JUDGMENT : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 16.01.2006 passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal (the Tribunal) in Appeal No. 267 of 2004, whereby the appeal of the petitioner challenging the order dated 19.07.2004 passed by respondent No. 2 in the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal dated 22.10.2003 was dismissed. 2. Brief facts, which led to the filing of the petition, are as follows: The petitioner was posted as Talaticum-Manatri at Village Pipli of Taluka Jam Khambhaliya, District Jamnagar. On 05.06.1992 a charge-sheet came to be issued to the petitioner alleging, inter-alia, that the petitioner had wrongly mutated illegal entries in the revenue record i.e. Village Form No. 6 for several survey numbers, thereby wrongly transferring certain lands in favour of some interested persons. It was, inter-alia, alleged that the petitioner attempted to fraudulently sell fallow land of the State Government and also attempted to illegally transfer certain lands in favour of certain persons. In response to the charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his reply and explanation vide communication dated 20.06.1992. Thereafter, Deputy District Development Officer (Development), District Panchayat, Jamnagar was appointed as an Inquiry Officer in the matter, who submitted his report on 13.12.1993 finding the petitioner guilty of the charges leveled against the petitioner. The said report was forwarded to the Deputy District Development Officer after almost one decade i.e. on 30.09.2003 and a copy of the report was also sent to the petitioner. Along with the said report, a show cause notice was also issued to the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why punishment should not be imposed upon the petitioner. On receipt of the Inquiry Report, the petitioner appeared before the Deputy District Development Officer and made submissions. 3. However, without considering the submissions made by the petitioner, he was ordered to be dismissed from service vide order dated 22.12.03 by respondent No. 1Deputy District Development Officer. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before respondent No. 2. During pendency of the appeal the petitioner retired from service w.e.f. 31.01.2004. After hearing the appeal, respondent No. 2 dismissed the same vide order dated 19.07.2004. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before respondent No. 2. During pendency of the appeal the petitioner retired from service w.e.f. 31.01.2004. After hearing the appeal, respondent No. 2 dismissed the same vide order dated 19.07.2004. Said order is also confirmed by the Tribunal vide order dated 19.07.2004 passed in Appeal No. 267 of 2004 preferred by the petitioner, which has given rise to filing of the present petition. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Nirav C. Thakkar appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the authorities below ought to have appreciated that though the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner in 1992, the order of dismissal was passed in 2003 i.e. after more than 11 years. He has submitted that such undue and unexplained delay in conclusion of the inquiry itself was violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. Mr. Thakkar further submitted that assuming without admitting and only for the sake of argument, it is taken that the entries were made in Village Form No. 6 without proper verification, the same only amounts to negligence in performance of duties and could not be said to be constituted any criminal offence requiring dismissal of the petitioner from service. In view of the aforesaid submissions, he has urged that the present petition deserves to be allowed as prayed for. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. Thakker has contended that for similar set of facts/incident, the department had registered F.I.R. No. 140/92 for the offences under sections 406, 420, 423, 477 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for which a trial was conducted. He has stated that the judgment dated 09.11.2006 passed by Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Lalpur, in Criminal Case No. 34 of 1993, the petitioner is acquitted from the aforesaid offences. Hence, he has urged that the authority may be directed to review the impugned order of the petitioner in light of Circular dated 19.04.2004 issued by the General Administration Department (GAD), State of Gujarat. 7. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities have submitted that the departmental proceedings held against the petitioner do not suffer from any infirmity. He has stated that the petitioner was granted full opportunity of hearing, and there is no allegation made by the petitioner about violation of any statutory rules in holding the departmental inquiry. Learned Advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities have submitted that the departmental proceedings held against the petitioner do not suffer from any infirmity. He has stated that the petitioner was granted full opportunity of hearing, and there is no allegation made by the petitioner about violation of any statutory rules in holding the departmental inquiry. Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw has also drawn the attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. He has stated that the petitioner has not denied the fact that interpolation in the entries is done by him. 8. Apropos the contention raised by Mr. Thakker about undue delay taken by the respondent authorities, learned advocate Mr. Munshaw has submitted that the delay itself would not vitiate the departmental proceedings. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw has submitted that the facts of the criminal case are not entirely similar to the departmental inquiry. He has contended that in the criminal trial only 05 entries were in question, whereas in the departmental inquiry pertained to 12 entries made by him. He has also stated that there were five accused against whom the criminal trial was conducted, and the trial court has acquitted the petitioner only on the ground that the superior officer had examined the legality of the documents. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw has contended that the departmental inquiry cannot be equated with the criminal trial as both proceeded on different footing. He has stated that the departmental proceedings pertain to misconduct under the service rules, which is different from the criminal offence. In this context, Mr. Munshaw has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011 (9) SCC 94 . 10. Lastly, learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw has submitted that the judicial review in the matters pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings is very limited. He has stated that in the present case even the Tribunal has not interfered with the penalty order. In view of the aforesaid submissions, he has urged that the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. I have considered the rival contentions made by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties for the lis. I have also perused the documents on record. 12. The contention raised by the learned Advocate Mr. In view of the aforesaid submissions, he has urged that the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. I have considered the rival contentions made by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties for the lis. I have also perused the documents on record. 12. The contention raised by the learned Advocate Mr. Thakkar that delay caused in concluding the departmental proceedings will vitiate the impugned order is concerned, the same does not merit acceptance. It is pertinent to note that no such contention was raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court in the case of Shri Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society, 2013 (6) SCC 515 has observed thus: “The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The Court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the Court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion, which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion.” 13. In the present case, the facts reveal that the misconduct, for which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, can be said to be very serious in nature. Had the disciplinary authority acted diligently at the relevant time on the inquiry officer’s report, the petitioner would have been precluded in enjoying his service for period of delay. In the present case, the facts reveal that the misconduct, for which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, can be said to be very serious in nature. Had the disciplinary authority acted diligently at the relevant time on the inquiry officer’s report, the petitioner would have been precluded in enjoying his service for period of delay. The Supreme Court has specifically observed that the principle elucidated in the above paragraph will equally apply in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the departmental proceedings held against the petitioner cannot be quashed solely on the ground of delay. 14. As observed by the Inquiry Officer in his report that the petitioner has not disputed about interpolation made by him in the revenue entries, more particularly for entry No. 129, he himself has given the proof of interpolation. In wake of the fact that the petitioner has not denied such interpolations made by him in the entries, the impugned order of penalty cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal has examined the entire record of the case and has concluded that there was no illegality committed in the disciplinary proceedings. 15. The respondent authorities cannot be directed to review the case of the petitioner in view of his acquittal in the criminal case, as suggested by the learned advocate Mr. Thakker, since the criminal trial was concerned with only five entries made by the petitioner. The departmental proceedings were initiated for total 12 entries interpolated by the petitioner in various survey numbers. Some of the affected persons are also different from those who were co-accused with the petitioner. Thus, there is different set of facts in the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings. The Trial Court has acquitted four accused and the petitioner only on the basis that the superior to the petitioner has not questioned the documents and no loss is caused to the Government. Moreover, the petitioner has also not denied about the interpolation done by him. The contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw that the departmental proceedings pertain to the misconduct under the service rules, which is different from the criminal offence, deserves acceptance. Moreover, the petitioner has also not denied about the interpolation done by him. The contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw that the departmental proceedings pertain to the misconduct under the service rules, which is different from the criminal offence, deserves acceptance. The Apex Court in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh (supra) has observed thus: “Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental proceedings, the department has to prove only preponderance of probabilities. In the present case, we find that the department has been able to prove the case on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the submissions of the counsel appearing for the appellant are found to be without any merit.” 16. This Court cannot reevaluate or re-appreciate the evidence of the disciplinary proceedings held against the petitioner. In the case of R.R. Parekh vs. High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2016 SC 3356 , the Apex Court has observed thus: “A disciplinary inquiry, it is well settled, is not governed by the strict rules of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A charge of misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The High Court while exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 has to determine as to whether the charge of misconduct stands established with reference to some legally acceptable evidence. The High Court would not interfere unless the findings are found to be perverse. Unless it is a case of no evidence, the High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there is some legal evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or reevaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is not possible to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court on the charge of misconduct. The charge of misconduct was established in disciplinary Inquiry 15 of 2000.” 17. In the present case, the petitioner has not alleged that the departmental proceedings are conducted in violation of principles of natural justice or the Rules governing the same. The charge of misconduct was established in disciplinary Inquiry 15 of 2000.” 17. In the present case, the petitioner has not alleged that the departmental proceedings are conducted in violation of principles of natural justice or the Rules governing the same. It will be apposite to extract the observations made by the Supreme Court in the rendered in the case of Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad vs. A. Prahalada Rao, 2001 (1) SCC 165 : “It is settled law that Court's power of judicial review in such cases is limited and Court can interfere where the authority held the enquiry proceedings in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry and imposing punishment or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or is such that no reasonable person would have ever reached. As per the Regulation, holding of regular departmental enquiry is a discretionary power of the disciplinary authority which is to be exercised by considering the facts of each case and if it is misused or used arbitrarily, it would be subject to judicial review.” 18. The petitioner has not pointed out any Rules or Regulations which have been violated in holding the disciplinary proceedings, hence, the penalty imposed on the petitioner does not call for any interference. 19. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the Tribunal has examined the merits of the case, and has also found that the disciplinary proceedings are also conducted in compliance of natural justice, in my considered opinion, no case is made out calling for exercising the discretion of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. The petition accordingly dismissed. RULE is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.