ORDER : Dinesh Mehta, J. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer: "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that Your Lordships may be pleased to accept and allow the writ petition and order dated 6.8.09 and 29.9.09 (Annexure-6 and Annexure-7) may kindly be quashed and set aside with all consequal benefits and petitioner may kindly be allowed to run his liquor shop the respondent may further be directed to pay the compensation to the petitioner for the period for which the petitioner could not run his shop to the tune of rupees one lacs per months. This Hon'ble Court. Would further be pleased to quashed and set aside order dated 31.8.2009 (Annexure-8) and in alternate the respondent may kindly be directed to pay the petitioner entire license fees and security deposit..any other order which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner." 2. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner has conceded that due to efflux of time, his relief seeking cancellation of license has been rendered otiose and thus confined his writ petition only to the extent of forfeiture of the security deposit of Rs.3,44,170/-, vide impugned order dated 31.8.09. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Manoj Bhardwaj submitted that by way of the impugned order dated 31-8-09, the respondent No. 2 had not only terminated the petitioners licence, but had also forfeited the security deposit of Rs.3,44,170/-, which was deposited on 20/21 March, 2009. While challenging the forfeiture of the security deposit mentioned above, he submitted that the State had not suffered any loss so as to justify the forfeiture of the security money. In this regard he relied upon the provisions contained in Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872. 4. To buttress this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case of "V.K. Ashokan v. Assistant Excise Commissioner & Ors." and other connected matters reported in (2009) 14 SCC Page 85 more particularly; paras 62 to 66 thereof. While referring to above paragraphs, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the present case also the respondents have failed to show any loss or damage caused to them. While referring to above paragraphs, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the present case also the respondents have failed to show any loss or damage caused to them. According to him the liquidated damages or damages has to commensurate with the loss to the State, which in the present case has not been quantified. 5. Para 60 to 66 of the judgment, supra for ready reference reads as under: "60. Damages can be imposed on a licensee either for violation of the provisions of a statute on the part of the licensee and/or under the contract. So far as the damages to be levied under the statute are concerned, it will be governed by the provisions of statute. However, if damages are to be computed under the contract, the provision of the Contract Act, 1872 and/or the terms of the contract would be relevant. Ordinarily, they should not be mixed up. If having regard to the provisions of Section 18-A of the Act no contract for a period of more than one year could have been granted, damages could not have been calculated on the basis of the contract. 61. Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules and factually all the documents point out that the appellants had been allowed to carry out their business for a period of one year. The appellants were called upon to pay a sum of Rs.2,06,55,786/- by notice dated 21-10-1997 within three days without complying with the principles of natural justice as the appellant had not been given an opportunity of hearing entirely on the basis of the recommendation made by the Circle Inspector of Exercise. 62. The contract was directed to be cancelled inter aila on the premise that the contractors did not remit the defaulted amount such as kist, tree tax and interest in spite of the said notices. It is on the aforementioned ground alone the order of cancellation as also the forfeiture of security amount was passed. No statement had been made as to how and in what manner the State suffered any loss. If the amount of security is to be taken into consideration indisputably there would be no default. 63. The term "security" signifies that which makes secure or certain. No statement had been made as to how and in what manner the State suffered any loss. If the amount of security is to be taken into consideration indisputably there would be no default. 63. The term "security" signifies that which makes secure or certain. It makes the money more assured in its payment or more readily recoverable as distinguished from, as for example, as mere IOU, which is only evidence of a debt, and the world is not confined to a document which gives a charge on specific property, but includes personal securities for money. (See Chetumal Bulchand v. Noorbhoy Jafferji). It is a word of general import signifying an assurance. The amount of security was available in cash. The State could at any time recoup its damages or at least a part of it from the amount of security. It is in the aforementioned backdrop, we may analyse the provisions of sub-rule (28) of Rule 6. It confers a discretionary jurisdiction on the Assistant Commissioner of Excise. Exercise of such jurisdiction in favour of the Revenue, if any, would furthermore be subject to confirmation by the Board of Revenue. The said statutory authority may at its discretion cancel the license. While doing so, it may order a resale at the risk and cost of the licensee. It may at its option also direct the management of the business of the contract by the departmental agency or otherwise dispose of the same. It is only when one or other direction is issued, all losses on account of such cancellation and resale or departmental management or other disposal of the privilege shall be born by the defaulting licensee. 64. It is of some importance to notice that whereas all losses are to be borne by the licensee but he would have no right to the gain, if any, which accrues by reason of such resale of license or taking over of the management of the business by the departmental agency or disposal thereof otherwise. Actual losses suffered by the State by reason of any of the aforementioned actions taken must therefore be clearly ascertained. 65. As Rule 6 (28) provides for a penal clause, the principles of natural justice were required to be applied. Actual losses suffered by the State by reason of any of the aforementioned actions taken must therefore be clearly ascertained. 65. As Rule 6 (28) provides for a penal clause, the principles of natural justice were required to be applied. Rule 6 (28) itself provides that any sum due from a licensee on account of kist, tree tax or otherwise may be recovered from his deposit subject only to the condition that if any adjustment is made from the deposit, the licensee would be bound to replace the sum adjusted therefor within fifteen days of receipt of notice from the proviso appended confers a wide jurisdiction upon the Assistant Excise Commissioner to restore the license cancelled by him in the event the defaulter pays up the amount defaulted by him before the expiry of one month from the date of such cancellation. The said Rule, therefore, does not postulate that consequences must ensure on happening of one contingency or the other. 66. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. If damages cannot be calculated and the terms of the contract provide therefor only for penalty by way of liquidated damages, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 74 of the Contract Act a reasonable sum only could be recovered which need not in all situations even be the sum specified in the contract. (See Maula Bux v. Union of India and Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air Craft Ltd.)" 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case of the Maula Bux v. Union of India reported in (1969) 2 SCC 554 and invited attention of this Court towards para 4 of the said judgment. In some and substance, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner has been: since the State had already cancelled his license and the license for area had subsequently been granted/allotted to somebody else, there was no loss to the State and hence the State cannot forfeit the security money deposited by him against the alleged loss, without quantifying such loss, if any. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the forfeiture of the security is in the nature of penalty and in absence of any statutory provision in the State Excise Act, such imposition is impermissible in law. 8. Mr. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the forfeiture of the security is in the nature of penalty and in absence of any statutory provision in the State Excise Act, such imposition is impermissible in law. 8. Mr. Nikhil Simlote, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Excise Department made various submissions, including maintainability of the writ petition in wake of availability of alternative remedy under the provisions of Section 9(A) of the State Excise Act. He mainly contended that the present case is not a case of levy of damages and the security money had been forfeited, pursuant to a specific clause namely 8.7 in the licence, which he read zealously to support his argument. He further urged that the condition enumerated in the license is not even under challenge while maintaining that the same is binding. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has also read Section 34(3) of the State Excise Act, to contend that the State is empowered to cancel the licence and forfeit the fee paid or deposited with the license. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 11. This Court is not much convinced with the argument of learned counsel for the respondents in relation to availability of alternative remedy, as the writ petition was filed in 2009 and the matter is pending consideration before this Court, since then. In the present factual matrix, I do not think it appropriate to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of availability of alternative/statutory remedy, particularly when no disputed question of facts are required to be determined in the present case. 12. Coming to the merit of the case, it is to be noticed that due to petitioners involvement in criminal case, the impugned order had been passed by the District Excise Officer, Kota, whereby the license granted to the petitioner stood cancelled and simultaneous therewith, the security money of Rs.3,44,170/- was forfeited, as a natural corollary. Though the order impugned does not make a specific reference of the condition of license but the forfeiture of the security money was obviously forfeited by virtue of clause 8.7 of the conditions of license. It will not be out of place to reproduce condition no. Though the order impugned does not make a specific reference of the condition of license but the forfeiture of the security money was obviously forfeited by virtue of clause 8.7 of the conditions of license. It will not be out of place to reproduce condition no. 8.7 of the license which reads as under: ^^8-7- vuqKki= fujLr djus okys vf/kdkjh dks ;g vf/kdkj gksxk fd og vuqKki= dks vuqKk/kkjh dh tksf[ke ,oa ykxr ij fujLr dj mlds }kjk izLrqr dh xbZ /kjksgj jkf'k vekur jkf'k dks lfEefyr djrs gq, dks tCr ljdkj dj ldsA lkFk gh nqdku@nqdkuksa ds iM+r jgus vFkok nksckjk Bsdk de jkf'k ij mBus ;k vU; rjhds ls nqdku@nqdkuksa ds lapkyu ds ifj.kkeLo:i jkT; ljdkj dks tks Hkh gkfu gksxh mls lEcfU/kr vuqKk/kkjh dh foHkkx ds ikl mudh tek fdlh Hkh jkf'k ls] muds }kjk izLrqr dksysVjy flD;qfjVh ls jktLFkku vkcdkjh vf/kfu;e ds rgr rFkk Hkw&jktLo dh cdk;k olwyh dh Hkkafr mudh leLr py&vpy lEifRr;ksa ls rFkk muds okfjl@okfjlksa@mRrjkf/kdkfj;ksa dh lEifRr;ksa ij izFke izHkkj vkcdkjh foHkkx dk jgsxkA ;fn nqdku@nqdkuksa ds iqu% mBus ij dksbZ ykHk gksxk rks vuqKk/kkjh mls ikus ds gdnkj ugha gksxsaA** 13. A perusal of the condition 8.7 referred above shows that there is a clear cut stipulation of forfeiture of security (Dharohar Rashi) in the event of cancellation of license. 14. Forfeiture of security money is a natural fall out of the cancellation. It is only for other loss namely license being idle, due to lesser realization from the grant of subsequent license or on account of loss due to other mode of running the shop etc., the quantum of loss is required to be quantified. In considered opinion of this Court, there is no requirement of calculating or ascertaining the actual or probable loss as far as forfeiture of security money is concerned, it is a necessary concomitant of the cancellation of the license. 15. The petitioner has taken license, subject to these conditions, with open eyes. The petitioner has not laid any challenge to the offending condition No.8.7 of the conditions and hence the stipulation encapsulated in para 8.7 is binding upon the petitioner. In other words, petitioner cannot wriggle out of the conditions of the contract. 16. 15. The petitioner has taken license, subject to these conditions, with open eyes. The petitioner has not laid any challenge to the offending condition No.8.7 of the conditions and hence the stipulation encapsulated in para 8.7 is binding upon the petitioner. In other words, petitioner cannot wriggle out of the conditions of the contract. 16. With regard to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, regarding quantification of the damages as per Section 74 of the Contract Act, suffice it to observe that Section 74 of the Contract Act deals with the quantification of the damages in a case, when such loss or damage has not been mentioned or quantified in the contract. 17. It is the damage, which is required to be equal to the actual loss caused to the State and for calculation of such damages the provisions of Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872 are attracted and the principles enumerated in the judgments relied upon by Mr. Manoj Bhardwaj have some implications. 18. In my analysis of facts and law, particularly based on reading of clause 8.7, the security money can be forfeited along with the termination of license and if the State finds that additional loss has been caused to it on account of the subsequent license granted at lesser price or delay in grant of license, the same can also be recovered from the licensee. In the present case the conditions of license mutually agreed, forms a contract and clause 8.7 thereof specifically defines or quantifies the damages; in the form of forfeiture of security. As such, forfeiture of security money, in the present case cannot be treated to be imposition of penalty and the provisions of Section 74 of the Contract Act, has no application at all. 19. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondents in relation to Section 34(3), is not at all relevant, as the petitioner has not challenged the cancellation of license or forfeiture of license fee and has limited his grievance to the forfeiture of security money. 20. In view of above, I do not find any substance in the writ petition and the same is dismissed hereby. No costs.