ORDER 1. This appeal by the plaintiffs under section 96 CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2002 passed in Civil Suit No. 12-A/2001 by III Additional District Judge, Gwalior. 2. Facts relevant and necessary for decision in the appeal are that one Harcharan Singh was owner and in possession of different parcels of agricultural lands including land admeasuring 5 bighas falling in Survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4 situated in Village Mahalgaon, District Gwalior (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit land'). As the State Government interfered with the possession and having apprehension of forcible dispossession from the suit lands, Harcharan Singh had filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction vide Civil Suit No.284/1989 (changed number 41-A/1995) – Harcharan Singh and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 3. It is relevant to mention at this juncture that a bunch of writ petitions, viz., Miscellaneous Petitions No.703, 704, 705, 707, 708 and 709 of 1990 [M.P. No.704 of 1990 (P. C. Chandil v. State of M.P. and Harcharan Singh)] had been filed seeking a direction against the State Government for making available lands and funds for raising construction of High Court building at Gwalior. Amongst the lands required for construction of the High Court building, certain parcels of land in the ownership of Harcharan Singh since were also required and demanded in the writ petitions, therefore, plaintiff – Harcharan Singh was also added as party. A Division Bench of this Court while disposing of aforesaid bunch of writ petitions with the consent of the parties had passed the following order; “5. With the consent of parties we make accordingly the following directions in disposing of these petitions :- (i) Orders of temporary injunction passed in formal Civil Suits No.263-A of 1987 and 284-A of 1989 stand vacated; (ii) Plaintiff-respondent Harcharasingh's land as specified below shall be taken possession amicably by the State Government and no notice shall be necessary in that regard to be served on the plaintiff-respondents. (a) Survey No.796/4 .. area 3 bighas, and (b) Survey No.732/6 .. area 9 bighas. The trial of the suit shall continue and that shall be expedited. (a) Survey No.796/4 .. area 3 bighas, and (b) Survey No.732/6 .. area 9 bighas. The trial of the suit shall continue and that shall be expedited. The plaintiff-respondent is permitted to amend the plaint and to make a prayer therein for compensation so that in the event of plaintiff's succeeding in proving his title it may be possible for him to take a decree for compensation for the land of which possession he has given to the State Government. We also make it clear that the State of Madhya Pradesh, figuring as the defendant in the suit, shall be entitled to amend suitably its written statement. It shall be open to both parties to adduce evidence on the question of title as also possession. (iii) Uttamsingh' land, 4 bighas, of Survey No.732/5 of Civil Suit No.158-A of 1987 is no longer in his possession. By an order passed by this Court on 16-4-1990 in Miscellaneous Petition No.820 of 1987 and 634 and 800 of 1989, possession of that land has already been handed over by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh to Jiwaji University. We had passed that order in view of the fact that there was no injunction order in regard to that plot in the pending suit of Uttamsingh. However, it shall be now possible for Uttamsingh also to amend his plaint and to claim therein compensation for that land in the same manner and for the same purpose as directed above in the case of Harcharansingh. State shall also be entitled to amend suitably its written statement and both parties shall adduce evidence in the same manner as directed above. Trial of that suit shall also be expedited. (iv) In so far as lands of Balkrishna and others of Civil Suit No.263-A of 1987 are concerned, possession of lands of Survey Nos.732/3 and 732/4 measuring respectively 3 bighas and 10 biswas and 2 bighas and 10 biswas shall be amicably taken over by the State of Madhya Pradesh and for that no notice shall be necessary and the other directions made above in regard to other two cases shall also apply to Balkrishna's case. It shall be open to them to amend their plaint and for State to amend its written statement and both parties shall adduce evidence in the manner for the purpose herein above specified. It shall be open to them to amend their plaint and for State to amend its written statement and both parties shall adduce evidence in the manner for the purpose herein above specified. Trial of this suit shall be expedited.” (Emphasis supplied) 4. The aforesaid facts were incorporated in the plaint by way of amendment. The relief for payment of compensation in respect of the lands falling in Survey Nos.796/4 area 3 bighas and 732/6 area 9 bighas was also added in Civil Suit No.41A/1995 (supra), by the plaintiff. 5. In view of the changed circumstances, the subject-matter of the suit for declaration and permanent injunction was confined to Survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4 area admeasuring 5 bighas. Thereafter, following issues were framed by the trial Court:- dza okn iz'u fu"d"kZ ¼1½ D;k oknh gjpju flag oknxzLr Hkwfe dk Hkwfe Lokeh gS \ ¼2½ D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe ij ih-MCyw-Mh- foHkkx dk uke xyr :i ls fy[kk x;k gS \ ¼3½ D;k izfroknhx.k oknh dks voS/k :i ls csn[ky djuk pkgrs gSa \ ¼4½ D;k oknh losZ Ø- 732@6] 796@4 jdck 12 ch?kk dk eqvkotk 'kklu ls ikus dk ik= gS \ ¼5½ lgk;rk ,oa okn O;; \ ¼6½ ¼v½ D;k rglhynkj vkns'k fnukad 4-5-1971 vafre gks pqdk gS \ ¼c½ ;fn gk¡ rks D;k izfroknh dks rglhynkj vkns'k fnukad 4-5-1971 ds f[kykQ dFku djus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS \ 6. Both the parties led evidence. Upon critical evaluation of the evidence on record, the trial Court rendered the judgment and decreed the suit on 24.1.1996. Both the parties led evidence. Upon critical evaluation of the evidence on record, the trial Court rendered the judgment and decreed the suit on 24.1.1996. The decree reads as under: ^^Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS vkSj fuEu vkns'k o vkKkIr iznku dh tkrh gS %& ¼1½ oknh gjpju flag Hkwfe losZ Øekad 732@6 jdck 9 ch?kk ,oa Hkwfe losZ Øekad 796@4] jdck 3 ch?kk fLFkr xzke esgyxk¡o] ijxuk o ftyk Xokfy;j dk LoRof/kdkjh gS] bl dkj.k oknh jktLo fjdkWMZ esa ih-MCY;w-Mh- ds uke ds banzkt dks gVk, tkus ckor~ fof/kor~ dk;Zokgh dj ikus ,oa mDr lanHkZ esa eqvkotk izkIr dh Hkh fuEukuqlkj dk;Zokgh dj ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSaA ¼2½ oknh gjpju flag Hkwfe losZ Øekad 732@3-4] jdok 5 ch?kk fLFkr xzke esgyxk¡o] ijxuk o ftyk Xokfy;j dk LoRo~ ,oa vkf/kiR;/kkjh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS vkSj bl dkj.k oknh jktLo foHkkx esa ih-MCY;w-Mh- ds uke dk banzkt gVk, tkus dh fof/kor dk;Zokgh djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ¼3½ Hkwfe losZ Øekad 792@3-4] jdck 5 ch?kk] fLFkr xzke esgyxk¡o] ijxuk ftyk Xokfy;j ds laca/k esa izfroknhx.k ds fo:) bl ckor~ fu"ks/kkKk tkjh dh tkrh gS fd os vFkok mlds v/khuLFk deZpkjh] oknh gjpju flag dks bl Hkwfe ls fdlh Hkh izdkj fof/k fo#) <ax ls csn[ky u djsaA ¼4½ izdj.k ds rF; o ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds eísutj mHk;&i{k viuk&viuk okn O;; Lo;a ogu djsaxsA vfHkHkk"kd 'kqYd izekf.kr gksus ij fu;ekuqlkj yxkbZ tk,A** 7. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was subject matter of first appeal at the instance of the State Government vide First Appeal No.28 of 1997 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Harcharan Singh and others). The appeal was dismissed by IX Additional District Judge, Gwalior vide judgment and decree dated 15.5.1998. Second appeal arising therefrom being Second Appeal No.487 of 1998 (State of M.P., and another v. Harcharan Singh and others) also stood dismissed by this Court vide judgment and decree dated 25.1.1999 and lastly, the Special Leave Petition filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court being Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC 5855/1999 (Stat of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Harcharan Singh and others) was also dismissed on 18.11.1999. As such, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has attained finality. 8. As such, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has attained finality. 8. Harcharan Singh had transferred lands falling in Survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4 admeasuring 5 bighas (for short, referred to as 'the suit land') in favour of the present appellants and proforma defendants No.2 to 7 by way of registered sale deed dated 25.5.1998, while the appellate proceedings were pending. 9. Present appellants and defendants No.2 to 7 have filed the instant suit bearing Civil Suit No.12-A of 2001, inter alia contending that they have acquired title, right and interest over the suit land. It is asserted that they are in possession over the suit land by virtue of registered sale deed dated 25.5.1998, hence, entitled for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession of the suit land, allegedly taken forcible possession by the respondent/defendant – Jiwaji University (for short, referred to as 'the University'). 10. Respondent/defendant – University has filed written statement and denied plaint allegations. It was contended that the plaintiffs are neither owners nor in possession and the suit land has all along been a Government land but, remained in possession of the University, for decades together. It was contended that the suit land has been allotted to the University by the State Government in lieu of exchange of lands which have been spared by the University for construction of High Court building as offered by the State Government during the course of hearing as is evident from the Order dated 20.8.1992 passed in Miscellaneous Civil Case No.32 of 1992 - High Court Bar Association, Gwalior v. State of M.P., and another (Ex.D-8), the relevant paragraphs 4 and 5 are reproduced below : “4. In so far as the question of lands to be given in exchange to the University is concerned, the position in that regard is to be clarified as per disclosures made today by the Nazul Officer with respect to availability of the lands contiguous to University's other lands which may be suitable for the purpose of the University. Details of those are given below and it will be for the University now to make its choice out of the area offered in the following survey numbers by the Nazul Officer on behalf of the State Government. 5. In village Mahalgaon two plots are offered. Details of those are given below and it will be for the University now to make its choice out of the area offered in the following survey numbers by the Nazul Officer on behalf of the State Government. 5. In village Mahalgaon two plots are offered. In Survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4 5 bighas of lands and in Survey No.884 11 bighas and 2 biswas. Additionally, in Ohadpur village 13 bighas and 6 biswas of land of Survey Nos.8 and 9 are offered. Choice is left to the University to accept the lands offered today or those offered earlier and referred to in the University's resolution.” Consequent upon allotment of land by the State Government, by raising educational building within campus and around the vacant suit land, the University continued to be in possession. It was denied that the University has ever taken forcible possession or threatened for forcible dispossession over the suit land, as alleged in the plaint. That apart, as a matter of fact, earlier Civil Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), filed by Harcharan Singh was based on forged patta. It was contended that as the original patta was not placed before the trial Court, no title accrued to him, therefore, he had no right, title and interest to transfer the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot gain any advantage on the strength of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in the earlier suit though affirmed by the appellate Court on 15.5.1998 and this Court in second appeal on 25.1.1999 as well as in SLP (Civil) on 18.11.1999 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra). As such, the plaintiffs are not entitled for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession, as claimed in the plaint. 11. As such, the plaintiffs are not entitled for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession, as claimed in the plaint. 11. Upon aforesaid pleadings, trial Court framed the following issues:- Ø- okn iz'u fu"d"kZ ¼1½ D;k oknhx.k fookfnr Hkwfe ds LoRo/kkjh gSa \ ¼2½ D;k oknhx.k dk fookfnr Hkwfe ij vkf/kiR; gS \ ¼3½ D;k izfroknh Ø- 1 fookfnr Hkwfe ij dCtk djuk pkgrk gS \ ¼4½ ¼v½ D;k izfroknh Ø- 1 us fookfnr uhyh js[kk ls nf'kZr Hkwfe ij voS/k dCtk dj fy;k gS \ ¼c½ D;k oknh mDr dCtk okfil ikus dk vfèkdkjh gS \ ¼5½ ¼d½ D;k okn dk ewY;kadu mfpr fd;k gS \ ¼[k½ D;k mfpr U;k; 'kqYd vnk fd;k gS \ ¼6½ D;k nkok le; vof/k esa gS \ ¼7½ ¼d½ D;k e-iz- 'kklu bl izdj.k esa vko';d i{kdkj gS \ ¼[k½ ;fn gk¡ rks izHkko \ ¼8½ lgk;rk ,oa O;; \ 12. While answering issue No.2, the trial Court relying upon the entries in khasra panchshala wherein though the name of the plaintiff, Harcharan Singh has been recorded as owner but the name of University since recorded in possession on Government land, therefore, concluded that the suit land is not in possession of the plaintiffs even though the Tahsildar has passed an order for mutation of the names of plaintiffs in the revenue record vide exhibits D-15 to D-17. That apart, the trial Court also expressed its views on the orders passed by the Tahsildar that it appeared no enquiry was held. Consequently, while answering issue No.1, the trial Court concluded that even though the earlier suit was decreed in favour of the predecessor-in-title of plaintiff therein and the first appeal, second appeal as well as the SLP by the Hon'ble Supreme Court arising therefrom at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh have been dismissed (supra), still, in view of entries in khasra panchshala, the University found to be in possession and, therefore, in the opinion of the trial Court, the plaintiffs could not be held to have any right, title and interest over the suit land (paragraph 25). The remaining issues have been answered accordingly, and dismissed the suit. 13. The remaining issues have been answered accordingly, and dismissed the suit. 13. Shri N.K.Gupta, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri P. C. Chandil, learned counsel for the appellants has made the following submissions : (i) once the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) (supra), wherein the plaintiff had been declared to have title and in possession of the suit land and the said judgment having attained finality in First Appeal No.28 of 1997, Second Appeal No.487 of 1998 and Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC 5855/1999 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra), the trial Judge has committed grave error of law and in fact while dismissing the suit only for the reason that in khasra panchshala, the name of University has been recorded to be in possession. Moreover, the impugned judgment is hit by the principles of constructive res judicata; (ii) trial Judge has failed to appreciate that there is no order by the competent authority of the State Government for allotment of suit land in favour of the University, at any point of time, hence, no right or interest or title in the suit land ever devolved upon the respondent/University as claimed in the written statement. In the alternate, learned senior counsel contends that even assuming that the State Government had allotted land to the University as pleaded in the written statement in the year 1992, in view of Exhibits D-3 dated 29.8.1992 and D-4 dated 9.11.1992, the same shall have to give way to the ultimate decree passed by the trial Court applying the principles of lis pendens; (iii) learned senior counsel relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in (2013)5 SCC 397 Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and others [(paras 26 to 29), (2010)12 SCC 370], T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal and another [(paras 11 to 15) and (2004)2 SCC 601 ], Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal and others (paras 5 and 9) to bolster his submissions; (iv) trial Court while answering the issue No.2 as regards the claim for possession of the University over the suit land, there is a patent illegality in the impugned judgment as the aforesaid finding has been recorded in paragraph 16 of the judgment solely based on few khasra panchshala entries without there being any order by the competent authority of the State Government for mutation in the name of the University in respect of the suit land. Learned senior counsel contends that the entries in the khasra panchshala assumes legal significance only if they are based on the strength of the order passed by the competent authority. In absence thereof, the entry by itself neither has any statutory sanction nor can be used to conclude legal possession; (v) the entries in khasra panchshala for the period during which the earlier Civil Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) (supra), and the appeals arising therefrom were pending consideration are of no relevance/credence in the light of final judgment passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) dated 24.1.1996 (supra). Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside. 14. Per contra, learned counsels appearing for the University supports the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside. 14. Per contra, learned counsels appearing for the University supports the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Learned counsel has made the following submissions : (a) the lands of the ownership and in possession of the University have been handed over for construction of High Court building and in lieu thereof, the State Government has made an offer for allotment of the suit land to the University as evident from the order passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Civil Case No.32 of 1992, Exhibit D-8 (supra). On such offer being made, the University had agreed for the same. Consequently, the suit land was handed over to the University by the orders of the Collector as evident from Exhibit D-3 dated 29.8.1992 and since then, the University continued to be in possession. As a matter of fact, University is in possession over the suit land since the year 1965 as surfaced in evidence before the trial Court; (b) the University was not a party to the proceedings in the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) (supra). Moreover, once the University is in possession over the suit land, on the orders passed by the State Government, the judgment and decree passed in the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) though attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra), shall not yield any right, title and interest in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants in respect of the suit land. Hence, not binding upon the University. (c) the University being an educational institution, the suit land is in the midst of the area surrounded by the University buildings and, therefore, if the possession is taken from the University, the same shall jeopardize the educational activities of the University. (d) consequent upon allotment of suit land and prior thereto since the name of University continued to be recorded in khasra panchshala,, the trial Court did not commit any error of law while concluding the issue No.2 in favour of University and consequently, issue No.1 concluded against the plaintiffs; and (e) even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has ample power to modify the decree passed by the trial Court as provided for under Order XLI rule 33 CPC. 15. 15. Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, following questions emerge for consideration in this appeal : (i) Whether the judgment and decree dated passed in earlier Civil Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession in respect of the suit land falling in Survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4 area admeasuring 5 bighas situated at Mahalgaon, District Gwalior operates as res judicata under section 11 CPC against the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, in this appeal; (ii) Whether the alleged claim of allotment of suit land in favour of the University by the State Government hit by the principles of lis pendens under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; (iii) Whether the entries in khasra panchshala as considered in paragraphs 16 and 25 of the judgment rendered by the trial Court can be said to be conclusive proof of title and possession of the defendant/University against the plaintiffs in the teeth of the final judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 41-A/1995 in favour of plaintiff therein and attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra); and (iv) Whether the power under Order XLI rule 33 CPC can be exercised for modification of the judgment and decree attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC No.5855/1999 on 18.11.1999 (supra). As regards question (i) 16. Section 11 CPC quoted below : “11. Res judicata -- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. … …. .... Explanation III. -- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. … …. .... Explanation III. -- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. … … ....” As such section 11 CPC provides for three essential ingredients for its application in a given set of facts, viz; (a) such a matter has been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (b)(i) the earlier suit and the subsequent suit is between the same parties; b(ii) or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim; and (c) the issue so involved has been heard and finally decided by such Court. 17. The earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (Old No.284/1989) (supra), filed in the year 1989 was between Harcharan Singh and others and State of Madhya Pradesh and the judgment rendered therein inter alia decreed the suit on 24.1.1996 to the effect the suit land falling in Survey No.732/3-4 admeasuring 5 bighas in village Mahalgaon, Tahsil and District Gwalior is of the ownership and in possession of the plaintiff, Harcharan Singh with further declaration that the plaintiff is entitled for mutation by substitution of his name in place of the Public Works Department in the revenue record and permanent injunction was also issued restraining the respondent/State of Madhya Pradesh from interfering with the possession or dispossess the plaintiff. The aforesaid decree has attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra). 18. The instant Suit No.12-A/2001 is between the present plaintiffs who have acquired the right, title and interest over the suit land by virtue of sale deed dated 25.5.1998 executed by Harcharan Singh in their favour and Jiwaji University claimed to have been allotted the suit land by the State Government and in possession thereof. As such, parties are the same. The subjectmatter of the dispute is land falling in Survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4, admeasuring 5 bighas and the issue involved is that of declaration and recovery of possession directly and substantially involved is the same in the suit, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the trial Court is bound by the decree passed in the earlier suit. Consequently, dismissal of the instant suit is hit by the principles of res judicata. The trial Court is found to have committed illegality while dismissing the suit for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession. Consequently, dismissal of the instant suit is hit by the principles of res judicata. The trial Court is found to have committed illegality while dismissing the suit for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession. In that context, the relevant part of decree passed by the trial Court in earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), is reproduced below:- ^^Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS vkSj fuEu vkns'k o vkKkfIr iznku dh tkrh gS %& ¼1½ ------ ------ ------ ¼2½ oknh gjpju flag Hkwfe losZ Øekad 732@3-4] jdck 5 ch?kk fLFkr xzke esgyxkao] ijxuk o ftyk Xokfy;j dk LoRo~ ,oa vkf/kiR;/kkjh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gS vkSj bl dkj.k oknh jktLo foHkkx esa ih-MCY;w-Mh- ds uke dk banzkt gVk, tkus dh fof/ko~r dk;Zokgh djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ¼3½ Hkwfe losZ Øekad 792@3-4] jdck 5 ch?kk] fLFkr xzke egyxk¡o] ijxuk ftyk Xokfy;j ds laca/k esa izfroknhx.k ds fo#) bl ckor~ fu"ks/kkKk tkjh dh tkrh gS fd os vFkok mlds v/khuLFk deZpkjh] oknh gjpju flag dks bl Hkwfe ls fdlh Hkh izdkj fof/k fo#) <ax ls csn[ky u djsaA** The clauses (2) and (3) of the aforesaid decree, as clarified in paragraph 14 of the judgment in First Appeal No.28/1997 (supra), by the first appellate Court (supra), reads as under, are relied upon:- ^^14- ifj.kkeLo:i mijksDr lk{; dh foospuk ds vk/kkj ij vihykFkhZx.k@ izfroknhx.k dh orZeku vihy varxZr /kkjk 96 fl-iz-l- ,rn~ }kjk lkjghu gksus ls bl la'kks/ku ds lkFk fujLr dh tkrh gS fd] iz'uk/khu fu.kZ; fnukad 24-1-1996 dh fu.kZ; dafMdk&24 dh vuqrks"k dafMdk&2 esa Hkwfe losZ Ø- 732@3-4 jdck 5 ch?kk ds LFkku ij Hkwfe losZ Ø- 792@3-4 jdck 5 ch?kk i<+k tk,A izdj.k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds vkyksd esa bl vihy dk okn O;; viuk viuk ogu djsaA** As regards question (ii) 19. It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens is a doctrine based on the concept that in the course of administration of justice, the decision of a Court in a suit is binding not only the litigating parties but also on those who derive title pendente lite. It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens is a doctrine based on the concept that in the course of administration of justice, the decision of a Court in a suit is binding not only the litigating parties but also on those who derive title pendente lite. True it is, that section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not declare a pendente lite transfer by a party to the suit as void or illegal, but makes the pendente lite purchaser bound by the decision in the pending litigation or in other words, the transfer does not annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise, but renders it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation. 20. The law as regards lis pendens and the consequences flowing therefrom is well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajender Singh and others v. Santa Singh and others [ AIR 1973 SC 2537 ], with the approval of the principles laid down in the case of Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami [ AIR 1973 SC 569 ], reiterated as under : “15. The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a Court, in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is pending, by private dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the Court's power to decide a pending dispute of frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any immovable property during a litigation over it are held to be bound, by an application of the doctrine, by the decree passed in the suit even though they may not have been impleaded in it. The whole object of the doctrine of Iis pendens is to subject parties to the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in immovable property which are the subject matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of the Court so as to prevent the object of a pending action from being defeated.” 21. Now turning to the facts in hand, the suit land involved in the instant suit unquestionably was the subject-matter of the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra). Now turning to the facts in hand, the suit land involved in the instant suit unquestionably was the subject-matter of the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra). The Jiwaji University claimed that the State Government has allotted the suit land in its favour but there is no order of allotment by the competent revenue authority except the communication between the Collector and Commissioner placed on record before the trial Court vide Exhibit D-3 dated 29.8.1992. The earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), was decreed on 24.1.1996, therefore, during continuance of the suit at the appellate stage, the suit land is alleged to have been allotted in favour of the Jiwaji University by the State Government. Thus, the defendant/University does not have independent right but the same is through the State Government. As such, the transfer, if any, in the form of allotment in favour of the University as regards the suit land is always subject to the final outcome of the Civil Suit No. 41-A/1995 (supra), and is subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation wherein the plaintiff has been held to be owner and in possession of the suit land, the principles of lis pendens squarely applies and the decree yields fruits flowing therefrom in favour of the present plaintiffs. As regards question (iii) 22. As regards question (iii) 22. Now turning to the question for claim of possession, upon evaluation of the documentary and oral evidence placed on record, in the opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs/appellants have right, title and interest as well as possession over the suit land on the strength of the decree passed by the trial Court in the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), wherein in clause (3) as clarified by the first appellate Court as regards survey numbers in paragraph 14 of its judgment, it has been ordered as under:- ^^14- ifj.kkeLo:i mijksDr lk{; dh foospuk ds vk/kkj ij vihykFkhZx.k@ izfroknhx.k dh orZeku vihy vUrxZr /kkjk 96 fl-iz-l- ,rn~ }kjk lkjghu gksus ls bl la'kks/ku ds lkFk fujLr dh tkrh gS fd] iz'uk/khu fu.kZ; fnukad 24-1-1996 dh fu.kZ; dafMdk&24 dh vuqrks"k dafMdk&2 esa Hkwfe losZ Ø- 732@3-4 jdck 5 ch?kk ds LFkku ij Hkwfe losZ Ø- 792@3-4 jdck 5 ch?kk i<+k tk,A izdj.k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds vkyksd esa bl vihy dk okn O;; viuk viuk ogu djsaA** Thus, the plaintiff therein had been declared to have title and in possession of the suit land with further right to seek mutation in the revenue record and a decree for permanent injunction restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh not to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff or dispossess the plaintiff therefrom. 23. Based upon the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and upheld in first appeal by the first appellate Court and in second appeal by this Court as well as in Special Leave Petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra), the Tahsildar, Tahsil Gwalior had ordered for mutation in the revenue record, in favour of the plaintiffs vide Exhibits P-15 to P-17 dated 18.7.2001 and 20.7.2001, respectively, therefore, the plaintiffs have legal right of possession over the suit land. Merely for the reason that in khasra panchshala, the name of the University has been recorded to be in possession over the Government land (Public Works Department) but without orders of the competent revenue authority, in the opinion of this Court, the aforesaid entries shall not have much of relevance or bearing to the credit of the defendant/University for more than one following reasons; (a) in the teeth of the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 41-A/1995 and attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra), and the orders passed pursuant thereto by the Tahsildar, Tahsil Gwalior vide Exhibits P-15 to P-17, the aforesaid entries have no legal significance; (b) admittedly, there is no order of the competent authority of the State Government for mutation of the suit land in favour of the defendant/University. As such, the aforesaid khasra panchshala, prima facie are without authority and not in accordance with the provisions contained under sections 109 and 110 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959; and (c) even otherwise, the khasra panchshala entries, during which period, the suit and the appellate proceedings were going on, which ultimately came to an end after dismissal of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) CC No.5855/1999 on 18.11.1999 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Exhibit P-8 (supra), the entries during pendency of the litigation were not relevant to ascertain the fact of possession in contrast to the pleadings and oral evidence as well as documentary evidence placed on record by the plaintiffs; particularly, the oral evidence led by PW1, Kailash Chandra Agarwal in support of the plea of possession. With the aforesaid reasoning, this Court finds that the trial Court has committed grave illegality while recording finding of possession in favour of the defendant/University and negated the claim of plaintiffs. As regards question (iv) 24. It is well settled by now that the object of Order XLI rule 33 CPC is to avoid inconsistency and contradictory decisions on the same question in the same suit. As the power under this rule has been held to be in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree passed against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, the Court is required to exercise such power with care, caution and circumspection. As the power under this rule has been held to be in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree passed against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, the Court is required to exercise such power with care, caution and circumspection. The provision under Order XLI rule 33 CPC does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final only for the reason that the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from and ordinarily the exercise of power under this rule is confined to such cases where the Court as a result of interference in favour of the appellant further interference with the decree appealed from is found necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to the concept of justice, equity and good conscience. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala Bala Ghose and another v. Balai Chand Ghose and others [ AIR 1965 SC 1874 ], has explained the object and scope of rule 33 Order XLI CPC in paragraph 24 as under : “The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with direction, and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the Court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the Court appealed from and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by Order XLI rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from.” 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal [ (2003)9 SCC 606 ], has further reiterated that the power under Order XLI rule 33 CPC is subject to three limitations in paragraph 15 which reads as under : “ ….. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal [ (2003)9 SCC 606 ], has further reiterated that the power under Order XLI rule 33 CPC is subject to three limitations in paragraph 15 which reads as under : “ ….. firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before Court; secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate Court exercising power under rule 33 of Order 41 CPC.” 27. With the finality attached to judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dated 24.1.1996 in the earlier Suit No.41A/1995 (supra), between Harcharan Singh and others and the State of Madhya Pradesh, of the nature of declaration and injunction, rights of parties therein stand crystalized. Thereafter, the suit land viz., admeasuring 5 bighas falling in survey Nos.792/3 and 792/4 situated in village Mahalgaon, District Gwalior stands transferred in the name of the present plaintiffs by a registered sale deed dated 25.5.1998 executed by late Harcharan Singh. 28. The instant suit has been filed by the plaintiffs, successorsin-interest on the strength of the judgment and decree in the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), seeking declaration, injunction and recovery of possession. The respondent/University was not party to the earlier suit and claimed the suit land as allottee by the State Government in the year 1992 albeit no order of allotment of suit land by the competent revenue authority has been placed on record except certain communication between the Collector and the Commissioner. Order XLI rule 33 CPC does not empower the appellate Court to interfere with the decree passed in the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), to the prejudice of the present appellants as factual matrix in hand do not conform to the requirement of Order XLI rule 33 CPC. Order XLI rule 33 CPC does not empower the appellate Court to interfere with the decree passed in the earlier Suit No.41-A/1995 (supra), to the prejudice of the present appellants as factual matrix in hand do not conform to the requirement of Order XLI rule 33 CPC. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/University that the suit land being surrounded by the buildings of the University be ordered to be retained by the University in the wider interest of the educational activities of the University cannot be countenanced. However, the respondent/State of Madhya Pradesh or the respondent/University as the case may be is always free to take recourse to acquisition proceedings under relevant laws. 29. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dated 23.12.2002 passed in Civil Suit No.12-A/2001 is hereby set aside. Plaintiffs are held to be the owners of the suit land purchased by them by way of registered sale deed dated 25.5.1998 from late Harcharan Singh. Further, the plaintiffs are held entitled for recovery of possession of the suit land shown in red ink in the map attached to the plaint and thereafter, defendants shall be restrained from interfering with the possession of suit land. Let a decree be drawn, accordingly. 30. With the aforesaid appeal stands allowed and disposed of.