JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present petitioner – Vadodara Mahanagar Seva Sadan has approached this Court by way of present petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for challenging an award dated 06.12.2007 passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Court No.2, Vadodara in Reference (IT) No.81 of 2000. 2. The facts in brief are that the respondent herein Smt. Bhanuben Gordhanbhai Solanki has claimed an appointment by way of compassionate basis claiming to be a legal heir of Shri Gordhanbhai Solanki, who was originally working with the petitioner Corporation in Ward No.2 as a ‘Safai Sevak’ in Sanitary Department on the permanent basis. The father of respondent is retired from the services on account of reaching the age of superannuation and by contending that respondent is eligible to get an appointment in his place on compassionate basis she appeared to have raised an industrial dispute initially before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Vadodara, who vide order dated 24.03.2000 was pleased to refer it to the Industrial Court for adjudication. This Reference appears to have been raised through Union who submitted claim statement at Exh.6 inter alia claiming that there is a policy in petitioner Corporation that whoever retires from the services one of the legal heirs is to be given an appointment on compassionate basis and respondent being deserted daughter of original employee of the Corporation has submitted an application that she is eligible to seek an employment on that basis and claimed the relief that with effect from 28.10.1991 her claim be considered with all consequential benefits with 18% interest and the cost of Rs.5,000/- of Reference is claimed. 3. The record indicates that to meet with the claim submitted by the respondent workman through Union after service of summons from the learned Industrial Court a written reply came to be submitted at Exh.10 by the petitioner Corporation. It has been mainly contended that the father of the respondent claimant had retired by way of superannuation long before and Reference is submitted after more than a period of ten years and therefore, dispute raised itself is barred by principles of delay and laches. It has been mainly contended that the father of the respondent claimant had retired by way of superannuation long before and Reference is submitted after more than a period of ten years and therefore, dispute raised itself is barred by principles of delay and laches. It was also contended that at a relevant point of time, father of the respondent claimant was superannuated, she was not a deserted daughter nor depending upon the father and, therefore, by submitting such kind of contention, a Reference was opposed by the petitioner. At Exh.11, the list of documents to have been submitted by the respondent and as many as eight documents were adduced and she herself chosen to be examined by deposing at Exh.13. From the deposition it appears that the father of the claimant had retired from the services way-back in the year 1991 and the Reference appears to be in the year 2000. However, with a view to meet with the stand of the claimant some documents have also been adduced by the petitioner Corporation at Exh.14 and later on an amended affidavit came to be submitted by the claimant respondent at Exh.18 by pointing out that it was not correct that when father died she was at her matrimonial home. After leading evidence, claimant respondent has submitted a closer Pursis at Exh.20 whereas the Corporation submitted at closer pursis at Exh.24 and after considering overall material, issues came to be framed by the learned Presiding Officer and ultimately after evaluating the evidence on record, the learned Presiding Officer was pleased to partly allow the Reference by directing petitioner Corporation to take respondent claimant in service within a period of 60 days in view of agreement at Exh.14/2 and the said employment be on the basis of inheritance and the entire Reference came to be disposed of by an order dated 06.12.2007. 4. It is this award which is made the subject matter of petition before this Court which originally was entertained by Court upon issuance of notice on 12.01.2009 and later on the petition travelled through various stages. The record further indicates that during the passage of time in the month of March, 2009, Mr. Raval, learned advocate representing the respondent had conveyed proposal for interim Resolution of dispute and conveyed the same to the Corporation and the decision was awarded as such the matter was kept pending. The record further indicates that during the passage of time in the month of March, 2009, Mr. Raval, learned advocate representing the respondent had conveyed proposal for interim Resolution of dispute and conveyed the same to the Corporation and the decision was awarded as such the matter was kept pending. Even at the later stage in the month of April, 2009, this Court with a view to see that some interim mechanism to put an end the dispute can be arrived at an order came to be passed on 08.04.2009 which reads as under: “Heard Mr. Desai learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Raval learned advocate for the respondent. Mr. Raval learned advocate for the respondent has placed on record a copy of the proposal offered by respondent to the petitioner for settlement of the dispute. Mr. Desai learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the consideration is likely to take sometime. In this view of the matter limited consensus between the parties has been arrived at as regards admission of the petition, thus on joint request, Rule. Ad-interim relief granted earlier to continue, however with clarification that it will be for the petitioner Corporation to take into consideration offer made by the respondent as full and final settlement upon further discussion in connection with the respondent's proposal. If settlement is arrived at it would be open for the parties to place the same on record with a request to dispose of the petition. Mr. Raval learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the Commissioner may take necessary decision on the respondent's proposal within reasonable time. Submission appears reasonable. Mr. Desai learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Commissioner will make all efforts to take appropriate decision within period of three months from today and that the Commissioner will take into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and difficult times that the respondent is going through. Direct service is permitted.” 5. Thereafter petition came tobe adjourned from time to time and with this background it has come up for final disposal before this Court on 29.09.2017 and on which date, at length, both the learned advocates have been heard by the Court. 6. Mr. Direct service is permitted.” 5. Thereafter petition came tobe adjourned from time to time and with this background it has come up for final disposal before this Court on 29.09.2017 and on which date, at length, both the learned advocates have been heard by the Court. 6. Mr. Pranav G. Desai, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner Corporation has submitted that there is a gross delay of more than 10 years in raising an industrial dispute for claiming employment on compassionate basis and, therefore, the claim is barred by principle of delay and laches. It has also been contended that after considering the policy prevailing in the Corporation twice the request of respondent herein came to be considered and rejected and, therefore, there is no just reason to now consider the case repeatatively once having been already decided and conveyed. It has also been contended by Mr. Desai, learned advocate that a Circular which is tried to be pressed into service dated 16.12.1991 which is part of the record at Exh.14/2, clause – (iv) a relevant clause is not meeting with the contingency for which the claim is generated by the respondent and, therefore, when the Circular itself is not applicable in a situation in which the claim was based before the Corporation, the findings arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer are perverse. Even on merits also the respondent is not fulfilling any eligibility criteria to claim the services by way of compassionate basis and, therefore, no case is made out which ought to have been considered by the learned Presiding Officer and having not considered the same the decision delivered by the learned Presiding Officer is not just and proper. It has also been contended by Mr. Desai that by now law is amply clear on the issue of compassionate appointment with the basic object is to provide immediate relief to the family which is suddenly placed into precarious position and therefore compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right even otherwise the same would violate basic principle of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which would also deprive other eligible candidate, who are waiting in queue for employment and here in the present case as per the say of Mr. Desai, learned advocate for the Corporation the rules are not permitting to consider the case of the respondent and therefore, rightly rejected in past which was also communicated to the respondent. It has also been contended by Mr. Desai, learned advocate that even when this Court in the year 2009 has observed to consider the case since the proposal was extended from the respondent the same was considered in its true perspective and ultimately found not possible to be accepted and, therefore, no relief by way of writ can be granted in favour of respondent. It has also been pointed out that the father of the respondent claimant was no doubt a permanent employee but he retired by way of normal circumstance on reaching age of superannuation. Since both sons of employee were working so some how an application is generated from the respondent claim who was married at the relevant point of time and was not even depending upon the father. The application was also grossly at a belated stage and, therefore since case does not fall within peripheral limit and condition of the agreement dated 07.07.1992 and other circular on record and relevant policy the Corporation has rightly not considered the case, and, therefore, when rules are not permitting to consider the claim the writ of mandamus cannot be issued as there is no legal right in favour of respondent to claim as a matter of right. There is no fundamental right or legal right is infringed by the Corporation which necessitates the Court to issue a writ of mandamus. 6.1 Mr. Desai, learned advocate for the petitioner Corporation has submitted that ultimately here is a claimant where despite no legal right has approached this Court to seek writ of mandamus which is otherwise not amenable in which the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer deserves to be interfered with. 7. In addition thereto Mr. 6.1 Mr. Desai, learned advocate for the petitioner Corporation has submitted that ultimately here is a claimant where despite no legal right has approached this Court to seek writ of mandamus which is otherwise not amenable in which the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer deserves to be interfered with. 7. In addition thereto Mr. Desai, learned advocate has submitted that record of the case and the averments contained in the claim statement coupled with the reply filed by Corporation if to be looked into in correction with the policy of the Corporation no case is made out by the respondent in the Court below and the findings arrived at while passing the award are not based upon true interpretation of evidence on record and is on the basis of misreading of the evidence, this is a fit case in which such perverse findings which have been arrived at deserve to be interfered with in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction. Mr. Desai, learned advocate has submitted that this Court has ample power to interfere even in extra ordinary jurisdiction especially when reasons are not germane and the findings are perverse and there appears to be a clear manifest error in passing the award and hence requests the Court to accept the petition and grant relief as prayed for in the petition. 8. As against this, to oppose the stand of the Corporation Mr. R.D.Raval, learned advocate appearing for the respondent has vehemently contended that there is a clear dishonesty on the part of petitioner Corporation to approach by way of petition. It has been contended that when the failure report was submitted while making Reference to the learned Presiding Officer such order of Reference was not challenged by the Corporation and, therefore, they have acquiesced their right to oppose the award. It was pointed out that there is a specific assertion in the claim statement that respondent claimant was eligible to seek compassionate employment at a relevant point of time and to meet with the same, no cogent evidence is adduced by the Corporation, to indicate that she was not eligible and, therefore, this being a petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, such assertion since remained uncontroverted no interference be made. Mr. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further contended that the Corporation has chosen not to enter into witness box and led the evidence which can be believed by the Court below. Mere filing of written statement without proving evidence is nothing but merely a piece of paper and therefore the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is rightly sustainable in eye of law. It was further contended that it is undisputed position on record that respondent claimant was a nominee of father who happened to be permanent employee of the Corporation and she was also receiving pension and after retirement she immediately applied for compassionate appointment, and, therefore, if there is any delay is caused on the part of the Corporation the same cannot be attributed to the respondent. Simply because the Reference is made at a much belated stage, such delay cannot be attributed to the respondent. Ultimately, Mr. Raval, learned advocate has submitted that this post in which the respondent is seeking employment is an unwilling post as majority of persons will not opt for this work though work is of essential in nature and, therefore, by showing some humanitarian approach, the Corporation ought to have considered the request made by the respondent and this was a very purpose when in the month of April, 2009 a request was made and the proposal was exchanged. The Corporation has no doubt taken a decision but is not in the right spirit and the object for which liberty to reconsider the claim was given. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has further contended that ultimately the statute i.e. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a benevolent legislation and, therefore, something has to be considered when the person has claimed before the Industrial Tribunal and if the compassionate appointment is to be granted such would be an innocuous relief since no financial burden can be shouldered by the petitioner Corporation and looking to the award which is passed, there is no monetary liability is fixed on the Corporation which would not be a hindrance if relief can be considered even at this stage. After pointing out this, Mr. After pointing out this, Mr. Raval, learned advocate has submitted that ultimately respondent is a poor lady coming from a lower strata of society and when Industrial Disputes Act was prescribed no limitation in raising the industrial dispute even if it is at a belated stage Court can consider relief in absence of any embargo. Ultimately Mr. Raval, learned advocate has contended that the learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Court has arrived at a finding based upon evidence and such finding may not be disturbed in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction. It was pointed out further that ultimately Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not for re-appreciation of evidence but to see whether any manifest error is committed by the Court below. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has submitted that it is undisputed that respondent claimant is belonging to Scheduled Caste community and on the contrary Government has, nowadays, promoted the Scheduled Caste community by framing various schemes of different nature, and, therefore, when the Corporation itself has entered into an agreement it would be a boundend duty of the Corporation to give effect to the policy which has been framed in past and, therefore, after giving some sympathetic and reasonable treatment the claim deserves to be considered. Mr. Raval, learned advocate has then alternatively submitted that if the employment is not possible to be extended to respondent workman by the Corporation, then some suitable lumpsum compensation by way of financial assistance be provided to the respondent which would meet the end of justice and then submitted to dismiss the petition. No other submissions have been made. 9. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record, following circumstances are not possible to be ignored by this Court even while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction. No other submissions have been made. 9. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record, following circumstances are not possible to be ignored by this Court even while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction. 9.1 First of all before dealing with case on hand, the law on the subject has to be considered for compassionate appointment which has been drastically modified looking to the situation by catena of decisions and hence before proceeding to appreciate the entitlement of the respondent about her claim to be accommodated on compassionate basis, the Court thinks it proper to refer to some of the pronouncements in the field pertaining to that issue in case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Pankaj Kumar Vishnoi reported in (2013) 11 SCC 178 , more particularly in paras:11 to 15 read thus. “11. Umesh Kumar Nagpal v state of Haryana while dealing with the concept of compassionate appointment the Court has observed that: (SCC p.140, para 2) “2. …....The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. …......mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependent of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution.” 12. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependent of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution.” 12. In SAIL v. Madhusudan Das [ (2008) 15 SCC 560 ] this Court reiterating the principle has stated thus:-(SCC p.566, para 15) "15. This Court in a large number of decisions has held that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefor viz. that the death of the sole bread winner of the family, must be established. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependant of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right." 13. In SBI v. Anju Jain [ (2008) 8 SCC 475 ] it has been clearly stated that: (SCC p.481, para 31) "31.... Appointment on compassionate ground is never considered to be a right of a person. In fact, such appointment is violative of rule of equality enshrined and guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. As per the settled law, when any appointment is to be made in Government or semi-government or in public office, cases of all eligible candidates are be considered alike. The State or its instrumentality making any appointment to public office, cannot ignore the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. At the same time, however, in certain circumstances, appointment on compassionate ground of dependants of the deceased employee is considered inevitable so that the family of the deceased employee may not starve. The primary object of such scheme is to save the bereaved family from sudden financial crisis occurring due to death of the sole bread winner. It is an exception to the general rule of equality and not another independent and parallel source of employment." (emphasis in original) 14. The primary object of such scheme is to save the bereaved family from sudden financial crisis occurring due to death of the sole bread winner. It is an exception to the general rule of equality and not another independent and parallel source of employment." (emphasis in original) 14. "In Union of India and Another v. Shashank Goswami [ (2012) 11 SCC 307 ] it has been observed that: "9.... the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is based on the premise that the applicant was dependant on the deceased employee. Strictly, such a claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service, and, therefore, appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be claimed as a matter of right." 15. "In SBI v. Raj Kumar [ (2010) 11 SCC 661 ] it has been ruled that (SCC p.664, para8): "8.... The dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is, therefore, traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever outside such scheme.” Yet another decision of the Apex Court reported in I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi (2007) 6 SCC 162 , the Apex Court, while dealing with such an issue, has observed like this which deserves to be quoted hereinafter. “7. Public employment is considered to be a wealth. It in terms of the constitutional scheme cannot be given on descent. When such an exception has been carved out by this Court, the same must be strictly complied with. Appointment on compassionate ground is given only for meeting the immediate hardship which is faced by the family by reason of the death of the bread earner. It in terms of the constitutional scheme cannot be given on descent. When such an exception has been carved out by this Court, the same must be strictly complied with. Appointment on compassionate ground is given only for meeting the immediate hardship which is faced by the family by reason of the death of the bread earner. When an appointment is made on compassionate ground, it should be kept confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for endless compassion.” Now, keeping this proposition on the issue in mind, yet another decision in the case of SBI vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 is also since relevant quoted herein after. “8. It is now well settled that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to participate in the selection process. The dependents of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever outside such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can be made only if the scheme is in force and not after it is abolished/withdrawn. It follows therefore that when a scheme is abolished, any pending application seeking appointment under the scheme will also cease to exist, unless saved. The mere fact that an application was made when the scheme was in force, will not by itself create a right in fravour of the applicant.” 9.2 Now in the backdrop of aforesaid proposition of law in mind, if we analyze the facts of the case on hand, it would make it clear that there is no absolute right in favour of the respondent to seek employment on compassionate basis. In addition thereto there appears to be a gross delay of more than period of ten years in between aspect also to be kept in mind. In addition thereto there appears to be a gross delay of more than period of ten years in between aspect also to be kept in mind. Further, from the record, it is undisputed that twice the request of the respondent was considered and petitioner Corporation thought it fit not to extend such benefit to the respondent and while taking decision, it also appears that the relevant circulars pertaining to the issue have also been taken note of and, therefore, even on merits also the petitioner authority found that respondent is not eligible in view of policy which was prevailing. 9.3 For the purpose of consideration of the claim put forth by the respondent, it also appears that there is a categorical stand taken by the Corporation even in the Court below about the gross delay of ten years in referring the dispute about the adjudication and further the father of the respondent claimant had got superannuated on 31.08.1991 and at the time when the father got himself superannuated from the services, the respondent claimant was married who was not entitled in view of eligible criteria to seek employment on compassionate basis. In addition thereto there were two sons who were serving somewhere and therefore simply because in the nomination the name of the respondent claimant was mentioned, no right to be crystallized in her favour. There further appears to be a clear assertion by the petitioner Corporation that at the time when question crops up for considering the claim, it was not evident from the record that, she was neither destitute nor had divorced and, therefore, in view of this specific stand being taken, the circulars on the contrary runs counter to the respondent rather than in aid. Even Clause (iv) of the said Circular dated 16.12.1991 is not coming to rescue to the respondent and as such there is no eligibility being fulfilled as is evident which fact appears to have lost sight by the learned Presiding Officer. A bare perusal of the Circular in question if further to be looked into then even in special case if the case is to be considered then no other child must be having any income and married daughter if taking responsibility of maintenance and having no other child with retired employee only then as a special case claim can be considered. But even this is also not visible in the present case, and, therefore, even on merit there appears to be no eligibility of respondent. To this Court record reflects that respondent is not fulfilling any criteria and the learned Presiding Officer while considering the policy and the Circular as possible lost sight of the clause relevant content in the circular. In furtherance of this position prevailing on record, except bare assertion there is no cogent reason available to substantiate the award and the amended affidavit also which has been submitted on record of the Court at Exh.18 an assertion is reflecting that after divorce she came to parental house but it also not coming out specifically that when on 31.08.1991 father got superannuated as a routine retirement that she was in any way eligible to claim employment on such base, and, therefore, it appears to this Court also that respondent is not in a position to claim such employment as a matter of right. Long duration of time which has lapsed would also disentitle the respondent to seek such employment and if at this stage the same is to be considered, it would be frustrating the very object for which such kind of employment is being offered and therefore keeping the aforesaid proposition of law in mind and in addition to the relevant record, which is available on the petition, Court is of the considered opinion that findings arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is not only perverse but reflects a clear non-application of mind. Further in view of the aforesaid situation, which is prevailing, the contentions which have been raised by Mr. Raval, learned advocate representing the respondent are devoid of merit. Here, in the present case, what has been challenged is an ultimate award which has been pressed by the learned Presiding Officer on its own merit, and, therefore, simply because the original award making a Reference is not challenged, it cannot be said that the petitioner is not in a position to challenge the ultimate final award. On the contrary, without raising such kind of issues before the Court below both the sides have participated in adjudication of impugned Reference and after hearing at length the award came to be passed and, therefore, this contention is not possible to be accepted in the background of the present facts. Another contention which has been raised by Mr. On the contrary, without raising such kind of issues before the Court below both the sides have participated in adjudication of impugned Reference and after hearing at length the award came to be passed and, therefore, this contention is not possible to be accepted in the background of the present facts. Another contention which has been raised by Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the respondent is that the petitioner has not chosen to enter into witness box and, therefore entire stand can be ignored. This aspect is also not possible to be considered in view of the fact that a specific assertion which has been made by the respondent while raising claim has to independently establish on his own and in view of the settled propositions of law that person, who asserts, the claim has to independently establish, irrespective of the defects and from the entire material on record, as stated earlier, this is not a case in which respondent has put forth any legal right by substantiating any independent material and in addition thereto this kind of hyper technical contention, though found to be attractive, does not seem to have been raised before the Trial Court and on the contrary respondent has allowed the entire adjudication to go on till the final award came to be passed, and, therefore, it is not possible for this Court to allow such technicality to be raised at this stage at the instance of the respondent more particularly when there is no legal right established of any nature. On the contrary, the Court found that there is no explanation about the delay which occurred at the instance of respondent in agitating the claim. Even during pendency of petition, no efforts made to precipitate claim vigorously except waiting for final hearing in 2017. No doubt the Industrial Disputes Act is benevolent legislation but such benevolence object cannot be stretched to that aspect where even if there is no legal right and even if gross delay, no undue sympathy to be shown under the guise of benevolence. The Court is not inclined to accept such contention at the behest of learned counsel for the respondent. It is settled position of law that no undue sympathy is to be shown to a litigant who has not come forward so promptly. The Court is not inclined to accept such contention at the behest of learned counsel for the respondent. It is settled position of law that no undue sympathy is to be shown to a litigant who has not come forward so promptly. So far as alternative compensation issue is concerned, since the Court found that there is no legal right of whatsoever nature to claim such benefit of compassionate appointment and there is a gross delay of more than ten years and no effective steps appear to have been taken so promptly, the Court is not in a position to accept when the main relief of seeking compassionate employment and since the main relief is not possible to be accepted as such, as found not justiciable, there is hardly any reason to accept the plea of alternative compensation. Such alternative compensation is not bounty but has to be supported by some legal background and when such legal right is completely missing, in this peculiar set of circumstance, the plea of alternative compensation in lieu of reinstatement is not possible to be accepted and, therefore, no such contention was raised before the Court and same is not supported by any documentary evidence or material on record and, therefore, contentions raised by the learned counsel are though attractive not possible to be accepted. Hence, the case of the petitioner is clearly made out. 9.4 Normally in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction the findings arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer is not to be disturbed, however, in a given case if the findings are perverse to the record reflects clear deviation from the record and based upon misreading of evidence and thereby resulted in manifest error, then Court can certainly exercise jurisdiction even under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of such exercise are enlisted by one of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 , so succinctly, the Court is inclined to quote the same hereby the relevant paras 6 and 7 as under: “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while "deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while "deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ]. After considering various facets of the issue, the two-Judge Bench culled out the following principles : (SCC pp. 694- 96, para 38) “(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2000 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction – by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction – by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is selfevident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling fro correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ], and it was held: (SCC pp.347 -49, para 49) “(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] and the principles in Waryam Singh, [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, ‘within the bounds of their authority’. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997 (3) SCC 261 and therefore abridgment by a constitution amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 10. In the premise aforesaid, and in view of the facts and circumstances stated herein above, after examining the entire evidence on record and after hearing at length the learned counsel appearing for the respective sides and after considering their rival contentions Court is of the considered opinion that the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer is nothing but a manifest error hence in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction requires intervention of this Court. Accordingly, the award being found to be unsustainable in eye of law hence same deserves to be quashed and set aside and accordingly by allowing the petition, award dated 06.12.2007 passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Court No.2, Vadodara in Reference (IT) No.81 of 2000 is quashed and set aside hereby. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.