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2017 DIGILAW 177 (TRI)

Biswajit Das, S/O Sri. Haripada Das v. Bijan Roy Chowdhury, son of late Satyesh Roy Chowdhury

2017-03-24

S.TALAPATRA

body2017
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. A. Nandi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. A. Gon Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3, United India Insurance Company Limited. None appears for the remaining respondents despite due notice from this court. 2. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, from the judgment and award dated 02.09.2014 delivered in T.S (MAC) 179 of 2012 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South Tripura, Udaipur (now Gomati, Tripura). In the road traffic accident which occurred on 17.03.2011, the claimant-appellant received grievous injury. The accident occurred for rash and negligent driving of the auto rickshaw bearing No. TR-01-D-2189. The appellant herein filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and he stated in the claim petition that for negligent driving of the driver, the said auto rickshaw got capsized in the place of occurrence. The claimant appellant has adduced evidence. He has introduced the first information report in the evidence. 3. Mr. Nandi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has seriously asserted that despite such evidence and without being approached by the claimant appellant, the Tribunal converted the claimant petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and passed the impugned judgment and award to the serious prejudice of the claimant appellant. On scrutiny of the judgment it appears that the Tribunal has observed as under: “The sole evidence is not categorically denied and it is also supported by the FIR, injury report and discharge certificate. Respondents’ side had given no evidence to discard it. So, it is come to the safe conclusion that the petitioner sustained injury by motor vehicle accident on 17.03.2011. But, the fact of rash and negligent driving not proved by any other evidence. So, it is considered that accident occurred due to use of the vehicle no. TR-01-D-2189. Therefore, the claim petition under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act is maintainable”. Accordingly, the tribunal proceeded to decided the compensation. 4. But, the fact of rash and negligent driving not proved by any other evidence. So, it is considered that accident occurred due to use of the vehicle no. TR-01-D-2189. Therefore, the claim petition under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act is maintainable”. Accordingly, the tribunal proceeded to decided the compensation. 4. On scrutiny of the records of the evidence, this court finds that the claimant in his examination-in-chief has categorically stated that ‘the driver of the said vehicle from the very beginning had started to drive the vehicle with an abnormal high speed with rash and negligent manner, due to which after reaching in front of Kakraban R.D.Block, the driver of the vehicle had lost control over the vehicle and the vehicle capsized on the road as a result I have received grievous fracture injuries in my both legs, head, chest and color bone and other multiple bleeding injuries all over my body’. 5. Though the appellant (PW-1) was cross examined but that part was not even confronted by the respondents in any manner. Hence, Mr. Nandi, learned counsel is absolutely correct while contending that the said conversion was wholly unwarranted in law as it is not the business of the Tribunal to convert a claim petition, which is based on fault liability, to a claim petition of No Fault Liability. Moreover, the appreciation of the evidence is entirely perverse as the claimant-appellant has categorically stated that the accident could occur only for the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. This court has really taken aback on registering this kind of appreciation from the senior Judicial Officer who is holding the proceeding in the Tribunal. 6. Mr. Gon Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has fairly submitted that the procedure as adopted by the tribunal for conversion cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order is set aside but this court is of the further view that the compensation shall not be determined by this court as the components as considered by the tribunal in terms of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was wholly irrelevant in the context. Hence, the claim shall be re-determined by the tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Having held so, the case being T.S (MAC) 179 of 2012 is remanded for fresh decision by the tribunal. Hence, the claim shall be re-determined by the tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Having held so, the case being T.S (MAC) 179 of 2012 is remanded for fresh decision by the tribunal. It is to be mentioned here that this court having been approached by the claimant-appellant has admitted some additional documents which are also placed in the records of the trial court. Those shall be considered by the trial court. If the claimant-appellant is persuaded by relevance and discovery he may be given one solitary opportunity to lead the additional evidence. The claimant-appellant by filing a petition before the tribunal say that he would not adduce any further evidence and on the basis of the evidence that is already on record, the claim may be decided by the tribunal. The option lies with the claimant-appellant. If the claimant appellant is inclined to adduce any additional evidence, then the respondents shall have their right to cross-examine and to place the rebuttal evidence. Be that as it may, the entire process shall be completed by the tribunal preferably within a period of 6(six) months from the date when the tribunal shall receive the records from this court. 7. In terms of the above, this appeal stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Send down the LCRs forthwith. Copy of this order be furnished to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondent No.3.