ORDER : Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred challenging the order dated 12th October, 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 203 of 2015 whereby, the correction in the date of birth was not allowed by the learned Single Judge and: no writ of mandamus was issued and hence, the original writ petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is the original petitioner, who has preferred a writ petition for changing the date of birth. As per this appellant (original petitioner) his date of birth is 9th January, 1960 whereby as per the respondents it is 25th June, 1952. It further appears from Annexure-3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal which is a service excerpts, which reveals that this appellant was of 34 years on 25th June, 1985. This document has also been signed by this appellant. His signature is at page No. 16 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal. It further appears from the facts of the case that never any dispute has been raised by this appellant (original petitioner) which relates to the age of superannuation which is dated 25th June, 2012. 3. Even the writ petition has been preferred after three years from the date of his retirement. 4. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Others v. Dinabandhu Majumdar & Another, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 172 , especially in para-10 as under: "10. Entertainment by High Courts of writ applications made by employees of the Government or its instrumentalities at the fag end of their services and when they are due for retirement from their services, in our view, is unwarranted. It would be so for the reason that no employee can claim a right to correction of birth date and entertainment of such writ applications for correction of dates of birth of some employees of Government or its instrumentalities will mar the chances of promotion of their juniors and prove to be an undue encouragement to the other employees to make similar applications at the fag end of their service careers with the sole object of preventing their retirements when due. Extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction vested in the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, in our considered view, is not meant; to make employees of Government or its instrumentalities to continue in service beyond the period of their entitlement according to dates of birth accepted by their employers, placing reliance on the so-called newly-found material. The fact that an employee of Government or its instrumentality who has been in service for over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application before the High Court seeking correction of his date of birth in his Service Record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee, in our view, should be a sufficient reason for the High Court, not to entertain shall applications on grounds of acquiescence, undue delay and laches. Moreover, discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court can never be said to have been reasonably and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, for no employee, who had grievance as to his date of birth in his "Service and Leave Record" could have genuinely waited till the fag end of his service career to get it corrected by availing of the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily High Courts should not, in exercise of their discretionary writ jurisdiction, entertain a writ application/petition filed by an employee of the Government or its instrumentality, towards the fag end of his service, seeking correction of his date of birth entered in his "Service and Leave Record" or Service Register with the avowed object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement." (Emphasis Supplied) 5. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Another v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & others, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 , especially in para-12 to 20 as under : "12. Apart from the notification and the said instruction this Court in a series of cases has categorically laid down that the employees should not be permitted to change the date of birth at the fag end of their, service career. Apart from the notification and the said instruction this Court in a series of cases has categorically laid down that the employees should not be permitted to change the date of birth at the fag end of their, service career. In the instant case the application of alteration has been filed at the fag end of his service career after a lapse of twenty-eight years. 13. In Union of India v. Harnam Singh this Court was confronted with almost similar facts. The Court laid down as under: (SCC pp. 172-73, para 15) "15. In the instant case, the date of birth recorded at the time of entry of the respondent into service as 20-5-1934 had continued to exist, unchallenged between 1956 and September 1991, for almost three and a half decades. The respondent had the occasion to see his service book on numerous occasions. He signed the service book at different places at different points of time. Never did he object to the recorded entry. The same date of birth was also reflated in the seniority lists of LDC and UDC, which the respondent had admittedly seen, as there is nothing on the record to show that he had no occasion to see the same. He remained silent and did not seek the alteration of the date of birth till September 1991, just a few months prior to the date of his superannuation. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches on the part of the respondent to seek the necessary correcting would in any case have justified the refusal of relief to him. Even if the respondent had sought correction of the date of birth within five years after 1979, the earlier delay would not have non-suited him but he did not seek correction of the date of birth during the period of five years after the incorporation of Note 5 to FR 56 in 1979 either. His inaction for all this period of about thirty-five years from the date of joining service, therefore precludes him from showing that the entry of his date of birth in service record was not correct." 14. In State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan this Court was clearly of the opinion that the government servant should not be permitted to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career. In State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan this Court was clearly of the opinion that the government servant should not be permitted to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career. The Court, in very strong terms, observed as under: (SCC p. 307, para 7) "7.... The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. It is common phenomenon that just before superannuation, an application would be made to the Tribunal or court just to gain time to continue in service and the Tribunal or courts are unfortunately unduly liberal in entertaining and allowing the government employees or public employees to remain in office, which is adding an impetus to resort to the fabrication of the record and place reliance thereon and seek the authority to correct it. When rejected, on grounds of technicalities, question them and remain in office till the period claimed for, gets expired. This case is one such stark instance. Accordingly, in our view, the Tribunal has grossly erred in showing overindulgence in granting the reliefs even trenching beyond its powers of allowing him to remain in office for two years after his date of superannuation even as per his own case and given all conceivable directions beneficial to the employee. It is therefore, a case of the grossest error of law committed by the Tribunal which cannot be countenanced and cannot be sustained on any ground." 15. In Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran the Court again reiterated the legal position that the courts have to be extremely careful when application for alteration of the date of birth is filed on the eve of superannuation or near about that time. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 160, para 9) "9..... As such whenever an application for alteration of the date of birth is made on the eve of superannuation or near about that time, the court or the tribunal concerned should be more cautious because of the growing tendency amongst a section of public servants, to raise such a dispute, without explaining as to why this question was not raised earlier". 16. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri. In this lease, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal relief was denied to the government employee on the 'ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 39 years of service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court, ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades. 18. Two decades ago this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. M. Hayagreev Sarma has held that subsequent claim for alteration after commencement of the Rules even on the basis of extracts of entry contained in births and deaths register maintained under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1886, was not open. Reliance was also placed on State of U.P. v. Gulaichi, State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan, Bhadrak (R&B) Division v. Rangadhar Mallik, Union of India v. Harnam Singh and Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran. 19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran reads as under: (SCC pp. 158-59, para 7) "7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever.... Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever.... According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order.... the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book." 20. In view of the consistent legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and even on a plain reading of the notification and the' instructions set out in the preceding paragraphs leads to the conclusion that no application for alteration of the date of birth after five years should have been entertained." (Emphasis Supplied). 6. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Others v. Premlal Shrivas, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 664 , especially in para-7 and 8 as under: "7. Having considered the issue at hand in light of the aforestated factual scenario, and the principles of law on the point, we are convinced that the High Court was not justified in directing change in date of birth of the respondent. 8. Having considered the issue at hand in light of the aforestated factual scenario, and the principles of law on the point, we are convinced that the High Court was not justified in directing change in date of birth of the respondent. 8. It feds, to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights. (Emphasis Supplied) 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and reasons, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant being W.P.(S) No. 203 of 2015 vide order dated 12th October, 2015. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and hence, the same is hereby, dismissed.