ORDER : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. Petitioners have preferred this writ petition assailing the award dated 18/05/1989 whereby the reference was answered in favour of the respondent workman holding him entitled to be reinstated in service with back wages and continuity of service and a cost of Rs. 300/- was also awarded. 2. The core issue raised by the petitioner is whether the retrenchment would come within the exemption in terms of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or not. In support of submission of proving the case within said exemption, learned counsel points out that respondent-workman was appointed on 27/12/1993 for a period of three months. Vide another order dated 14/03/1994, his services were extended for two months and vide order dated 30/04/1995, his services were extended upto 30/09/1995. For the intervening period, between the extension orders dated 14/03/1994 to 30/04/1995, admittedly the petitioner was continued. However, no extension order has been placed either before the Labour Court or this Court. 3. In light of the aforesaid extension orders, which were for fixed period, it is submitted that the petitioner was appointed on fixed term basis and lastly upto 30/09/1995 where after his services were dispensed with on completion of the contract. Therefore, in view of the provisions introduced in Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act of 1947, it is submitted that the petitioner could not have been given the benefit of provisions of Section 25-B of the Act of 1947 and there was no requirement to give him notice in terms of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 or compensation thereto as it did not fall within the definition of retrenchment. Learned counsel relies on the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri: AIR 2013 (SC) 2762 as well as in the case of Excorts Limited, reported in 1997 Labour Law Reporter 699. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that services of the respondent-workman were continued by extending his term of contract from time to time and the contract was renewed. There is no order of extension after 04/03/1994 but his services were continued and order was passed on 30/04/1995 in order to treat petitioner's services on contract basis by making the last period from 30/04/1995 to 30/09/1995 as on contract. There is no order of extension after 04/03/1994 but his services were continued and order was passed on 30/04/1995 in order to treat petitioner's services on contract basis by making the last period from 30/04/1995 to 30/09/1995 as on contract. Thus, the petitioner has worked continuously from 27/12/1993 to 30/09/1995 without any break and was therefore, entitled to be given the benefit of such service rendered with the petitioners before terminating his services and the action being in violation of Section 25-F, the award has been passed rightly in his favour. Learned counsel relies upon the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bhuvesh Kumar Dwivedi v. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. (Civil Appeal Nos. 4883-4884 of 2014), decided on 25/04/2014. It is submitted, therefore, that as there has been continuous renewal of services of the respondent-workman from time, the same would not fall within the ambit of the exemption carved out in terms of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947 to the definition of retrenchment and it is a case of retrenchment of services of the respondent-workman and provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act of 1947 would apply. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and looking to the material available on record, this Court finds that the Apex Court in the case of Excorts Limited (supra) had noted that the workman had worked for 3 different periods, 05/02/1986 to 29/04/1986, 14/07/1986 to 31/07/1986 and 09/01/1987 to 12/02/1987 by issuing appointment orders for three different periods. Thus, there were three different contracts of service for a fixed period and in that circumstances, the Apex Court treated the same to come within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947. The facts of the present case are different and the said judgment would not have any application. 6. On looking to the facts of the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri (supra), it is to be noted that the workman was appointed for two fixed periods i.e. from 02/05/1988 to 30/06/1988 and by another order from 04/07/1988 to 15/07/1988 by issuing separate office orders. On 15/07/1988 the respondent there stood terminated on completion of the second order and served only for a period of 54 days. There is not counting between two periods. On 15/07/1988 the respondent there stood terminated on completion of the second order and served only for a period of 54 days. There is not counting between two periods. In these circumstances, the Apex Court found the appointment to fall within the exemption to Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947, while, as quoted above, services of the petitioners have been continued from time to time. The provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947 provide as under:- "2(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein" 7. Thus, the said provisions show that non-renewal of the contract of employee should result in the termination. However, here, it is a case where initially, the petitioner was appointed and before completion of the period mentioned in the first appointment order, his services were extended and thereafter without issuing any order, his services were further extended. Thus, it is a case of continuous employment and not under different contracts. The services were lastly dispensed with from 30/09/1995 and he had admittedly worked for more than 240 days in the preceding calendar year before his services were dispensed with. 8. In the circumstances, the Labour Court has rightly reached to the conclusion that the case does not fall within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947 and the order therefore, does not suffer from any legal infirmity and in the opinion of this Court, the award passed by the Tribunal is upheld and the petitioners are now directed to comply with the award. However, this Court finds that there was an interim order passed by this Court and taking into consideration that the writ petition has been pending since 2000 and is being decided after a period of 17 years, the issue relating to back wages still remains. 9. However, this Court finds that there was an interim order passed by this Court and taking into consideration that the writ petition has been pending since 2000 and is being decided after a period of 17 years, the issue relating to back wages still remains. 9. In view of the long pendency of the case for which no party should made to suffer, this Court deems it appropriate to modify the award impugned with direction of reinstatement and continuity of service with all the consequential benefits thereto but the actual back wages would be granted to the extent of 25% only. This is being done in view of the fact that the learned counsel has informed that three units of the petitioners have already been closed on account of financial crises. The award impugned, as modified herein above, would not be implemented within a period of three months from the date of submission of certified copy of this order. 10. The writ petition stands partly allowed in the aforesaid terms.