JUDGMENT : B. Amit Sthalekar, J. Heard Ms. Afshah Shafaq, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri R.K. Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner in the writ petition is seeking quashing of the order dated 23.12.2002 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Stamps), Allahabad in case no. 471 of 2002 (State v. Wahid Hussain and another) as well as the order dated 27.5.2003 passed in Revision no. 14 of 2003 (Wahid Hussain and another v. State and others) by the Chief Controlling Authority, Board of Revenue, Allahabad. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that a settlement was entered into between the petitioners and two other persons whereby each of them became owners of the th share of the property in question. This deed also provided that no owner will be allowed to transfer his part or full share to any outsider unless other co-owners are not willing to negotiate in an honourable and peaceful manner. The deed is dated 27.8.1997. Admittedly, the deed was never registered. Proceedings under the Indian Stamp Act were initiated against the petitioners on the ground that there was deficiency of stamp duty as the deed had never been registered though it was required to be registered being in respect of immovable property. In these proceedings a finding was recorded that since a deed resulted in disruption of the rights of the parties and conferred independent rights on the members and signatories of the deed (family settlement), therefore, registration was required. Accordingly, in the proceedings under the Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1899) the deficiency of stamp duty was computed at Rs. 7,36,000/- including penalty of Rs. 710/-. Aggrieved the petitioners filed revision which has also been dismissed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court is two fold. First, that the deed was a family arrangement and not a family settlement and that there was no disruption of the rights and no new rights came into existence in favour of the signatories of the parties and therefore, the document was not required to be registered and was rightly not registered. First, that the deed was a family arrangement and not a family settlement and that there was no disruption of the rights and no new rights came into existence in favour of the signatories of the parties and therefore, the document was not required to be registered and was rightly not registered. The second leg of the submission is that even assuming that the deed created independent rights of the owners and was required to be registered but the proceedings under the Act, 1899 were itself initiated on 20.09.2002 by issuing notices to the petitioners and as per requirement of Section 47A (3) of the Act, 1899, the proceedings could have only been initiated within a period of four years, therefore, the proceedings in the present case having been initiated beyond the period of four years are barred by the limitation prescribed in the Act. 5. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand referring to the averments made in the counter affidavit submitted that since the document was not registered, therefore, there was no time limit prescribed. He further submitted that since the document was in the file of the Nagar Nigam, it was impounded under Section 33 of the Act where no limitation has been provided. 6. Before going into the question as to whether the family settlement is actually a deed of settlement creating independent rights of ownership among the signatories to the settlement, it would be necessary to examine the question of limitation as to whether the proceedings were within time because the proceedings have been initiated by the respondents on the assumption that this family arrangement was actually a deed of settlement. The deed itself is dated 20.8.1997. The respondents do not seem to have ever been in any doubt that this settlement was a deed of settlement which required registration and it is on that assumption proceedings were initiated. The proceedings are, therefore, required to be initiated within the period of four years from the date of execution of the document as required by the provisions of Section 47A (3) of the Act, 1899. 7. The proceedings are, therefore, required to be initiated within the period of four years from the date of execution of the document as required by the provisions of Section 47A (3) of the Act, 1899. 7. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel that Section 33 (1) does not provide for any limitation is absolutely irrelevant for the reason that limitation for initiation of proceedings is provided under Section 47A (3) which is four years from the date of execution of the instrument, therefore, the date when the document is impounded by the authorities becomes irrelevant. 8. This question is no longer less integral having been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava and another v. State of U.P. and others reported in 1998 RD (Suppl.) 523 wherein the Full Bench has held that period of limitation would be counted from the date of instrument. There is no dispute that the instrument titled 'Memo of Settlement Deed' is dated 20.8.1997 and the proceedings under Section 47A (3) were initiated by the issue of notice dated 20.2.2002 i.e. after more than five years. Therefore, under the circumstances, the entire proceedings stood barred by time and were barred by limitation as prescribed in the Act. The relevant paragraph 14 of the Full Bench decision reads as under: "14. Our answers to the questions referred are as follows: 1. While exercising power under sub-section (4) of Section 47-A the Collector can determine the market value of the property and the duty payable on the instrument as a result of such determination but he has no power to impose penalty. 2. The period of limitation of four years in sub-section (4) to Section 47-A applies to the action which may be initiated by the Collector and not to a reference from any Court or other authorities enumerated in the sub-section." 9. For reasons aforesaid, the impugned orders dated 23.12.2002 and 27.5.2003 cannot survive and are accordingly, quashed. 10. The writ petition is allowed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioners have already deposited certain amount before filing of the appeal/revision before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority towards deficiency of stamp duty. If this is so, such amount would be liable to be refunded to the petitioners. 10. The writ petition is allowed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioners have already deposited certain amount before filing of the appeal/revision before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority towards deficiency of stamp duty. If this is so, such amount would be liable to be refunded to the petitioners. The respondents are therefore, directed to examine the matter and if any such amount has been deposited towards deficiency of stamp duty, the same shall be refunded to the petitioners within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.