JUDGMENT/ORDER 1. Both the aforesaid writ petitions shall stand decided by this common order as the impugned order and issue involved is same. 2. It is not disputed that the post on which the respondent No. 1 is claiming the equivalent pay scale vis-a-vis the employees of the government institutions is actually a non-aided post. Thus, the question involved in the present writ petition is as to whether the respondent No. 1 can claim the same pay scale under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 and Rule 34 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-in-aid and Service Conditions etc.) Rules, 1993. 3. Since the Writ Petition No. 6883/2016 had already been admitted, this Court deemed it proper to fix the same for regular hearing but the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 stated that he is the only contesting and effected party and therefore, the matter should be decided there and then. Accordingly, this Court proceeds to hear and decide the same. 4. For convenience, the facts are being taken from Writ Petition No. 6883/2016. 5. The respondent No. 1 herein is a class IV employee of the petitioner society. He filed an application before the respondent No. 3 - Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur praying that he may be granted benefit of selection grade as per the orders of the State Government dated 25.01.1992, benefit of selection scale as per the Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised Pay Scale) Rules, 2008 and arrears of fixation along with interest. The reply to the said application was filed by the petitioner society denying the claim of the respondent No. 1. The application of the respondent No. 1 was allowed by the tribunal with a direction that the respondent No. 1 be given the benefit of selection grade as per the Order dated 25.01.1992 and shall also be paid benefit of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised Pay Scale) Rules, 2008 with interest @ 6% from the date the same became due till its payment. 6. 6. While praying for dismissal of the writ petition and upholding the order of the tribunal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the petitioner-institution is a recognized institution and is running under a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and therefore, the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (for short “the Act of 1989” hereinafter) and the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-in-aid and Service Conditions etc.) Rules, 1993 (for short “the Rules of 1993” hereinafter) were applicable to the institution. Reliance was placed on Section 29 of the Act of 1989 to state that the pay and allowance of all the employees of an aided institution cannot be less than those prescribed for the staff belonging to the similar categories in the Government institutions. Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993 was also referred, which is to the same effect. It was further contended that as per the definition of word “employee” given in Section 2(i) of the Act of 1989, the employee includes a teacher and every other employee working in a recognized institution and that as per Section 2(b), the aided institution means a recognized institution which is receiving aid in the form of maintenance, grant from the State Government meaning thereby that, the Act makes no distinction between an employee working against an aided post or an unaided post. Thus, even an employee working against an unaided post is entitled to the same pay scale as an employee working against an aided post. It was further contended that the Court was bound by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Sri Sanatan Dharm Shastri Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Vs. The State of Rajasthan & ors. (D. B. Civil Special Appeal [Writ] No. 522/2013) decided on 19.09.2013 wherein it was concluded that the term ‘employee’ does not make any distinction between the ‘employee’ engaged on daily wages basis or otherwise and therefore, this Court too could not distinguish between aided and non-aided post. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 also referred to the Larger Bench decision of this Court in the case of S.R. Higher Secondary School Vs. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & ors. reported in R.L.W. 2003 (1) Raj. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 also referred to the Larger Bench decision of this Court in the case of S.R. Higher Secondary School Vs. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & ors. reported in R.L.W. 2003 (1) Raj. 530 vide which too it was held that the teachers working in government educational institutions are entitled for encashment of privilege leave on their retirement and so by virtue of Section 29 of the Act, the teachers of Non Government Educational Institutions are entitled for the similar scale of pay and allowances except compensatory allowance. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 further argued that at the time of the grant of recognition to the petitioner institution, an undertaking was taken that the institution will be bound by the rules and regulations and other terms and conditions imposed by the State Government from time to time and shall comply with the directions of the education department and thus, the petitioner institution being a recognized institution was bound by the Clause 14 of Schedule-II of the terms and conditions which are prerequisite for grant of recognition. 9. The matter was heard at length. 10. After hearing, it appears that the only question that requires to be decided is as to whether Section 29 of the Act of 1989 and the Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993 applies to an unaided post in a recognized aided institution. In order to adjudicate the same, it would be appropriate to reproduce the Section 29 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993. Section 29(1) of the Act reads as under :- “29. Pay and allowance of employees. (1) The scales of pay and allowances except compensatory allowances with respect to all the employees of an aided institution shall not be less than those prescribed for the staff belonging to similar categories in Government institutions. Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993 reads as under :- “34. Pay and allowance of employees. (1) The scales of pay and allowances except compensatory allowances with respect to all the employees of an aided institution shall not be less than those prescribed for the staff belonging to similar categories in Government institutions. Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993 reads as under :- “34. Pay and allowance - The scales of pay and allowances of the staff of the aided educational institutions shall not be less than those Prescribed by the Government for the staff of similar category in the Government educational institutions.” No doubt, a perusal of the same refers to, “all the employees of an aided institution” with a direction that their pay scale shall not be less than those prescribed for the “staff belonging to the similar categories in the government institutions’” From the reading of the above provisions, it is clear that for getting the same pay scale as given to an employee in the government institutions, an employee must satisfy the following :- 1. The employee should be working in ‘aided institution’. 2. He must belong to ‘similar category’ as in government institutions. 11. At the same time, it is evident that the Rule and the Section does not talk of ‘recognized institution’. 12. Taking up the first condition, there is no dispute that the employees of an aided institution working against the aided posts are governed by Section 29 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993. However, the respondent No. 1 is admittedly working against an ‘unaided post’. No grant has been received against the post on which the respondent is working even since he was appointed. Besides, it is an admitted position that the petitioner institution is no more an aided institution from the year 2010. The grant-in-aid was stopped with the coming into force the Rajasthan Voluntary Rural Education Service Rules, 2010. Thus, Section 29 of the Act and Rule 34 of the Rules cannot be said to be applicable in the present case. In any case, no aid was being provided against the post on which the respondent was working. 13. The judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Sri Sanatan Dharm Shastri Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya (supra) does not help the respondent. In any case, no aid was being provided against the post on which the respondent was working. 13. The judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Sri Sanatan Dharm Shastri Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya (supra) does not help the respondent. The facts of the said case related to an employee whose services had been terminated and it was held that the said termination was in violation of the provisions of Act of 1989 and reinstatement was ordered for totally different reasons. The Division Bench of this Court had refused to interfere in view of the settled proposition of law that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is confined to decision making process and not to correct an error to review or reassess the evidence on the basis of which the inferior Court or Tribunal had purported to pass the order. 14. The judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Bal Niketan and Shri Dungargarh Vs. The State of Rajasthan & others (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) Nos. 1082 and 1076 of 2005) decided on 02.04.2013 was passed in a situation where the appellant institutions had refused to pay the salary as admissible to a government employee in terms of Section 29 of the Act of 1989 on the ground that the State Government had withheld their 50% grant from 1990 onwards. The Court dismissed the appeals of the appellant institution on the ground that once the institution is categorized as an aided institution and the said aid is only temporarily withheld, it would not affect the category of the appellant-institution as not being an aided institution. In the present case, the very post was unaided and the very nature of the institution stands changed from an aided institution to an unaided institution. 15. Similarly, the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of S.R. Higher Secondary School (supra) ordered to pay the encashment of privilege leave on their retirement by virtue of Section 29 of the Act as the post was an aided post holding as under :- “Thus, there is a provision for accumulation of privilege leaves. Admittedly, the teachers working in government educational institutions are entitled for encashment of privilege leave on their retirement. Admittedly, the teachers working in government educational institutions are entitled for encashment of privilege leave on their retirement. By virtue of Section 29 of the Act the teachers of NGEIs are entitled for the similar scale of pay and allowances except compensatory allowance, it being the post of granted in aid therefore, whatever allowances the teachers of government educational institutions are entitled to, would also be available to the teachers of NGEIs. Leave encashment is an allowance and the teachers in the NGEIs would have the right to claim this allowance.” 16. It is evident that the same benefit was granted only because the said post was receiving grant-in-aid. In the present case, no grant-in-aid is received for the post, on which the respondent was working. 17. In fact, the controversy stands settled and explained by the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Sharma & 126 ors. Vs. State & ors. reported in 2014(1) WLC (Raj.) 1 wherein the petitioners in that case filed the writ petition challenging the vires of Rule 2(g) of the Rajasthan Voluntary Rural Education Service Rules, 2010. Section 7 of the Act of 1989 came to be amended in 2011 vide which the power was given to the State to deny or stop the grant-in-aid and in pursuance to the said amendment, the respondent-State issued the notification dated 29.11.2010 promulgating the Rules of 2010 for the purpose of absorbing the employees of the Non Government Aided Educational Institutions of the Government of Rajasthan who were working on sanctioned aided posts in the Non Government Aided Educational Institutions on the date of issue of the notification dated 29.11.2010. Some persons who were working on unaided sanctioned posts challenged the action of the State in providing an option for absorption in the government service only to those employees of the non government aided institutions working on aided sanctioned posts, ignoring the employees working on nonaided sanctioned posts of the Non Government Aided Educational Institutions, even though, their appointment was made by the same selection committee as being arbitrary and discriminatory. 18. The Rule 2(g) of the Rules of 2010 promulgated vide notification dated 29.01.2010 was challenged. The said Rule 2(g) of the Rules of 2010 reads as under :- “2(g). 18. The Rule 2(g) of the Rules of 2010 promulgated vide notification dated 29.01.2010 was challenged. The said Rule 2(g) of the Rules of 2010 reads as under :- “2(g). “employee” means an employee working in a recognized non-government aided educational institution and who is working against aided and sanctioned post.” 19. The petitioners therein questioned the legality of this Rule as it resulted into formation of two different classes out of one homogenous group of employees working in the non-government aided educational institution. The Division Bench of Jaipur Bench of this Court after taking into account the various judgments and the law laid down, after taking into account the procedure for appointment in government service, terms and conditions for appointment of employees in government service, procedure for grant-in-aid, upheld the classification as being reasonable and held in Para 65 and 66 as under :- “65. The State as a policy decision has decided, in the backdrop of the fact that the employees, who are working on aided sanctioned post, a major part of their remuneration is provided by the State and therefore, has restricted the entry to the rural service under the Rules of 2010, keeping in view the financial burden; cannot be faulted, for the reason that the State Government will stop the grant-in-aid on such posts whereas on the other hand the employees working on nonaided sanctioned post, the State Government has no financial burden to pay their salary and remuneration etc. Further, Section 7 of the Act of 1989 is an enabling provision and sufficient guidelines have been provided for the exercise of the power. The reasons for exercise of the power are valid and germane. As a one time measure, only those employees of the Non-Government Aided Educational Institutions 51 working against aided and sanctioned posts, have been accorded option to enter into the Government Service under the Rules of 2010 as per the mandate of Rule 2(g). 66. Article 14 guarantees similarity of treatment contradistinguished from identical treatment. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per se amount to discrimination. There is no right to grant-inaid since it depends upon the financial resources and other relevant considerations. The classification under the Rules of 2010 is founded on an intelligible differentia with a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per se amount to discrimination. There is no right to grant-inaid since it depends upon the financial resources and other relevant considerations. The classification under the Rules of 2010 is founded on an intelligible differentia with a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The learned counsel for the petitioners could not persuade us for any tenable reason, pointing out any clear transgress of the constitutional principle(s).” 20. Thus, to say that the legislature meant to include an unaided post in the Section 29 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993 as well does not appear to be reasoned one. The Government has itself distinguished between the two posts while absorbing the aided posts in the government institutions and ignoring those working against unaided posts in the year 2010 and the challenge to the action of the State given in the case of Rajendra Prasad Sharma & 126 ors. (supra) has been dismissed. 21. As per the second condition, in order to claim that the post held by the respondent is equivalent to the post of similar category in a government institution, the respondent is required to show that he has requisite qualification of the said post of driver or the alleged post against which he is working, which is also the requisite qualification in the State Government, his selection too was as per the selection procedure laid down for the government institution, the work load and responsibility is same, the nature of liability is same, he must satisfy the condition of equal pay for equal work. No finding has been recorded by the tribunal to the said effect. There is nothing on record to show that the job held by the respondent was equivalent with the job in a government institution, which he claims to be a corroborating job to that of the government institution. It is a settled proposition of law that the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scale only after considering several factors. The onus too lies on the employee to show that the nature and quantum of duties and responsibilities of the two post are comparable and equivalent. Not a word has been mentioned in his application before the tribunal and the tribunal too has passed the order without determining the same. 22. The onus too lies on the employee to show that the nature and quantum of duties and responsibilities of the two post are comparable and equivalent. Not a word has been mentioned in his application before the tribunal and the tribunal too has passed the order without determining the same. 22. The Apex Court in the case of Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh and ors. Vs. Mrs. Manju Mathur & anr. (Civil Appeal No. 2823 of 2009) decided on 14.01.2011 while setting aside the order of the High Court granting equivalent pay scale to the Senior Dietician and Dietician under the Director, Health Services, Chandigarh Administration held in Para 7 of the judgment as under :- “7. Considering this report of the Equivalence Committee, the Respondents are not entitled to the same pay scale as that of Dietician (Gazetted) and Dietician (Non- Gazetted) in the Directorate of Research and Medical Education, Punjab, as held by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order. This Court has held in a recent case State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai (2009) 13 SCC 635 ] that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated and that similarity of the designation or nature or quantum of work is not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales and that the Court has to consider several factors and only if there was wholesale identity between the holders of the two posts, equality clause can be invoked, not otherwise. This Court has also held in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Charanjit Singh (2006) 9 SCC 321 ] that normally the applicability of principle of equal pay for equal work must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body and these are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. This Court has further held in this decision that it is only when the High Court is convinced on the basis of material placed before it that there was equal work and of equal quality and that all other relevant factors were fulfilled, it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of filing of the respective writ petition. This Court has further held in this decision that it is only when the High Court is convinced on the basis of material placed before it that there was equal work and of equal quality and that all other relevant factors were fulfilled, it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of filing of the respective writ petition. In the present case, the Appellants had seriously disputed the equivalence between the posts held by the Respondents and those held by the Dietician (Gazetted) and Dietician (Non- Gazetted) under the Government of Punjab and the High Court instead of referring this dispute regarding parity of posts under the Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh, with the posts under the Government of Punjab to an expert body has erroneously equated the posts under the Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh, with the posts under the Government of Punjab on the basis of the pleadings of the Respondents and issued the direction to grant pay scales to the Respondents equal to pay scales of Dietician (Gazetted) and Dietician (Non-Gazetted) under the Directorate of Research and Medical Education, Government of Punjab.” 23. As stated, the person claiming parity must plead necessary averments and prove that all factors are equal between the concerned posts. The respondent never made any averment and failed to prove the same. 24. The Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and ors. Vs. Dibyendu Bhattacharya (Civil Appeal No. 9480 of 2010) decided on 29.10.2010 held that two posts should not be treated as equivalent unless there is complete identity between the two posts. Para 26 of the said judgment clarifies the same :- “26. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that the eligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work and duties and effort, reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and responsibilities and status of both the posts are identical. The functions may be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really and substantially different. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The functions may be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really and substantially different. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove that all things are equal between the concerned posts. Such a complex issue cannot be adjudicated by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties. The onus to establish the discrimination by the employer lies on the person claiming the parity of pay. The expert committee has to decide such issues, as the fixation of pay scales etc. falls within the exclusive domain of the executive. So long as the value judgment of those who are responsible for administration i.e. service conditions etc., is found to be bonafide, reasonable, and on intelligible criteria which has a rational nexus of objective of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is not prohibited in law to have two grades of posts in the same cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may not be the sole determinative factor. The courts in exercise of their limited power of judicial review can only examine whether the decision of the State authorities is rational and just or prejudicial to a particular set of employees. The court has to keep in mind that a mere difference in service conditions does not amount to discrimination. Unless there is complete and wholesale/wholesome identity between the two posts they should not be treated as equivalent and the Court should avoid applying the principle of equal pay for equal work.” 25. The Apex Court in the case of S.C. Chandra & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and ors. reported in 2007 (8) SCC 279 while rejecting the plea for parity in employment thereby refusing to give parity in salary claimed by school teachers with class working under Government of Jharkhand and BCCL held as under :- “20. After going through the order of the Division Bench we are of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is correct. Firstly, the school is not being managed by BCCL as from the facts it is more than clear that BCCL was only extending financial assistance from time to time. After going through the order of the Division Bench we are of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court is correct. Firstly, the school is not being managed by BCCL as from the facts it is more than clear that BCCL was only extending financial assistance from time to time. By that it cannot be saddled with the liability to pay these teachers of the school as being paid to the clerks working with BCCL or in the Government of Jharkhand. It is essentially a school managed by a body independent of the management of BCCL. Therefore, BCCL cannot be saddled with the responsibilities of granting the teachers the salaries equated to that of the clerks working in BCCL. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on Article 39(d) of the Constitution. Article 39(d) does not mean that all the teachers working in the school should be equated with the clerks in BCCL or the Government of Jharkhand for application of the principle of equal pay for equal work. There should be total identity between both groups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand and the clerks in BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be educated with the clerks of the State Government or of BCCL. The question of application of Article 39(d) of the Constitution has recently been interpreted by this Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh wherein Their Lordships have put the entire controversy to rest and held that the principle, 'equal pay for equal work' must satisfy the test that the incumbents are performing equal and identical work as discharged by employees against whom the equal pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the cases bearing on the subject and after a detailed discussion have finally put the controversy to rest that the persons who claimed the parity should satisfy the court that the conditions are identical and equal and same duties are being discharged by them. Though a number of cases were cited for our consideration but no useful purpose will be served as in Charanjit Singh all these cases have been reviewed by this Court. More so, when we have already held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking any parity of the pay with that of the clerks of BCCL.” 26. More so, when we have already held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking any parity of the pay with that of the clerks of BCCL.” 26. In the light of the aforesaid principle, it is evident from the record of the case that the material on record to show that the post against which the petitioner is claiming equivalent pay as in the government institutions is negligible. In fact, there is not even a word and whisper to the said effect. Hence, the order of the tribunal deserves to be set aside on this ground as well. The final argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner institution had given an undertaking at the time of recognition, which is a pre-requisite for recognition that it will abide by the instructions issued by the government from time to time does not help the respondent in any manner. The Clause 14 of Schedule-II appended to the Rules of 1993 pertains to the grant of salary and allowances as per the government rules, which reads as under :- 14- osru HkÙks ¼d½ izkFkfed@mPp izkFkfed@ek/;fed@lhfu;j mPp ek/;fed fo|ky; LakLFkk esa dk;Zjr deZpkfj;ksa dks ljdkj ds fu;eksa ds vuqlkj osru] egaxkbZ HkÙkk ,oa Hkfo"; fuf/k lqfo/kk,¡ miyC/k djk;h tk;sA 27. Section 29 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 34 of the Rules of 1993, as noticed above, does not apply to a recognized institution. Moreover, no instructions have been brought to the notice of this Court particularly in pursuance to Clause 14, which show that any such notification has been issued by the State Government directing the recognized unaided schools to pay the selection grades or particular scale. 28. In the case of Satimbla Sharma Vs. St. Paul’s Senior Secondary School reported in (2011) 13 SCC 760 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :- “23. We also do not think that the Court could issue a mandamus to a private unaided school to pay the salary and allowances equal to the salary and allowances payable to teachers of Government schools or Government aided schools. This is because the salary and allowances of teachers of a private unaided school is a matter of contract between the school and the teacher and is not within the domain of public law. 24. In Sushmita Basu & Ors. This is because the salary and allowances of teachers of a private unaided school is a matter of contract between the school and the teacher and is not within the domain of public law. 24. In Sushmita Basu & Ors. v. Ballygunge Siksha Samity the teachers of a recognized private school known as Ballygunge Siksha Sadan in Calcutta filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Calcutta praying for issuance of writ of mandamus directing the authorities of the school to fix the salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of the school and to remove all the anomalies in the scales of pay as recommended by the Third Pay Commission as extended to other Government - aided schools and Government schools and this Court held that in the absence of statutory provision no such direction can be issued by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 25. Where a statutory provision casts a duty on a private unaided school to pay the same salary and allowances to its teachers as are being paid teachers of Government - aided schools, then a writ of mandamus to the school could be issued to enforce such statutory duty. But in the present case, there was no statutory provision requiring a private unaided school to pay to its teachers the same salary and allowances as were payable to teachers of Government schools and therefore a mandamus could not be issued to pay to the teachers of private recognized unaided schools the same salary and allowances as were payable to Government institutions. 26. In K. Krishnamacharyulu and Others vs. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg. relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, executive instructions were issued by the Government that the scales of pay of Laboratory Assistants as non-teaching staff of private colleges shall be on a par with the government employees and this Court held that even though there were no statutory rules, the Laboratory Assistants as non-teaching staff of private college were entitled to the parity of the pay-scales as per the executive instructions of the Government and the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide enough to issue a writ for payment of pay on a par with government employees. In the present case, there are no executive instructions issued by the Government requiring private schools to pay the same salary and allowances to their teachers as are being paid to teachers of Government schools or Government - aided schools. 27. We cannot also issue a mandamus to Respondent nos.1 and 2 on the ground that the conditions of provisional affiliation of schools prescribed by the Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations stipulate in Clause (5)(b) that the salary and allowances and other benefits of the staff of the affiliated school must be comparable to that prescribed by the State Department of Education because such conditions for provisional affiliation are not statutory provisions or executive instructions, which are enforceable in law. Similarly, we cannot issue a mandamus to give effect to the recommendations of the Report of Education Commission 1964-66 that the scales of pay of school teachers belonging to the same category but working under different managements such as government, local bodies or private managements should be the same, unless the recommendations are incorporated in an executive instruction or a statutory provision. We, therefore, affirm the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.” 29. Thus, the argument with respect to the fact that the petitioner institution is bound by the terms and conditions laid down by the State Government as pre-requisite for the recognition too does not entitle the respondent for grant of the relief as observed in the case of Satimbla Sharma (supra) and Sushmita Basu (supra) wherein it was held that no mandamus can be issued to a private unaided institution/recognized institution to pay the equivalent to the pay and allowances payable to the employees of the government school in the absence of any statutory provision/instructions. Neither any notification nor any executive instructions of the State has been pointed out laying down the pay scale to be paid to such employees of unaided posts of recognized institutions in pursuance to Schedule-II appended to the Rules. 30. Accordingly, the present writ petitions are allowed and the impugned Judgment dated 08.02.2016 passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur is set aside.