the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India at Dhanketi, Shillong had been as under:- "GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA LAW DEPARTMENT No.LJ(B)116/79/89 Dated Shillong, the 22nd May, "89 From: Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya Law Department. To, The Regional Manager-II, State Bank of India (Regional Office), Dhanketi, SHILLONG-793001 Sub: NON APPLICATION OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963 IN THE TRIBAL AREAS Sir, With reference to your letter No.RM (II) GEN/158 dated 11.2.89, I am directed to say that in view of the Government of Assam's notification No.TAD/GA/12/64 dated 14.3.66 the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the tribal areas now forming part of the State of Meghalaya. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (S. Dykes) Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Law Department" The pivot of the submissions, the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, reads as under:- "Government Of Assam Tribal Areas And Welfare Of Backward Classes Department The 14th March, 1966 No. TAD/GA/12/64. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (S. Dykes) Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Law Department" The pivot of the submissions, the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, reads as under:- "Government Of Assam Tribal Areas And Welfare Of Backward Classes Department The 14th March, 1966 No. TAD/GA/12/64. - In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (b) of Sub-paragraph (1) and sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 12 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Governor of Assam is pleased to direct that the Limitation Act, 1963 (No.36 of 1963) shall not apply to the Tribal Areas of Assam specified in Part A of the table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, with effect from the 1st January 1964. Ramesh Chandra Secy. to the Govt. of Assam T.A. & W.B.C. Deptt." 18. For dealing with different facets of the question regarding applicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya, we may now take note of the relevant provisions, as contained in the applicable enactments and the Constitution of India. The provisions of law 19. Indisputably, the Limitation Act of 1963 extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of Section 1 (2) thereof. However, its inapplicability to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya is suggested on the strength of the submissions that such tribal areas were earlier forming the part of Assam as specified in Part-A of the table Appended to Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and its applicability to such areas was specifically excluded in the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam by virtue of the powers conferred by Clause (b) of Sub-Paragraph (1) and Sub-Paragraph (2) of Paragraph 12 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that by virtue of the provisions contained in the Reorganisation Act of 1971 as also the Reorganisation Act of 1969, the aforesaid notification would continue to operate in relation to the tribal areas which were earlier the part of Assam but are now comprising the State of Meghalaya. It is further submitted that by virtue of the provisions contained in the Reorganisation Act of 1971 as also the Reorganisation Act of 1969, the aforesaid notification would continue to operate in relation to the tribal areas which were earlier the part of Assam but are now comprising the State of Meghalaya. Per contra, it is contended that by virtue of Paragraph 12-A of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Limitation Act, being an Act of Parliament and having not been excluded from operation by any notification by the President, would apply to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya; and the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 shall have no application. We have already taken note of the notification dated 14.03.1966. Now, the relevant provisions of law could be taken note of as under: 20. Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, as was existing prior to the changes brought about by the Re-organisation Act of 1971 and describing the tribal areas within the State of Assam read as under:- "20. Tribal areas.- (1) The areas specified in Parts A and B of the table below shall be the tribal, areas within the State of Assam. (2) The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District shall comprise the territories which before the commencement of this Constitution were known as the Khasi State and the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District, excluding any areas for the time being comprised within the cantonment and municipality of Shillong, but including so much of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong as formed part of the Khasi State of, Mylliem: Provided that for the purposes of clauses(e) and (f) of sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 3, paragraph 4, paragraph 5, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph(2), clauses(a), (b) and (d) of sub-paragraph(3) and sub-paragraph(4) of paragraph 8 and clause(d) of sub-paragraph(2) of paragraph 10 of this Schedule, no part of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong shall be deemed to be within the District. (3) Any reference in the table below to any district (other than the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District) or administrative area shall be construed as a reference to that district or area at the commencement of this Constitution Provided that the tribal Areas specified in Part B of the table below shall not include any such areas in the plains as may, with the previous approval of, the President, be notified by the Governor of Assam in that behalf. PART A 1. The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District 2. The Garo Hills District. 3. The Lushai Hills District. 4. The Naga Hills District. 5. The North Cachar Hills. 6. The Mikhir Hills PART B 1. North East Frontier Tract including Balipara Frontier. Tract Tirap Frontier Tract, Abor Hills District and Misimi Hills District. 2. The Naga Tribal Area." 21. This Paragraph 20 has gone through a sea change, commencing from the substitution by Section 71 (i) and Eighth Schedule to the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and by the later constitutional amendments. In the present form, Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India reads as under:- "20. Tribal areas.- (1) The areas specified in Parts I, II, II-A and III of the table below shall respectively be the areas within the State of Assam, the State of Meghalaya, the State of Tripura and the State of Mizoram. (2) Any reference in Part I, Part II or Part III of the table below to any district shall be construed as a reference to the territories comprised within the autonomous district of that name existing immediately before the day appointed under clause (b) of section 2 of the North-Eastern Areas(Reorganization) Act, 1971: Provided that for the purposes of clauses(e) and (f) of sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 3, paragraph 4, paragraph 5, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph(2), clauses(a), (b) and (d) of sub-paragraph(3) and sub-paragraph(4) of paragraph 8 and clause(d) of sub-paragraph(2) of paragraph 10 of this Schedule, no part of the area comprised within the municipality of Shillong shall be deemed to be within the Khasi Hills District. (3) The reference in Part II-A in the table below to the "Tripura Tribal Areas District" shall be construed as a reference to the territory comprising the tribal areas specified in the First Schedule to the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Act, 1979. PART I 1. The North Cachar Hills District. 2. (3) The reference in Part II-A in the table below to the "Tripura Tribal Areas District" shall be construed as a reference to the territory comprising the tribal areas specified in the First Schedule to the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Act, 1979. PART I 1. The North Cachar Hills District. 2. The Karbi Anglong District. PART II 1. Khasi Hills District. 2. Jaintia Hills District. 3. The Garo Hills District. PART II-A Tripura Tribal Areas District. PART III 1. The Chakma District. 2. The Mara District. 3. The Lai District." 22. We may also take note of Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India carrying the transitional provisions as under:- "19. Transitional provisions.- (1) As soon as possible after the commencement of this constitution the Governor shall take steps for the constitution of a District Council for each autonomous district in the State under this Schedule and, until a District Council is so constituted for an autonomous district, the administration of such district shall be vested in the Governor and the following provisions shall apply to the administration of the areas within such district instead of the foregoing provisions of this Schedule, namely:- (a) no act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall apply to any such area unless the Governor by public notification so directs; and the Governor in giving such a direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall, in its application to the area or to any specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit; (b) the governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any such area and any regulations so made may repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any existing law which is for the time being applicable to such area. (2) Any direction given by the Governor under clause (a) of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect. (3) All regulations made under clause(b) of sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to the President and, until assented to by him, shall have no effect." 23. (2) Any direction given by the Governor under clause (a) of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect. (3) All regulations made under clause(b) of sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph shall be submitted forthwith to the President and, until assented to by him, shall have no effect." 23. It may also be noticed that Paragraph 12 of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, as originally enacted and as existing on the date of issuance of the notification dated 14.03.1966, had been as under:- "12. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the state to autonomous districts and autonomous regions.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution- (a) no Act of the Legislature of the State in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region unless in either case the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region by public notification so directs, and the District Council in giving such direction with respect of any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to such district or region or any part thereof have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit; (b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State to which the provisions of clause(a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification. (2) Any direction given under sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect." 24. The above-quoted Paragraph 12 was first amended by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 whereby, its application was confined to the State of Assam. Several other changes have also been made in its applicability to the State of Assam, which are not required to be noticed for the present purposes. The above-quoted Paragraph 12 was first amended by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 whereby, its application was confined to the State of Assam. Several other changes have also been made in its applicability to the State of Assam, which are not required to be noticed for the present purposes. However, this Paragraph 12, as now existing in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, is as under:- "12. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Assam to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Assam.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution- (a) no Act of the Legislature of the State of Assam in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State of Assam prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region in that State unless in either case the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region by public notification so directs, and the District Council in giving such direction with respect of any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to such district or region or any part thereof have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit; (b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State of Assam to which the provisions of clause(a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region [in that State], or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification. (2) Any direction given under sub-paragraph(1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect." 25. The relevant aspect of the matter for the present purpose is that when the Autonomous State of Meghalaya within the State of Assam was formed under the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, Paragraph 12-A was inserted in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which was, thereafter, substituted by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971. The relevant aspect of the matter for the present purpose is that when the Autonomous State of Meghalaya within the State of Assam was formed under the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, Paragraph 12-A was inserted in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which was, thereafter, substituted by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971. This Paragraph 12-A, in its present form, reads as under:- "12-A. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Meghalaya.- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- (a) if any provision of a law made by a District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya with respect to any matter specified in sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 3 of this Schedule or if any provision of any regulation made by a District Council or a Regional Council in that State under paragraph 8 or paragraph 10 of this Schedule, is repugnant to any provision of a law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya with respect to that matter, then, the law or regulation made by the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional Council whether made before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya, shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void and the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya shall prevail; (b) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect." 26. At this juncture, Paragraph 12-B, as inserted in the Sixth Schedule by the same Reorganisation Act of 1971, may also be noticed. This Paragraph 12-B had been the subject of interpretation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama's case (supra). At this juncture, Paragraph 12-B, as inserted in the Sixth Schedule by the same Reorganisation Act of 1971, may also be noticed. This Paragraph 12-B had been the subject of interpretation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama's case (supra). Paragraph 12-B, in relation to the State of Mizoram and the Autonomous District in the State of Mizoram, in its present form reads as under:- "12-B. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Mizoram.- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- (a) no Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region in that State unless, in either case, the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region, by public notification, so directs, and the District Council, in giving such direction with respect to any Act, may direct that the Act shall, in its application to such district or region or any part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit; (b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of the Legislature of the State of Mizoram to which the provisions of clause(a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply, shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region in that State, or shall apply to such district or region, or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications, as he may specify in the notification; (c) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region in the State of Mizoram, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof, subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect." 27. Apart from the above, we may also take note of the relevant provisions of the Re-organisation Acts of 1969 and 1971. Apart from the above, we may also take note of the relevant provisions of the Re-organisation Acts of 1969 and 1971. Initially, the Autonomous State to be known as Meghalaya within the State of Assam was formed by virtue of Section 3 (1) of the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, that reads as under:- "3. Formation of Meghalaya.-(1) On and from the appointed day there shall be formed within the state of Assam an autonomous State to be known as Meghalaya which shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section(2) comprise the following tribal areas, namely : (i) The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District as described in sub-paragraph(2) of paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution(exclusive of the proviso thereto) but excluding the areas transferred to the Mikir Hills autonomous district by the notification of the Government of Assam No.TAD/R/31/50/149, dated the 13th April, 1951, and (ii) The Garo Hills District specified in Part A of the table appended to paragraph 20 aforesaid. .... .... ...." 28. In this Reorganisation Act of 1969, the Autonomous State was conferred with the status of a State for certain purposes and certain provisions of the Constitution of India, as enumerated in Section 67 thereof. However, for the present purpose, Section 66 of this enactment providing for continuance of existing laws and their adaptations, could be noticed as under:- "66- Continuance of existing laws and their adaptations.- (1) all law in force immediately before the appointed day in the autonomous State shall continue to be in force therein until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. (2) For the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the autonomous State of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government may, within two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations or modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient and there upon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. Explanation- In this section, the expression "appropriate Government" means as respects any law relating to a matter enumerated in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Central Government, as respects any law relating to a matter in the Second Schedule, the Government of Meghalaya, and, as respects any other law, the Government of Assam." 29. The relevant and material development after the aforesaid Reorganization Act of 1969 had been that by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, the States of Manipur and Tripura were established and the State of Meghalaya was formed apart from the Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. For the present purpose, suffice it to notice that by virtue of Section 5 thereof, the State of Meghalaya was formed in the following manner:- "5. Formation of the State of Meghalaya. On and from the appointed day there shall be formed a new State, to be known as the State of Meghalaya, comprising- (a) the territories which immediately before that day were comprised in the autonomous State of Meghalaya formed under Section 3 of the Assam Re-organisation ( Meghalaya ) Act, 1969 (55 of 1969); and (b) so much of the territories comprised within the cantonment and municipality of Shillong as did not form part of that autonomous State; and thereupon the said territories shall cease to form part of the existing State of Assam." 30. Thus, by virtue of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, the State of Meghalaya was formed with the territories that were comprised in the Autonomous State of Meghalaya under the Reorganisation Act of 1969; and with other territories of the cantonment and municipality of Shillong. This full-fledged State of Meghalaya came into being on 21.01.1972. Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, which have been referred to and relied upon in support of the contention that the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 continues to apply, could also be taken note of as under:- "77. Territorial extent of laws. This full-fledged State of Meghalaya came into being on 21.01.1972. Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971, which have been referred to and relied upon in support of the contention that the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 continues to apply, could also be taken note of as under:- "77. Territorial extent of laws. The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and the territorial references in any such law to the existing State of Assam or the autonomous State of Meghalaya or the Union territory of Manipur or the Union territory of Tripura or the North-East Frontier Agency shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State or autonomous State or Union territory or Agency immediately before the appointed day. 79. Power to adapt laws. For the purpose of facilitating the application of any law in relation to any of the States or Union territories formed or established by the provisions of Part II, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from the appointed day, by order, make such adaptations of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. Explanation. In this section, the expression "the appropriate Government" means- (a) as respects any law relating to matter enumerated in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Central Government; and (b) As respects any other law,- (i) in its application to a State, the State Government, and (ii) in its application to a Union territory, the Central Government." The relevant case law 31. Having extensively taken note of the relevant provisions having bearing on the issue, we may now take note of the ratio of the decisions relied upon. In support of the view-points that the said notification dated 14.03.1966 continues to operate and is in force in the tribal areas forming the State of Meghalaya, the decision of the Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong's case (supra) has been strongly relied upon. In support of the view-points that the said notification dated 14.03.1966 continues to operate and is in force in the tribal areas forming the State of Meghalaya, the decision of the Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong's case (supra) has been strongly relied upon. In the said decision, the High Court dealt with the question as to whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the criminal revision filed against an order of discharge of an accused person. The Court took note of the said notification dated 14.03.1966 and, while observing that there was no dispute as to its applicability to the State of Meghalaya, proceeded to hold that it remained operative by virtue of the provisions contained in the Reorganisation Act of 1971. The Court said,- "10. In the aforesaid notification dated 14.3.66, the Governor of Assam directed that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply to the Tribal Areas of Assam specified in part A of the table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The above notification dated 14.3.66 came into force from the 1st day of January, 1964. However, there is no dispute as to the applicability of the said notification to the State of Meghalaya. After coming into force of the North East Areas Re-organisation Act, 1971, the notification remained in force by virtue of Section 7 read with 79 of the said Act. Therefore, our conclusion is that the notification referred to above issued which came into force on and from 1.1.64 is still in force. Therefore, in view of the notification dated 14.3.66 which came into force on and from 1.1.64 we cannot adopt the spirit of Limitation Act in the present nature of a case. We therefore, hold that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. We make it clear that our answer to the reference is relating to the applicability of Limitation Act of 1963 in the present nature of the case and on no other laws which are in force in the State of Meghalaya. The reason being that the reference was sought for relating to the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act in tribal areas. (Underlining supplied for emphasis) 32. The reason being that the reference was sought for relating to the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act in tribal areas. (Underlining supplied for emphasis) 32. On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court in J. Thansiama's case has been referred in support of the contention that the Limitation Act does apply to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya and that the said notification dated 14.03.1966 has ceased to operate over these areas. 33. The aforesaid decision in J. Thansiama was rendered by the Supreme Court in an appeal arising out of an order of the Gauhati High Court dated 01.08.2005 wherein, the Limitation Act was held applicable to the State of Mizoram. The Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the said notification dated 14.03.1966 and traced the relevant aspects of the history of enactment of the Re-organisation Act of 1971 and its relevant provisions, including Sections 77 and 79 there of. In the context of the State of Mizoram, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also took note of Paragraph 12-B of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and thereafter, pointedly held that the notification dated 14.03.1966 issued by the Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to the Mizo District once the area therein no longer formed a part of the tribal areas of Assam. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "12. What, however, would require a pointed notice is that the Notification dated 14.03.1966 issued by the Governor of Assam excluding the operation of the Limitation Act from the tribal areas of the State of Assam ceased to be applicable to the Mizo District once the areas therein no long formed a part of the tribal areas of Assam and, instead, became a part of the tribal areas of the Union Territory of Mizoram with effect from 21.1.1972. The further developments (historical, geographical and constitutional), namely, the exclusion/omission of the Mizo district even from the tribal areas of the Union Territory of Mizoram; the dissolution of the Mizo District Council and the addition of Pawai, Lakher and Chakma Districts to part III of Para 20 of the Sixth Schedule as the tribal areas of the Union Territory of Mizoram, of which all developments had occurred subsequent to the creation of the Union Territory of Mizoram, would further fortify the above position. The aforesaid facts would demonstrate that the Notification dated 14.03.1966 ex facie would not apply to the areas within the erstwhile Mizo District of the State of Assam once the said areas ceased to be so and came to comprise the Union Territory of Mizoram with effect from 21.1.1972 by virtue of Section 6 of the Reorganisation Act." (Underlining supplied for emphasis) 34. In the aforesaid decision in J. Thansiama, though the Supreme Court expressed doubts on the reasoning of Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong's case but left the matter at that only for the reason that the correctness thereof was not in challenge and the case at hand did not relate to the applicability of the Limitation Act to the State of Meghalaya. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "13. Indeed it is correct that the Gauhati High Court in The State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong has held that in view of the notification dated 14.3.1966, the Limitation Act 1963 will not apply to the State of Meghalaya. The reasoning of the High Court in the said case has been pressed into service for our acceptance in the present case also on account of the parity of the facts of the two cases. Having gone through the said judgment we are unable to accept the reasoning contained therein. However, we say no more as the correctness of view expressed in the State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong (supra) is not under challenge before us; neither is the question involved therein, namely, the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the State of Meghalaya the issue arising in the present case." (Underlining supplied for emphasis) 35. However, we say no more as the correctness of view expressed in the State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong (supra) is not under challenge before us; neither is the question involved therein, namely, the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the State of Meghalaya the issue arising in the present case." (Underlining supplied for emphasis) 35. Thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its previous decision in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shillong City Bus Syndicate: (1996) 8 SCC 741 whereby the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 was held applicable to the Khasi Hills District in the State of Meghalaya after holding that the transitional provisions of Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule ceased to operate with the constitution of the District Council; and that the application of laws in the State of Meghalaya is governed by the provisions of Paragraph 12-A; and further that until publication of a notification by the President, all Acts of Parliament, which are not occupied by the provisions contained in Paragraph 3, shall be operative in the areas of the Autonomous Regions or Districts in the State of Meghalaya. The Supreme Court particularly referred to paragraph 16 of the said decision in Shillong City Bus Syndicate on the interpretation of Paragraph 12-A of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India; and applied the same principles to Paragraph 12-B of the Sixth Schedule. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while reproducing paragraph 16 in Shillong City Bus Syndicate (supra), observed and held as under:- "16. The eventual conclusion of this Court are to be found in Para 16 which is quoted below with the clarification that Para 12A referred to therein pertains to the autonomous Districts or Regional Councils in the State of Meghalaya whereas in the instant case the relevant provisions of the Sixth Schedule would be Paragraph 12B as initially applicable to the Union Territory of Mizoram and thereafter to the State of Mizoram. "16. It would, thus, be clear that, on constitution of the District or Regional Council, paragraph 19 ceases to operate and power of the Governor becomes coterminous and ceases to exist. Simultaneously, the power of the District or Regional Council becomes operational to make laws on subjects covered in paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule. Proprio vigore, paragraph 12-A comes into force. Simultaneously, the power of the District or Regional Council becomes operational to make laws on subjects covered in paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule. Proprio vigore, paragraph 12-A comes into force. By operation of paragraph 12-A(b), the President has been empowered to direct by a notification that any Act of Parliament should not be made applicable or made applicable with such modifications and exceptions, as may be specified in the said notification. In other words, until such notification is published by the President, all Acts of Parliament which are not occupied by the provisions contained in paragraph 3 shall proprio vigore become operative in the area of the Autonomous Regions or Districts in the State of Meghalaya." (Underlining is ours) 17. We also do not find any substance in the arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellant that the Notification dated 14.3.1966 would continue to be applicable to the Union Territory and the successor State of Mizoram by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. We do not see how the said provisions of the General Clauses Act can have any application to the present case. 18. Consequently, we dismiss the present appeal and affirm the view taken by the High Court." 36. The interpretation of the relevant provisions with their inter-play and enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shillong City Bus Syndicate case (supra) may be noticed in a little more detail for being relevant to the present case. In Shillong City Bus Syndicate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined and analysed the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; and, after dealing with Paragraph 12-A and Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule, pointed out, inter alia, as under:- "6. In Shillong City Bus Syndicate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined and analysed the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; and, after dealing with Paragraph 12-A and Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule, pointed out, inter alia, as under:- "6. After the formation of State of Meghalaya, by operation of paragraph 12-A(a) with a non obstante clause engrafted therein, that if any provision of a law made by a District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya, with respect to any matter specified in sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule or if any provision or any regulation made in paragraph 8 or paragraph 10, is repugnant to any of the provisions of a law made by the Meghalaya State Legislature with respect to that matter, then, the law or regulation made by the District Council or Regional Council whether made before or after the law made by the Meghalaya State Legislature, shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void and the law made by the Legislature of Meghalaya State shall prevail. 7. Clause(b) of paragraph 12-A provides that the President may with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to any Autonomous District or Region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply subject to such exceptions or modifications as may be specified therein. 8. Paragraph 19 is a transitory provision pending constitution of the District or Regional Council in the State. Therein, the Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature shall not apply to any such area unless the Governor by public notification, so directs and makes it applicable with such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the public notification. Equally, the Governor has the power to make regulations or power to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any existing law which for the time being is applicable to such area. He has got power also to make such direction with retrospective effect. They shall be submitted forthwith to the President and until they are assented to by the President, they shall have no effect, as envisaged in paragraph 19(3). 9. It would, thus, be seen that the operation of paragraph 19 is transitory pending constitution of the Autonomous District Councils. He has got power also to make such direction with retrospective effect. They shall be submitted forthwith to the President and until they are assented to by the President, they shall have no effect, as envisaged in paragraph 19(3). 9. It would, thus, be seen that the operation of paragraph 19 is transitory pending constitution of the Autonomous District Councils. Therefore, till the Council is so constituted and until the Governor, by a public notification makes an Act of Parliament applicable to the area proprio vigore, it has no application. He is also empowered by a public notification, to make an Act of Parliament applicable with such modifications or exceptions as he may specify. As soon as the District or Regional Council is constituted, the power under paragraph 19 ceases to operate and as a corollary paragraph 12 begins to operate in relation to Autonomous District Council or Regional Council in the State of Assam and paragraph 12-A begins to operate in respect of the District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya. By operation of paragraph 12(1)(b) or paragraph 12-A(b), the Governor or the President, as the case may be, by notification, may direct that with respect to the area over which the Regional or District Council respectively has jurisdiction, any Act of Parliament shall not apply to such Autonomous District or Region or shall apply with such modifications or exceptions, as may be specified in the notification." 37. The principles relating to the limited operation of transitional provisions contained in Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and applicability of Acts of Parliament to the tribal areas were also explained in no uncertain terms by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 16 and 17 of this decision. Para 16 of this decision in Shillong City Bus Syndicate has already been noticed herein above, as reproduced in the decision in J. Thansiama. The relevant part of para 17, however, may also be noticed as follows:- "17. ........... The law made by Parliament, becomes operational, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, for the whole or any part of the territory of India. No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extraterritorial operation. The relevant part of para 17, however, may also be noticed as follows:- "17. ........... The law made by Parliament, becomes operational, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, for the whole or any part of the territory of India. No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extraterritorial operation. Therefore, as soon as the Governor ceases to have power under paragraph 19, the Act became operative in the area or region over which Khasi Hills District Council had assumed power under paragraph 12-A(a). Soon thereafter, paragraph 19 ceased to operate. Proprio vigore, the Act of Parliament came into operation for the area of Khasi Hills District until the President, by a notification, excluded its application to that area or made it applicable with such modifications and exceptions as may be specified in a notification published in this behalf in the Gazette of India. Admittedly, no such notification was published by the President. Resultantly, the Act came into operation throughout the country except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But earlier, by operation of paragraph 19(1)(b) of the Sixth Schedule, due to a non obstante clause engrafted therein, its application stood excluded since no notification was issued by the Governor making the same applicable under paragraph 19(1)(b) to that autonomous District which ceased to be operative from 26-6-1952." (Underlining supplied for emphasis) 38. Having thus taken note of the law applicable to the case, we may now take up for determination the questions referred to this Bench. Question No. 1. Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the tribal areas now comprising the State of Meghalaya? 39. In comprehension of the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the relevant provisions of law with the principles expounded and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the Limitation Act indeed applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the tribal areas. 40. 39. In comprehension of the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the relevant provisions of law with the principles expounded and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the Limitation Act indeed applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the tribal areas. 40. The line of arguments suggesting inapplicability of the Limitation Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya has its foundation in the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam coupled with the provisions contained in Section 66 of the Reorganisation Act of 1969 and Sections 77 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act of 1971; and the support to this contention is taken from the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Mynsong's case (supra). The contention sans merit and, with respect, we find it difficult to accept the view taken by the Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong's case as that of correct proposition of law. 41. Indisputably, while framing the Constitution of India, a separate scheme was evolved for administration of several of the areas described as schedule and tribal areas; and, the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India in its original form made the provisions for administration of tribal areas in the State of Assam. As noticed, the areas specified in Part A and B of the table Appended to the original Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule were declared as tribal areas within the State of Assam. 42. In the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, in the beginning it was provided that there shall be Autonomous District Councils or Regional Councils for the specified areas in the State of Assam; and such Councils were vested with legislative authority on the specified subject/s and were, inter alia, given the power to set up and administer their own system of justice and welfare services in respect of the subjects enumerated in Paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule. As regards the applicability of the Act of Parliament and Legislature of the State to such Autonomous Districts and Autonomous Regions, over-riding provisions were made in Paragraph 12 of the Sixth Schedule; and by virtue of Clause (a) of Paragraph 12(1), no Act of the State Legislature, in respect of any of the matters specified in Paragraph 3 for which a District Council or a Regional Council could make laws; and no Act of the State Legislature prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor, were to apply to the Autonomous Districts/Autonomous Regions unless the jurisdictional District Council would so direct by way of a public notification with or without modification. However, Clause (b) of Paragraph 12(1) provided that the Governor could by public notification direct that any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature of Assam, to which the provisions of Paragraph 12 (1) were not applicable, would not apply to an Autonomous District or an Autonomous Region in that State. The Governor was also empowered to direct by way of public notification that such an Act shall apply to such Autonomous District or Region or any part thereof subject to such exception or modification as specified by him in the notification. 43. In the Sixth Schedule, transitional provisions were also made in Paragraph 19 that as soon as possible, after commencement of the Constitution, the Governor would take steps for constitution of a District Council for each Autonomous District; and until such constitution of District Council, the administration of such District was to vest in the Governor. Paragraph 19 further provided that the Act of Parliament or State Legislature would not apply to such Autonomous District areas, unless the Governor by way of public notification would so direct and make it applicable with such exception or modification as may be specified. Significantly, the Governor was also entrusted with the power to make regulations for the peace and good governance of any such area and by such regulations, the Governor could have repealed or amended any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any existing law applicable to such areas. However, such regulations were subject to the assent of the President. 44. However, such regulations were subject to the assent of the President. 44. We have referred to the aforementioned originally enacted provisions in Paragraphs 20, 12 and 19 of the Sixth Schedule for the reason that these and some other provisions of the Sixth Schedule have gone through a substantial transformation with the enactment of Re-organisation Act of 1969 and the Re-organisation Act of 1971; and such changes are of direct bearing on the issue at hand. Relevant it is to notice that the said notification dated 14.03.1966 was issued much before promulgation of the Re-organisation Acts of 1969 and 1971; and was issued under the powers of the Governor of the State of Assam, as were available at the relevant time in Paragraphs 12 (1) (b) and 12 (2) of the Sixth Schedule. The development of law after the aforesaid notification dated 14.03.1966 had been that by the Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment) Act of 1969, Article 244-A was inserted to the Constitution of India, enabling the Parliament to enact a law to give effect to the scheme for Reorganisation of Assam by forming within the State of Assam an Autonomous State comprising wholly or in part any of the tribal areas specified in Part A of the table Appended to Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule. This reorganisation scheme led to the enactment of the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969 and as noticed, from the appointed day therein, an Autonomous State within the State of Assam was to be formed, comprising the tribal areas of United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District. In Section 66 of this Reorganisation Act of 1969, the provisions were made that, all law in force immediately before the appointed day would continue to be in force, until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. It was also provided that for the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the Autonomous State of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government could make adaptations or modifications of law within two years, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary. It was also provided that for the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the Autonomous State of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government could make adaptations or modifications of law within two years, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary. However, thereafter, full-fledged State of Meghalaya was formed under the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 comprising: (i) the Autonomous State of Meghalaya formed under Section 3 of the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969; and (ii) so much of the territories comprised within the cantonment and municipality of Shillong, which did not form the part of that Autonomous State. By the same enactment i.e., North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, the States of Manipur and Tripura were also established and the Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh were also formed. Extensive provisions were made in this enactment for all such States and Union Territories and extensive amendments were also made in the related provisions in the Constitution of India including those in the Sixth Schedule. 45. By the Eighth Schedule to the Re-organisation Act of 1971, the above noted changes were made in Paragraphs 12 and 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; and amongst others, Paragraphs 12-A and 12-B were also inserted. By virtue of Paragraph 12-A, specific and distinct provisions were made as regards the application of the Act of Parliament and the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to the Autonomous District and Autonomous Region in the State of Meghalaya. 46. The question in the present reference relates to the Limitation Act, which is an Act of Parliament and in that relation, the relevant Clause (b) of Paragraph 12-A could be re-read as under:- "12-A. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Meghalaya.- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- ..... ..... ..... (b) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to an autonomous district or an autonomous region in the State of Meghalaya, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect." 47. In fact, similar provisions were made in the newly inserted Paragraph 12-B as regards the application of the Act of Parliament to the Autonomous District or Autonomous Region in the Union Territory of Mizoram. The sum and substance of these provisions, as contained in Paragraphs 12-A and 12-B, is that in relation to the Act of Parliament, the President may, by notification, direct that it would not apply to an Autonomous District or an Autonomous Region or would apply to such District or Region or part thereof subject to the specific exceptions or modifications; and such directions could be given retrospective effect too. Section 79 of the Re-organisation Act of 1971 provides that to facilitate the application of any law in the State or Union Territory formed under the provisions of Part-II of the enactment, the appropriate Government may, before expiration of two years from the appointed day, make such adaptations or modifications of the law as may be necessary or expedient. 48. It is further provided that once such adaptation or modification is made, the law shall have effect subject to such adaptation or modification, until the same is altered or repealed by the competent legislature or the competent authority. 49. It is at once clear that the notification dated 14.03.1966, as issued by the Governor of Assam, whereby the Limitation Act was excluded from its operation in the tribal areas of the State of Assam, ceased to be applicable to such tribal areas that ceased to be tribal areas of Assam and became part of the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya w.e.f. 21.01.1972. The same position, with its contextual variation, has been declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in relation to the tribal areas forming part of the then Union Territory of Mizoram and now forming part of the State of Mizoram in J. Thansiama's case after interpretation of the aforesaid provisions of the Reorganisation Act of 1971 and with particular reference to Paragraph 12-B of the Sixth Schedule, as applicable to that case. In the very same decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has indicated its disagreement with the reasoning in U. William Mynsong's case but did not finally pronounce on the same, essentially for the reason that the application of the Limitation Act to the State of Meghalaya was not the issue involved. In the very same decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has indicated its disagreement with the reasoning in U. William Mynsong's case but did not finally pronounce on the same, essentially for the reason that the application of the Limitation Act to the State of Meghalaya was not the issue involved. However, on a comprehension of the entire matter, we are left with no doubt that the very same principles, as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Thansiama's case, apply for the purpose of the present case too because, on all the material aspects, the provisions contained in Paragraphs 12-A and 12-B of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution are in pari materia and operate in the same field and are of same purport and effect. Further, it was clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Shillong City Bus Syndicate (supra), while holding the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 applicable to the Khasi Hills Autonomous District in the State of Meghalaya, that the transitional provisions of Paragraph 19 of the Sixth Schedule ceased to operate with the constitution of the District Council; and until publication of a notification by the President, all Acts of Parliament, which are not occupied by the provisions contained in Paragraph 3, shall be operative in the areas of the Autonomous Regions or Districts in the State of Meghalaya too. 50. Obviously, the decision of Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in U. William Mynsong's (supra) does not stand in conformity with the law declared by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases in J. Thansiama and Shillong City Bus Syndicate; and in view of these decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there remains little scope for any suggestion that the Limitation Act would not apply to the State of Meghalaya because of the notification issued on 14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam. The said notification, as held by the Supreme Court, ceased to operate as soon as the areas to which it was applicable no longer formed the part of the tribal areas of Assam. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that once the tribal areas in question within the State of Assam ceased to be so and came to comprise the territory of Meghalaya, the said notification dated 14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to such areas. 51. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that once the tribal areas in question within the State of Assam ceased to be so and came to comprise the territory of Meghalaya, the said notification dated 14.03.1966 by the Governor of Assam ceased to be applicable to such areas. 51. So far the letter dated 22.05.1989 is concerned, nothing much is required to be discussed about the same. Suffice it to notice that the said letter was issued by the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya while suggesting to the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India that Limitation Act was not applicable to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya because of the said notification dated 14.03.1966. As already held, the said notification had ceased to operate qua the tribal areas of Meghalaya; and the Limitation Act does apply to the entire State of Meghalaya. The said letter, obviously proceeding on a wrong assumption of law, could only be considered redundant and ineffective. 52. It was sought to be suggested before us that Section 66 of the Re-organisation Act of 1969 and Sections 77 and 79 of the Re-organisation Act of 1971 were not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions aforesaid; and the Limitation Act would not be applicable in view of the said provisions. This submission remains entirely baseless for the simple reason that when the Hon'ble Supreme Court has enunciated the law in relation to any particular issue, it is not open to suggest that any particular provision was not considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Moreover, it is distinctly noticed that in the case of Shillong City Bus Syndicate, the entire scheme of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India on all the relevant aspects relating applicability of the Act of Parliament to the area of an Autonomous District came up for fuller exposition; and the Supreme Court expounded the principles in no uncertain terms, as noticed above. Moreover, in J. Thansiama's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, apart from the relevant reference to the provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule, has also distinctly taken note of the Sections 77 and 79 of the Re-organisation Act of 1971; and, as noticed, the principles of J. Thansiama directly apply to the present case. 53. Moreover, in J. Thansiama's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, apart from the relevant reference to the provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule, has also distinctly taken note of the Sections 77 and 79 of the Re-organisation Act of 1971; and, as noticed, the principles of J. Thansiama directly apply to the present case. 53. For what has been noticed and discussed herein above, we are clearly of the view that the Limitation Act, being an Act of Parliament and having not been excluded in its operation by any notification issued by the President, applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the tribal areas. Question No. 2 Whether the Law of Limitation is not applicable to the application seeking review of the order dated 05.03.2014 passed in PIL No.2 of 2013? 54. Even when we have held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the entire State of Meghalaya, the question still remains about the limitation in relation to the application seeking review of an order passed in a Public Interest Litigation by this Court. Indisputably, a petition in the nature of Public Interest Litigation is essentially a petition for issuance of writ/direction and is that of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No limitation as such has been prescribed in the Limitation Act for such proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution; and review of an order passed in such proceedings would also be essentially in the exercise of the plenary jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, even if the Limitation Act applies to the State of Meghalaya, it is difficult to directly apply Article 124 thereof, prescribing the period of limitation of 30 days for an application for review of an order passed by a Court other than the Supreme Court, to an application for review of an order passed in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, it cannot follow as a necessary corollary that an application for review of an order passed in the proceedings under Article 226 could be maintained at any time, as desired by the applicant. 55. It cannot be gainsaid that the law of limitation is essentially based on public policy so as to ensure that there is an outer limit of bringing a lis for seeking relief in the Court. 55. It cannot be gainsaid that the law of limitation is essentially based on public policy so as to ensure that there is an outer limit of bringing a lis for seeking relief in the Court. In the case of the State of M.P. and others v. Bhai Lal Bhai: AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Constitution Bench indicated that the reasonable standard for measuring the delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be with reference to the period of limitation prescribed for such an action in the Civil Court. The Hon'ble Court, inter alia, observed as under:- "21. ....... It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. ......." 56. The very same question as regards the reasonable period for filing an application for review of an order passed in a PIL was considered by the Gauhati High Court in the case of Mori Riba and others v. Yomkar Riba and others: AIR 2011 Gauhati 181. Therein, while noticing that no period of limitation was as such prescribed for such review application in the High Court Rules but with reference to the aforesaid decision in Bhai Lal Bhai, the Hon'ble Court observed and held as under:- 7. In the face of the decision in Bhai Lal Bhai (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that the High Court's jurisdiction is not barred in considering an application for review of an order passed by it under Article 226 even if the application, seeking review of the order, is made beyond the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of making of the order. When the High Court entertains an application for review even after expiry of a period of 30 days, the High Court, as a measure of public policy, must be satisfied that there were reasons preventing the applicant from making an application for review for reasons beyond his control. 8. It is, therefore, imperative that an application, seeking review of an order made under Article 226, discloses adequate reasons if the application is not made expeditiously. If an application for review is found by the High Court to be suffering from negligence or latches, the High Court may not entertain such an application for review in respect of an order passed by it even under Article 226. Though the Gauhati High Court Rules, as correctly indicated in Sri Kanak Chandra Sarma, (AIR 1995 Gauh 82) (supra), do not prescribe any period of limitation for making an application for review of order passed in a writ proceeding, the High Court may, in a given case, decline to entertain an application for review of an order passed under Article 226 if the application for review is, inordinately, delayed and in the meanwhile, the lis becomes stale. There can be no doubt that the High Court, as a Court of plenary jurisdiction, can review is own order passed under Article 226 at any given period of time, the High Court would nevertheless, ordinarily, govern itself by the established standards. 9. Because of what has been discussed and pointed out above, while we agree with the observation, made in the case of Sri Kanak Chandra Sarma (supra), that the Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to an application for review of an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we clarify that the High Court would not, ordinarily, entertain an application for review if the same is made beyond the period of 30 days as prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, on the ground that the public policy is not to, ordinarily, entertain an application for review beyond the period of 30 days from the date of making of the order. It would, however, remain open to the High Court to entertain, in a given case, an application for review even if such an application is filed beyond the period of 30 days provided that the High Court is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient reasons for not being able to apply for review earlier." 57. In our view, the aforesaid decision of the Gauhati High Court aptly expounds and clarifies the law to be applied to the question of limitation in relation to an application for review of an order passed in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and we find no reason to take any different view of the matter. Hence, while respectfully agreeing with the aforesaid decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Mori Riba, we are inclined to hold accordingly. Conclusion 58. In view of the above, the answers to the referred questions are as under: 1. The Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the tribal areas of Autonomous Districts or Regions. 2. An application for review of an order passed by this Court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should ordinarily be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of making of the order but it would always remain open for the Court to entertain the review application filed beyond this period of 30 days if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 59. With the aforesaid answer to the reference, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the review application shall now be placed before a Division Bench of this Court for consideration. 60. While concluding, we would, of course, put on record our appreciation that several learned members of the Bar indeed put across different viewpoints and rendered valuable assistance to this Court in determination of the referred questions.