JUDGMENT : N.V. ANJARIA, J. The two petitions which involve similar facts and identical issue are treated together to be decided by this common order. 1.1 The petitioner in both is common who has challenged in the two petitions two sets of orders of even date arising in respect of two licences granted to the petitioner passed in exercise of powers under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 2. The first prayer in both the petitions is to set aside order dated 30th July, 2007 passed in respect of product Envas 2.5mg issued by respondent No.2- National Pharmaceuticals Pricing Authority fixing the price. The second prayer is to set aside order dated 16th April, 2008 issued by respondent No.1 under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government of India rejecting the representation/ review application and notice of demand dated 02nd April, 2008 issued by respondent No.2. 2.1 It is further prayed to direct to the respondents to consider review application dated 29th August, 2007 submitted by the petitioner on merits and to decide the same in accordance with law. Yet another prayer is made to to set aside order dated 02nd April, 2008 issued by respondent No.3-Commissioner, Food and Drug Control Administration in respect of price fixation of the product and giving notice for initiating action for non-compliance. 3. The common facts are stated in brief referring them from the first petition which virtually travel parallel. The respondent authorities sent letter dated 16th June, 2006 to the petitioner stating inter alia that the price of the product Envas in 2.5mg and 5mg had gone up substantially during the period between April, 2005 and April, 2006. The petitioner responded with reply dated 26th June, 2006 stating that it had changed the packing of the said product from 10 tablet trip to 15 tablet trip and the price had been fixed by the pro-rata pricing and there was no increase therefore in the tablet price. It is the case of the petitioner that however, the respondent authorities exercised powers under Para 10 and 11 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 issued by the Government of India under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (herein after referred to as “Order of 1995” and “the Act” respectively). It is the case of the petitioner that however, the respondent authorities exercised powers under Para 10 and 11 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 issued by the Government of India under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (herein after referred to as “Order of 1995” and “the Act” respectively). 3.1 By passing order dated 30th July, 2007, the respondents notified maximum retail price inclusive of excise duty and taxes for the said product. The aforesaid order dated 30th July, 2007 was dispatched on 07th August, 2007 and came to be received by the petitioner on 11th August, 2007. On 29th August, 2007, the petitioner preferred review application which was delayed by two days as Rule 22 of Order of 1995 requires the filing of the review application within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. There was a delay of two days. 3.2 It is stated by the petitioner that the petitioner did not specifically made any application for condonation of delay, hoping that minuscule delay could be condoned by the respondents and that the application would be decided on merits. 3.3 The review application of the petitioner came to be rejected on 02nd April, 2008 on the ground that the same was time barred under Para/Rule 22 of the said Order of 1995. In the second petition also, the review application was rejected on 17th March, 2008 on the same ground being time barred. 3.4 It is further stated that in the meanwhile, respondent No.2 issued demand notice to the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 49,51,687/- in respect of Envas in 2.5mg on 02nd April, 2008. In the second petition, demand notice for a sum of Rs.92,91,159/- in respect of Envas in 5mg came to be issued. The recoveries were stayed by this Court and has remained stayed during the pendency of the petitions. 4. Heard learned senior advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore for Singhi & Co., Advocate for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. P.Y. Divyeshvar for respondent No.1. 5. Rule 22 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 providing for power to review and limitation period for the purpose of filing review, reads as under, “22. 4. Heard learned senior advocate Mr. Mihir Thakore for Singhi & Co., Advocate for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. P.Y. Divyeshvar for respondent No.1. 5. Rule 22 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 providing for power to review and limitation period for the purpose of filing review, reads as under, “22. Power to review: Any person aggrieved by any notification issued or order made under paragraphs 3,5,8,9 or 10 may apply to the Government for a review of the notification or order within fifteen days of the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazetee or the receipt of the order by him, as the case may be, and the Government may make such order on the application as it may deem proper. Provided that pending a decision by the Government on the application submitted under the above paragraph, no manufacturer, importer or distributor, as the case may be, shall sell a bulk drug or formulation, as the case may be, at a price exceeding the price fixed by the Government of which a review has been applied for.” 5.1 In the contest of above Rule 22 and the limitation period of 15 days prescribed therein, the question which arises in the facts of the case is whether the said limitation period could be condoned and filing of review application could be permitted beyond the said period, if sufficient cause is shown or the delay is found condonable otherwise, by applying the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act by attracting Section 5 thereof. 5.2 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under, "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 6. In Mangu Ram vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ AIR 1976 SC 105 ], in which it was stated and held, “There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, sub-section (2) is concerned. Whereas, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, subsection (2), clause (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would include Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which there are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” (para 10) 6.1 It was further explained : “S. 29 sub-sec. (2) Cl.(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, Sub-section(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani’s case, [ AIR 1964 SC 260 : 1964 (1) Cri.LJ 152] can therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 is specifically made applicable by section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he head sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation.” (para 10) 6.1.1 It was next stated : “It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Rani’s case AIR 1964 SC 260 = (1964 (1) Cri LJ 152) the time limit of sixty days laid down in subsection (4) of Section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of section 5.” (para 10) 6.1.2 And pertinently observed : “It is true that the language of sub-section (4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar.” (para 10) 6.1.3 Following was held in clear terms : “Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in subsection (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it.” (para 10) [emphasis supplied] 6.2 In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [ (2001) 8 SCC 470 ], the Supreme Court considered the question of applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 in the context of section 34(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to address the question whether in respect to the period of limitation prescribed in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, Section 5 of the Act would apply and whether the delay beyond the said prescribed limitation could be condoned. Section 34 provided that the application to set aside the arbitral award could be made within three months and proviso to the section stated that if the applicant was prevented from making application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days, but not thereafter. 6.2.1 Referring to the language of section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court noticed to hold that the crucial words therein were “but not thereafter”. It was held that in view of such language employed by the Legislature, it would amount to express exclusion within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and would therefore, bar the application of section 5 of the Act. It was held that exclusion of provisions of Limitation Act within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, may be an expressed exclusion or implied exclusion. 6.2.2 It was stated as under : “Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because "mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5” 6.3 Wherever a special statute in its provisions or in that matter in Rule in the subordinate Legislation, prescribes the limitation period, in order to ascertain as to whether time beyond such prescribed period in special statute is condonable in terms of the provisions of the Limitation Act in particularly Section 5 thereof, the decisive test is language of provisions in the special statute or rule providing for such limitation. It has to be gathered and judged from the language whether it either expressly or impliedly excludes the applicability of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6.4 Adverting to the Rule/Para-22 of Drugs Price Control Act, 1995, it contemplates period of 15 days for filling review application. The word used is “within 15 days”. These words are not qualified or superfine by any qualifying prefixed or suffixed. 6.4 Adverting to the Rule/Para-22 of Drugs Price Control Act, 1995, it contemplates period of 15 days for filling review application. The word used is “within 15 days”. These words are not qualified or superfine by any qualifying prefixed or suffixed. Juxtaposing the language in Section 34 of Arbitration Act where the words are “not thereafter” on the basis of which the supreme court construed the said special provision of limitation to be applied strictly excluding the application of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it is not necessary nor expedient nor justified to read the language of Rule/para 22 in this case in such a way. It does not prefixed or suffixed by any limiting words or by creating special embargo to construe against applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act. 6.5 It cannot be said that by providing the period of 15 days, Rule 22 of the Order of 1995, displaces the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to view the delay beyond 15 days perod as not condonable. In a given case, therefore, if there is a delay in filling the review application beyond 15 days and sufficient cause is made out, such delay could be condoned and the review application can be entertained by the reviewing authority. In the instant case, the delay is of two days which is explained and having regard to the small period of delay it by itself makes out a sufficient case to condone. Therefore, it deserves to be condoned. 7. In view of the above discussion, both the petitions are partially allowed. The decision of respondent No.1 – Union of India, Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, reflected in communication dated 16th April, 2008 in not entertaining the Review Applications of the petitioner dated 29th August, 2007 is hereby set aside. Delay in filing Review Application under Para/Rule 22 of the Drug Price Control Order, 1995 is hereby condoned, with a direction to the competent authority to hear and decide the Review Application of the petitioner in accordance with law and on merits within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. Delay in filing Review Application under Para/Rule 22 of the Drug Price Control Order, 1995 is hereby condoned, with a direction to the competent authority to hear and decide the Review Application of the petitioner in accordance with law and on merits within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the merits of the case of the petitioner with regard to order dated 30th July, 2007 passed in respect of product Envas 2.5 m.g. as well as in respect of product Envas 5 m.g. By respondent No.2 – National Pharmaceuticals Pricing Authority fixing the price of the said products. The contentions of both the sides in this regard are kept open. It is further directed that until the Review Applications are decided, the demand notice issued in both the cases by the respondent shall not be enforced and shall be subject to the outcome of the decision in Review. Rule is made absolute in both the petitions accordingly. Petitioners partly allowed.