Premjibhai Jashabhai Bagada v. Production Specialist Officer
2017-11-02
BIREN VAISHNAV, M.R.SHAH
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 30/06/2016 in Special Civil Application No. 12024/2006 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said petition preferred by the appellant herein - original workman and has confirmed the judgment and award passed by the learned Labour Court, Amreli in Reference Case No. 233/1998 by which the learned Labour Court rejected the said Reference in which the workman challenged the alleged termination for the year 1989/1990, appellant herein-original petitioner - workman has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appellant herein - original petitioner - workman was working as a daily wager and as such was engaged for temporary period on daily basis as Chowkidar. He was engaged for few days in February, 1992 and he worked for two days only in March, 1992. Thereafter, in the year 1992, the appellant herein - original workman was not offered any work, and therefore, the appellant herein - original workman raised an industrial dispute challenging the said alleged termination on the ground that he was terminated/retrenched without following the due procedure as required under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant - workman also submitted that he also worked earlier for the period between 1986 to 1989 continuously. On appreciation of evidence, the learned Labour Court specifically observed and found that the appellant - workman has failed to prove that in the last preceding year he worked for not less than 240 days. Learned Labour Court also considered the case of the workman that as such subsequently again he was engaged in November, 1990, and therefore, the earlier appointment during the period from 1986 to 1989 cannot be clubbed together with the alleged appointment in November, 1990. On appreciation of evidence, learned Labour Court found that as the workman has failed to establish and prove that in the last preceding year he worked for not less than 240 days, there was no breach of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, more particularly, 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore, the learned Labour Court rejected the said Reference. The judgment and award passed by the learned Labour Court rejecting the Reference has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order. 2.
The judgment and award passed by the learned Labour Court rejecting the Reference has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order. 2. Shri Barot, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that as the appellant - workman worked for the period between 1986 to 1989 continuously, the said Reference ought to have been considered by the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge, and therefore, considering the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal and Others, AIR 2010 SC 2140 the appellant - workman would at least be entitled to monetary compensation. It is submitted that therefore both the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge have erred in not awarding monetary compensation. 3. Having heard Shri Barot, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and considering the judgment and award passed by the learned Reference Court rejecting the Reference and the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, it is required to be noted that as such there are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge that the appellant - workman failed to establish and prove that in the last preceding year he worked for not less than 240 days. The findings recorded by the learned Labour Court confirmed by the learned Single Judge that there is no violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act are on appreciation of evidence. However, the only submission on behalf of the appellant - workman is/was that the appellant - workman worked as a daily wager Chowkidar for the period between 1986 to 1989, and therefore, the said period ought to have been considered and the appellant - workman ought to have been awarded monetary compensation is concerned, the aforesaid has been dealt with and considered by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 10.1 of the impugned judgment and order. The appellant herein - workman might have worked as daily wager for few days between 1986 to 1989, however thereafter, there was fresh appointment. Even as per the case of the appellant - workman he was again engaged in November, 1990, and therefore, there was fresh appointment in November, 1990.
The appellant herein - workman might have worked as daily wager for few days between 1986 to 1989, however thereafter, there was fresh appointment. Even as per the case of the appellant - workman he was again engaged in November, 1990, and therefore, there was fresh appointment in November, 1990. Under the circumstances, the earlier period was not required to be considered at all. Now so far reliance placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal and Others (supra) is concerned, the same shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The aforesaid decision shall be applicable only in a case where the termination/retrenchment is found to be in breach and/or in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and thereafter when the question with respect to reinstatement arises as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal and Others (supra), looking to the number of days worked and the tenure, such workman instead of reinstatement be awarded monetary compensation. That is not the case here. Under the circumstances, the aforesaid shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Hence, present Appeal deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.