ORDER : S.B. SHUKRE, J. 1. Heard Shri Anjan De, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri S. Malode, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, who are the main contesting parties. None appears for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5. In support of the contentions raised in this application, the applicants have filed on record additional affidavit vide stamp No. 10700/2017. 2. According to Shri Anjan De, learned counsel for the applicants, the expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to be construed liberally by adopting a practical and pragmatic approach while avoiding pedantic and technical approach. He places his reliance upon the view taken by this Court in the case of Ashok Maheshkar v. Gangadhar Phadnavis and others, reported in 2013(2) Mh LJ 497. According to Shri S. Malode, no sufficient cause is disclosed either in the application or in the additional affidavit. 3. The reasons stated in the application are that the applicants were acting under bona fide impression that their interests were being properly secured by the then learned counsel. who had filed his appearance before the lower Court on 10.12.2012. But, the fact was that then learned counsel, having joined judicial service, did not remain present on the date of hearing of the application vide Exh. 14 moved under Section 9A and order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also submitted by the applicants that after the order now sought to be challenged, which is an order dated 15.12.2014, came to the knowledge of the applicants, the applicants took immediate steps for filing of a revision application in order to challenge the order. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that he reappeared on behalf of the applicant before the trial Court on 26.8.2015 and it was only in a week's time thereafter that he gave his advice to the applicant to challenge the order dated 15.12.2014. Of course, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submits that this is no explanation in the eye of law and therefore, it should not be accepted. 4. As for the events that took place till reappearance of the present counsel before the trial Court, which was on 26.8.2015, I am of the view that the appellants have shown sufficient cause in the matter. 1 to 3 submits that this is no explanation in the eye of law and therefore, it should not be accepted. 4. As for the events that took place till reappearance of the present counsel before the trial Court, which was on 26.8.2015, I am of the view that the appellants have shown sufficient cause in the matter. It is not in dispute that the previous counsel, who filed his appearance before the trial Court on 10.10.2012, soon thereafter, joined judicial service. So, it is understandable that there was a communication gap between these appellants and the previous counsel and the result was that the applicants were not heard before the trial Court when the order dated 15.12.2014 was passed. But, the real issue begins after acquisition of the knowledge of passing of the order dated 15.12.2014 by the trial Court. It is the submission of the applicants that their new counsel had taken inspection of the Court record on 26.8.2015 and about a week's time thereafter, they had received advice from him to challenge the order dated 15.12.2014. So one can say that the appellants were aware of me fact that they were required to file a revision application at least in the first week of September 2015 and, therefore, the appellants would be required to explain the delay occurred from September 2015 till filing of the present civil revision application. It has been filed along with the delay condonation application on 18.11.2016. So, the appellants owe an explanation for the delay of about 14 months and if we exclude the period of 90 days, it would be of about 11 months. For this period, I find the only reasons given in the application as well as the additional affidavit are that there were administrative exigencies arising from the need to take a decision to file a revision application not locally at Nagpur but at Mumbai entailing moving of the concerned file through different channels. In my view, this is no explanation in the eye of law. 5. If the applicants say that there were administrative exigencies involved in the decision making process, the applicants should explain what kind of difficulties and exigencies they faced in arriving at a decision to challenge the order dated 15.12.2014. It would not be enough for the applicants to say that those exigencies were there and that they were of administrative nature. If the applicants say that there were administrative exigencies involved in the decision making process, the applicants should explain what kind of difficulties and exigencies they faced in arriving at a decision to challenge the order dated 15.12.2014. It would not be enough for the applicants to say that those exigencies were there and that they were of administrative nature. In fact, even the Courts would understand the administrative exigencies normally bureaucratic organizations like the applicant No. 1 usually face in taking administrative decisions. But, these difficulties differ from one organization to another, although broadly speaking they could be termed as administrative difficulties. Therefore, such organization must inform the Court of the actual nature of the difficulties faced by such organization and also the time that was broadly taken by various decisions making authorities placed in an hierarchical order in the organization formed on bureaucratic principles. 6. In an organization which is governed by bureaucratic principles, just as the appellant No. 1, there is a division of labour and such division of labour varies from the nature of the organization, the objects of the organization and the powers that are conferred upon various authorities in the whole line of the decision making. So, it is incumbent upon each of such organizations to explain broadly the division of labour and time taken by each of the authorities at various rungs in the organization in considering the proposal for filing of a challenge in the nature of revision application. In the instant case, as stated earlier, this has not been done by the appellant. Rather the appellants, wary of giving any explanation, have formed an opinion that the delay was on account of some administrative exigencies. One must remind the applicants that it is for the Courts to express an opinion and not for the applicants or the parties to come with some opinionated pleadings before the Court and insist upon the Court to accept their self proclaimed judgment about the delay. The fact, to repeat, has been here that no material was placed before this Court to enable it to form an opinion that the difficulties faced by the applicants were really of administrative nature and, therefore, warranted adopting of liberal, pragmatic and elastic approach, as is the law. There must be an occasion provided to the Court to interpret that the cause shown by the party is sufficient cause. There must be an occasion provided to the Court to interpret that the cause shown by the party is sufficient cause. If no cause has been given, there would not be any occasion for the Court to adjudicate it to be a sufficient cause or otherwise. This is what has happened in the instant case. Therefore, no assistance could be had by the appellant from the case of Ashok Maheshkar (supra). The application being devoid of any cause, much less sufficient cause, deserves to be rejected. The application stands rejected. No costs.