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Gujarat High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1748 (GUJ)

SUNIL BABURAO MORE v. BANK OF BARODA

2017-10-11

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 22.11.2005 dismissing the petitioner from service. By subsequent amendment, the petitioner has also prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 29.09.2004. 2. The brief facts of the case are that : the petitioner was working as Cashier-cum-Clerk, Kosamba Branch, Surat, at the relevant point of time. On 22.09.2001 one Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat wrote a letter to the Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda, Surat, wherein she has stated that she is having a joint Savings A/c. No. 017447 since 1995 with Kosamba Branch of Bank of Baroda. She has further stated that on 23.08.2001 an amount of Rs.45,000/- was misappropriated vide Cheque No. 752186. She came to know about the said fact on 19.09.2001, when she had gone to withdraw money from her account and, therefore, an oral complaint was made before the Branch Manager and since nothing was done, she filed a written complaint. Pursuant to the said complaint, on 13.12.2001, the Senior Branch Manager wrote a letter to the Regional Manager along with the signatures of four staff members wherein it was mentioned that the petitioner has made confession in presence of them. 3. On 09.01.2002 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner wherein it was mentioned that the petitioner had misappropriated amount of Rs.45,000/- by forging the signature of the account holder, through one Mr. Salim Patel. Petitioner wrote a letter dated 17.01.2002 and requested to grant him time to file his reply to the show cause notice dated 09.01.2002. On 30.01.2002 the petitioner gave a reply to the said show cause notice and thereby denied the allegation made in the show cause notice as well as the facts regarding confessional statement referred to in the said show cause notice was also denied. 4. On 12.02.2002 the Branch Manager, Kosamba Branch of Bank of Baroda, Surat, lodged a complaint against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 405, 406, 420, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 before the Kosamba Police Station being C.R. No. I-20 of 2002. In connection with the aforesaid F.I.R., the petitioner was arrested and by order dated 07.03.2002 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.1561 of 2002, he was released on regular bail by this Court. 5. In connection with the aforesaid F.I.R., the petitioner was arrested and by order dated 07.03.2002 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.1561 of 2002, he was released on regular bail by this Court. 5. On 15.03.2002, the order of suspension was passed against the petitioner by the Assistant General Manager and Competent Authority. On 03.04.2003, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner wherein it was stated that while working as Cashier-cum-Clerk, Kosamba Branch, Surat, on 18.07.2001 Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat, a customer of the bank having a joint Savings A/c. No. 017447, requested the petitioner to till up the cheque for withdrawing Rs.7,000/- from her account. After getting the cheque filled up from the petitioner, she went to the Computer Operator to collect a token, leaving the check book on the counter and at that time the petitioner pilfered Cheque No.752186 from the cheque book. Thereafter, the petitioner presented the said cheque, putting the date as 21.08.2001, after filling up the particulars, forging a signature of the account holder on 23.08.2001, through one Mr. Salim Patel, misappropriated Rs.45,000/- from the account of Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat. It was stated in the charge-sheet that the petitioner has accepted the said act in presence of the staff members of the branch as well as before the police. It was stated that the act of the petitioner would amount to gross misconduct under Clause 19.5(5) of the bipartite settlement and, therefore, the charge of criminal act of forgery, stilling and misappropriating funds, committing act which shows lack of integrity and honesty, doing an act and made such omission prejudicial and detrimental to the interest of the bank and act of commission omission of unbecoming of the bank employee were leveled in the aforesaid charge-sheet. Mr. A.D. Pinagwala, Senior Branch Manager, Pandessara Branch, was appointed as an Inquiry Officer. 6. On 14.05.2003, the Assistant General Manager and Competent Authority, Surat Region, passed an order revoking the order of suspension. In view of the aforesaid order of revocation of suspension, the petitioner was relieved from Kosamba Branch. On 22.08.2003 Shri B.S. Pandya, Presenting Officer, produced a letter containing the list of management documents and management witness for the purpose of inquiry against the petitioner. Again on 29.08.2003 Shri B.S. Pandya, Presenting Officer, produced another letter containing list of the additional management documents. On 15.09.2003, during departmental proceedings, three management witnesses viz. On 22.08.2003 Shri B.S. Pandya, Presenting Officer, produced a letter containing the list of management documents and management witness for the purpose of inquiry against the petitioner. Again on 29.08.2003 Shri B.S. Pandya, Presenting Officer, produced another letter containing list of the additional management documents. On 15.09.2003, during departmental proceedings, three management witnesses viz. Shri B.S. Oak, Shri Y.A. Shaikh, and Mr. V.S.N. Moorthy were examined. On 20.02.2004, on behalf of the petitioner, his representative submitted written arguments. 7. On 21.04.2004, the Inquiry Officer submitted his findings in case of the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Disciplinary Authority wrote a letter on 27.04.2004 to the petitioner and informed him to make any submission/representation. 8. In response to the aforesaid letter, the Union of the petitioner, i.e. Gujarat Bank Workers Union, submitted the reply/representation dated 28.5.2004, on behalf of the petitioner, wherein it was stated that it has not been proved that who delivered the cheque book or pilfered the cheque book. Only on hearsay evidence the charges are proved and no opinion of a handwriting expert was sought to prove his involvement in the case. 9. Thereafter, on 12/30.08.2004, the Assistant General Manager, Surat Region and Disciplinary Authority has passed an order of “Dismissal from Banks Service without Notice”. However, further opportunity of personal hearing was also given to the petitioner. 10. Finally, on 29.09.2004, after giving personal hearing to the petitioner, was dismissed from service. Against the said order, the petitioner, on 04.09.2004, preferred Appeal No.1 of 2004 before the Appellate Authority of Bank of Baroda, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 22.11.2005 by Deputy General Manager, South Gujarat Zone, Surat and Appellate Authority, which has given rise to filing of the present petition. 11. Learned Advocate Mr. D.P. Kinariwala appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the first charge leveled against the petitioner was that he committed forgery and misappropriation of funds. He has submitted that so far this charge is concerned, it was contended by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer and Appellate Authority that the said charge is based merely on hearsay evidence only. He has further submitted that there was nothing on record to show that the signature of Cheque No.752186 was forged by the petitioner. He has submitted that no hand writing expert’s opinion was taken by the respondent Bank in this regard. 12. He has further submitted that there was nothing on record to show that the signature of Cheque No.752186 was forged by the petitioner. He has submitted that no hand writing expert’s opinion was taken by the respondent Bank in this regard. 12. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala has contended that the departmental proceedings were initiated due to the letter dated 22.09.2001 written by one Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat, a customer of the bank having a joint Savings A/c. No. 017447. He has further submitted that even in that letter, no allegation about misappropriation of funds from her account at the hands of the petitioner has been made. On the contrary, she has said that she does not know that who has withdrawn the amount from her account. Learned advocate has submitted that even explanation called for from the petitioner vide letter dated 09.01.2002 is totally in contradiction to the letter dated 22.09.2001, written by the account holder. It is submitted that in the said letter, Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat, has not stated anything about that the petitioner as misappropriated of the amount of Rs.45,000/- from her Savings A/c. 13. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that no single witness has said that the petitioner has received amount of Rs.45,000/-. On the contrary, one of the witnesses during the inquiry proceedings has specifically said that it was Mr. Salim Patel, who received amount of Rs.44,000/- and there is also further record available that the said witness, in spite of the fact that Rs.1,000/- was given less, he had left because he was afraid of being caught. 14. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala has submitted that Shri B.S. Oak, Officer, Shri Sajanbabu, Officer, Shri Y.A. Shaikh, Sub-Assistant, and Mr. V.S.N. Moorthy are the officers of the bank. Along with the said four officers, Senior Branch Manager on 13.12.2001 wrote a letter to the Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda, informing him that the petitioner has today confessed orally of his involvement in the said fraudulently withdrawal before the authority and in presence of the other staff members. The said letter further states that the account holder Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat also informed that she has received the amount fraudulently withdrawal from her. It is further submitted that there is no written admission/confession by the petitioner. Mr. The said letter further states that the account holder Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat also informed that she has received the amount fraudulently withdrawal from her. It is further submitted that there is no written admission/confession by the petitioner. Mr. Kinariwala further submitted that the signatures of the letter dated 13.12.2001 are the signatures of the status of the officers of the Bank's Branch. The branch is having different cadre of employees viz. starting from Peon to the Branch Manager. It is submitted that very conveniently, the letter dated 13.12.2001 was brought up by the Branch Manager and other officers with a view to save their officers and the petitioner is made a scapegoat of that fraudulent act. 15. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala further submitted that since the officer of the management was involved in that act (by passing a cheque in spite of the fact that there was a difference in signature), they themselves have found out a way to save their officers and the Branch Manager wrote a letter to the Regional Manager with the signatures of the other officers saying that the petitioner has made confession. Learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that on the contrary involvement of Mr. Y.A. Shaikh and Mr. M.B. Bhatt is proved because they were passing officers who have passed the cheque in spite of the fact that there was a difference in signature. 16. It is submitted by Mr. Kinariwala that even without admitting the same, if the letter dated 13.12.2001 could be said to be a confessional statement of the petitioner, then it cannot be said that the so-called statement constituted the offence against the petitioner. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala further submitted that the so-called oral confession was made before the then Branch Manager, who was not examined during the departmental inquiry. It is submitted that it was for the bank who has to prove the allegation against the petitioner and there is nothing on record to show that what bona fide reason Branch Manager is not examined. 17. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala also submitted that the person, who had issued the token, was not shown as witness and was not examined during the departmental proceedings. It is submitted that if the person who had issued the token i.e. Mr. 17. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala also submitted that the person, who had issued the token, was not shown as witness and was not examined during the departmental proceedings. It is submitted that if the person who had issued the token i.e. Mr. Majmudar would have been examined in that case he would have certainly pointed out the real fact before the departmental proceedings. He has further submitted that the allegation of the bank was that the petitioner has misappropriated the amount of Rs.45,000/-, however, the account holder has not said that the petitioner has misappropriated the amount of Rs.45,000/- from her account. Not only that it is the say of the bank and it is the document of the bank, which reveals the fact that Mr. Salim Patel has withdrawn the amount from the Savings A/c. of the account holder. It was the say of the bank that the petitioner has misappropriated the amount of Rs.45,000/- from the account of Mrs. Sharifa Mohmmed Bholat and, therefore, the onus was upon the bank to prove the said allegation. Mr. Kinariwala has also submitted that the complainant had already received the whole amount, hence the petitioner could not have been imposed such a harsh penalty. 18. Learned advocate Mr. Kinariwala has submitted that the Appellate Authority, without considering the aspects of the matter has passed an order, confirming the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority and in that view of the matter, the order passed by the respondent is bad and, therefore, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside by allowing the present petition. 19. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Darshan M. Parikh appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank has submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being too limited and, therefore, this Court may refuse to exercise such jurisdiction. He has submitted that this is not a case of no evidence nor is it a case of violation of principles of natural justice. He has submitted a full-fledged departmental inquiry has been held against the petitioner and he has been given opportunity to defend himself and after considering the enormity of proof of the charges leveled against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have come to a conclusion that the charges leveled against the petitioner are proved. He has submitted a full-fledged departmental inquiry has been held against the petitioner and he has been given opportunity to defend himself and after considering the enormity of proof of the charges leveled against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have come to a conclusion that the charges leveled against the petitioner are proved. He has submitted that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is commensurate with the gravity of charges leveled and proved against the petitioner. 20. Mr. Parikh has submitted that the fact remains that admittedly the petitioner returned the money to the account holder, which fact suggests the involvement of the petitioner in the act of misappropriation. He has submitted that during the inquiry proceedings leading questions are asked and the depositions disclose/reveal that the same are asked. He has stated that the strict rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are not applicable and the questions which were objected to were permitted by the Inquiry Officer and it is denied that the alleged questions are required to be ignored or that the conclusion or the punishment are based on irregularity in procedure during the inquiry or that the same is bad in law or the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that it is not required to examine the Branch Manager during departmental inquiry and in absence of his deposition, the allegation was not proved or that the confession would not be a confession in the eye of law. 21. To buttress his arguments, learned advocate Mr. Parikh has relied upon the judgements rendered by Supreme Court in the cases of – (i) J.D. Jain Vs. The Management of State Bank of India & Anr., AIR 1982 S.C. 673 ; (ii) Tara Chand Vyas Vs. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority & Ors., (1997) 4 S.C.C. 565 ; (iii) Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) Vs. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 S.C.C. 254 ; AND (iv) General Manager (P), Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. Vs. Daya Singh, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 233 . 22. I have heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. The documents on record are also examined by me. 23. The entire controversy raised in the present petition rests on the oral confession made by the petitioner before the officers of the Bank. Vs. Daya Singh, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 233 . 22. I have heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. The documents on record are also examined by me. 23. The entire controversy raised in the present petition rests on the oral confession made by the petitioner before the officers of the Bank. The officers, in whose presence the petitioner had confessed, were examined as the witnesses in the departmental proceedings. The petitioner was also afforded full opportunity of cross-examining them. At this juncture, it will be apposite to refer to the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of J.D. Jain (supra), wherein, in almost similar set of facts, the Apex Court has observed thus: “The learned Tribunal has committed another error in holding that the finding of the domestic enquiry was based on "hearsay" evidence. The law is well-settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry. This Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Rattan Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 1512 held (at p. 1513):" “It is well-settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. 10. xxx xxx 11. In the instant case, the alleged misconduct of the appellant was that he forged documents, withdrew Rs.1,500.00 Rs. 1,000.00 in excess of the amount he was authorized to do and misappropriated the excess amount of Rs.1,000,00. With regard to the fact whether the appellant manipulated the documents withdrew excess amount and misappropriated it, there is, of course, no direct evidence of any eyewitness except the appellant's 'confession' referred to above. The evidence on which reliance has been taken by the respondent is the confession and circumstantial evidence, namely, the authority letter containing the admitted interpolations by the appellant in his own handwriting in different ink, and the addition of the digit "1" before 500. The evidence of Kansal would have been primary and material, if the fact in issue were whether Kansal authorised the appellant to make the alterations in the authority letter. But Kansal's complaint was to the contrary. The evidence of Kansal would have been primary and material, if the fact in issue were whether Kansal authorised the appellant to make the alterations in the authority letter. But Kansal's complaint was to the contrary. For the purpose of a departmental enquiry complaint, certainly not frivolous, but substantiated by circumstantial evidence, is enough. What the respondent sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that Kansal had made a verbal complaint with regard to the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant in presence of the four witnesses, namely, Wadhera, Gupta, Ramzan and Sarkar, aforesaid against his advice. On the complaint of Kansal, the evidence of these four witnesses is direct as the complaint is said to have been made by Kansal in their presence and hearing; it is, therefore, not hearsay. As the respondent has succeeded in proving that a complaint was made by Kansal on the evidence of the above-named four witnesses, the respondent has succeeded. No rule of law enjoins that a complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal. 12. The Tribunal has committed yet another grievous error, in failing to appreciate the confessions made by the appellant "in the presence of witnesses and to the higher officer who appeared as witness" (as found by itself) namely, Wadhera, Ramzan, Gupta and Sarkar, aforesaid. The confessions of the appellant before the said witnesses were to the effect that he had altered the amount in figure and words in his own hand.” 24. In the foregoing case before the Supreme Court, the Tribunal directed the reinstatement by holding that the evidence against the employee was hearsay in absence of examination of the complainant. The delinquent employee had orally confessed before the employees of the Bank. The Supreme Court, after examining the confession made before the employees of the Bank, held that the same cannot be said to be “hearsay” evidence and further held that the Tribunal fell in error in discarding the same. In my considered opinion, the present case will be governed by the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case. The confession made by the petitioner before the employees of the Bank cannot be discarded merely because the same is hearsay. His confession is proved in the statements made by the employees of the Bank. The petitioner was also given full opportunity to cross-examine them. The confession made by the petitioner before the employees of the Bank cannot be discarded merely because the same is hearsay. His confession is proved in the statements made by the employees of the Bank. The petitioner was also given full opportunity to cross-examine them. Nothing adverse is brought out by him in the cross-examination. Thus, the disciplinary authority and the inquiry officer are justified on placing the reliance on the confession made by the petitioner before the Bank employees. There was no need to examine the complainant Mrs. Bholat nor the witness Mr. Salim Patel in the disciplinary proceedings, if the petitioner had confessed his involvement. In the aforenoted judgement in the case of J.D. Jain (supra), the complainant was also not examined in the departmental proceedings. Hence, the submission canvassed by learned Advocate Mr. Kinariwala, that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside as the misconduct is proved on the oral confession does not merit acceptance. The judgements relied upon by the learned Advocate of the petitioner, mentioned in the petition deal with the confession made in a criminal offence, which cannot be paralleled with the confession made by a delinquent in the disciplinary proceedings. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of A.T. Mane (supra) has observed thus: “Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment, on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating corporation's fund, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal.” 26. I may gainfully extract the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Tara Chand Vyas (Supra): “The employees and officers working in the banks are not merely the trustees of the society, but also bear responsibility and owe duty to the society for effectuation of socioeconomic empowerment. Their acts and conduct should be in discharge of that constitutional objective and if they derelict in the performance of their duty, it impinges upon the enforcement of the constitutional philosophy, objective and the goals under the rule of law. Their acts and conduct should be in discharge of that constitutional objective and if they derelict in the performance of their duty, it impinges upon the enforcement of the constitutional philosophy, objective and the goals under the rule of law. Corruption has taken deep roots among the S. of the society and the employees holding public office or responsibility equally became amenable to corrupt conduct in the discharge of their official duty for illegal gratification. The banking business and services are also vitally affected by catastrophic corruption. Disciplinary measures should, therefore, aim to eradicate the corrupt proclivity of conduct on the part of the employees/officers in the public offices including those in banks. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider, from this perspective, the need for disciplinary action to eradicate corruption to properly channelise the use of the public funds, the live wire for effectuation of socioeconomic justice in order to achieve the constitutional goals set down in the Preamble and to see that the corrupt conduct of the officers does not degenerate the efficiency of service leading to denationalisation of the banking system. What is more, the nationalisation of the banking service was done in the public interest. Every employee/officer in the bank should strive to see that banking operations or services are rendered in the best interest of the system and the society so as to effectuate the object of nationalisation. Any conduct that damages, destroys, defeats or tends to defeat the said purposes resultantly defeats or tends to defeat the constitutional objectives which can be meted out with disciplinary action in accordance with rules lest rectitude in public service is lost and service becomes a means and source of unjust enrichment at the cost of the society. Shri B.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that for proof of the charges none of the witnesses was examined nor any opportunity was given to cross-examine them and the petitioner has disputed his liability. As a consequence, the entire enquiry was vitiated by manifest error apparent on the face of the record. We find no force in the contention. The thrust of the imputation of charges was that he had not discharged his duty as a responsible officer to safeguard the interest of the Bank by securing adequate security before the grant of the loans to the dealers, and had not ensured supply of goods to the loanees. We find no force in the contention. The thrust of the imputation of charges was that he had not discharged his duty as a responsible officer to safeguard the interest of the Bank by securing adequate security before the grant of the loans to the dealers, and had not ensured supply of goods to the loanees. It is based upon the documentary evidence which has already been part of the record and copies thereof had been supplied to the petitioner. Under those circumstances, we do not think that there is any manifest error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference. It is then contended that no reasons have been given in support of the conclusions to substantiate the charges. The enquiry officer had elaborately discussed each charge and given reasons which were considered by the disciplinary authority and reached the conclusion that the charges were proved. So had the appellate authority. They are not like a civil court.” Thus, the petitioner, who was working in a Bank was expected of maintaining highest degree of honesty and integrity. The reputation of the Bank is at stake when the employees indulge in dishonest activities while dealing with its account holders. The likelihood of financial loss to the Bank is enough to constitute a misconduct. It is not necessary that actual loss should be caused. Thus, even if no financial loss is caused to the complainant, it cannot be said that the petitioner is not guilty of any delinquency. 27. The contention of the petitioner that the handwriting expert’s opinion was not sought for before proving the charge pales into insignificance in wake of his confession. Once the confession of the petitioner is apropos the misconduct is proved, then no further evidence is required to be substantiated in support of proving the charge. 28. Apropos the contention of the petitioner that the appellate authority has passed the order without discussing the relevant aspects of the matter, a perusal of the order dated 22.11.2005 will reveal that the appellate authority has passed a well-reasoned order after taking into account all the grounds raised in the appeal filed by the petitioner. The appellate authority has precisely observed that in the departmental inquiry strict rules of law of evidence does not apply but law of preponderance of probabilities applies. The appellate authority has precisely observed that in the departmental inquiry strict rules of law of evidence does not apply but law of preponderance of probabilities applies. The order portrays total application of mind by the appellate authority, and hence, the aforesaid contention does not merit acceptance. 29. In the case of R.R. Parekh Vs. High Court of Gujarat reported in AIR 2016 SC 3356 , the Apex Court has observed thus: “A disciplinary inquiry, it is well settled, is not governed by the strict rules of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A charge of misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The High Court while exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 has to determine as to whether the charge of misconduct stands established with reference to some legally acceptable evidence. The High Court would not interfere unless the findings are found to be perverse. Unless it is a case of no evidence, the High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there is some legal evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or reevaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is not possible to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court on the charge of misconduct. The charge of misconduct was established in disciplinary Inquiry 15 of 2000.” 30. In the present case, the petitioner has not alleged that the departmental proceedings are conducted in violation of principles of natural justice or the Rules governing the same. It will be apposite to extract the observations made by the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad Vs. A. Prahalada Rao, reported in 2001 (1) SCC 165 : “It is settled law that Court's power of judicial review in such cases is limited and Court can interfere where the authority held the enquiry proceedings in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry and imposing punishment or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or is such that no reasonable person would have ever reached. As per the Regulation, holding of regular departmental enquiry is a discretionary power of the disciplinary authority which is to be exercised by considering the facts of each case and if it is misused or used arbitrarily, it would be subject to judicial review.” 31. The petitioner has not pointed out any Rules or Regulations which have been violated in holding the disciplinary proceedings, hence, the penalty imposed on the petitioner does not call for any interference. 32. Hence, the petition, being sans merit, stands dismissed. RULE discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.