ORDER : RAJESH H. SHUKLA, J. 1. The present petitions are filed by the petitioner-Bhavnagar District Panchayat under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar below Application Exh.40 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 345 of 2003 on the grounds stated in the memo of petition. 2. Heard learned Advocate Shri Mahavir M. Gadhvi for the petitioner. 3. Learned Advocate Shri Gadhvi has referred to the impugned order at Annexure-A and submitted that the application for additional evidence could not have been allowed. He has pointedly referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Application No. 5189 of 2008 to support his contention that the application may be either allowed or rejected. He has therefore tried to submit that the present petition may be allowed as the order is erroneous and does not meet the requirement of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has also stated that the application below Exh.40 has been preferred by a person who is not a party to the appeal proceedings. 4. Though these submissions have been made it is not in dispute that the matter i.e Regular Civil Appeal No. 345 of 2003 under the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) is pending before the learned District Judge, Bhavnagar. The Application Exh.40 is given by the Respondent and initially it was “fixed for hearing” and thereafter the impugned order came to be passed. 5. As it is stated in the application that the documents which are sought to be produced are regarding subsequent event after the final order of the appeal and are therefore material evidence and therefore the application has been given. The court below therefore consciously only allowed the production. It is only for the production of the document the application was allowed. It has been clearly observed in paragraph 6 : “It is made clear that these documents are merely allowed to be produced in the present Appeal and only for the reference to decide the present Appeal wherever the Court feels it necessary and the parties shall not be entitled to construe these documents as an additional evidence in the present Appeal. The documents pertaining to the dispute of the present Appeal are only allowed to the extent of production and not as an additional evidence.” 6. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court sought to be relied upon also clearly observe in paragraph 4 that the first appellate court only allowed the production of the document and did not receive them as an additional evidence. 7. It is in this context the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed referring to Order 41 Rule 27 which contemplates that whenever an additional evidence is allowed to be produced by the appellate court, the court should record the reasons for its admission. 8. In fact in this order the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the reasons did not refer or record that only production of document was allowed. In the facts of the case, it has been so clarified that only production is allowed. Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code merely provide: “The appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.” 9. Section 27(aa) of the Code which has been amended clearly provide:— “The party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, ………………….the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness the to be examined.” 10. The reasons which are required to be recorded as per Section 27(2) has been clearly stated in the impugned order that it is allowed only for the purpose of production at this stage and therefore it will depend upon the facts and circumstances at the time of hearing of the Appeal where both the parties may have the opportunity to comment on such production of documents. 11. It is well settled that the production of document is one thing and whether it should be taken as an additional evidence will require further exercise, which has to be established as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. 11. It is well settled that the production of document is one thing and whether it should be taken as an additional evidence will require further exercise, which has to be established as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. Therefore, at this stage, merely because the documents are permitted to be produced particularly when it has been clearly stated in the application itself that it relates to the subsequent event after the filing of appeal, the impugned order cannot be said to be erroneous which would call for any interference in a petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Though in the petition it is written under Article 226, specifically it is a petition under Article 227 challenging the interim order at the interlocutory stage pending the appeal. 12. It is well settled that the scope of exercise of discretion under Article 227 is limited. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in in catena of judicial pronouncement has expressed a word of caution observing that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised merely because the other view is possible. Therefore when there is no jurisdictional error merely because the other view is possible would not justify exercise of discretion under Article 227. It has been observed in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal reported in (2002) 1 SCC 100 : AIR 2002 SC 33 : “The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the byproduct of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.” 13. Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present petitions challenging the impugned order cannot be entertained and deserve to be dismissed summarily and accordingly stands dismissed.