JUDGMENT : B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties finally by consent. 2. By this petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, an elected Councillor or Corporator from Prabhag 30/C of Nagpur Municipal Corporation on 23.2.2017 challenges the order dated 19.5.2017 passed by respondent No.1 Divisional Commissioner and a communication/note-sheet dated 20.5.2017 prepared on that basis by respondent No.2 Corporation. 3. The facts are not in dispute. The controversy arizes due to recognition of respondent No.3 as Leader of Opposition by respondent No.4 Mayor in terms of Section 191AA of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “1949 Act”). The petitioner claims that he was recognized and treated as Leader of Opposition by respondent No.1 for the purposes of the Maharashtra Local Authority Members Disqualification Act, 1986 and 1987 Rules framed thereunder. These statutory provisions are referred to as “1986 Act” and “1987 Rules” respectively in the body of this judgment. The matter was presented in Vacation on 22.5.2017 and 23.5.2017. The learned Vacation Judge issued notice and made it returnable on 26.5.2017. On 26.5.2017 prayer for grant of interim relief has been rejected by a detailed order. It has been accepted prima facie that the respondent No.1 Divisional Commissioner merely by accepting desire of majority to treat the respondent No. 3 as their Leader cannot be said to have acted either arbitrarily or contrary to law. 4. After this, the petition has been amended and Mayor of Nagpur Municipal Corporation has been added as respondent No.4. Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee of Indian National Congress and Indian National Congress (Nagpur City) are added as respondent nos. 5 & 6. The other Councillors of Indian National Congress Party elected to respondent No.2 Nagpur Municipal Corporation as Corporators who support respondent no. 3, have been added as respondent Nos. 7 to 22. The prayer clause in the petition, however, remains the same. 5. Total 29 Corporators have been declared elected on symbol of Indian National Congress party on 23.2.2017. On 4.3.2017, it is claimed that meeting of 29 elected Corporators has been conducted under Chairmanship of one Vikas Thakare, President Indian National Congress (Nagpur City). Respondent No.3 Tanaji Wanwe suggested name of petitioner Sanjay Mahakalkar for post of Leader of Congress Party in Nagpur Municipal Corporation. On 4.3.2017, it is claimed that meeting of 29 elected Corporators has been conducted under Chairmanship of one Vikas Thakare, President Indian National Congress (Nagpur City). Respondent No.3 Tanaji Wanwe suggested name of petitioner Sanjay Mahakalkar for post of Leader of Congress Party in Nagpur Municipal Corporation. Accordingly, he was elected and President Shri Vikas Thakare informed the same vide letter dated 4.3.2017 to respondent No.1 Divisional Commissioner. Other Councillors of Indian National Congress Party also submitted necessary declarations to respondent No.1. Advocate Mr. Ganesh Patil, Secretary of Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee of Indian National Congress vide letter dated 4.3.2017 informed the respondent No.1 about election of petitioner Sanjay as Leader for a term of 2½ years. The provisions of 1986 Act and 1987 Rules were accordingly complied with. 6. Indian National Congress Party is the original political party of 29 Corporators. It is the largest party in opposition in Nagpur Municipal Corporation. Petitioner Sanjay, therefore, came to be nominated as Leader of Opposition by respondent No.4 Mayor as per Section 191AA of 1949 Act. The petitioner accordingly started exercising powers of that post. 7. As per Section 16 of 1949 Act, five Councillors were to be nominated on Nagpur Municipal Corporation and meeting for that purpose was scheduled on 4.5.2017. As a Leader of Opposition, petitioner received letter dated 2.5.2017 from respondent No.2 Corporation. The meeting was held on 4.5.2017 and names of nominated candidates were finalized. 18.5.2017 was the date for submission of their nominations. 8. On 16.5.2017 at about 1 p.m. Sanjay came to know that a group of Corporators of Indian National Congress Party has created a show that a meeting was held on 16.5.2017 for the purposes of election of a Group Leader. Petitioner Sanjay submits that he was not aware of this meeting. There was no notice to all 29 elected Corporators of Congress Party. The other group claims that 17 Corporators out of total 29 attended that meeting conducted in Pragati Sabhagrah, Chhatrapati Square, Nagpur and elected respondent No.3 Tanaji as Group Leader. They then submitted a letter to respondent No.1 Divisional Commissioner to record Tanaji as Group Leader. Petitioner made enquiries and learnt that no such meeting was held. 9. Petitioner Sanjay submits that after enquiry he learnt that four Corporators, namely, Sau. They then submitted a letter to respondent No.1 Divisional Commissioner to record Tanaji as Group Leader. Petitioner made enquiries and learnt that no such meeting was held. 9. Petitioner Sanjay submits that after enquiry he learnt that four Corporators, namely, Sau. Neha Nikose, Ramesh Punekar, Parasram Manvatkar and Dinesh Chavan stated that they did not sign any letter on 16.5.2017 for change of Group Leader. They agreed to sign a representation to respondent no.1 bringing this fact on record. Petitioner Sanjay sent a communication to respondent no.1 accordingly. On 17.5.2017, he received a letter sent by Municipal Secretary of respondent no.2 that respondent no.3 was to attend on 17.5.2017 at 4 p.m. with 17 Corporators for verification of their signatures on communication dated 16.5.2017 sent to respondent no.1. The verification was ordered by respondent no.1. On 18.5.2017 he received letter from the Municipal Secretary with its copy to one Ramesh Punekar – Corporator and also to respondent no.3 Tanaji. Ramesh Punekar was called upon to remain present before the Municipal Secretary on 20.5.2017 at 11 a.m. for verifying his signature. 10. When this compliance was planned on 20.5.2017, the respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner passed impugned order on 19.5.2017 itself and accepted claim of respondent no.3 Tanaji as Leader of Indian National Congress Party in Nagpur Municipal Corporation. It is this order which has been questioned in the present petition. The petitioner Sanjay also points out that because of this status conferred upon Tanaji, in a note-sheet on 20.5.2017 respondent no. 4 Mayor has recognized respondent no.3 Tanaji as Leader of Opposition for the purposes of Section 191AA of 1949 Act. 11. Most of the facts mentioned supra are not in dispute. The respondents only state that petitioner was aware of meeting called on 16.5.2017 and as he did not enjoy support of majority, he did not attend that meeting. 12. It is in this background that we have heard Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. P.V. Ghare, learned Advocate for the petitioner Sanjay, Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Khedkar, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. 5 & 6, Shri Sunil V. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri A.A. Naik, learned Advocate for Respondent No.3, Shri A.S. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. M.S. Sharma, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. P.V. Ghare, learned Advocate for the petitioner Sanjay, Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Khedkar, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. 5 & 6, Shri Sunil V. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri A.A. Naik, learned Advocate for Respondent No.3, Shri A.S. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. M.S. Sharma, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. 7 to 22, Smt. A.R. Kulkarni, learned A.G.P. for respondent No.1 and Shri J.B. Kasat, learned Advocate for Respondent Nos. 2 and 4. 13. Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel has supported the contentions of Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel and added to it. Shri Sunil V. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel has opposed both of them and Shri A.S. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel while supporting Shri Sunil V. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel has made some additional submissions. The learned A.G.P. and Shri Kasat, learned Counsel have supported the order dated 19.5.2017 and consequential note-sheet dated 20.5.2017. 14. Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sanjay, has submitted that the notice issued on 13.5.2017 for holding meeting on 16.5.2017 by the 17 Corporators is not legal and valid. It is not sanctioned or issued by Indian National Congress party and it is, if issued by any body else, is at the eleventh hour. Subject therein was to reconsider resolution dated 4.3.2017 on the ground that it recorded incorrect facts. Object was to pass appropriate resolution electing Group Leader but then perusal of actual resolution dated 16.5.2017 does not reveal any discussion on business transacted on 4.3.2017. He further states that if there was any legal and valid change in Group Leader, intimation thereabout should have been sent by authorized person on behalf of Indian National Congress party or then by its Group Leader. Here intimation has been sent by one Harshal Sable, Corporator (respondent no.7). Thus, this intimation is legally unsustainable. 15. Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, further points out the provisions of Rule 3 of 1987 Rules to urge that the said notice and proceedings conducted on 16.5.2017 are in its contravention. No election of Group Leader has taken place on 16.5.2017 as per constitution of Indian National Congress Party. He however has not substantiated it. Though various objections were raised before the Divisional Commissioner to this meeting by petitioner Sanjay, Divisional Commissioner has in the impugned order dated 19.5.2017 acted mechanically & obliged respondent nos. No election of Group Leader has taken place on 16.5.2017 as per constitution of Indian National Congress Party. He however has not substantiated it. Though various objections were raised before the Divisional Commissioner to this meeting by petitioner Sanjay, Divisional Commissioner has in the impugned order dated 19.5.2017 acted mechanically & obliged respondent nos. 7 to 22. The valid objections raised by petitioner have been overlooked because of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Haribhau Kale Versus Avinash Gulabrao Mardikar And Others, (2015) 11 SCC 403 (Civil Appeal No. 2080/15 decided on 20.2.2015). He submits that the contention that said judgment was not relevant and point involved in this matter did not arise there, has been overlooked by respondent no.1. The request made by Indian National Congress Party has also been not properly evaluated. Though it was felt necessary to verify signatures, that exercise was left incomplete and without verifying signature of Corporator Ramesh and without waiting for date scheduled to complete that exercise, hastily the impugned order came to be passed. Thus respondent no.1 has not acted as an independent and impartial authority in discharge of obligations cast upon it by 1986 Act and 1987 Rules. 16. Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, invites attention to Section 191AA of 1949 Act to point out that there also Mayor (respondent no.4) has to act with due application of mind. He cannot mechanically accept Leader of Group recognized by respondent no.1 as a Leader of Opposition for the purposes of that provision. The consequential note dated 20.5.2017 is, therefore, bad in law. 17. He contends that thus respondent no.1 has not recorded any finding on contention that there was no meeting on 16.5.2017 or its legality. The undisputed meeting conducted on 4.3.2017 attended to by all 29 Corporators, therefore, could not have been ignored. He also states that as petitioner Sanjay has right to complete tenure as Leader of Group for 2½ years, that tenure has been cut short without giving any opportunity of hearing. Consequently, the petitioner also loses statutory post of Leader of Opposition under Section 191AA of 1949 Act. 18. To explain the need of compliance with principles of natural justice, he relies upon AIR 1967 SC 1269 State of Orissa v. Dr. Consequently, the petitioner also loses statutory post of Leader of Opposition under Section 191AA of 1949 Act. 18. To explain the need of compliance with principles of natural justice, he relies upon AIR 1967 SC 1269 State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others (Placitum B paragraph 12) and AIR 2013 SC 681 – Manohar Manikrao Anchule v. State of Maharashtra and another (paragraphs 17, 18, 19 & 22). Support is also taken from judgment of this Court reported at 2006(3) Bombay Cases Reporter 852 – Jyoti Anil Ganeshpure vs. State of Maharashtra to urge that the proceedings before the respondent no.1 as also respondent no.4 were quasi-judicial in nature. Order dated 1.12.2008 in Writ Petition No. 4664/08 (Mahadeo s/o Bhaiyalal Bundele vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Urban Development, Mantralaya Extension Mumbai 32 and others), is also relied upon for that purpose. He contends that it was necessary for respondents to demonstrate a power in constitution of the Indian National Congress Party enabling them to cut short the tenure. Full Bench of this Court in 2016(5) Mh.L.J. 436 – Shah Faruq Shabir and others vs. Govindrao Ramu Vasave & others has held that 1986 Act and Rules thereunder are penal in character. As such, strict interpretation of provisions contained therein is must and principles of natural justice cannot be sidetracked. Rule 3 of 1987 Rules has not been fully complied with and no intimation warranting any change in recorded information in a register maintained by respondent no.1 is given by Group leader like the petitioner or then authorized signatory of Indian National Congress party. Even alleged Group Leader respondent no.3 Tanaji has also not submitted any such intimation. He draws support from judgment reported at 2014 (3) SCC 183 Pune Municipal Corporation and another vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others paragraph 18. 19. According to him, reliance upon judgment in case of Sunil Haribhau Kale Versus Avinash Gulabrao Mardikar and Others (supra) by Divisional Commissioner is erroneous since there the controversy was entirely different in nature. He further points out that any intimation for change needs to be sent by original political party as understood in Section 2(j) of 1986 Act and not by respondent no. 7 or any other person. He submits that judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court does not extend to original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress Party in the present matter. He further points out that any intimation for change needs to be sent by original political party as understood in Section 2(j) of 1986 Act and not by respondent no. 7 or any other person. He submits that judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court does not extend to original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress Party in the present matter. It is confined only to issues at level of Aghadi or Group. 20. To submit that Group Leader must be elected, he draws support from judgment of this Court reported at 2011(3) ALL MR 512 – Sahebrao s/o Narayan Kharat & another vs. The Collector, Jalna – paragraph 38. The petitioner Sanjay has been elected by original political party and 29 Corporators, while this procedure has not been followed when respondent no. 3 Tanaji came to be elected as alleged on 16.5.2017. He claims that finding of no need of hearing reached by respondent no.1 is contrary to the law in this respect. He points out that resolution passed on 4.3.2017 still holds the field and needs to be acted upon. 21. No power in 29 Corporators or then in Indian National Congress party to recall petitioner Sanjay or to express no confidence in him has been shown and this indirect “no confidence” casts a stigma upon Sanjay. He relies upon observations of this Court in AIR 1982 Bombay 216 – Hindurao Balwant Patil and another vs. Krishnarao Parshuram Patil and others paragraph nos. 10 & 18. The respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner does not possess power to recall or review or adjudicate After the earlier order passed by respondent no.1 registering petitioner Sanjay as Leader of Group, it could not have been, therefore, modified by him on 19.5.2017. 22. Coming to scope of power exercised by respondent no.1, according to Shri Mishra, learned Senior Counsel, information received by office of Divisional Commissioner is required to be entered in register. Application of mind, if any, therefore, has to be by Divisional Commissioner himself and he cannot delegate that power to anybody. Here exercise of verification of signatures intimating change dated 16.5.2017 could not have been delegated by respondent no.1 to anybody else. The exercise has vital importance. The respondent no.1 has after such delegation, not waited for its completion and hurriedly passed the order on 19.5.2017 itself, conferring status as Leader of Group upon respondent no.3. Here exercise of verification of signatures intimating change dated 16.5.2017 could not have been delegated by respondent no.1 to anybody else. The exercise has vital importance. The respondent no.1 has after such delegation, not waited for its completion and hurriedly passed the order on 19.5.2017 itself, conferring status as Leader of Group upon respondent no.3. The attention is invited to word “decide” employed in Explanation 2 to Rule 4 of 1987 Rules to contend that it casts obligation to get personally satisfied and hence, the power cannot be delegated. Rule 5 is also relied upon to show that duty to maintain register is of Commissioner and hence his personal satisfaction about entries therein is necessary. Judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court reported at 2015(2) Mh.L.J. 794 –Shrikant @ Balasaheb M. Chaudhari vs. State of Maharashtra and others paragraph 16 is pressed into service. To demonstrate need of strict interpretation Full Bench judgment in the case of Shah Faruq Shabir and others vs. Govindrao Ramu Vasave & others (supra) paragraph nos. 32, 36, 62, 69, 71 & 73 are relied upon by him. 23. Reply filed by respondents is also relied upon by him to urge that respondent nos. 5 & 6 are still supporting petitioner Sanjay and though other respondents are claiming fraud, they did not bother to serve notice of meeting allegedly conducted on 16.5.2017 upon petitioner. 24. Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 5 & 6, adds to arguments of Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for petitioner. The municipal party is subservient to its parent political party, i.e. original political party for all purposes. Section 191AA of 1949 Act and Explanation to it show that finding or decision thereunder is a political decision and, therefore, final and conclusive. It does not leave any discretion in Mayor and order dated 4.3.2017 passed by Divisional Commissioner, therefore, could not have been discarded by respondent no.4 Mayor. He is drawing support from judgment reported at 2009(1) Mh.L.J. 813 – Ulhas Vasantrao Bagul @ Aba Bagul vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and others, more particularly portion at page 819. To explain concept of Leader of Party in Opposition, he invites attention to judgment reported at 2003 Mh.L.J. 902 – Abdul Rashid s/o Abdul Sattar and others vs. Vikas s/o Ratanlal Jain and others paragraph 16. To explain concept of Leader of Party in Opposition, he invites attention to judgment reported at 2003 Mh.L.J. 902 – Abdul Rashid s/o Abdul Sattar and others vs. Vikas s/o Ratanlal Jain and others paragraph 16. To urge that 1949 Act and 1986 Act need to be construed harmoniously, he draws support from AIR 2012 SC 1210 – Jeevan Chandrabhan Idnani and another vs. Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Bhavan and others paragraph 14 to 17 & 21. He argues that the provisions of 1949 Act cannot be interpreted to defeat the object of 1986 Act. 25. To explain scheme of 1986 Act, he has invited attention to Xth Schedule of Constitution of India and judgment reported at 1998 (7) SCC 517 Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand, paragraphs 4 to 8, 69 & 70. He also draws support from Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shah Faruq Shabir and others vs. Govindrao Ramu Vasave & others (supra) paragraphs 10, 11 to 14, 22, 38 & 39. 26. According to him, the judgments supra show that it is only the original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress party which can issue whip and municipal party consisting of 29 Corporators does not possess such authority. 27. Right to choose leader is again given to original political party by Rule 2(b)(b1)( i) of 1987 Rules. Rule 3 gives power to such leader to submit information in Form 1 and hence election of such Leader of Group is first step. According to him, under Rule 3(5) leader of municipal party can issue whip because of authorization in his favour by original political party and hence, whip has to be only by Indian National Congress party. Meeting dated 16.5.2017, if any, is neither at the instance of nor supported by original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress Party and hence, it is liable to be ignored. Meeting conducted on 4.3.2017 is recognized by and organized by that original political party and hence, it is the only legal and valid meeting. Information submitted about the proceedings of that meeting by group leader elected therein is, therefore, only authentic material of which cognizance needs to be taken by respondent no.1 and respondent nos. 2 & 4. 28. Meeting conducted on 4.3.2017 is recognized by and organized by that original political party and hence, it is the only legal and valid meeting. Information submitted about the proceedings of that meeting by group leader elected therein is, therefore, only authentic material of which cognizance needs to be taken by respondent no.1 and respondent nos. 2 & 4. 28. To explain limited scope of judicial review in such matters, Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, draws support from 1992 Supplement to SCC 651 – Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and others paragraph 109 at page 710. Judgment in the case of Abdul Rashid s/o Abdul Sattar and others vs. Vikas s/o Ratanlal Jain and others (supra) paragraphs 19 & 20 are also relied upon by him for this purpose. He concludes by submitting that as original political party, namely, Indian National Congress party has no involvement in process of alleged election of respondent no.3 Tanaji as Leader of Group, it is bad. 29. Shri Sunil Manohar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent no.3, states that petitioner has not placed before this Court order passed by Mayor under Section 191AA recognizing him as Leader of Opposition. He further states that petitioner was elected by 29 Corporators elected on Nagpur Municipal Corporation and he has not been elected by original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress party. He then points out subsequent events leading to intimation dated 16.5.2017 sent by respondent no.7 Harshal Sable pointing out election of respondent no.3 Tanaji as group leader. He further invites attention to the fact that original political party or original party is defined only in 1986 Act and not in Section 191AA of 1949 Act. 30. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that post of Group Leader is a tenure post and any of his civil rights is violated. They did not establish that curtailment of such tenure or civil right (if any) is always possible only by original political party and not by municipal party. Shri Sunil Manohar, learned Counsel submits that none of its contentions are substantiated by petitioner and under 1986 Act or 1987 Rules the municipal party is not subordinate to or subservient to original political party. He has taken us through relevant provisions including provisions about merger contained in Section 3, Section 5(1) & (2) of 1986 Act to buttress his submissions. He has taken us through relevant provisions including provisions about merger contained in Section 3, Section 5(1) & (2) of 1986 Act to buttress his submissions. He adds that purpose of 1986 Act and 1987 Rules is to accord stability to the House, i.e. Nagpur Municipal Corporation and it has got nothing to do with original political parties which function outside the House. Its purpose or their status is, therefore, not germane at all. He pleads that the provisions of Disqualification Act, particularly Section 3 operate on an event taking place in house and hence, scheme of Section 3 of 1986 Act is not relevant for the purpose of understanding Section 191AA of 1949 Act. He further states that leader of municipal party, i.e. leader of group needs to be elected. He invites attention to Sunil Kale vs. Avinash, supra, for the said purpose. He further adds that 1987 Rules give primacy to & deal with municipal party only. 31. Entire controversy raised in Writ Petition is, therefore, an internal and private dispute of the 29 Corporators constituting municipal party i.e. party in opposition in respondent no.2 Corporation. He relies upon judgments reported at 2007(3) Mh.L.J. 76 Databhau s/o Annasaheb Pathrikar vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2007(6) Mh.L.J. 216 – Narendra s/o Gotu Pardesi vs. Mayor, Dhule Municipal Corporation Dhule and others paragraphs 4, 11 to 18, 24 & 25, 2009(6) Mh.L.J. 695 – Prafulla s/o Vinodji Gudadhe vs. State of Maharashtra & others, paragraphs 21, 22, 25, 26; Sunil Haribhau Kale vs. Avinash Gulabrao Mardikar & others, (supra) paragraphs 9, 10 & 11 to explain his arguments. To counter arguments of petitioner about violation of a civil right, he draws support from 2015(8) SCC page 1 Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others and 2016 (8) SCC page 1 Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and others. He claims that power to express no confidence in an elected office bearer is inherent in democracy. Similarly, entire controversy is a political question which cannot be looked into by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 32. To explain the scheme of Section 191AA of 1949 Act, he has taken us through Sections 5, 19 & 191A of that Act. He explains that 1949 Act does not deal with concept of original political party at all. 33. Similarly, entire controversy is a political question which cannot be looked into by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 32. To explain the scheme of Section 191AA of 1949 Act, he has taken us through Sections 5, 19 & 191A of that Act. He explains that 1949 Act does not deal with concept of original political party at all. 33. According to him, petitioner never disputes holding of meeting dated 16.5.2017 and only defence was about absence of or forging of signatures of four Corporators upon it as pleaded in paragraph no. 24. The impugned order considers this aspect. Signatures have been verified by an independent impartial authority and entire process has also been video-graphed. Necessary opportunity was also extended and thereafter impugned orders have been passed. 34. Coming to case pleaded by the Shri Bana Bakode, he states that said intervenors are not representing original political party and there is no such request by that party. In verification process, respondent no.3 established support of 16 Corporators out of total 29 & proved his majority. 35. Judgment at 2007(6) Mh.L.J. 775 Vilas s/o Supdaji Shelke vs. Commissioner, Akola Municipal Corporation, Akola and others – paragraphs 9 to 11 and judgment dated 1.12.2008 in Writ Petition No. 4664/08 delivered at Nagpur are relied upon by him to urge that it does not deal with question of violation of principles of natural justice. 2012(5) Mh.L.J. 853 Sanjay Devram Bhoir and another vs. Mayor, Thane Municipal Corporation and others, paragraph 7 is pressed into service to urge that there is no option given to Mayor, 2012(5) Mh.L.J. 330 Jeevan s/o Abajirao Ghogre Patil vs. Mayor, Nanded Waghala Municipal Corporation and others, paragraph 22 is read out to show Court's role & parameters showing how a political question needs to be approached. 2003(4) Mh.L.J. 520 Rohidas Shankar Patil vs. Mayra Gilbert Mendosa, Mayor & others, particularly paragraphs 24 & 25 are relied upon by him for substantiating his contention that petitioner has no cause of action. According to him, function of Mayor is ministerial and not adjudicatory. It is his subjective satisfaction and hence, no hearing is contemplated. Mayor has to act fairly and procedure followed has to be transparent. Shri Sunil Manohar, learned Senior Counsel submits that it has been so here & there are no allegations of any bias, malafides or of use of irrelevant consideration by Mayor. It is his subjective satisfaction and hence, no hearing is contemplated. Mayor has to act fairly and procedure followed has to be transparent. Shri Sunil Manohar, learned Senior Counsel submits that it has been so here & there are no allegations of any bias, malafides or of use of irrelevant consideration by Mayor. Section 191AA employs word “recognized” and it, therefore, shows only an acknowledgment and declaration of an existing fact. Such leader is already notified by respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner. Ground 9A in Writ Petition is pressed into service by him to show that petitioner himself accepts such recognition to be a consequential or incidental event. Before respondent no.4 Mayor nobody has claimed any opportunity of hearing and there was no objection raised. After the Mayor finds that 16 Corporators are supporting respondent no.3 Tanaji, the status of Leader of Opposition has been conferred on Tanaji. 36. Shri A.S. Jaiswal, learned Senior Counsel points out that 16 Corporators are even today supporting respondent no.3 Tanaji. 37. Shri J.B. Kasat, learned Counsel invites attention to pleadings to urge that decision has been taken by Mayor and there is nothing wrong in or about it. Learned A.G.P. appearing for respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner supports the order dated 19.5.2017. 38. Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel in reply arguments, points out that provision contained in Rule 3 of 1987 Rules has been violated as information about alleged change is not submitted by Group Leader. The intimation is by so-called new group and hence, its due verification by respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner himself was essential. When petitioner himself was recognized as Leader of Opposition by respondent no.4, change therein could have been accepted by respondent no.4 only after due verification and due application of mind. Respondent no.4, therefore, should have consulted all 29 Corporators. Municipal party, a smaller group, for the purposes of 1986 Act or 1987 Rules cannot be recognized as political party relevant under Section 191AA of 1949 Act. He also invites attention to fact that Division Bench of this Court in judgment in the matter of Praful Gudadhe vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) in case of disputed facts, did call for a report from the Divisional Commissioner and then proceeded further. 39. Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel submits that political party in opposition is a concept not defined in 1986 Act or 1987 Rules. 39. Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel submits that political party in opposition is a concept not defined in 1986 Act or 1987 Rules. The judgment in Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand, (supra) is binding and contention of respondents that portion read out, particularly paragraph 50 or paragraph 124 do not lay down any law is incorrect. Law has been laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court from paragraph 69 onwards in that judgment and though it is contained in para recorded by a Hon'ble Judge of Apex Court, other Hon'ble Judge has not disagreed with it. Full Bench of this Court in 2016 has followed it. He also invites attention to para 4 in Narendra s/o Gotu Pardesi vs. Mayor, Dhule Municipal Corporation Dhule and others (supra), Databhau s/o Annasaheb Pathrikar vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) Sunil Haribhau Kale Vs. Avinash Gulabrao Mardikar And Others (supra) to urge that defence raised is erroneous and misconceived. 40. We note that the prayers in petition show challenge to order dated 19.5.2017 passed by respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner and to order-sheet dated 20.5.2017 (cleared by the Mayor) by the office of Nagpur Municipal Corporation. This order dated 19.5.2017 after mentioning facts points out that respondent no.7 Harshal Sable on 16.5.2017 gave intimation about election of respondent no.3 Tanaji as leader of municipal party of Indian National Congress with signatures of 17 Corporators. Petitioner Sanjay has raised objection to it on 17.5.2017. Only objection raised by him is about genuineness of signatures of four named Corporators. He, therefore, requested for verification of allegedly put by said 4 Corporators on it. This fact is not in dispute. It is apparent that the petitioner, in his first objection did not plead that no meeting was conducted on 16.5.2017 or then 13 other Corporators did not sign upon intimation. He only objected to four specific signatures upon it. Names of those four signatories are already mentioned by us, supra. The objection of this nature is obviously after proper inquiry by him. If these four Corporators are excluded, intimation given by the respondent no. 7 Harshala in favour of respondent no.3 Tanaji then would be only by 13 Corporators. Indian National Congress Party, i.e. original political party has 29 Corporators on respondent no.2 Corporation. The objection of this nature is obviously after proper inquiry by him. If these four Corporators are excluded, intimation given by the respondent no. 7 Harshala in favour of respondent no.3 Tanaji then would be only by 13 Corporators. Indian National Congress Party, i.e. original political party has 29 Corporators on respondent no.2 Corporation. 13 Corporators out of 29, therefore, would not have constituted majority and in its absence, the status of petitioner as Group Leader could not have been removed. 41. Perusal of intimation submitted by respondent no.7 shows that it specifically sought change in Group Leader recognized by respondent no.1 on 4.3.2017. Thus, fact that petitioner was recognized as Group Leader on 4.3.2017 and he was sought to be displaced is not in dispute. Intimation submitted by respondent no.7 Harshal is accompanied by Resolution and that Resolution is supported by 17 signatures. Only four were in dispute before respondent no.1. 42. The impugned order also shows that because of this limited controversy, respondent no.1 has embarked upon exercise of verification of signatures and entrusted it to Deputy Director, Municipal Administration. It is obvious that if there was to be any objection to this exercise, respondent no.1 needed to be & should have been left free to look into it. Moreover, he did not direct verification of only four signatures but, because of assertion of fraud, found it fit to look into all signatures upon the intimation in dispute. The Authorized Officer (Regional Deputy Director, Municipal Administration) has conducted that exercise wherein total 16 Corporators participated. They accepted their signatures & thus supported the meeting & proceedings dated 16.5.2017. Only one Corporator, namely, Ramesh Punekar did not turn up on scheduled day. Entire exercise of verification has been video-graphed. Correctness of these facts is not in dispute. 43. The impugned order also notes the fact that Ramesh Punekar was informed to remain present on 20.5.2017 at 11 a.m. for verifying his signature. The impugned order records that said chance was given to Punekar by Municipal Commissioner of Municipal Corporation at his level and not by respondent no.1-Divisional Commissioner. Respondent no. 1 has thought it proper to proceed further without waiting for verification of signature of Ramesh Punekar. This time for verification was not extended by him & was not binding on respondent no.1 at all. Respondent no. 1 has thought it proper to proceed further without waiting for verification of signature of Ramesh Punekar. This time for verification was not extended by him & was not binding on respondent no.1 at all. On the contrary, satisfied with verification already conducted by Regional Deputy Director of Municipal Administration on 17.5.2017, respondent no.1 deemed it proper not to wait till 20.5.2017 and has proceeded to pass impugned order on 19.5.2017. When 16 Corporators out of total 29 accepted their signatures on proceedings of meeting dated 16.5.2017 and supported respondent no.3 Tanaji as Group Leader, no fault can be found with this decision of respondent no.1. Respondent no.1 has looked into all relevant aspects including extension unauthorizedlly given by Municipal Commissioner without consulting respondent no.1 and then, proceeded to pass the order on 19.5.2017. The Petitioner does not plead lack of bonafides at all on part of the Divisional Commissioner. When the verification already brought on record the majority, the step taken on 19.5.2017 by the Divisional Commissioner can not be seen as hasty one. 44. The respondent no.1 has then appreciated judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Haribhau Kale vs. Arvind Gulabrao Mardikar & others (supra). In that judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that once a municipal party is formed and recognized by Divisional Commissioner, in view of Section 2(i) of 1986 Act, a Group Leader is chosen by such municipal party. 1987 Rules do not provide for nomination of a Group Leader. Such Group Leader elected by municipal party can be changed only by municipal party and not by any one constituent thereof. In facts before Hon'ble Apex Court, one of the constituents of municipal party, namely, Indian National Congress party (original political party) had 17 members and Hon'ble Apex Court has held that still such original political party cannot impose a group leader on a municipal party. 45. Perusal of impugned order dated 19.5.2017 shows that Professor Dinesh Bana Bakode and one Deepak Wankhede, Vice President of Nagpur City (District) Congress Committee submitted their separate letters and sought opportunity to Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee or Nagpur District Congress Committee to submit their say. Respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner has found it not necessary. The Divisional Commissioner has found that original political party was not concerned in any way with the controversy. There is nothing wrong with this application of mind. Respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner has found it not necessary. The Divisional Commissioner has found that original political party was not concerned in any way with the controversy. There is nothing wrong with this application of mind. These persons or then their original political party has not brought on record any material to demonstrate any prejudice caused due to this approach of the Divisional Commissioner. 46. In view of this finding and exercise, respondent no.1 has recognized respondent no.3 Tanaji as Group Leader of Congress Municipal Party. Respondent no. 4 Mayor has then proceeded to discharge obligation under S.191AA of 1949 Act. Section 191AA of 1949 Act reads as under: “Section 191AA. Leader of Opposition: (1) An elected Councillor who is, for the time being, the Leader of the Party in opposition, having greatest numerical strength and recognised as such by the Mayor, shall be the Leader of the Opposition. Explanation. - Where there are two or more parties in the opposition, having the same numerical strength, the Mayor shall, having regard to the status of the party, recognise the Leader of any one of such parties as a Leader of the Opposition for the purposes of this Act and such recognition shall be final and conclusive. (2) There shall be paid to the Leader of the Opposition such honoraria and allowances and other facilities as may be provided by regulations made in this behalf by the Corporation.” Thus, a leader of party in opposition having greatest numerical strength and recognised as such by Mayor becomes Leader of Opposition for the purposes of this provision. Fact that Congress Municipal Party has such greatest numerical strength is not in dispute. Fact that it is party in opposition is also not in dispute. The only question is out of its 29 Corporators, who should be the Leader of that party. The Leader of Congress Municipal Party is to be recognised by Mayor as Leader of Opposition. Note submitted to Mayor by office of respondent no. 2 Municipal Corporation contains all relevant facts & shows necessary consideration in this respect. Order of respondent no.1 conferring status as Group Leader on respondent no.3 Tanaji on 19.5.2017 is also mentioned. Then provisions of Section 191AA and the need of recognising the changed Group Leader because of language therein is also pointed out. 2 Municipal Corporation contains all relevant facts & shows necessary consideration in this respect. Order of respondent no.1 conferring status as Group Leader on respondent no.3 Tanaji on 19.5.2017 is also mentioned. Then provisions of Section 191AA and the need of recognising the changed Group Leader because of language therein is also pointed out. Accordingly, the note has been placed before the respondent no.4 Mayor and this has been approved by him. It cannot be said that respondent no.4 Mayor, therefore, has acted mechanically. Application of mind necessary for the purposes of Section 191AA is apparent in the matter. 47. Though parties have raised various contentions, need of harmonious interpretation and an effort to read 1949 Act as also 1986 Act consistently with each other is not in dispute. Various judgments have been relied upon for that purpose. Judgment particularly on Section 31A of 1949 Act supports the same. As there is no dispute between parties in this regard, we need not look into all those judgments. Even otherwise, when object of 1986 Act and 1987 Rules framed thereunder is to strengthen democracy, the provisions of later cannot be used to defeat the provisions of earlier enactment and vice versa. 48. The perusal of 1986 Act shows definition of phrase “municipal party”. For Municipal Corporation, it is group of Corporators for the time being belonging to that political party as explained in Explanation to Section 3. Thus, it is “group” which is recognised as municipal party and it is, therefore, distinct from political party. Explanation (a) to Section 3 reveals that such corporator is deemed to belong to a political party which set him up as a candidate for election. Undisputedly, municipal party consists of a smaller group carved out of the original political party. In present facts, it is not in dispute that 29 corporators have been set up by political party, namely, Indian National Congress party for election as corporators to respondent no.2 Nagpur Municipal Corporation. Thus, group of 29 corporators, therefore, formed or forms a municipal party. Section 5 of 1986 Act is about disqualification on ground of defection. It stipulates that it does not apply in cases of merger. Reading of Section 5(1) reveals that when original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress Party here merges with another political party, a corporator can safely become member of such new entity coming into existence after merger. Section 5 of 1986 Act is about disqualification on ground of defection. It stipulates that it does not apply in cases of merger. Reading of Section 5(1) reveals that when original political party, i.e. Indian National Congress Party here merges with another political party, a corporator can safely become member of such new entity coming into existence after merger. He can also safely refuse to accept merger and he or the municipal party can opt to function as a distinct group. In that event, after merger of such original political party, such unwilling group is deemed to be a political party for the purpose of subsection (1) of Section 3 and also original political party for the purpose of subsection (1) of Section 5. This, therefore, shows that Legislature has intended to strengthen the elected group of Corporators at institutional level & hence, protect people's voice itself within such institution i.e. local body & administration in a Municipal Corporation. The contention of petitioner that original political party (Indian National Congress Party here) has been given a upper hand or a major role while municipal party is subservient to it, therefore, has to fail. Unless and until there is some defiance or violation or a wrong at the level of or within the municipal party & it has impact on some municipal matter or business of a municipal corporation, provisions for defection in 1986 Act or 1987 Rules cannot operate. Then also, there is a super added requirement that such a wrong conduct should not have been condoned by the original political party. Judgment of Hon. Apex Court in Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand (supra) considering para 3 of the Tenth Schedule, need not detain us more. 49. Perusal of scheme of 1987 Rules in this respect shows that Rule 2(b)(b1)( i) defines “Leader in relation to a municipal party”. Thus, leader is not in relation to original political party but in relation to municipal party. Parties do not dispute that he is required to be elected by the corporators of opponent municipal party in Municipal Corporation. Information thereabout is to be forwarded by leader of such party. The initial information was accordingly furnished on 4.3.2017 and petitioner Sanjay was recognised as Leader of Congress Municipal Party. Fact that there has been change in it on 16.5.2017 is duly established. Information thereabout is to be forwarded by leader of such party. The initial information was accordingly furnished on 4.3.2017 and petitioner Sanjay was recognised as Leader of Congress Municipal Party. Fact that there has been change in it on 16.5.2017 is duly established. 16 out of total 29 corporators have sought that change and information about change is also received by respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner. The Divisional Commissioner has verified that information in best possible manner and found it correct. Contention that such intimation should have been given by petitioner Sanjay is erroneous because Sanjay would never have given it. Intimation given by respondent no.7 Harshal is supported by authorization in that regard given to her by all 17 elected councillors to approach respondent no.1 for change of group leader and for consequential recognition of a new leader. This fact and authorization has not been disputed by petitioner before us. The accompanying resolution submitted by respondent no.7 is not in dispute. Resolution dated 16.5.2017 expressly stipulates that petitioner Sanjay was never approved as Group leader by 17 corporators who have placed their signature below resolution dated 16.5.2017. In view of verification exercise undertaken by respondent no.1, correctness of this proceeding as recorded on 16.5.2017 has been established. This resolution, therefore, shows that respondent no.3 Tanaji has been elected as a Group Leader by majority of Congress Municipal Party. There is nothing brought before us to show that said meeting was contrary to any mandate/whip of the original political party or then, any direction not to hold it or not to attend it was ever issued by the original political party to any of its 29 Corporators. Hypothetical question is also whether for such a defiance, legally, any action against the majority of municipal party corporators is envisaged in 1986 Act or the 1987 Rules. 50. This position emerging on record has been acted upon and implemented by respondent no.4 and respondent no.2 by conferring status as Leader of Opposition on respondent no.3 Tanaji. Section 191AA itself uses the words “for the time being”. Thus, it accepts & provides for a possibility of change in party in opposition or numerical strength in it, which is inherent in democracy. If such change is brought out legally, Section 191AA obliges Mayor to take its cognizance and to execute it. Section 191AA itself uses the words “for the time being”. Thus, it accepts & provides for a possibility of change in party in opposition or numerical strength in it, which is inherent in democracy. If such change is brought out legally, Section 191AA obliges Mayor to take its cognizance and to execute it. Language employed itself supports the change as per desire of majority not only in leader of opposition but also in largest municipal party. Factors therein like “for the time being” or “the Leader of the Party in opposition” or “having greatest numerical strength”, indicate the use of events carrying intrinsic potential to change as parameters. No law has been pointed out which prohibits or condemns any change in any one or more of these factors. Hence, the determination of leader of opposition in a vibrant democracy has to be with reference to these dynamic events. This Section calls for an attention to a state of affairs prevailing at a given time & need to construe it in consonance with such “point of time”, when the exercise is being undertaken by the Mayor. 51. Neither petitioner nor respondents have invited our attention to document of constitution of Congress Municipal Party. A municipal party can not be registered with Respondent no. 1 without such a Constitution. Petitioner has not urged that notice of meeting dated 16.5.2017 should have been issued and served in a particular manner as is specified in said constitution. Petitioner has also not pointed out that constitution does not permit such change in resolution dated 4.3.2017 or its cancellation or modification for a particular time. Petitioner has also not urged that such substitution or modification of Group Leader is prohibited even when majority in Municipal Party desires it. Such an argument may militate with the spirit of S.191AA of 1949 Act. We, therefore, find no substance in contention that the change brought about on 16.5.2017 is illegal or bad. 52. In fact, when 17 or 16 corporators on 16.5.2017 accept that on 4.3.2017, they did not support petitioner as Group Leader, it is apparent that registration of petitioner Sanjay as Group Leader by respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner is itself wrong and unsustainable. It called for rectification. Their grievance recorded in meeting dated 16.5.2017 goes to uproot the proceedings allegedly conducted on 4.3.2017. It called for rectification. Their grievance recorded in meeting dated 16.5.2017 goes to uproot the proceedings allegedly conducted on 4.3.2017. If meeting for change or correction could not have been conducted by 17 corporators of a municipal party or then only a Secretary or President of original political party, namely, Indian National Congress party could have convened/conducted such a meeting, a legal provision in that respect contained in such Constitution ought to have been pressed into service by petitioner. There is no such effort on his part. Neither petitioner nor respondent nos. 5 & 6 have pointed out any such legal bar or then any proceedings initiated by them under Sections 6 or 7 of 1986 Act against respondent nos. 3, 7 to 22 for their alleged defection or implied act of giving up voluntarily the membership of Indian National Congress. No proceedings under Rule 6 of 1987 Rules have been filed urging that these respondents have given up voluntarily the membership of Indian National Congress or have violated any whip legally issued in the matter. 53. Alleged violation of principles of natural justice also call for consideration. Observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269 : (1967) 2 LLJ 266 show that there alteration in date of birth was the bone of contention. Some preliminary enquiry was made by one Dr S. Mitra. but the report thereof was never disclosed to the first respondent Binapani. Facts in the case also support the prejudice caused to Dr. Binapani. Thereafter she was required to show cause why April 16, 1907 should not be accepted as the date of birth and without recording any evidence, the impugned order was passed. Such an enquiry and decision are held contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. There were four different dates as birth dates before the State authorities. The order though administrative in character, but Hon. Apex Court states that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, could have been made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to her of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. As no such steps were admittedly taken, the High Court was, was found right in setting aside the impugned order of the State. 54. In Manohar Manikrao Anchule v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), Hon. Apex Court points out in paragraph 25 that the principle is clear and settled that right of hearing, even if not provided under a specific statute, the principles of natural justice shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded. It is more so when exercise of authority is likely to visit the person with consequences of civil nature. It finds the State Information Commission wrong in forming an opinion that the appellant was negligent and had not performed the duty cast upon him. After 4-4-2007, the date when the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not responsible for the acts of omissions and/or commission of the office at Nanded. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant had shown that the default, if any on his part, was not without reasonable cause or result of a persistent default on his part. On the contrary, he had taken steps within his power and authority to provide information to Respondent 2. It was for the department concerned to react and provide the information asked for. In the present case, some default itself is attributable to Respondent 2 who did not even care to respond to the letter of the Department dated 11-4-2007. The order passed by the State Information Commission dated 26-2-2008 and the judgment of the High Court under appeal were set aside. Thus in this matter, the Hon'ble Apex Court notices adjudicatory powers conferred on the Forum & also the resultant prejudice caused. 55. In present matter, the objection raised by the Petitioner was very specific & hence, an exercise of verification of all 17 signatures on the proceeding dated 16.5.2017 was undertaken by the respondent no. 1. Looking to the dispute raised, the responsible officer like respondent no. 1 found it safe to verify all the signatures & did not feel it proper to restrict the exercise to only disputed signatures. There is no challenge to correctness of this decision or the outcome thereof. Only delegation to a another officer to verify the same was questioned. We have already found no merit in it. It is obvious that the Petitioner is not prejudiced in any way. 56. There is no challenge to correctness of this decision or the outcome thereof. Only delegation to a another officer to verify the same was questioned. We have already found no merit in it. It is obvious that the Petitioner is not prejudiced in any way. 56. Jyoti w/o Anil Ganeshpure Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) or the other judgments like Mahadeo s/o Bhaiyalal Bundele vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Urban Development, Mantralaya Extension Mumbai 32 and others, (supra) or the Full Bench of this Court in Shah Faruq Shabir and others vs. Govindrao Ramu Vasave & others (supra) relied upon by the Petitioner to submit that the power exercised by the Respondent no. 1 is quasi judicial in nature or for interpreting the 1986 Act & 1987 Rules strictly, therefore need not be dealt with in present facts. Reliance upon the classic statement (of Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad) that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden & reliance on Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (supra) is also unwarranted. No legal provision conferring the right upon the Petitioner to any specific statutory tenure has been pointed out by him & hence, it can not be said that use of its right by the majority has resulted in any legal injury to him. For the same reasons, Hindurao Balwant Patil & others Vs. Krishnarao Parshuram Patil & others (supra) also need not detain us because there section 73 in Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, conferred a tenure of 5 years & the model byelaw permitting the no confidence were not adopted by the society. Judgment of Hon. Apex Court & law as expounded in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others, (supra), with purpose of placing provision like Section 191AA in 1949 Act being considered little later, proves no need to dwell on this Division Bench judgment as it is distinguishable due to clear difference in language of both the provisions. 57. Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others, (supra) shows that the Hon. Apex Court finds power of removal by majority or by no confidence needs to be read in such statutes. 57. Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others, (supra) shows that the Hon. Apex Court finds power of removal by majority or by no confidence needs to be read in such statutes. In the light of discussion above where We find that cognizance by respondent no. 1 of or the proceedings in meeting dated 16.5.2017 do not tantamount to review & 16 out of 29 Corporators of Original Political Party i.e. Congress National Party desired it & in absence of any provision fixing tenure of leader of opposition, the displacement of Petitioner Sanjay is legal, the exposition of law is not very relevant here. Observations therein by the Hon. Apex Court, otherwise clinch the situation here. There also the removal by no confidence was not expressly provided in the Byelaws. Neither was there any such provision in the Act or Rules. The only enabling provision was Byelaw 18.2 which mandated that in case the office of the Chairperson of the Federation falls vacant before the expiry of his term for any reason, the Board has to elect a new Chairperson for the remaining term. Hon. Court states that in the background of the constitutional mandate, the question was not what the statute does say but what the statute must say. If the Act or the Rules or the byelaws do not say what they should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. “Insofar as in its Act Parliament does not convey its intention clearly, expressly and completely, it is taken to require the enforcement agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either — (a) by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation.” The Hon. Apex Court observes that the cooperative society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or byelaws both on the principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles into the Act or Rules or byelaws. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or byelaw regarding election of an office bearer by the board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India, and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no-confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express provision under the Act or Rules or byelaws for removal of an office-bearer, such office bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office. Hence the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon. Apex Court in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and others, (supra) therefore need not be gone into in this case. The spirit & object of S.191AA of 1949 Act already discussed by us supra & the very status of respondent no. 2 Body as institution of local self governance, pave way even for no-confidence in certain contingencies. 58. The respondent no.1 Divisional Commissioner has not passed an order of either recall or review. After the earlier order passed by him registering petitioner Sanjay as Leader of Municipal Party, on 16.5.2017, there have been certain developments which show that majority substituted respondent no. 3 Tanaji as Group Leader. Cognizance of such a change need to be taken by him as the Law does not prescribe any fixed term for Petitioner or any other protection. The Division Bench of this Court in Databhau s/o Annasaheb Pathrikar vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (supra) negates the contention that Corporator recognized as Leader of Opposition is to be continued until the completion of the term of the elected body of the Corporation. There is no legal bar to recognize any other Corporator as Leader of Opposition whenever change in numerical strength of the Councillors supporting a particular leader takes place. In said matter, earlier petitioner Databhau was declared as a leader of opposition being supported by 10 out of 18 elected members of the Congress I party. There is no legal bar to recognize any other Corporator as Leader of Opposition whenever change in numerical strength of the Councillors supporting a particular leader takes place. In said matter, earlier petitioner Databhau was declared as a leader of opposition being supported by 10 out of 18 elected members of the Congress I party. Later respondent No.4 mustered the support of 14 Councillors out of 18 Councillors belonging to Congress (I) party which was the largest group amongst the opposition parties in the Corporation. Division Bench declares that the decision taken by the Mayor in recognizing respondent No.4 as a leader of opposition cannot be faulted. It also holds that both the decisions are taken in the different political backdrop. Act of recognition of respondent No.4 as a Leader of Opposition therefore, was not the review of the earlier order recognizing the petitioner as leader of opposition. Petitioner has not demonstrated that this exposition is unsustainable. Paragraph 5 Order dated 1.12.2008 in Writ Petition No. 4664/08 (Mahadeo s/o Bhaiyalal Bundele vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Urban Development, Mantralaya Extension Mumbai 32 and others) reveals that there also there was no fixed tenure of group leader or party leader. Any dispute in relation thereto was seen as internal matter between the party & the party leader. This order therefore does not advance the cause of the Petitioner. 59. Parties are in agreement about the need to democratically elect the group leader & hence Sahebrao s/o Narayan Kharat & another vs. The Collector, Jalna, or Sunil Haribhau Kale v. Avinash Gulabrao Mardikar, (both supra) need not be looked into for said proposition. 60. In Shrikant @ Balasaheb M. Chaudhari Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary for Urban Development Department & ors. (supra), the President of political party in a Municipal Council changed petitioner as group leader and appointed respondent no.4 as such pursuant to unanimous decision of the Yavatmal District Congress Committee. Learned Single Judge held that there is no prohibition for the political party concerned to appoint or authorise leader of such party for the purposes of 1986 Act and 1987 Rules. Role of Collector under these provisions was only to note about the change informed and to communicate it to Municipal Council. Learned Single Judge held that there is no prohibition for the political party concerned to appoint or authorise leader of such party for the purposes of 1986 Act and 1987 Rules. Role of Collector under these provisions was only to note about the change informed and to communicate it to Municipal Council. It is also held that if displaced leader was aggrieved by the action taken by his own political party, he could approached President of his political party but he cannot question the communication of substitution sent by the Collector's Office to the Municipal Council. In present facts also, the Respondent no. 1 has completed the process of verification of signatures faultlessly & reached necessary satisfaction about Respondent 3 Tanaji being the group leader. Strict interpretation placed by Full Bench in Shah Faruq Shabir and others vs. Govindrao Ramu Vasave & others (supra) on 1986 Act or 1987 Rules also does not prohibit this exercise & does not bar Respondent no. 1 from taking note of meeting dated 16.5.2017. 61. The Division Bench in Ulhas Vasantrao Bagul @ Aba Bagul vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and others, (supra), points out that section 19.IAA of the 1949 Act does not contemplate an election of a person. It contemplates simplicitor recognition of an elected counselor by the Mayor as a leader of opposition. Therefore, the Mayor has to see that a person is an elected counselor, belongs to a party in opposition and the said opposition party is having greatest strength in the House. One more thing required to be looked into is that an elected counselor who is a leader of the party in opposition has to be recognised as a leader of opposition. The leader of the party in opposition means that a leader of political party which is sitting in opposition. This judgment & the law laid down by the Hon. Apex Court in Jeevan Chandrabhan Idnani and another vs. Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Bhavan and others – (supra) (paragraph 14 to 17 & 21) also demonstrate that the provisions of 1949 Act cannot be interpreted to defeat the object of 1986 Act or 1097 Rules. This judgment & the law laid down by the Hon. Apex Court in Jeevan Chandrabhan Idnani and another vs. Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Bhavan and others – (supra) (paragraph 14 to 17 & 21) also demonstrate that the provisions of 1949 Act cannot be interpreted to defeat the object of 1986 Act or 1097 Rules. Very same Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Rashid s/o Abdul Sattar and others vs. Vikas s/o Ratanlal Jain and others – (supra) reiterates the same law & also finds that the word "party" in its proper connotation means a "municipal party" in the Corporation or Council as the case may be, having the greatest numerical strength and its elected Councilors. 62. In Narendra s/o Gotu Pardesi vs. Mayor, Dhule Municipal Corporation Dhule and others, (supra) the Division Bench holds that respondent no.1 proceeded on the erroneous basis that what was required was the support of the majority of the Councillors of all the Opposition parties and not the majority of the Councillors of only the largest opposition party. Other Division Bench in Prafulla s/o Vinodji Gudadhe vs. State of Maharashtra & others, to which one of us (B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. is party) observes that it is for mayor to recognize a Leader of Municipal Party having greatest numerical strength to be the Leader of Opposition. The mode and manner in which it is to be done is left by statute to Mayor himself. Neither petitioner nor respondent no.6 in that case, placed any material before mayor to show that they were elected as Leader of Municipal Party by the Party. The communication sent by Prafula resulting into the action dated 28th April, 2008 only revealed that he was enjoying support of 20 Corporators. The exercise of verification undertaken by mayor on 16th June, 2008 again shown that he was enjoying support of 20 Corporators. None of the orders demonstrated that he was elected as a Leader of Opposition by Municipal Party. The Bench observes that mayor has to obtain appropriate report from Secular Democratic Front, i.e., Municipal Party in that matter, about its leader and then recognize such leader as Leader of Opposition in terms of Section 201E(1). 63. In Vilas s/o Supdaji Shelke vs. Commissioner, Akola Municipal Corporation, Akola and others, (supra) there was a political alliance between the Indian National Congress and Nationalist Congress Party and they together constituted a ruling party. 63. In Vilas s/o Supdaji Shelke vs. Commissioner, Akola Municipal Corporation, Akola and others, (supra) there was a political alliance between the Indian National Congress and Nationalist Congress Party and they together constituted a ruling party. Bhartiya Janata Party had 11 councillors, Bahujan Mahasangh had 10 and Shiv Sena had 7. There was a pre-poll alliance between Bhartiya Janata Party and Shiv Sena. Bhartiya Janata Party is a single party having largest numerical strength of corporators. There was no pre-election alliance of the independent candidate with Bhartiya Republican Party and Bahujan Mahasangh. The Division Bench of this Court holds that this heterogenetic group cannot have the status of "a party". Act of respondent No.2 recognizing respondent No.3 as a Leader of Opposition was found in patent disregard of mandatory provisions of law and by way of gross abuse of power. In Jeevan s/o Abajirao Ghogre Patil vs. Mayor, Nanded Waghala Municipal Corporation and others, (supra) the Division Bench takes same view. In Sanjay Devram Bhoir and another vs. Mayor, Thane Municipal Corporation and others, (supra) the Division Bench holds that Section 191AA of 1949 Act does not confer a choice on the Mayor to appoint any one except a Leader from a party having the greatest numerical strength. 64. In 2003 (4) Mh.L.J. 520 Rohidas Shankar Patil vs. Mayra Gilbert Mendosa, Mayor & others (particularly paragraphs 24 & 25) the Division Bench found itself unable to hold that NCP and INC can be said to be 'parties in ruling' as contemplated by the Explanation to Section 191A. When there was no aghadi or pre-election alliance and in certain wards, both the parties contested the election against candidates of each other though both Mayoress as well as Deputy Mayor belonged to those two parties Mayoress of NCP and Deputy Mayor of INC. Both the candidates obtained equal number of votes against their rivals i.e. 54 : 25. From the facts, however, Division Bench held that both the parties are not parties in ruling. It observes that – “In politics, there may be several considerations by various parties to support a candidate of each other. These are questions which can be considered by them, keeping in mind diverse factors. A Court of law is ill-suited to resolve them.” In paragraph 26 it is observed – “25. It observes that – “In politics, there may be several considerations by various parties to support a candidate of each other. These are questions which can be considered by them, keeping in mind diverse factors. A Court of law is ill-suited to resolve them.” In paragraph 26 it is observed – “25. In spite of wide powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, there are certain fields not subject to judicial scrutiny. It is well-settled that "question of political wisdom could not be subjected to judicial review". (Vide Bhut Nath vs. State of W.B., AIR 1974 SC 806 ).” 65. When the Petitioner Sanjay or his supporters can not point out any binding statutory provision protecting his term or then, rendering the proceedings of the meeting dated 16.5.2017 bad, mere reliance upon judgment of Hon. Apex Court in Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and others (supra) to press into service the scope & extent of judicial review in such matters is unwarranted. 66. We repeat that none of the parties have opened a page in the constitution or byelaw of the Municipal Party to which Sanjay or Tanaji belong and with support of any clause therein, attempted to either support or assail the later meeting dated 16.5.2017. Obviously, the Petitioner has to suffer for this. 67. Here there are no allegations of malafides or perversity on part of Mayor – respondent no. 4 in recognizing respondent no. 3 Tanaji as Leader of Opposition. On merits, We have found no substance in the challenge. The 1986 Act & 1987 Rules are not aimed at preserving any political party I.e. original political party. Its object is to give stability to the body formed democratically after an election & to ensure that part of such local body viz. “a municipal party” does not cease to exist, except in limited situations. Hence, if the act of any corporator forming a part of municipal party does not have any bearing on role of that municipal party qua the administration of the local body like Municipal Corporation, neither 1986 Act nor 1987 Rules can spring to life. Internal strifes amongst the Corporators of a municipal party for becoming its leader for the purpose of 1986 Act or 1987 Rules can not have impact on the democratic administrative discharge & functioning of the municipal corporation always. Internal strifes amongst the Corporators of a municipal party for becoming its leader for the purpose of 1986 Act or 1987 Rules can not have impact on the democratic administrative discharge & functioning of the municipal corporation always. At least in present matter, the displacement of Petitioner Sanjay by respondent no. 3 Tanaji does not warrant any action against later or against 16 Corporators supporting him under said Act & Rules. Even if any breach of any byelaw/constitution/scheme regulating such internal affairs is presumed, that by itself, is not justiciable in writ jurisdiction. We therefore need not delve into the contention that it is only the original political party, which can issue any whip & the municipal party or its majority is subservient to it. 68. We, in effect, find that petitioner has miserably failed to demonstrate any violation of his legal right or then violation of any provision of 1949 Act or 1986 Act or 1987 Rules. No case is, therefore, made out warranting intervention. 69. The Writ Petition is therefore dismissed. Rule stands discharged. There will be no order as to costs.