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2017 DIGILAW 1772 (JHR)

Madhusudan v. State of Jharkhand

2017-10-11

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2017
ORDER : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 7.6.2017 passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee (hereinafter referred to as "CSC"), State of Jharkhand, whereby the claim of the petitioner for Scheduled Caste status has been rejected and the order was forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Home, Prison & Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing the enquiry report dated 29.7.2015 submitted by the three Member Enquiry Committee on the ground that the Committee has incorporated distorted facts in its report. 2. The case of the petitioner as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner was born on 21.2.1964 in a Baniya family (OBC) in the house of one Jadunandan Prasad. His natural father was a poor newspaper hawker.' One Rameshwar Paswan who was an agricultural labourer was a close friend and neighbour of the natural father of the petitioner and was issueless, whereas the petitioner has four brothers. It was agreed upon by the natural father of the petitioner and Rameshwar Paswan that his natural father would give the petitioner in adoption to Rameshwar Paswan and as such, the adoption process was completed on 10.3.1978 in the presence of the Mukhia Shri Suresh Kumar Singh, villagers and family members. After the adoption, affidavits were executed by the natural father and adoptive father of the petitioner before the Executive Magistrate, Nawada vide oath nos. 913 and 914 respectively both dated 4.4.1979. Thereafter, in the School Admission Book of Government High School, Kauwakol, Nawada, Bihar, the name of the father of the petitioner was also changed by inserting the name of the adoptive father in place of the natural father. The petitioner, after completing his schooling, graduated from the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad and served as Mining Engineer at BCCL, Dhanbad from September, 1986 to September, 1992. Thereafter, he appeared in the 37th Combined Civil Services Examination as Scheduled Caste candidate and was declared successful in the said examination conducted by Bihar Public Service Commission and joined the Bihar Police Service as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Subsequently, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner alleging that he secured appointment in Bihar Police Service by submitting false caste certificate. Subsequently, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner alleging that he secured appointment in Bihar Police Service by submitting false caste certificate. The petitioner challenging the show-cause notice filed C.W.J.C. No. 14254 of 2001 before the Patna High Court, wherein it was held by the learned Single Judge that the petitioner was given in adoption for getting benefit in the employment, but on equitable consideration, the learned Single Judge allowed the petitioner to continue in service with a condition that he would not be entitled for benefits of reservation in future. Aggrieved thereby, the State-respondents filed L.P.A. No. 708 of 2002 before the Patna High Court and the learned Division Bench held that the petitioner was not entitled for the benefit of reservation in the matter of appointment as a Scheduled Caste candidate and the termination of the petitioner from service was justified. However, the question as to whether the petitioner by virtue of his marks scored in the Bihar Civil Services Examination is entitled to any post in the Bihar Civil Service under any category, was left open for decision of the State Government. Thereafter, the petitioner made representation before the State of Bihar and in the meantime in the year 2003, his service was allocated to the State of Jharkhand. After about 10 years, the State of Jharkhand took a decision to initiate a proceeding for terminating the service of the petitioner vide Memo No. 4051 dated 10.8.2013 which was challenged by the petitioner in W.P.(S) No. 440 of 2014. In the meantime, the Government of Jharkhand took a cabinet decision on 24.5.2014 to verify the caste status of the petitioner by the Caste Scrutiny Committee (CSC) in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil & Ors. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Ors." reported in (1994) 6 SCC 241 . The petitioner filed a petition along with the relevant documents before the CSC, but the Committee vide impugned order dated 7.6.2017 held that no legal procedure was followed during alleged adoption of the petitioner and also no evidence was produced to show that the petitioner ever lived with his adoptive father. 3. Mr. The petitioner filed a petition along with the relevant documents before the CSC, but the Committee vide impugned order dated 7.6.2017 held that no legal procedure was followed during alleged adoption of the petitioner and also no evidence was produced to show that the petitioner ever lived with his adoptive father. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed by the CSC suffers from illegality as the same is based on an enquiry report without applying its independent mind. The CSC has accepted the inquiry report without getting it proved by the maker and subjecting it to further cross-examination. The evidence on affidavit filed by the petitioner was not disputed by any authority before the CSC and, therefore, the CSC was not justified in not considering the said evidence. It is further submitted that there are glaring contradictions in the statements recorded in the video recording and the hard copy contained in the enquiry report and the said contradictions were though highlighted before the CSC, but the CSC failed to take into consideration those facts at the time of passing the impugned order. It is further submitted that neither the enquiry report nor the impugned order was provided to the petitioner and he came to know about the enquiry report through RTI and the impugned order through the media. It is further submitted that the CSC while adjudicating the issue of social status of the petitioner, has dealt with the issue of adoption of the petitioner in wrong manner. It is further submitted that a document which is more than 30 years old and issued by the competent authority shall be presumed to be legally executed. The petitioner had filed the entire documents in 'support of the fact that since the date' of adoption i.e.; 10.3.1978, he remained with the adoptive family, but the CSC while passing the impugned order totally ignored all those documents. It is further submitted, that during enquiry, the Committee was reconstituted but the petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing before the newly constituted Committee which is a clear violation of principles of natural justice. It is further submitted, that during enquiry, the Committee was reconstituted but the petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing before the newly constituted Committee which is a clear violation of principles of natural justice. All the documents corroborating the facts of adoption were issued by the competent authorities immediately after the adoption which includes the matriculation certificate, School Leaving Certificate (SLC) and caste certificate, thus, there is also no valid reason to dispute the school admission register. The CSC of the State of Jharkhand, being the quasi-judicial body, should not have redelegated the role of making enquiry to the Bihar Caste Scrutiny Committee, rather it should have enquired the matter of its own and should have prepared the report. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment rendered by the Patna High Court in the case of "Parwati Bhandar vs. State of Bihar and Ors." reported in 1991(2) PLJR 774 and submits that the delegatee cannot delegate its power to any other body or authority. It is further submitted that enquiry committee at no point of time issued any notice to the petitioner nor afforded opportunity of hearing. It is further submitted that the age of the petitioner at the time of adoption was wrongly considered as 15-16 years on the basis of evidence of witnesses Y.K. Lal and R.S. Lal. In fact, from the audio visual recording prepared by the enquiry team, it would appear that Y.K. Lal stated that the age of the petitioner at the time of adoption was 5-7 years, whereas R.S. Lal stated the age of the petitioner to be 10-11 years, but the same were not taken into consideration by the CSC. It is further submitted that the entire evidence given by the petitioner as well as by the enquiry team would show that the petitioner was given in adoption to late Rameshwar Paswan. It is further submitted that the registration of the deed of adoption is not mandatorily required under law. The learned Senior Counsel also relies on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Mst. Param Pal Singh through father Vs. M/s National Insurance Co. & Anr." reported in (2013)3 SCC 409 and submits that there is no statutory stipulation that the registration of adoption-deed is required to be mandatorily done. The learned Senior Counsel also relies on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Mst. Param Pal Singh through father Vs. M/s National Insurance Co. & Anr." reported in (2013)3 SCC 409 and submits that there is no statutory stipulation that the registration of adoption-deed is required to be mandatorily done. It is further submitted that after the death of the adoptive father, although the funeral was not performed by the petitioner as he was posted in the interiors of Dhanbad, however, other rituals were performed by him. The affidavits sworn by the natural father and the adoptive father of the petitioner were not accepted by the CSC on the ground that the office of the Executive Magistrate failed to produce the original register though burden was upon the State as it is the custodian of the said register and not the petitioner. After the adoption, the petitioner lived and maintained his relationship with his adoptive father till his lifetime and after the death of the adoptive father, the petitioner also performed his "Shradh" karma. On perusal of the enquiry report, it would appear that at the time of adoption, the age of the petitioner was not above 15 years. Thus, the adoption is valid in terms of Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The finding of the CSC is also perverse in view of the fact that the statements which have been taken into consideration are of the incompetent and unreliable witnesses. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment rendered in the case of "L. Debi Prasad (dead) by L.Rs. VS. Smt. Tribeni Devi & Ors." reported in (1970)1 SCC 677 and submits that in judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not, one has to bear in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof in support of such adoption. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also puts emphasis on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra) [sub-para (9) of paragraph no. 13] and submits that the CSC is required to complete the proceeding within a period not exceeding two months. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also puts emphasis on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra) [sub-para (9) of paragraph no. 13] and submits that the CSC is required to complete the proceeding within a period not exceeding two months. However, in the present case, the CSC has taken 3 years in concluding the proceeding and thus, the same is - ab-initio bad in law. The learned Senior Counsel further relies on the judgment rendered in the case of. "Dayaram Vs. Sudhir Batham & Ors." reported in (2012)1 SCC 333 and submits that the judgment rendered in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra) has substantively been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with certain modification. The learned Senior Counsel also put reliance on the judgment rendered by this court in the case of "The State of Bihar & Ors. VS. Kumari Abha" reported in 2002(2) JLJR 627 . 4. Per Contra, Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent-State of Jharkhand submits that late Rameshwar Paswan was not issueless, rather he had a daughter who died at the age of 4 years. It is further submitted that in the school register, the name of the father was written as Jadunandan Prasad, but the same has been changed by cutting in red ink which appears to have been done recently. It is further submitted that in the alleged affidavits of the natural father and adoptive father, the date of birth of the petitioner is different and there is vast difference in the serial numbers of both the affidavits which creates doubt over the genuinity of the affidavits. It is further submitted that the original register was never produced by the Office of the Executive Magistrate, Nawada in spite of reminders and as such, the alleged affidavits cannot be accepted. It is further submitted that the proper procedure of adoption was not followed and no concrete documentary evidence in this regard has been produced by the petitioner before the CSC. It is also submitted that the petitioner failed to produce any evidence to show that the petitioner ever stayed with late Rameshwar Paswan in his house and his last rites were done by him, rather in the evidence, it has come that the same was done by one Suraj Paswan. It is also submitted that the petitioner failed to produce any evidence to show that the petitioner ever stayed with late Rameshwar Paswan in his house and his last rites were done by him, rather in the evidence, it has come that the same was done by one Suraj Paswan. It is further submitted that the petitioner was afforded ample opportunity of hearing including the opportunity to 'produce supporting documents, but he failed to establish his claim as held by the CSC. The learned Additional Advocate General while referring to sub-para (10) of paragraph no. 13 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra) submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court has also clarified so as to deal with the situation where the proceeding of the CSC is not concluded within a period of 2 months. Thus, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that if the enquiry is not concluded and the report is not prepared within a period of 2 months, the CSC would become functus officio, is not correct. So far as the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the CSC of the State of Jharkhand could not have delegated the enquiry to the CSC of Bihar, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that paragraph no. 3 of the impugned order itself makes it clear that since the concerned Village Sekhodeora is situated in the District-Nawada (Bihar), which is out of the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand, a request was made to the Government of Bihar to send the report on 5 points, which has been detailed in the impugned order itself. So far as conducting an enquiry by the CSC of Government of Jharkhand is concerned, the learned Advocate General puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of "State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Ravi Prakash Babulalsingh Parmar & Anr." reported in (2007)1 SCC 80 (this judgment has also been relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner) and submits that the provisions of Indian Evidence Act is not applicable for the purpose of enquiry to be conducted by the CSC. vs. Ravi Prakash Babulalsingh Parmar & Anr." reported in (2007)1 SCC 80 (this judgment has also been relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner) and submits that the provisions of Indian Evidence Act is not applicable for the purpose of enquiry to be conducted by the CSC. The CSC may devolve its own procedure for making an enquiry to collect proper evidence so as not to cause any injustice to the concerned person, however, it cannot be restricted to any particular procedure. The learned Additional Advocate General referring to paragraph no. 5 of the Instructions of the Government of India dated 2.5.1975 (Annexure-2/11 to the writ petition) submits that in cases where a person claims to be a Scheduled 'Caste on the ground that he has been adopted by a Scheduled Caste person the validity of the said adoption has to be clearly established before any caste certificate is issued. The onus of proof is on the person who claims to be adopted by a Scheduled Caste person. It is further submitted that paragraph no. 9 of the impugned order itself indicates that on 4.3.2016, the petitioner appeared before the Chairman of the CSC and his statement was also recorded. The learned Additional Advocate General also refers to page no.74 of the writ petition which is a declaration by one Suresh Kumar Singh the then Mukhia, Village Panchayat-Sekhodeora, District-Nawada, Bihar and submits that the petitioner has claimed his date of birth to be 21.2.1964 and as per the statement of said Mukhia, the adoption was made on 4.4.1979. Thus, taking both the dates together, the petitioner was more than 15 years of age on the date of adoption. It is thus, submitted by the learned AAG that the impugned order passed by the CSC is completely justified and the same does not warrant interference by this court. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on going through the documents placed on record, it appears that the petitioner has claimed that he was born on 21.2.1964 in a backward class family, but subsequently at 14 years of age on 10.3.1978, he was taken in adoption by one Rameshwar Paswan (a scheduled caste person) as per Hindu customary law in front of the villagers. After the adoption, his natural father as well as adoptive father executed affidavits before the Executive Magistrate, Nawada on 4.4.1979 and thereafter, his father's name was also changed in the school register. Subsequently, the petitioner was issued caste certificates of scheduled caste on 25.4.1979, 13.8.1987 and 5.2.1992. The petitioner carne out successful in 37th Combined Civil Services Examination conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission as a Scheduled Caste category candidate and was thus selected for Bihar Police Service and was posted as Deputy Superintendent of Police but subsequently he was issued show-cause stating therein that he secured appointment on the basis of false caste certificate. After the petitioner's service was allocated to the State of Jharkhand, a decision was taken vide Memo No. 4051 dated 10.8.2013 to start a proceeding for terminating the petitioner from service, but later on the Government of Jharkhand took a cabinet decision on 24.5.2014 to get the caste status of the petitioner verified by the CSC in terms with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra). Finally, the CSC found that no legal procedure was followed during alleged adoption of the petitioner and also no evidence has been produced to show that the petitioner ever lived with his adoptive father. In the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has streamlined the procedure for issuance of Social Status Certificate, its scrutiny and approval. It has been held inter alia that there would be a Caste Scrutiny Committee in every State, which on an application for verification of the caste certificate, shall get it investigated by a Vigilance Cell consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in overall charge and other police officers. For the investigation, the Inspector would go to the local place of residence and the original place from where the candidate hails and usually resides or in case of migration, to the place from where- he originally hailed from. The Vigilance Officer should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed by the candidate or the parents or guardian, as the case may be. He should also examine the school records, birth registration, if any. The said officer should also examine the parents, guardian or the candidate in relation to their caste etc. The Vigilance Officer should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed by the candidate or the parents or guardian, as the case may be. He should also examine the school records, birth registration, if any. The said officer should also examine the parents, guardian or the candidate in relation to their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social status of the candidate and then submit a report to the Directorate together with all particulars as envisaged in the proforma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes relating to their peculiar anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the castes or tribes or tribal communities concerned. 6. In the present case, when the matter reached the CSC of the State of Jharkhand, it took a decision that since the matter is related to a district situated in the State of Bihar which is beyond its territorial jurisdiction, it would be appropriate to call for a report from the Government of Bihar on five points, all related with respect to the adoption of the petitioner. Finally, the CSC vide impugned order dated 7.6.2017, rejected the Caste Certificate of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner failed to produce any legal document to show that he was legally adopted by his adoptive father. It appears from the impugned order that none of the witnesses have categorically denied the adoption of the petitioner. However, there are variance in the statements of the witnesses examined by the Investigating Committee of the State of Bihar with regard to the age of the petitioner at the time of adoption. Four witnesses appear to have been examined by the Investigating Committee relating to the age of the petitioner at the time of adoption. The CSC at paragraph no. 13 of the impugned order has stated that as per the C.D. submitted by the Investigating Committee, witness Rajendra Prasad stated the age of the petitioner as 22-25 years, Suraj Paswan stated 18-20 years, Jugal Kishore Lal stated that the petitioner was adopted in young age and Ravi Shankar Prasad stated that the petitioner was 15 years at the time of adoption. However, in paragraph no. However, in paragraph no. 6 of the impugned order also, the statements of Jugal Kishore Lal and Ravi Shankar Prasad have been recorded where it has been mentioned that Jugal Kishore Lal stated that the age of the petitioner at the time of adoption was 15-16 years and Ravi Shankar Prasad has stated that the age of the petitioner was 10/15 years at the time of adoption. 7. However, in the Matric certificate produced by the petitioner which was issued in the year 1980, the name of the father of the petitioner has been mentioned as Rameshwar Paswan and at that time, the petitioner was aged about 16 years. The first caste certificate was issued to the petitioner on 25.4.1979 which is also a Government document. Thus, it is hard to believe that the petitioner was adopted after the age of 15 years. The witnesses namely, Rajendra Prasad and Suresh Paswan appear to have lack of knowledge about the exact age of the petitioner at the time of adoption. So far the other witnesses i.e., Jugal Kishore and Ravi Shankar Prasad are concerned, their statements were incorporated at two places with two different versions which also create doubt about their knowledge as to the date 9f adoption of the petitioner. On the other hand, the petitioner in support of his claim filed the affidavits of Mukhiya Birendra Kumar Singh and 31 villagers who have stated that the petitioner was taken in adoption at the age of 14 years as per Hindu Customary Law and after adoption, the petitioner came in the house of Rameshwar Paswan and performed all his obligation as .the son of Rameshwar Paswan. 8. Since, there is variance in the statements of the witnesses as to the age of the petitioner, the same cannot be taken into consideration by this court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, I am proceeding with the case by taking into consideration the age of petitioner as 14 years at the time of adoption as has been claimed by the petitioner himself. The CSC rejected the claim of the petitioner mainly on the ground that the petitioner has not produced any legal document/registered adoption deed to prove his adoption and the alleged affidavits of his natural father as well as the adoptive father have also not been proved. The CSC rejected the claim of the petitioner mainly on the ground that the petitioner has not produced any legal document/registered adoption deed to prove his adoption and the alleged affidavits of his natural father as well as the adoptive father have also not been proved. It has further been observed in the impugned order that the "Shradh" of late Rameshwar Paswan was also not performed by the petitioner, however, he had given money for performing last rites of late Rameshwar Paswan. 9. So far the observation of the CSC with regard to the necessity of registration and legal requirement of adoption is concerned, the judgment cited on behalf of the petitioner in the case of "Param Pal Singh vs. National Insurance Co." (supra) is relevant. Paragraph Nos. 11 to 14 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: 11. In the first instance we wish to deal with the issue relating to validity of the adoption of the appellant since if only his adoption is held to be valid there is scope for examining his right to claim compensation over the death of the deceased as his adopted son. 12. In Hindu Law in the celebrated decision of this Court reported in Lakshman Singh Kothari (supra), the legal requirement for a valid adoption has been succinctly stated in paragraph 10 which reads as under: "10. The law may be briefly stated thus: Under the Hindu Law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption is obviously to secure due publicity. To achieve this object it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it. The exigencies of the situation arising out of diverse circumstances necessitated the introduction of the doctrine of delegation; and, therefore, the parents, after exercising their volition to give and take the boy in adoption, may both or either of them delegate the physical act of handing over the boy or receiving him, as the case may be, to a third party." 13. The said legal position has been consistently followed by this Court which can be mentioned by referring to a recent-decision of this Court reported in M. Gurudas and Others vs. Rasaranjan and Others, (2006)8 SCC 367 . Paragraphs 26 and 27 are relevant for our purpose which read as under: "26. To prove valid adoption, it would be necessary to bring on record that there had been an actual giving and taking ceremony. Performance of "datta homam" was imperative, subject to just exceptions. Above all, as noticed hereinbefore, the question would arise as to whether adoption of a daughter was permissible in law. 27. In - Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 17th Edn., p. 710, it is stated: "488. Ceremonies relating to adoption.-(1) The ceremonies relating to an adoption are- (a) the physical act of giving and receiving, with intent to transfer the boy from one family into another; (b) the datta homam, that is, oblations of clarified butter to fire; and (c) other minor ceremonies, such as putresti jag (sacrifice for male issue). (2) The physical act of giving and receiving is essential to the validity of an adoption. As to datta homam it is not settled whether its performance is essential to the validity of an adoption in every case. As to the other ceremonies, their performance is not necessary to the validity of an adoption. (3) No religious ceremonies, not even datta homam, are necessary in the case of shudras. Nor are religious ceremonies necessary amongst Jains or in the Punjab." 14. In this context, it will be worthwhile to note the requirement of registration of an adoption deed. As to the other ceremonies, their performance is not necessary to the validity of an adoption. (3) No religious ceremonies, not even datta homam, are necessary in the case of shudras. Nor are religious ceremonies necessary amongst Jains or in the Punjab." 14. In this context, it will be worthwhile to note the requirement of registration of an adoption deed. Section 17 of the Registration Act specifically refers to the documents of which registration is compulsory. The deed of adoption is not one of the documents mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 17 which mandatorily requires registration. Sub-section (3) of Section 17 only refers to the mandatory requirement of registration of an authorization that may be given for adopting a son executed after 1.1.1872 if such authorization was not conferred by a will. Dealing with the said provision relating to authorisation, it has been held in the decision reported in Vishvanath Ramji Karate vs. Rahibai Ramji Karale and Others, AIR 1931 Bombay 105 by a deed of adoption as distinguished from authority to adopt does not require registration." 10. On perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that registration of adoption deed is not mandatorily required. It has also been held that there is no such legal procedure for a valid adoption. For a valid adoption, it is required to be proved from the fact of the case that a child has been given by the natural parents and taken by the adoptive parents. Thus, it appears that the CSC proceeded to decide the case of the petitioner on the basis of wrong assumption. The CSC has not gone to decide a very important and crucial issue as to whether the petitioner after adoption at the age of 14 years was entitled to the caste certificate of 'Scheduled Caste' on the ground that his adoptive father belonged to Scheduled Caste. Now, the question is as to whether this Court on the admitted facts available on record, can exercise the power of judicial review to decide the present lis. The extent of power of judicial review of the High Court in a similar matter has been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" '(supra), the relevant para of which is quoted hereinbelow: "15. The extent of power of judicial review of the High Court in a similar matter has been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" '(supra), the relevant para of which is quoted hereinbelow: "15. The question then is whether the approach adopted by the High Court in not elaborately considering the case is vitiated by an error of law. High Court is not a Court of appeal to appreciate the evidence. The Committee which is empowered to evaluate the evidence placed before it when records a finding of fact, it ought to prevail unless found vitiated by judicial review of any High Court subject to limitations of interference with findings of fact. The Committee when considers all the material facts and record a finding, though another view, as a Court of appeal may be possible, it is not a ground to reverse the findings. The Court has to see whether the Committee considered all the relevant material placed before it or has not applied its mind to relevant facts which have led the Committee ultimately record the finding. Each case must be considered in the backdrop of its own facts. " 11. From the aforesaid judgment, it transpires that the power of judicial review of the High Court in relation to the finding of fact arrived at by the Committee is limited. However, if the court sees that the Committee has not applied its mind to the relevant facts available on record which nave led the Committee to ultimately record its finding, then the court may exercise the power of judicial review. It has further been held that each case is required to be considered on its own fact. In the case in hand, although the CSC had sufficient factual materials on record, it failed in its duty to correctly apply the law and as such, I think it appropriate to discuss the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, with regard to the present issue on the basis of undisputed facts emerging in the present writ petition. 12. 12. The cases where a SC/ST woman marrying a man belonging to other caste and claiming reservation, the cases where offspring of an inter-caste married couple-either of the spouses belonging to SC/ST claiming reservation and cases where children of forward caste parents taken in adoption into the family of SC/ST/BC claiming reservation have repeatedly come up for consideration before the courts. In all the three categories of cases, the claim was for preferential treatment either under Article 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution of India. In almost all the cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court falling in these categories, the test laid down is whether the person claiming reservation under A.-tides 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India had advantageous start in life before being adopted by the Scheduled Caste family. With regard to the woman of a forward caste marrying a man of SC/ ST, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika vs. State of Gujarat & Ors." reported in (2012)3 SCC 400 [: 2012(1) JLJR (SC) 391] held that when a woman born in a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe marries a person belonging to a forward caste, her caste by birth does not change by virtue of the marriage. So far as the cases of the offspring of inter-caste married couple where one of the spouses belonging to SC/ST claiming reservation is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 54 of "Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika" (supra) held that the caste of the offspring is essentially a question of fact to be decided on the basis of the facts adduced in each case. The determination of caste of a person born out of an inter-caste marriage or a marriage 'between a tribal and a non-tribal cannot be determined in complete disregard to the attending facts of the case. In an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal, there may be a presumption that the child has the caste of the father. In an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal, there may be a presumption that the child has the caste of the father. This presumption may be stronger in the case where in the inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal, the husband belongs to a forward caste,- but by no means the presumption is conclusive or irrebuttable and it is open to the child of such marriage to lead evidence to show that he/she was brought up by the mother who belonged to the scheduled caste/scheduled tribe. By virtue of being the child of a forward caste father, he/she did not have any advantageous start in life but on the contrary, suffered the deprivations, indignities, humilities and handicaps like any other member of the community to which his/her mother belonged. Additionally, that he was always treated as a member of the community to which her mother belonged not only by that community, but by the people outside the community as well. The third situation, i.e., a child of non-tribal was transplanted to a tribal family by virtue of adoption, then whether he will gain the status of tribal for the benefit of reservation, is more relevant for adjudication of the present case. Thus, it would be pertinent to deal with the said issue in detail before deciding the case. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Valsamma Paul vs. Cochin University" reported in (1996)3 SCC 545 is a key judgment which has been cited and relied upon in various subsequent judgments of the different High Courts while deciding the said issue and as such, before coming to the merit of the case, I would like to take note of the guiding factors laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Valsamma Paul" (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 34 of the said judgment, held thus: "34. In Murlidhar Dayandea Kesekar Vs. Vishwanath Pandu, (1995)3 JT (SC)563 : (1995 AIR SCW 2224); and R. Chandevarappa vs. State of Karnataka, (1995)7 JT (SC)93, this Court had held that economic empowerment is a fundamental right to the poor and the State is enjoined under Articles 15(3), 46 and 39 to provide them opportunities. In Murlidhar Dayandea Kesekar Vs. Vishwanath Pandu, (1995)3 JT (SC)563 : (1995 AIR SCW 2224); and R. Chandevarappa vs. State of Karnataka, (1995)7 JT (SC)93, this Court had held that economic empowerment is a fundamental right to the poor and the State is enjoined under Articles 15(3), 46 and 39 to provide them opportunities. Thus, education, employment and economic empowerment are some of the programmes, the State has evolved and also provided reservation in admission into educational institution, or in case of other economic benefits under Articles 15(4) and 46 or in appointment to an office or a post under the State under Article 16(4). Therefore, when a member is transplanted into the Dalits, Tribes and OBCs he/she must of necessity also undergo same handicaps, be subject to the same disabilities, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings so as to entitle the candidate to avail the facility of reservation. A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Article 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution as the case may be. Acquisition of the status of scheduled caste etc., by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution." 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a clear and explicit term held that a person born in privileged class and subsequently transplanted in unprivileged class by adoption or marriage or conversion does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further added that acquisition of the status of scheduled caste etc., by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy enumerated under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. 14. Similar issue came before a Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of "A.S. Sailaja vs. Principal, Kurnool Medical College, Kurnool & Ors." reported in AIR 1986 AP 209 , the relevant paragraphs of which are quoted as under: "40. In the light of law, we have to see whether the petitioner, on adoption, becomes a member of the Backward Class. In the light of law, we have to see whether the petitioner, on adoption, becomes a member of the Backward Class. As indicated earlier, we would always keep in mind the constitutional march of making India secular casteless and classless State and enough leeway would be allowed for free mobility and interaction of all sections of the Society into an integrated class. But we should also keep in mind the constitutional goals set out. By adopting purposive construction we would reconcile the right of an individual as against the society and the society's right. Take an illustration that a Child belonging to a Brahmin is given and taken in adoption to a Shepard fairly, at an young age, say at first year or second year or even up to fifth year and the child is brought up in the adoptive family in the locality lived by the members of the Backward Class treating as ours son/daughter, presumptive evidence furnished that the child is assimilated in the homogeneous group and integrated himself/herself as a member of such group imbibing all the traits of the group or undergoing sufferings or subjected to all the disadvantages or handicaps ignominy which the members of the homogeneous group are subjected to. In those circumstances, such a child may be considered to be a member of the homogeneous group though had the birth in Brahmin caste. But conversely, if a boy or girl born in the advanced section of the society, had the advantage of the natural parental brought up in an atmosphere of affluence, social, cultural and educational advanced start off up to fairly a good age of 15 years or so and then taken in adoption, he or she cannot be said to belong to homogeneous group into which he/she was transplanted by operation of law nor he/she be said to be socially and educationally backward. 41. In Chitralekha's case ( AIR 1964 SC 1823 ) (supra), Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in considering the distinction between the classes and castes, held: "the juxtaposition of the expression "Backward Classes" and "Scheduled Castes" in Art. 15(4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the expression "Classes" is not synonymous with castes. 41. In Chitralekha's case ( AIR 1964 SC 1823 ) (supra), Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in considering the distinction between the classes and castes, held: "the juxtaposition of the expression "Backward Classes" and "Scheduled Castes" in Art. 15(4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the expression "Classes" is not synonymous with castes. It may be that for ascertaining whether a particular citizen or a group of citizens belongs to a backward class or not, his or their caste may have some relevance, but it cannot be either the sole or dominant criterion for ascertaining the class to which he or they belong." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, the caste as well as the social and educational backwardness of a citizen who intends to enter into the fold of the Backward Class or Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes is also a relevant factor and it must be established as of fact. 42. In the light of the above consideration, the necessary conclusion is that an adoption under the Act is personal the purpose of S.12 is that he or she becomes completely a member of the adoptive family "for all purposes"-be it for a religious or secular purpose, but "for the purpose of the Constitution", under Articles 14, 15(4) and 16(4), the adopted child must satisfy not only that he or she belongs to the particular homogeneous group or class or tribe but also become a member of the homogeneous group or class or tribe, also had suffered or subjected to all the disadvantages or handicaps which the members of the homogeneous group, class or tribe, are subjected to or have undergone or is undergoing. In that context, recognition of such a person by the caste or community elders to which the adoptee has already been assimilated or seeks an entry is a relevant factor which has to be established as a fact. The purpose of adoption under S.12 is personal to the adoptee and is distinct and apart from the constitutional scheme under Articles 14, 15(4) and 16(4). The registration under S.16 furnishes only a rebuttable presumptive evidence that the adoption was made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the presumption advances thus far and no further and is of little avail to the benefits under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution." 15. This issue is no more res integra. The registration under S.16 furnishes only a rebuttable presumptive evidence that the adoption was made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the presumption advances thus far and no further and is of little avail to the benefits under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution." 15. This issue is no more res integra. The reason or the historical background under which the Indian Constitution provided for reservation to scheduled caste and scheduled tribe was rooted in the social history of such caste or community. It was in this background, the benefit of reservation was provided under the Indian Constitution and has been continued thereafter. Such an ethos or reasoning has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in detail in the case of "Valsamma Paul" (supra). I am also in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of "A.S. Shailaja" (supra), wherein it has been held that if a child of Brahmin family was taken in adoption in a Shepard family in a very early age i.e., upto the age of 5 years and a presumptive evidence is furnished that the child is assimilated in the homogeneous group and integrated himself/herself as a member of such group imbibing all the traits of the group or undergoing sufferings or subjected to all the disadvantages or handicaps/ignominy which the members of the said homogeneous group are subjected to, then only a child may be considered to be a member of the said homogeneous group though he/she had the birth in Brahmin caste. However, a child who has social, cultural and educational advantageous start in life upto 15 years or so and then taken in adoption by a Shepard family, he/she cannot be said to be the part of the homogeneous group into which he/she was transplanted. 16. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was taken in adoption by a Scheduled Caste family at the age of about 14 years. The petitioner has not been able to establish that he became part and parcel of the adoptive family for all purposes i.e., social, religious, cultural etc. Rather, the case in hand discloses that after being adopted by a scheduled caste person, the scheduled caste certificate was obtained by the petitioner and used for educational and employment purposes. The petitioner has not been able to establish that he became part and parcel of the adoptive family for all purposes i.e., social, religious, cultural etc. Rather, the case in hand discloses that after being adopted by a scheduled caste person, the scheduled caste certificate was obtained by the petitioner and used for educational and employment purposes. The petitioner has also failed to establish that after his adoption he became part of the homogeneous group of scheduled caste community and suffered all the social sanctions, ridiculoust/ignominy as well as the handicaps being an integral member of scheduled caste society. On the contrary, it is the admitted case of the petitioner that he after adoption, got a scheduled caste certificate and thus, he certainly stood higher amongst the other candidates of that category. Moreover, as per the assertion of the petitioner himself, he, even after the adoption by a Scheduled Caste person, continued to study in the same school and obtained best possible higher education which itself indicates that he had never suffered any deprivation even after the adoption. The object of introducing the scheme of reservation is to provide proper representation to the oppressed and underprivileged class of citizens in public employment and if any person who had an advantageous start in life for a considerable age (in the present case-14 years) is allowed to compete with a person who, since the time of birth has suffered social indignities and deprivation, the object of introducing the scheme of reservation is frustrated. 17. The petitioner is also not justified in contending that since his natural father belonged to Other Backward Class, it would have made no material difference on the 'issue of reservation after being adopted by a, Scheduled Caste person, as the OBC (Baniya caste) itself has been notified by the Government to avail the benefit of reservation in public employment. In my considered view, both caste/class have different and distinct historical background. The scheduled castes are those who have suffered the social evil of untouchability over the period of time by the other castes of the society, whereas the "Other Backward Classes" are those who have been treated as relatively backward in social, economic and educational front. Moreover, both the caste/class have been recognized differently by the Constitution of India and thereby provided different protection/ privileges. Moreover, both the caste/class have been recognized differently by the Constitution of India and thereby provided different protection/ privileges. Thus, a "Scheduled Caste", by no means, can be equated with "Other Backward Classes". 18. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has put much reliance upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of "State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Kumari Abha" (supra), wherein it has been held as under: 14. In the present case, the writ petitioner-Kumari Abha originally born in a Backward Class 'Kurmi' family, she by birth was not a forward class. In this background, the State cannot equate her with a member of a forward caste Hindu. 15. It is not in dispute that Kumari Abha was adopted by (Late) Ramdin Ram, a scheduled caste at the age of 5 years. She was born in a family of backward caste 'Kurmi' and after her transplantation in a Scheduled Caste family by adoption she was brought up in a family of most backward class. It is also not in dispute that since her 5 years age brought up in the family of a Scheduled Caste was subjected to the disabilities, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings of a Backward Class. In the background, there appears to be no reason to deny her the facility to which a members of SC is entitled. 16. Further, it is not the case of the appellant-State that she misrepresented to obtain a Scheduled Caste Certificate, nor there is anything on record to suggest that the certificate is forged. On the other hand, it is evident that the writ petitioner-Kumari Abha was granted caste certificate by the competent authority after an enquiry. 19. The fact situation of the aforesaid case was entirely different where the child was taken in adoption at the age of 5 years and as it has already been discussed hereinabove that when the child is adopted at a very early age and he/she suffers the disadvantages or handicaps/ ignominy, then he/she would certainly be treated as integral part of scheduled caste community. However, in the case in hand, admittedly, the petitioner was adopted at the age of 14 years and did not suffer disadvantageous start in life, thus the ratio of "Kumari Abha" (supra) will not apply to the case of the petitioner. However, in the case in hand, admittedly, the petitioner was adopted at the age of 14 years and did not suffer disadvantageous start in life, thus the ratio of "Kumari Abha" (supra) will not apply to the case of the petitioner. In the matter of adoption "Advantageous start in life" is the key factor for determination of entitlement for the benefit of reservation on the basis of claim of being a member of Scheduled Caste. Once it is evident that a person has advantageous start in life i.e., he/she has spent a considerable period in the family of a non-scheduled caste and thereafter came into the scheduled caste family, does not entitle him/her for the benefit of reservation meant for that caste. However, if a child has been adopted at a very early age by a scheduled caste family, then he/she will be entitled to the benefit of reservation meant for that category as there is a high chance of his/her suffering with the same disability as that of the adoptive family. 20. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry was not completed within the time stipulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra) and as such, the same has no legal sanctity cannot be accepted as the time limit prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is directive in nature depending upon various eventualities. From the fact of the present case, it is evident that the matter was pending with the CSC of State of Jharkhand whereas the subject matter of inquiry was in the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Bihar which appears, to be one of the reasons for delay in conclusion of the proceeding. The learned Additional Advocate General has invited the attention of this court to sub-para (10) of Para 13 of the judgment of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra), which deals with the situation where the proceeding is not completed within the time stipulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The learned Additional Advocate General has invited the attention of this court to sub-para (10) of Para 13 of the judgment of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra), which deals with the situation where the proceeding is not completed within the time stipulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The further argument of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the CSC being a quasi-judicial authority and a delegatee itself, could not have redelegated the inquiry to other authority also cannot be accepted as in the case of "Ravi Prakash" (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Caste Scrutiny Committee may devolve its own procedure for making an inquiry to collect the evidences. Since the CSC has recorded the situation in the impugned order itself that the place of inquiry was situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Bihar and as such, it was thought appropriate to call for a report from the Government of Bihar, the recording of evidence cannot be said to be vitiated on that score. The further argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner has not been given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and also the inquiry was done behind his back is also not tenable as in paragraph no.13 of "Kumari Madhuri Patil" (supra), it is nowhere stipulated that the inquiry should be made in the presence of the candidate. Moreover, it could not be established by the petitioner as to what prejudice was caused to him in recording the statements of the witnesses during the enquiry. Moreover, the record reveals that the petitioner was given ample opportunity to adduce evidence before the CSC and the petitioner also produced all the evidences in his support, thus the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 7.6.2017 passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee and also the enquiry report dated 29.7.2015. 22. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.