JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Mr. Rathin Raval learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner for seeking quashing and setting aside the order dated 02.03.2015 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Rajkot below Exhibit-17 in Family Suit No. 335 of 2013. 2.1 The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner - husband had married to respondent - wife on 16.02.2002. Out of the said wedlock a child named Riva has been borne on 07.05.2007. The marriage did not last as a result of which it appears from the record that the present petitioner - husband has filed the proceedings before the Family Court for seeking judicial separation. The said proceedings have been registered as Family Suit No. 335 of 2013 before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Rajkot. In the meantime, an application came to be moved by the respondent - wife under sections 24 and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the purpose of seeking maintenance and costs of the proceedings on the premise that on account of the dire necessity of maintaining the minor child and to look after her studying and welfare and to sustain herself with minor daughter in this hardship, she needs at least Rs. 15,000/- per month and Rs. 10,000/- per month by way of interim maintenance for maintaining herself and for minor daughter. The said application appears to have been filed on 08.05.2014 and came to be contested by the petitioner - husband. The said application at Exhibit-17 was heard by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Rajkot, and it came to be partly allowed by passing the order of maintenance of Rs. 17,500/- per month from April, 2014 and thereby the application came to be disposed of. An additional amount of Rs. 7,500/- came to be given by way of costs of application. On 02.03.2015, the said order which has been passed is the impugned subject matter of present writ petition submitted before this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. The main premise on which the petition appears to have been submitted is that the petitioner - husband is earning a very meager amount and as against that earning of him, an extra amount of expenses to the extent of Rs. 3. The main premise on which the petition appears to have been submitted is that the petitioner - husband is earning a very meager amount and as against that earning of him, an extra amount of expenses to the extent of Rs. 17,500/- per month is awarded which in no circumstance is justifiable. It is further appearing from the record that the contention with regard to interim maintenance also appears to have been taken almost after a period of one and half year. It is also contended that the respondent-wife has sufficient funds to maintain herself and the child. It has also been mainly contended that it appears from the averment that the petitioner-husband is only earning Rs. 7,500/- per month by doing some job work and serving at factory and to indicate that a certificate is also attached with the petition compilation. The record indicates that this Court on 15.06.2015 after considering his specific averment about his income of Rs. 7000/- per month appears to have issue notice making it returnable on 29.06.2015. That notice came to be issued on condition that before the next returnable date, the petitioner-husband shall deposit a further sum of Rs. 50,000/- with the Family Court towards the arrears of maintenance under the impugned order and he shall continue to deposit the maintenance at the rate fixed by the Family Court in the impugned order. Upon such specific condition, the stay was granted against the recovery of arrears. The said order reads as under : "Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had produced certificate of the employer indicating that the petitioner's monthly income is Rs. 7,000/-. Family Court has awarded a sum of Rs. 17,500/- per month to the wife and child to be paid by the petitioner. 2. Notice returnable on 29th June, 2015. On condition that before returnable date the petitioner shall deposit a further sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with the Family Court towards arrears of maintenance under the impugned order and with further condition that he shall continue to deposit maintenance at the rate fixed by the Family Court for coming months including the present month of June, 2015, there shall be stay against recovery of arrears. Direct Service is permitted." 4. It appears that thereafter, the matter has travelled further in which Mr. Direct Service is permitted." 4. It appears that thereafter, the matter has travelled further in which Mr. Jignesh Hazare learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the compromise decree dated 29.06.2017 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 111 of 2013 filed by his father and under the said compromise decree several immovable properties have been agreed to have been shown as self-acquired properties of the father and the son had no right in any of the properties and by indicating the inability shown by the petitioner husband to meet with the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Mr. Hazare, learned advocate also appears to have been banking upon a public advertisement which has been given in the newspaper declaring that the daughter-in-law i.e. the respondent was taking false claim over his properties and that the son is already separated along with his wife. Prima facie, this Court has found the said compromise and declaration by the wife in the civil suit is highly doubtful and questionable resulting the records and proceedings from the learned trial Court has been called to examine the issue at length. After the said order being ordered on 10.08.2015, it appears that consistently the matter is rotating and hearing is not being attended by the learned advocate for the petitioner. The order-sheet indicates that several adjournments are sought and ultimately, the present petition has come up for hearing before this Court. 5. Today also, the petition is called out thrice during the course of the day, but learned advocate Mr. Jignesh Hazare for the petitioner has not appeared nor any mentioned is made on his behalf and as a result of that, the Court is constrained to take up the proceedings on merits. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Rathin Raval appearing for respondent - Wife has contended that while passing the order which is impugned in the petition, is just and proper and a reasonable stand is taken from the pleadings by the learned Judge to arrive at a conclusion. Mr. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Rathin Raval appearing for respondent - Wife has contended that while passing the order which is impugned in the petition, is just and proper and a reasonable stand is taken from the pleadings by the learned Judge to arrive at a conclusion. Mr. Rathin has further pointed out that while passing the order below Exhibit-17, the learned Judge has examined all the documents which are part of the record and only after perusing the same, the order came to be passed and hence when such order in exercise of discretion vested in law is passed after an application of mind, it cannot be said that no perversity is reflected from the order. Mr. Rathin has further pointed out that there is a specific note taken by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court about his certificate which is showing of the situation that the respondent and the petitioner while they were residing, were very much paying the monthly rent of Rs. 7,000/- which has been paid upto March, 2014 and in addition thereto, the child Riva who was admitted in SNK School, a reputed school of Rajkot, the fees with respect to that to the extent of Rs. 60,00070,000/- yearly has also been paid, which fact is not controverted and rather admitted and there is no controversy on that. Mr. Rathin Raval has further pointed out that on the basis of this undisputed fact, it is highly improbable that the petitioner is earning an amount of Rs. 7,000/- per month and paying fees for the education of the daughter to the extent of Rs. 60,00070,000/- yearly in addition thereto though their monthly earning is Rs. 7,000/- and, therefore, the learned Judge has rightly disbelieved the stand taken by the petitioner - husband. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court by learned advocate Mr. Rathin Raval that the certificate which is prior to be pressed into service dated 02.06.2014 at page 62 of petition compilation, a bare reading of the said certificate would clearly indicate that the same is nothing but a concoction on the part of the petitioner - husband who is avoiding responsibility of maintaining the respondent - wife and the child. From a bare reading of the certificate it clearly indicates from which date the petitioner is serving and doing the job work in the factory and for which Rs. From a bare reading of the certificate it clearly indicates from which date the petitioner is serving and doing the job work in the factory and for which Rs. 7,000/- per month is paid and in addition thereto, the employer has also given a residential accommodation in his own flat. This certificate and circumstance reflecting from it are highly questionable and therefore, the learned Judge has not committed any error in coming to the conclusion. 6.1. In addition thereto, learned advocate Mr. Rathin Raval has further pointed out that in the certificate dated 02.06.2014 a firm name which is reflecting is Multi Axis Engineers whereas the bank account which is operating in the name of the petitioner in the HDFC Bank is revealing some different firm named as Glare Techno. Mr. Rathin Raval has pointed out further from the said statement of the bank which is the part of the record, pertaining to the account of the petitioner in HDFC bank, Dr. Yagnik Road, Rajkot a specific indication is there on the statement of the petitioner as a `preferred customer' from various entries which are reflecting. Mr. Raval has pointed out an amount of Rs. 50,000/- is being paid by way of premium for life/general insurance as well the SNK School fees are also reflecting and, therefore, the bank statement is indicating that in a meager income of Rs. 7,000/- these transactions may not reflect and, therefore, the defence which has been taken before the Court below is sham and bogus which rightly has been examined and just order is passed in the interest of justice. Mr. Raval has further pointed out that from the records and proceedings, the school fees which are being paid upto March, 2014 are reflected and marked as 20/2 and the certificate which is being relied upon by the petitioner dated 02.06.2014 is also a part of the record and marked as 20/1 and, therefore, the learned Judge after examining these relevant record with regard to the income has rightly come to the conclusion and passed a just order which cannot be said to be in any way perverse which would warrant any interference. Mr. Mr. Raval has further pointed out that keeping in view the well settled proposition of law, relied upon by series of decisions, some of the decisions have also been relied upon and after detailed reasons contained in para 7, has passed a just order and it cannot be said to be unreasonable in any manner and, therefore, to sustain the respondent with the minor child and taking care of in all hardships of her life, this amount which has been awarded cannot be said to be unjust, arbitrary, unreasonable or illegal and, therefore, this being the position prevailing in the Court, Mr. Raval has requested that extra ordinary jurisdiction may not be exercised in the interest of justice. 7. Having heard the learned advocate for the respondent and having gone through the material on record, which is a part of the petition compilation, few facts are not possible to be unnoticed by the Court. 8. It is reflecting from the record that it is undisputed position that upto March, 2014, the petitioner was paying an amount of Rs. 7,000/- per month by way of rent and was also additionally paying school fees to the extent of Rs. 60,00070,000/- yearly. It is also not in dispute that the said amount was being paid regularly by the petitioner. 9. In addition thereto, the record also indicates that the certificate which has been relied upon at page 62 of the petition compilation is reflecting that he is earning Rs. 7000/- per month and if this certificate is to be compared with the transaction of the account in HDFC bank of the petitioner, the same is not possible to digest and, therefore, considering this position prevailing on record and in view of the fact that since March, 2014, the petitioner has stopped paying maintenance resultantly, the respondent was dragged to course of law. The said circumstance is not possible to be ignored by this Court. It appears from the record that there are series of litigation inter se between the parties, but the same are at large before the appropriate forums today. This Court is concerned as to what has been challenged in the petition is the order dated 02.03.2015 passed below Exhibit-17. 10. It appears from the record that there are series of litigation inter se between the parties, but the same are at large before the appropriate forums today. This Court is concerned as to what has been challenged in the petition is the order dated 02.03.2015 passed below Exhibit-17. 10. It is also appearing from the record that adequate reasons are assigned by the learned Judge and what has been awarded is not from the date of the application but it has been awarded from the stage where the petitioner husband has stopped paying i.e. March, 2014 and, therefore, when such order is passed based upon and relied upon a judicial pronouncement as reflected in paragraph 6 of the impugned order, this Court is of the view that such well reasoned order after application of the mind has been passed, does not deserve to be interfered with in exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. The law is amply clear of exercising writ jurisdiction in which it is not possible to substitute the findings which have been arrived at in absence of any material irregularity or perversity of any nature. This Court after careful consideration of relevant record of the present proceedings and the reasons assigned by the learned Judge is of the view that the presumption put into perversity or any material irregularity which resulted into any miscarriage of justice and hence this Court is not inclined to exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction. The fact finding Court at interim stage has considered every material and only thereafter, passed the order in exercise of judicial discretion vested in law and, therefore, this is not a fit case where writ jurisdiction deserves to be exercised. In view of the settled position of law on the issue of exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction and some of the relevant observations from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta Through PA Holder v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 , are taken note of, more particularly para 6 and 7, which read as under : "6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, 2003(6) SCC 675 . After following various facets of the issue, the two-Judge Bench called out the following principles : (SCC pp.694-96, para 38) "(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above-said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in super session or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010(8) SCC 329 , and it was held: (SCC pp. 347-49, para 49) "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997(3) SCC 261 , and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 11. Considering the aforesaid situation, the petition being devoid of merit, the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed. Interim relief stands vacated forthwith. While passing this order, the petitioner is directed to clear all the arrears and running interim maintenance which has been awarded by virtue of the order impugned in the petition within a period of three months from today, failing which appropriate steps is permitted to be taken by the respondent for such recovery. It is needless to say that the conditional order which has been passed by this Court on 15.06.2017 must have been complied with and if not, it is open for the respondent to take appropriate legal action in connection with the violation of the said condition contained in the order dated 15.06.2015. 12. With the above observations, the petition stands disposed of. Rule is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. 13. R&P to be sent forthwith.